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The thesis critically evaluates Jacques Derrida's conferral of the rights of reality on 
writing, focussing on his theory of an arche-text in light of the speculative nature of this 
theory. The theory is initially considered in the context of Derrida's elucidation of the 
usurpatory status of writing within the Platonic and Nietzschean texts. This consideration 
reveals an admission of writing's usurpatory status by both writers while at the same time 
demonstrating their awareness of the intrinsically speculative nature of this view, the 
significance of writing lying in its ability to exteriorise the radically indeterminate status of 
consciousness in relation to reality rather than its ability to displace consciousness or reality. 
The analyses, therefore, not only bring the Derridean hypothesis of a repressive or 
phonocentric metaphysical episteme into question but also exhibit the historical and 
philosophical role of potentiality in relation to writing, writing's ultimate significance lying 
in its capacity to exteriorise our existence as a mode of potentiality. Accordingly, in the 
second half of the thesis the Derridean theory of writing is countered with a specifically 
Aristotelian theory of the text as it is exhibited in the prose of Samuel Beckett, an author 
whose significance lies in his close alignment with Derridean theory within contemporary 
criticism. It is demonstrated that this identification has obviated an awareness of the 
significance of potentiality within the Beckettian text, his work consequently being appraised 
in the previously neglected context of Aristotelian metaphysics. 
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INTRODUCTION 
WRITING AND THE RIGHTS OF REALITY 
1 
REALISM, IDEALISM AND THE EXTERIORITY OF TI-lE TEXT 
If one looks up the word 'real' in the Oxford English Dictionary, one will find not 
only the word's definition ("Actually existing or present as a state or quality of things; 
having a foundation in fact; actually occurring or happening") but also a citation from a letter 
to a 1966 issue of The Listener: "The Vice Chancellor of Lancaster University strongly 
believes 'that the university must keep contact with the real world outside'. May I take this 
opportunity to ask (a) what is real about the real world? (b) why is it always outside?" 
Philosophically, these two questions are intertwined, one question providing the answer to 
the other. The traditional answer to the question of what makes the 'real world' real is that it 
is outside, this 'real world' not being contingent upon our experience of it. Reality, in spite of 
Berkeley's arguments, does not require our presence, a fact which seems so obvious from a 
common sense standpoint that many philosophers can scarcely bring themselves to question 
it: 
I regard the basic claim of external realism - that there exists a real world that 
is totally and absolutely independent of all our representations, all of our 
thoughts, feelings, opinions, language, discourse, texts, and so on - as so 
obvious, and indeed as such an essential condition of rationality, and even of 
intelligibility, that I am somewhat embarrassed to raise the question and to 
discuss the various challenges to this view. Why would anyone in his right 
mind wish to attack external realism? (Searle 14) 
Historically, however, this is not so much a matter of attacking external realism as an 
inability to verify external reality, this being, for Kant, the scandal of philosophy itself As 
Barry Stroud succinctly puts it: "If we treat outer objects as things in themselves, it is quite 
7 
impossible to understand how we could arrive at a knowledge of their reality outside us, 
since we have to rely merely on the representation that is in us" (171). If, therefore, it is its 
ability to exist independently of our awareness of it that makes the 'real world' real, then 
how can we affirm this reality apart from our awareness of it? Even if this external reality 
does exist, how can we establish that our apparent experience of it corresponds to its 
actuality? It is these essential questions, and their unanswerable nature, which form the basis 
of both the epistemological sceptic's case against realism and the idealism that arises from 
this line of reasoning The argument is not so much that external reality does not exist (one 
can no more affirm its non-existence than one can affirm its existence) but, rather, that it 
cannot exist for us: in pragmatic terms both of these approaches amount to the same thing, 
for as Berkeley argues, if material reality exists independently of us then we can never know 
it, and if it does not, then nothing is changed 1. 
Yet if the realist cannot surmount these seemingly incontrovertible objections, and is 
destined to accept idealism on some level, then this is not to say that the idealist altogether 
eludes the clutch of realism. Let us turn to the second question, for it is this question which 
leads us towards the contemporary theoretical outlook on this matter, and ultimately to the 
question ofwriting: "(b) why is it [reality] always outside?" The question not only raises the 
issue of why reality is necessarily 'outside' but also the converse ofthis question; why do we 
assume that representation is 'in us'? It is this supposition that draws the boundary between 
an external universe of 'things in themselves' (external reality) and an internal universe of 
meaning (the mind and its representations). Yet what is this 'us', this self that divides the 
world in two? Is not this self another ostensible point of reference that (following Berkeley) 
actually has no being apart from our consciousness of it? Evidently, if we cannot affirm 
"what is real about the real world" by virtue of our inability to affirm that it exists 
independently of discernment, then we can apply precisely the same stricture to this 'self. 
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The idealist contention that reality is a mental construction, a representation which is 'in us', 
therefore, presupposes another reality, an enclosing self which exists independently of our 
consciousness of it. To declare that this 'self is consciousness, that it is some form of 
transcendental ego, merely begs the question, for consciousness itself is other to our concept 
of consciousness, the referent of a signifier. It is clear, therefore, that the idealist stricture on 
reality puts the notion of consciousness itself in question, consciousness being merely 
another reality that purportedly exists independently of its representation. Does not, 
therefore, the idealist's scepticism towards the idea of a mind-independent reality oblige 
him/her to be sceptical of any 'reality' which escapes ideality, including the reality of the 
mind, of our very self? As J. Hillis Miller asserts: "Nihilism is the nothing of consciousness 
when consciousness becomes the foundation of everything" (3). In order to evade nihilism 
idealism inevitably remains implicated in some form of transcendental realism, a necessity 
which Nietzsche identifies: 
... the external world is the work of our organs? But then our body, as part of 
this external world, would be the work of our organs! But then our organs 
themselves would be- the work of our organs! It seems to me that this is a 
complete reductio ad absurdum, assuming that the concept of a causa sui is 
something fundamentally absurd. Consequently the external world is not the 
work of our organs -? (Heyond Good and Evil 212-13) 
Idealism is thus intertwined with the external realism that it challenges: in order to offset one 
version of external reality, it invariably presupposes another version, whether this reality be 
the self, the mind, Berkeley's God or Descartes' evil demon. External reality, it would 
appear, is a theorem which is as unavoidable as our inability to existentially affirm this 
reality. As John Searle points out: 
. . . it is wrong to represent external realism as the view that there are material 
objects in space and time, or that mountains and molecules, and so on, exist. 
Suppose there were no mountains and molecules, and no material objects in 
space and time. Then those would be facts about how the world is and thus 
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would presuppose external realism. That is, the negation of this or that claim 
about the real world presupposes that there is a way that things are, 
independently of our claims. (31) 
Yet if idealism can never shake off the spectre of realism, it must be recalled that realism can 
never shake off the spectre of idealism; whatever external reality one presupposes it 
nevertheless remains a supposition. While reality may exist "independently of our claims" (as 
Sear le asserts) it is equally true that it has no existence for us "independently of our claims". 
Taking these two views together, it would seem that external reality can only ever be a 
potentiality, albeit an inescapable potentiality. 
The reason why this historical aporia is summarised here is because it is this dilemma 
which informs contemporary critical theory, most specifically the post-structuralist or 
deconstructive theory which attempts to pass through this apparently inescapable 
metaphysical opposition. It is post-structuralism which reveals that "debates like this are 
essentially misconceived; that the whole long history of baffled encounters between 'idealist' 
and 'realist' positions has served to dissimulate their deeper collusion in the same 
metaphysical enterprise" (Norris 149). That the original questions that elicit our summary 
should have been posed in 1966 is prescient, even if it is coincidental. It was in 1966 that 
Jacques Derrida gave his ground-breaking address to a conference entitled "The Languages 
of Criticism and the Sciences of Man" held at Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, an 
address that has been called "a historic moment in the traffic of ideas between Europe and 
America" and "the moment at which 'post-structuralism' as a movement begins" (Lodge 
1 07). It is in this address2, given before such luminaries as Lucien Goldmann, Tzvetan 
Todorov, Roland Barthes and Jacques Lacan, that Derrida implicitly poses the same 
questions as the correspondent to The Listener, albeit in a more sophisticated manner. In this 
address Derrida outlines the nature of an "event" or a "rupture" (3 51) in the structure of the 
metaphysical thought that has been identified, the structure of opposition between 'inside' 
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and 'outside' which underpins a metaphysical episteme that is "as old as Western science and 
Western philosophy" (351). For Derrida, this logocentric tradition encompasses both realism 
and idealism since both are obliged to centre themselves on an external or self-present 
reality, whether this reality be the thing-in-itself, an essence or an origin, self-identity or 
unmediated consciousness. As Derrida puts it, the "matrix" of the history of metaphysics is 
. . . the determination of Being as presence in all senses of this word. It could 
be shown that all the names related to fundamentals, to principles, or to the 
center have always designated an invariable presence - eidos, arche, telos, 
energeia, ousia (essence, existence, substance, subject) aletheia, 
transcendentality, consciousness, God, man, and so forth. (353) 
One can begin to gain some insight into this "rupture" if one follows the logical 
trajectory of the sceptical argument that has previously been outlined, rejecting any mind 
independent reality which exists apart from representation, a category which (as has been 
indicated) incorporates not only the material universe, but also the self and even the mind 
itself What is left? What we have is an infinite field of representation which has no original 
referent, no exteriority or origin which can regulate this field in the way that (for example) 
concepts such as the 'self, the 'mind' or 'consciousness' limit representation for the idealist: 
as Derrida puts it, the "function" of the centre within the metaphysical episteme "was not 
only to orient, balance, and organize the structure . . . but above all to make sure that the 
organizing principle of the structure would limit what we might call the play of the structure" 
(352). Such a 'play' would not be caught up in the metaphysical opposition between realism 
and idealism, an 'outer' and an 'inner' world. Question "(b) why is it [reality] always 
outside?" and its converse, 'why is representation always inside?' become redundant for 
where, in the absence of any 'outer' world, would one draw the boundary between the 'ideal' 
and the 'real'? How can one justifiably speak of an 'inner' world if there is no 'outer' world 
against which it can be defined as such or, as Christopher Ricks puts it, "if all is fictive, 
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against what does the fictive define itself?" (146). Alain Robbe-Grillet, writing in 1958, 
foreshadows this post-structuralist approach and eloquently captures this transgression 
between outside and inside, albeit in romantic rather than purely linguistic terms: 
. . . the mountain may bring me for the first time the feeling of majesty. . . . 
This feeling would then develop within me and, proliferating, engender 
others: magnificence, prestige, heroism, nobility, pride .... It would be the 
same for each emotion, and in these ceaseless interchanges, multiplied to 
infinity, I would never again be able to find the true origin of anything. Was 
majesty first inside me, or outside me? The very question would lose all 
meaning. Nothing would be left between my self and the world but a sublime 
community of feelings .... These affective elements will come to be regarded 
as the profound reality of the material universe, the only reality, supposedly, 
worthy of my attention. ("Nature, Humanism, Tragedy" 368) 
Similarly, in the absence of any demonstrable 'outer' world the limits of the 'inner' world 
give way, not to an all-inclusive ideality but to a play of representational supplements which 
in their infinitude, violate the distinction between idealism and realism, inner and outer, the 
origin and its representational supplement. As Derrida stresses, such distinctions conform 
... to the logic of identity and to the principle of classical ontology (the 
outside is outside, being is, etc) but not to the logic of supplementarity, which 
would have it that the outside is inside, that the other and the lack come to add 
themselves as a plus that replaces a minus, that what adds itself to something 
takes the place of the default in the thing, that the default, as the outside of the 
inside, should already be within the inside, etc. (Grammatology 215) 
As Robbe-Grillet' s "affective elements ... come to be regarded as the profound reality of the 
material universe", the "lack" of any external reality adds itself as "as a plus that replaces a 
minus", Derrida's "rupture" constituting the "historical usurpation and theoretical oddity that 
install[s] the image within the rights of reality" (Grammatology 37). Reality is no longer 
'outside' for it "fall[s] into the exteriority of meaning" (Grammatology 13), a transgression 
which is also acknowledged by Michel Foucault in "What is an Author?" (1969): "Referring 
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only to itself, but without being restricted to the confines of its interiority, writing 1s 
identified with its own unfolded exteriority" ("What is an Author" 141). 
As F oucault' s remark indicates, it is a contemporary recognition of the historical role 
of writing, and of its philosophical import, which occasions this rethinking of "the 
structurality of the structure" ("Structure, Sign and Play" 353) this being "the moment when 
language invaded the universal problematic, the moment when, in the absence of a center or 
origin, everything became discourse" ("Structure, Sign and Play" 354). It is the modern 
advent of writing that unveils the epistemological possibility of the all-encompassing field of 
play in question, the incessantly transgressive arche-text3 that breaches the metaphysical 
opposition. Before going on to detail why such an exteriority should be specifically identified 
with writing, however, it is already evident that the theoretical valorisation of writing could 
be characterised in terms of its negation of potentiality. The reason why the historical debate 
between realism and idealism has historically sustained itself is precisely because both of 
these positions are potentially valid. Historically, two possibilities are presented and neither 
can be ruled out or affirmed, hence the alleged historical 'collusion' between realists and 
idealists within the metaphysical episteme. The effect of introducing writing into the realist/ 
idealist equation is to negate one possibility in favour of the other or, at the very least, to 
render one possibility (that of external reality) a philosophical luxury, there being no need for 
this extra-textual guarantor. Derrida may reject the accusations of idealism that are regularly 
levelled against his theories but there can be little doubt that his notion of a writing which is 
not limited by any pre-textual exteriority has an idealist lineage. The theoretical introduction 
of writing constitutes the means through which idealism transcends its own boundaries to 
such an extent that the ideal can take on the characteristics of the real, there being no 
externality which can contest the text's rights to reality. One historical potentiality is wholly 
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resolved in favour of the other, the rejection of any form of external, independent, reality 
allowing idealism to reach its logical, textual, conclusion. 
The purpose of this project is to consider this installation of the text within the "rights 
of reality" in the context of three theories of writing that have both influenced Derrida and 
have been interpreted in terms of his theory of the arche-text. In light of the subject, the 
question which faces us has two interrelated facets: it must be asked whether the text can 
legitimately lay claim to the rights with which Derrida would honour it and whether the text 
truly evades the contesting potentiality which is non-textual reality. Since this is a question of 
writing in general, rather than of particular writers and their prejudices, it is necessary that 
these questions be considered in relation to a spectrum of theories. At one extreme there is 
Plato, he who could justifiably be deemed the father of logocentrism in the Derridean view; 
for Derrida, it is the Platonic discussion of writing in the Phaedrus which constitutes the 
inaugural moment in the historical repression of writing. At the other extreme there is 
Samuel Beckett, a writer who Derrida considers to be so closely aligned with deconstructive 
approach that he cannot be deconstructed4, a prevalent attitude that has deeply affected 
Beckett studies in general. Bridging these two is the intermediate figure of Nietzsche, whose 
pertinence stems from his contradictory nature5 . On one hand, his egoistic valorisation of 
writing and his attempts to overturn metaphysical categories render him an influential 
precursor to the deconstructive approach and writing's historic installation within the 'rights 
of reality'; on the other hand, however, Nietzsche insists on the essentially biologic nature of 
his theories, an insistence which would seem to entail the necessity of an acceptance of the 
pre-textual reality of the body and, consequently, of the empirical reality in which this body 
is concerned. Constantly allowing for the possibility that textuality may bear no relationship 
to an extra-textual guarantor, this assessment will nonetheless investigate the manner in 
which these authors interpret the relationship between writing and reality within their texts, 
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and also the manner in which the texts themselves relate to reality. The question is, of course, 
whether these two factors adequately reflect each other, a failure by the author to fully 
account for the written status of his own work constituting, for Derrida, an instance of the 
historical repression of writing. Accordingly, we must address the associated issue of 
whether these texts retain the possibility of an extra-textual reality as a result of their 
conscious or unconscious implication in this repressive tradition or as a result of a genuine 
philosophical inability to elude the question of reality even via recourse to writing. Derrida's 
characterisation of the metaphysical episteme and its attitudes to writing are thus brought into 
question (and we should note on this point that this characterisation presupposes the validity 
of Derrida' s theory of writing). It is this issue that constitutes a distinction between the 
Derridean conception of textuality and a conception in which the text, rather, exists as a 
mode of potentiality. In this relation I will propose that the historical/ philosophical 
significance of writing does not lie in its ability to be installed within the "rights of reality" 
but in its ability to disclose that consciousness has never been installed within these rights; in 
other words writing exteriorises the fact that we exist as a mode of potentiality. All of our 
analyses, therefore, will contemplate the neglected role of potentiality in relation to writing, 
whether this is the potentiality that is exteriorised (Plato) or utilised (Nietzsche). This will 
ultimately demand an assessment of writing in its neglected Aristotelian context, Aristotle's 
theory of potentiality being the most historically influential. Ironically, it is the 'proto-
deconstructionist' Samuel Beckett who offers the most overt modern example of an 
Aristotelian conception of textuality. Consequently, the examination of Plato and Nietzsche 
will constitute a critique of the Derridean view, of its failure to fully account for the status of 
writing in these texts, while our examination of Beckett will constitute an overt 
exemplification of the Aristotelian alternative to this view. Before turning to these issues, 
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however, we must return to our examination ofDerrida's theories, for we must know what is 
at stake in these deliberations 
2 
THE GROUNDS OF DECONSTRUCTION 
Let us turn to the question of why the Derridean play of signification should explicitly 
be identified with writing_ This question can only be answered by identifying both the 
historical value of writing, its place in the metaphysical tradition that has been outlined, and 
its philosophical role in modem critical theory. It is in the interplay of these two factors that 
the profound significance of writing is exposed and, as we shall see, it is in this interplay that 
the problematic nature of Derridean theory becomes evident. Before tracing this interplay, 
however, it must be recognised that to speak of the historical 'origins' of Derrida's 
exteriorising "rupture" is, in one sense, a nonsense, it being implicit in the theory of the 
arche-text that this text has always already been an "unfolded exteriority". Derrida discloses 
this fact in his 1966 address: in speaking of the "event" at issue, he subsequently feels bound 
to add the proviso, "_ . . if this loaded word did not entail a meaning which it is precisely the 
function of structural - or structuralist - thought to reduce or suspect" ("Structure, Sign and 
Play" 3 51 t. Such a "precaution" ("Structure, Sign and Play" 3 51) constitutes Derrida' s 
admission that everything has always already been discourse, the "rupture" which is writing 
being that which, "although it has always been at work, has always been neutralized or 
reduced ... by a process of giving" the metaphysical structure "a center or of referring it to a 
point of presence, a fixed origin" ("Structure, Sign and Play" 352). To refuse to accept that 
the arche-text has always been a pre-condition of any 'originary' reality is to acquiesce to a 
repressive tradition in which "[t]he historical usurpation and theoretical oddity that install the 
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image within the rights of reality are determined as the forgetting of a simple origin. . . . 
Forgetfulness because it is a mediation and the departure of the logos from itself Without 
writing, the latter would remain within itself' (Grammatology 36-37). Yet obviously, one 
cannot forget that which has never been remembered in the first place, the usurpation under 
discussion being a purely "historical usurpation" rather than a philosophical event: "Writing 
did not 'enter' philosophy, it was already there" (A Taste for the Secret 8). There has never 
been any 'originary' presence that has not been logically preceded by representation, by 
arche-writing: "There is an originary violence of writing because language is first ... 
writing. "Usurpation" has always already begun" (Grammatology 37). 
Nonetheless, if we bear this proviso in mind, one can trace the evolution of this 
contemporary acknowledgment of writing's philosophical import, its extension from a 
supplementary mode of communication to an all-encompassing text which precedes and 
presents 'reality'. The most obvious point of derivation is F erdinand de Saussure' s A Course 
in General Linguistics with its insistence on the arbitrariness (i.e. the non-natural character) 
of the sign, and its recognition that language consists only of differences with no positive 
terms. It is this Saussurean awareness that eventually leads (via Russian Formalism and the 
Prague Linguistic Circle) to the French Structuralism of the 1950s and 1960s with its 
privileging of the linguistic system. The most noteworthy individual in this respect is Claude 
Levi-Strauss, Derrida's 1966 address unambiguously taking its theoretical impetus from 
Levi-Strauss' structural ethnography. Levi-Strauss' structuralism is the product of his 
exploration of the Saussurean tenets of arbitrariness and difference, an exploration which 
culminates in his acknowledgment that empirical manifestations of cultural phenomena, like 
linguistic utterances, can only be significant in the context of the system of differential 
relations which constitute them, that which Levi-Strauss, following Saussure, designates la 
langue in distinction to la parole (the individual utterance). Within structuralism, it is the 
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failure to appreciate the significance of the differential relations between phenomena in 
distinction to the specificity of the phenomena themselves that leads to a privileging of 
consciousness and the intentional object rather than the system that is the true source of this 
significance. The phenomenological philosophy of the period, or the existential philosophy 
that finds its momentum in Husserlian phenomenology, is most frequently charged with 
disregarding the philosophical consequences of language. The dominant figure in this respect 
is undoubtedly Jean-Paul Sartre whose Husserlian re-reading of Heidegger suggests that man 
has no being other to his consciousness in the world, thus implying that consciousness is 
absolutely continuous with its intentional object, language being transparent in our relation 
with the world. It is no coincidence, therefore, that Jacques Derrida's abandoned doctoral 
thesis should be entitled "The Ideality of the Literary Object in Husserl" (commenced 1957), 
this early study of Husserl being overtaken by the linguistic revolution which is 
structuralism7, ultimately leading to Derrida's deconstruction of Husserlian thought in his 
Speech and Phenomena (1967). It is this revolution which also displaces the early influence 
of Sartre on Derrida, Derrida subsequently expressing his inability to understand how 
someone as influential as Sartre could be wrong on so many issues (Norris12). Yet, whatever 
the faults of phenomenology and existential humanism there can be no doubt that it provided 
the theoretical drive towards a salvaging of Saussurean linguistics, and language itself, from 
the philosophical obscurity to which it had been assigned in contemporary thought. As 
Michel Foucault emphasises in conversation with Gerard Raulet: 
. . . everything which took place in the sixties arose from a dissatisfaction with 
the phenomenological theory of the subject, and involved different escapades, 
subterfuges, break-throughs, according to whether we use a negative or a 
positive term, in the direction of linguistics, psychoanalysis or Nietzsche. 
("Structuralism and Post-structuralism" 199) 
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Clearly, however, post-structuralism is not merely an extension of the structuralist 
endeavour to challenge this phenomenological privileging of consciousness; as the 
theoretical expansion of writing suggests, it is also a critique of structuralism. As Derrida 
indicates in his 1966 speech, the theoretical value of structuralism lies in its appreciation that 
the arbitrary nature of the sign renders any ontological distinction between the 'cultural' and 
the 'natural' problematic ("Structure, Sign and Play" 359}, this being the means through 
which Levi-Strauss facilitates the application of linguistic structures to supposedly "natural" 
phenomena. It is at this point that the contemporary "rupture" begins to intersect with the 
"rupture" which has always been at work within the metaphysical epoch for it is plainly a 
short step from Levi-Strauss' position to the recognition that there is no 'natural' hierarchy 
between speech and writing, a step that Derrida subsequently takes in his most influential 
work, Of Grammatology (1967). For Derrida, this elision of the hierarchical relationship 
between speech and writing is the key fact which structuralism fails to unearth from 
Saussurean linguistics. Structuralism thus demonstrates its continuing attachment to a 
logocentric tradition which, from Plato on, has repressed writing and its effects in favour of 
the living presence of speech, violating the very principles of 'arbitrariness' and 'difference' 
to which Saussurean linguistics points and even Saussure himself does not escape this 
accusation as Of Grammatology (passim) demonstrates. Derrida does not specifically 
mention writing in his 1966 lecture but he nonetheless utilises Levi-Strauss' recognition of 
the purely methodological, rather than ontological, value of the natural/ cultural distinction as 
a means of presaging his deconstruction of phonocentrism, revealing "two interpretations of 
interpretation, of structure, of sign, of play": 
The one seeks to decipher, dreams of deciphering a truth or an origin which 
escapes play and the order of the sign, and which lives the necessity of 
interpretation as an exile. The other, which is no longer turned towards the 
origin, affirms play and tries to pass beyond man and humanism, the name of 
man being the name of that being who, throughout the history of metaphysics 
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or of ontotheology - in other words, throughout his entire history - has 
dreamed of full presence, the reassuring foundation, the origin and the end of 
play. ("Structure, Sign and Play" 369-70) 
Derrida thus prefigures the divergence between the metaphysical episteme and a 
contemporaneity that acknowledges the philosophical significance of writing, Of 
Grammatology being a manifestation of this contemporary recognition. It is this work which 
unquestionably reveals both the necessity of writing in this attempt to pass beyond man and 
humanism and the necessity of Derrida' s own work in deconstructing the historical 
repression of writing: 
By a slow movement whose necessity is hardly perceptible, everything that 
for at least some twenty centuries tended toward and finally succeeded in 
being gathered under the name of language is beginning to let itself be 
transferred to, or at least summarized under, the name of writing. By a hardly 
perceptible necessity, it seems as though the concept of writing - no longer 
indicating a particular, derivative, auxiliary form of language in general 
(whether understood as communication, relation, expression, signification, 
constitution of meaning or thought, etc ), no longer designating the exterior 
surface, the insubstantial double of a major signifier, the signi.fier of a signi.fier 
- is beginning to go beyond the extension of language. In all senses of the 
word, writing comprehends language. ( Grammatology 7) 
The theoretical expansion of writing can thus be seen as the ultimate culmination of 
Saussure's recognition that language consists of only differences with no positive terms, a 
fact which obviates the distinction between speech and writing since neither articulates a pre-
existing meaning. Difference, or arche-writing, is, and has always been, the very condition of 
meaningful being rather than its reflection. 
We are thus dealing with two definitions of writing and two advents of writing. 
Firstly, we have the historical advent of writing, the production of words on the page, the 
empirical script that represents or reminds one of an originary speech, the effect of the cause 
that is the author. Secondly, we have the contemporary, philosophical, advent of writing in its 
far-reaching sense, the epistemological opening up of the field of representation under 
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discussion, this being an arche-writing which usurps and has always already usurped the 
originary position of 'reality'. The Aristotelian definition of writing as "the signi.fier of a 
signi.fier", that which merely symbolises spoken words (De Interpretation I.i.), is superseded 
by a definition in which writing acquires the characteristics of the Kantian a priori, now 
'denoting' the very condition of knowledge itself In other words writing is no longer the 
effect of a pre-existing, external reality but a prerequisite of 'reality'. Fundamentally, this 
reversal reflects the usurpation of reality within the process of consciousness, thus placing 
the notion selfhood in crisis. While representation is, hypothetically, the effect of a causal 
reality (whether defined in terms of an external referent or the body), a supplement to the 
origin, it is nonetheless apparent that such representation logically precedes any awareness of 
this 'exteriority'. A reversal occurs, there being no 'reality' for us in the absence of the 
representation which makes this 'reality' possible, representation being that which permits it 
to be determined as a presence. Indeed, from this standpoint, there is no originary 'us', no 
self and no enclosing consciousness, in the absence of the representation that logically 
precedes and makes these concepts possible. In this relation one should note the syntax of 
Descartes' famous pronouncement that "I think therefore I am" ("cogito ergo sum")8, the 
identification of the first term as 'thought' rather than signification presupposing the very 
existence which is subsequently established in the predicate. The question that Descartes' 
claim raises, therefore, is whether thought demonstrates the existence of the self or whether 
thought (or more appropriately, signification) produces the 'existence' of this self This 
difference is most frequently articulated in contemporary discourse in the distinction between 
selfhood and subjectivity: " ... language knows a 'subject', not a 'person', and this subject, 
empty outside the very enunciation which defines it, suffices to make language 'hold 
together', suffices, that is to say, to exhaust it" (Barthes "The Death of the Author" 145). 
Within post-structuralism the subject is not a precondition of meaning but an effect of the 
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mearung that necessarily precedes it. Moreover, if this ongm must differ from itself in 
signifying itself (i.e. becoming self-aware by positing itself in language) then this self-
differentiation has now always already occurred; no matter how far one traces signification, 
all that one will find is more signification, more supplements to an eternally absent origin. 
This is precisely why Derrida reformulates difference as differance, a neologism that 
combines the senses of 'to differ' and 'to defer'. It is differance that sustains and logically 
precedes "this play of representation" in which "the point of origin becomes ungraspable. 
There are things like reflecting pools, and images, an infinite reference from one to the other, 
but no longer a source, a spring. There is no longer a simple origin" (Grammatology 36). It is 
in light of this infinite play, this "game Ueu] that invariably goes beyond its own rules and 
transgresses its limits" (Foucault "What is an Author?" 141) that Foucault declares that we 
must return to the question of the subject 
... not in order to re-establish the theme of an originating subject, but to grasp 
the subject's points of insertion, modes of functioning, and system of 
dependencies. . . . In short, it is a matter of depriving the subject (or its 
substitute) of its role as originator, and of analysing the subject as a variable 
and complex function of discourse. ("What is an Author?" 158) 
The 'effect' thus arrogates the position of the 'cause', representation or writing being "the 
origin of the origin" (Grammatology 61). In other words the 'origin' (however it is 
formulated) is never the origin but another supplement to the representation that precedes it, 
a supplement to what is always already a supplement. Any originary or causal reality is the 
product of this textual play of signification, a reversal that Barthes famously applies to the 
notion of authorship: 
The Author is thought to nourish the book, which is to say that he exists 
before it, thinks, suffers, lives for it, is in the same relation of antecedence to 
his work as a father to his child. In complete contrast, the modem scriptor is 
born simultaneously with the text, is in no way equipped with a being 
preceding or exceeding the writing. . . . For him . . . the hand, cut off from any 
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voice . . . traces a field without origin - or which, at least, has no other origin 
than language itself, language that ceaselessly calls into question all origins 
("The Death of the Author" 146) 
To put it simply, the originary Author does not exist apart from the writing which defines 
him as such, a writing which always necessarily precedes this 'origin' in the same way that 
representation always precedes any 'originary' notion of self-hood or, for that manner, any 
notion of an 'exterior' or 'causal' reality. 
That such a "field without origin" should be designated writing therefore, is a 
manifestation of the fact that writing has historically been seen as a mere supplement to 
speech and the self-presence that is its cognate. Within writing's second advent this 
supplement historically usurps the ongmary position of speech, and is philosophically 
revealed to have always usurped this origin. In acknowledging that the supplement is a 
necessary pre-condition to any 'origin' one recognises that the difference between speech and 
writing, origin and representation, has always already inhabited the voice, rupturing the self-
identity or self-presence of this transcendental signified9. This arche-writing is always 
already in place as the pre-condition of the 'originary' voice, being the difference "that takes 
place before and within speech" (Grammatology 315) or the "[s]upplement of (at) the 
[ o ]rigin" (Grammatology 313). 
For Derrida, therefore, the magnification of the philosophical significance of writing 
is bound to the historical definition of writing as a mere supplement to speech, that which 
'stands in' for the living presence of the speaker or the author. It is only as a supplement to 
this logos that writing accrues its philosophical significance for it is in this role that writing 
exteriorises the profound significance of difference within the constitution of meaning, this 
being the a priori which logically precedes any determination of being as presence. Derrida, 
therefore, cannot simply jettison the metaphysical tradition for it is precisely this tradition 
which allocates writing its strategic value as a supplement, a status which allows the 
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contemporary theorist access to the boundless realm of the arche-text via writing. The 
"historical usurpation" of reality by a writing that has, philosophically, always already 
usurped reality, reveals that writing has a methodological rather than an ontological 
significance. This historically strategic value is reflected in the value that Derrida would also 
assign to the arche-trace, this being 
. . . the possibility of the spoken word, then of the "graphie" in the narrow 
sense, the birthplace of "usurpation," denounced from Plato to Saussure, this 
trace is the opening of the first exteriority in general, the enigmatic 
relationship of the living to its other and of an inside to an outside . . . 
(Grammatology 70) 
One can get some idea of the strategic role of this "concept" that "destroys its name" 
(Grammatology 61) if one contemplates Derrida's declaration that ""Usurpation" has always 
already begun" (Grammatology 37). Such a declaration, of course, logically entails that there 
has never been a usurpation or an origin to usurp, a fact which naturally prompts the question 
as to why Derrida should employ the concept of 'usurpation' at all. Likewise, why use the 
implicitly logocentric term 'supplement' if there is no origin to which writing is a 
supplement? For Derrida, it is only through this strategically posited usurpation (and, 
therefore, a strategically posited origin) that the critic can gain theoretical access to the play 
of textuality. For example, if we assume that a pre-semantic origin differs from, and 
supplements, itself in signifYing itsel:( then subsequently this origin has never existed in the 
absence of the difference which logically precedes its determination, its installation within 
the 'rights of reality', just as there has never been a reality which has not been preceded by 
the 'supplement' which is arche-writing. The "central presence ... has never been itself, has 
always already been exiled from itself into its own substitute. The substitute does not 
substitute itself for anything which has somehow existed before it" ("Structure, Sign and 
Play" 353). Regardless of how far one traces the origin, all that one will exhume is a writing, 
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a pre-ontological difference which is, or has been, always already in place. The originary 
instance of usurpation that we a<ssumed, therefore, has never occurred: "The trace is the 
erasure of selfhood, of one's own presence, and is constituted by the threat or anguish of its 
irremediable disappearance, of the disappearance of its disappearance" ("Freud and the Scene 
of Writing" 289). The strategic hypothesis of a usurpation thus permits Derrida to 
demonstrate that this usurpation logically entails its own erasure, leaving only the 
transgressive arche-text which has been exteriorised in this process, that which takes, and has 
always taken, the place ofthe origin: " ... the value ofthe transcendental arche [archie] must 
make its necessity felt before letting itself be erased. The concept of the arche-trace must 
comply with that necessity and that erasure" ( Grammatology 61) 10. Correspondingly, 
writing's purely historical status as a supplement to speech lends it strategic value as that 
which theoretically exposes the arche-text: this text, of course, has always already supplanted 
any originary reality thus negating writing's supplementary status ll_ As Derrida strategically 
utilises the usurpation in order that he can exteriorise textuality, he strategically hijacks the 
implicitly logocentric term 'supplement' as a weapon against logocentrism, disclosing the 
supplement at the origin. The inevitability of delineating the Derridean field of play in terms 
of writing, therefore, is a historical inevitability rather than a philosophical inevitability, this 
destiny being a consequence of writing's traditional definition as a supplement. 
3 
USURPING Tiffi TEXT 
Since the publication of Of Grammatology and the post-structuralist 'invasion' of 
discourse there can be few, if any, areas of modern thought which have remained untouched 
by this question of writing, the effects of the historical "'event"' or "rupture" under 
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consideration being felt (albeit to varymg degrees) in almost every form of intellectual 
enquiry. As Richard Rorty asserts in acknowledging the ubiquity of this transformation: "In 
the last century there were philosophers who argued that nothing exists but ideas. In our 
century there are people who write as if there were nothing but texts" (139)12. Rorty's 
allusion to Derrida's much disputed declaration that "[t]here is nothing outside of the text 
[there is no outside text; if n 'y a pas de hors-texte]" (Grammatology 158) is indicative of 
Jacques Derrida's central role in any current discussion of writing, a discussion which tends 
to be divided along the lines of an Anglo-American analytical or empirical tradition which 
remains obstinately rooted in the age of metaphysics and a French theory which is recurrently 
seen as being obfuscatory or philosophically suspect13 . As Edith Kurzweil maintains: 
"Structuralism could not become popular in America in the way that it did in France .... For 
the pursuit of knowledge, in France and America, proceeds from different traditions: we are 
empirical, the French are philosophical ... " (243). Within this debate Derrida's theories have 
a greater import because they not only influence contemporary philosophical attitudes 
towards writing but also demand a re-evaluation of the history of philosophy itself It is 
Derrida who most vehemently insists that the exigent question of writing, of difference, has 
been neglected in the metaphysical episteme, which is why the second advent of writing, the 
contemporary 'invasion' of discourse, is necessarily revisionist in nature. However, one must 
be cautious with the word 'revisionist' here for it is evidently not the case that 'writing' in 
the wider, quasi-transcendental, sense is a product of deconstruction, that which is 
subsequently applied to the history of philosophy. This second advent is, rather, the 
discovery that any historical positing of a grounding presence or reality has already, 
necessarily, presupposed a system of differences that allows and contests this positing. Of 
Grammatology is a product of this consciousness, being a work which demonstrates that 
writing and its profound effects have been repressed in favour of the logocentric belief in a 
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self-present reality which ontologically precedes, grounds, authorises or/and limits the play 
of signification, a beliefwhich (as we have seen) informs idealism as well as realism14 : 
The epoch of the logos . . . debases writing considered as the mediation of 
mediation and as a fall into the exteriority of meaning. To this epoch belongs 
the difference between signified and signifier, or at least the strange separation 
of their "parallelism," and the exteriority, however extenuated of one to the 
other. ( Grammatology 13) 
If writing now "invade[ s] the universal problematic" then this invasion is restricted to 
contemporary critical theory, for it is an appreciation that the historical, metaphysical system 
has always already been 'invaded' by the writing that it represses which characterises this 
coming to awareness. A reassessment of historical instances of this repression thus becomes 
essential, an archaeology that brings to light the manner in which the texts that form the basis 
of the history of metaphysics in some sense deconstruct (or have already deconstructed) 
themselves. This is why Derrida's deconstructive project has consisted of an assiduous re-
reading of these grounding texts, excavating and unravelling any attempt to logocentrically 
subordinate the play of textuality to an external reality, an attempt which unfailingly 
presupposes the very writing that it endeavours to repress, the arche-writing or the arche-text 
that makes this 'reality' possible. 
Evidently then, there is a certain inevitability in Derrida's construal of the 
metaphysical episteme as that which represses writing. Such a construal is an obligatory 
product of Derrida's absolute faith in his theory of the text for it is only in wholly accepting 
the issue of writing as being that which exteriorises the 'usurping' play of textuality that the 
metaphysical episteme can be delineated in such terms. The transgressive nature of writing, 
the discovery that there has never been any self-present reality beyond the text, is, after all, 
the very reason why writing has been historically repressed. Derrida thus overturns the 
continuity of the historical/ philosophical process of knowledge, it not being the case that 
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he deductively scrutinises the legitimacy of his own arguments in light of his predecessor's 
work, but that he necessarily presupposes the legitimacy of his view of writing in examining 
these preceding arguments. This is the reason why Derrida can declare, in his famous 
deconstruction of Rousseau's prioritising of speech over writing, that "[i]n a certain way, I 
am ... within Rousseau's text" (Grammatology 160). The textuality that Derrida charts is, so 
he argues, already innate to the works that he reads, buried beneath and disturbing the surface 
meaning of these works and their metaphysical assumptions, marginalised even as those 
margins dispute the priority of that which defines them as peripheral: 
My principal interests have tended towards the great canon of philosophy -
Plato, Kant, Hegel, Husserl; but, at the same time, towards the so-called 
'minor' loci of their texts, neglected problematics, or footnotes - things that 
can irritate the system and at the same time account for the subterranean 
region in which the system constitutes itself by repressing what makes it 
possible, which is not systematic. (A Taste for the Secret 5) 
As a result, Derrida's readings are always empathetic with what is actually going on in the 
text in spite of the manifest differences between the explicit import of the texts under 
consideration and his theory of writing. Text and reading always coincide since the former 
cannot escape the writing on which the latter is based. As Seim Burke realises, this places the 
theorist in an exceptional position in relation to the conventional practice: 
What distinguishes Derridean revisionism from any other . . . is that 
this proximity is not necessarily the outcome of a continuity between 
Derrida' s 'ideas' (if indeed there are such things), and those of the authors he 
reads, but that it arises rather from a unique approach to the act of 
philosophising. If Derrida is to be remembered as a great philosopher, it will 
be as the individual in whom - for the first time - the philosopher becomes 
exclusively a reader -critic. All philosophy begins with the reading of 
philosophy, most philosophers take the work of another philosopher and begin 
their careers with a critique of that work even if it is not explicitly proffered in 
this form. Yet, with Derrida, the task of philosophy is an interminable 
rereading in the closest possible manner, a constant working into the already-
written. Unlike the philosophers he deconstructs, Derrida never elects to reach 
that stage when his texts discuss problematics on their own terms, but rather 
must formulate, interrogate, deconstruct those problematics through other 
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eyes, hear their resonances with another ear. . . . Indeed, Derrida has himself 
said that his work is 'entirely consumed in the reading of other texts', and the 
word 'consumed' should be given its full emphasis here, for no other 
philosopher, or critic even, has ever buried his work so deeply in the 
resources, conceptuality, and language of the texts he reads .... the Derridean 
text is always at risk of disappearance into the world of the other. (Death and 
Return of the Author 167-68) 
Yet is it really the case that the Derridean text is "at risk of disappearance into the world of 
the other"? Is it not rather the case that the "other", the text under discussion, like external 
reality itself, is at risk of disappearance into to the world of Derrida, the world of an infinite 
writing? To identify these two worlds is not an overstatement; Derrida's readings are, after 
all, supplements to the texts in question, a supplement and a writing that supposedly inhabits 
the original text and has always inhabited these texts. In recognising this habitation, and in 
allowing himself to be consumed in these texts, Derrida' s readings imply a superlatively 
objective status, a reading that is not effected by the theorist's own prejudices or desires, or 
by any critical intention. Derrida, it would seem, does not appear in his own writings, these 
commentaries relying on the resources, concepts and language of the texts in question. As 
Christopher Norris asserts in relation to Derrida's Glas, the text 
. . . can nowhere be reduced to some privileged voice, some self-present 
source of meaning and truth. It is pointless to ask who is speaking in any 
given passage of this text, whether Hegel, Genet, Derrida ipse or some other 
ghostly intertextual 'presence'. For there is no last word, no metalanguage or 
voice of authorial control that would ultimately serve to adjudicate the matter. 
(64) 
Yet what status does this assign Derrida' s text (if one can continue to speak of such a thing)? 
If there is no "voice of authorial control" to "adjudicate the matter", then doesn't this make 
this text, this reading, the "last word" on the matter? Likewise, if this reading is not 
metalinguistic, being a reading which is intrinsic to the text under discussion, is not this an 
indication that this reading is unconditionally identifiable with the text read, thus precluding 
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any attempt to challenge this interpretation? If it is pointless to ask who is speaking in the 
text, then how does one attempt to interrogate Derrida's reading, an interrogation that 
necessarily implies a discrepancy between the text read and the reading, between (for 
example) the Hegelian text and the Derridean text? In refusing to ask who is speaking here, 
we elide both Derrida and Hegel into the oblique, neutral space which is writing, for it is 
writing which speaks here, an incontestable writing which 'Derrida's' text represents, the 
arche-writing which inhabits all texts and, indeed, the very fabric of 'reality' itself 
In the wider philosophical context, Derrida' s usurpation of authorial intention finds 
its analogy in this textual usurpation of metaphysical reality. It is in wholly accepting that 
writing possesses the philosophical value that Derrida assigns to it that one's view of the 
history of philosophy undergoes conversion, the conventional view that a failure to reconcile 
realism and idealism is the result of a genuine philosophical aporia being outstripped by a 
view in which both are the consequence of a failure to submit to the play of textuality. It is as 
though the answers to the questions that philosophers have always posed on this issue have 
been available since the historical advent of writing, it being a refusal to pose the question of 
writing which explains why these answers have not been forthcoming. Such a lack is also 
allied to the philosophical unwillingness or failure to relinquish the existentially comforting 
notion of a transcendental reality (whatever form it may take), again necessitating a 
repression of writing. It is these two factors which reflect the dual obligation of Derrida's 
theory of writing, these obligations being the means through which the deconstructive 
approach to textuality justifies itself Firstly, Derrida's theory must promote writing as that 
offers access to the boundless play of signification, this being the means through which 
Derrida passes through the metaphysical opposition. Secondly, and consequently, Derrida's 
theory must contest any transcendental reality that imposes a limit on this text since the re-
imposition of this externality would demote the deconstructive approach to a form of 
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idealism. In other words there can be no acceptance of the represstve nature of the 
metaphysical episteme unless one completely accepts both the philosophical value that is 
allocated to writing and the claim that the play of textuality is not dependent on an extra- or 
pre- textual reality. Derrida's work continually exhibits these obligations: in discussing the 
notion of matter, for instance, he asserts that he has not often used this word because "this 
concept has been too often reinvested with "logocentric" values, values associated with those 
of thing, reality, presence in general ... "(Positions 64). He goes on to demonstrate that such 
a refusal is a manifestation of his unqualified assurance in his theory of the text: 
. . . the signi:fier "matter" appears to me problematical only at the moment 
when its reinscription cannot avoid making of it a new fundamental principle 
which, by means of a theoretical regression, would be reconstituted into a 
"transcendental signified." . . . It then becomes an ultimate referent, according 
to the classical logic implied by the value of the referent, or it becomes an 
"objective reality" absolutely "anterior" to any work of the mark, the semantic 
content of a form of presence which guarantees the movement of the text from 
the outside. (Positions 65) 
It is these obligations which constitute the space between the critic and his object of 
study, it being an obvious yet not insignificant fact that the writers who have been subject to 
Derridean deconstruction, unlike Derrida himself, are under no obligation to unquestioningly 
accept the validity of his theories, the very validity which defines these texts as repressive. 
The obligation to evade the transcendental guarantor that is material reality, for example, 
may apply to the deconstructive critic and yet the writers who have been subject to this 
deconstructive criticism are not subject to this obligation. The onus is on Derrida here and 
not on the texts that he studies. One could, of course, argue that it is writing, and not Derrida, 
which enforces these demands, as would be suggested by the anonymous status of the 
Derrida which (for example) is "within Rousseau's text" (Grarnmatology 160): yet aside 
from the fact that this argument entails that Derrida has an unquestionable access to the truth 
of writing (and indeed to the truth of the being which is impossible to differentiate from 
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writing), this position passes over the fact that his theory of writing is a theory, a hypothesis, 
a possibility. Derrida himself concedes this in stressing that this theories are not meant to be 
assertions that we are "imprisoned in language" but are meant, rather, "[t]o distance ... the 
habitual structure of reference, to challenge or complicate our common assumptions about 
it", a distancing which "does not amount to saying that there is nothing beyond language" 
(Keamey 124). A great deal hangs on the question of the speculative nature of Derrida's 
work for, as has been shown, his construal of the metaphysical episteme in terms of its 
repression of writing is predicated on the philosophical value that he assigns to writing, on 
the fact that his description of writing and its theoretical consequences coincide with the 
actuality of its operations and effects, an identity which is never seriously in question for 
Derrida. To reduce this theory to a mere speculation, therefore, is to simultaneously reduce 
his characterisation of the metaphysical episteme to a speculation. This opens up the 
possibility that instances of 'repression' are actually manifestations of the fact that 
philosophers, and philosophy itself, are not under the same obligations as the deconstructive 
critic, their fidelity being to an undiscovered truth (even if this is the 'truth' that there is no 
truth) rather than to a contestation of logocentrism via recourse to the question of writing. 
Clearly, in presupposing the validity of the Derridean theory of writing there is always a risk 
of unwarranted revision, a risk that this theory does not in fact mirror the nature of the 
metaphysical epoch, undoing its repression of writing, but, rather, imposes the repression 
onto the history of philosophy, this being the means through which the deconstructive 
approach justifies itself If to accept the legitimacy of Derrida's theory is to presuppose a 
metaphysical epoch in which writing has been debased then one may easily remain blind to 
points of genuine resistance to this theory within this epoch. Worse still, such points of 
resistance may be dismissed as mere instances of repression when they actually represent a 
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genuine inability to accept the text and its 'rights to reality', it not being the case that the 
question of writing is not posed but that it is posed only for it to be found unanswerable. 
What characterises all of the writers who will be discussed in this project is an 
awareness of this radically indeterminate nature of the text, the irresolvable nature of the 
problem that writing exteriorises. Plato, for example, renders Derrida's characterisation of 
the metaphysical episteme problematic at its very inception by accepting the transgressive 
view of textuality as a possibility; indeed, the Phaedrus can be seen as a self-conscious and 
performative exteriorisation of this possibility. This, however, is not to say that Plato 
unequivocally accepts the text's 'rights to reality', it rather being the case that these rights 
can never be ratified. Moreover, in the historical context of a society based on an 
unquestioned oral or mythological tradition, Plato's refusal of these rights cannot be validly 
seen as the product of a phonocentric prejudice against writing; on the contrary, this refusal 
is the product of his desire to refute any attempted reduction of writing to a 'reality', to the 
monologic status of oral poetry or myth. Such a reduction, if it could be ratified, would 
constitute the closure of the imaginative space which writing opens up in exteriorising the 
fact that consciousness itself has never been installed within these rights. This denial of 
human potentiality clearly manifests itself in Derrida' s failure to account for the redemptive 
nature of the Nietzschean text, for as Nietzsche recognises, the retention of this space of 
potentiality, the "old gap in human knowledge" (On the Genealogy of Morals 556), 
simultaneously demands a retention of the logos as a potentiality. In Nietzsche's case it is the 
body that constitutes this potentiality, that which defers any final installation of the text 
within the 'rights of reality' until the point of death, that which defines life itself as a mode of 
potentiality, of self-overcoming. Both of these writers, in spite of their apparent differences, 
accept the speculative nature of the value that Derrida assigns to writing and thus accept that 
textuality is inhabited by two irresolvable and inescapable possibilities. Consequently, 
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Derrida' s attempt to resolve one textual possibility in favour of the other, while ignoring the 
philosophical consequences of the speculative nature of his theory of writing, leads to a 
premature installation of the text within the 'rights of reality'. This is nowhere more apparent 
than in the case of Beckett, who offers the most overt example of the dangers of an uncritical 
acceptance of the validity of Derridean theory in contemporary literary studies, his writings 
often being seen as wholly concurring with the deconstructive contention that writing has 
ontological primacy over reality, this being an effect of the auto-deconstructive nature of 
these texts Nevertheless, it is Beckettian textuality which most overtly reveals the 
impossibility of escaping the speculative nature of this position, this position being 
constantly contested, not as a result of the author's implication in a metaphysical tradition or 
as the result of any polemical desire on the part of the writer to establish an extra-textual 
'reality', but as a result of the fact that a specifically material reality continually haunts the 
text in the same manner that writing, for Derrida, haunts 'reality'. It is not Beckett that 
contests the ontological primacy of writing over reality, resisting the final deconstruction that 
would install the text within the 'rights of reality', but the Beckettian text, and it does so in 
spite of the author's (or his textual proxies) wishes. This is why Beckett constitutes such an 
important figure in any examination of the textual 'usurpation' of reality, for if 
deconstruction cannot confront the questions that a figure as amenable as Beckett raises in 
relation to writing's 'rights to reality' (this not being a question of a metaphysical bias, but of 
writing itself) then we must re-examine the anti-metaphysical prejudices on which the 
Derridean notion of textuality rests. Most notably, we must examine the possibility that the 
logos has not been seen as the solution to the irresolvable question of reality, but rather, has 
been acknowledged as the very cause of the problem itself 
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CHAPTER l 
THE QUESTION OF WRITING: PLATO, MYTH, AND THE ENCHANTMENTS OF REALITY 
1 
THE DIALOGIC TEXT 
The historical usurpation and the theoretical oddity that install the image 
within the rights of reality are determined as the forgetting of a simple origin .. 
. The violence of forgetting. Writing, a mnemotechnic means, supplanting 
good memory, spontaneous memory, signifies forgetfulness. It is exactly what 
Plato said in the Phaednts, comparing writing to speech as hypomnesis to 
mm?me, the auxiliary aide-memoire to the living memory. Forgetfulness 
because it is a mediation and the departure of the logos from itself Without 
writing, the latter would remain within itself Writing is the dissimulation of 
the natural, primary, and immediate presence of sense to the soul within the 
logos. Its violence befalls the soul as unconsciousness. Deconstructing this 
tradition will not therefore consist of reversing it, of making writing innocent. 
Rather of showing why the violence of writing does not befall an innocent 
language. There is an originary violence of writing because language is first . . 
. writing. "Usurpation" has always already begun. (Grammatology 36-37) 
Derrida thus links Plato to the self-erasing usurpation which is the arche-trace, 
writing constituting that which has always already deconstructed the distinction between the 
rememoration of the logos and the production of the logos. As Derrida subsequently 
recognises in "Plato's Pharmacy" 1, it is the Phaedrul- which inaugurates the history of 
logocentrism, it being ""Platonism," which sets up the whole of Western Metaphysics in its 
conceptuality" ("Plato's Pharmacy" 76). It is this work which constitutes an initial 
recognition that writing's ability to [re ]produce its origin without the necessity of this origin 
places the essentiality which is the logos in jeopardy, thus demanding the repression of 
writing which will subsequently characterise Western metaphysics. Yet, as Derrida 
recognises, it is also the Phaedn1s which reveals how this repression admits writing into the 
space which Plato would attempt to reserve for the living voice of the philosopher, thus 
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demonstrating that the usurpation of the origin and the installation of the text within the 
"rights of reality" have always already occurred. The "affirmation of the being-outside of the 
outside" which is writing (that which is, as the Phaedrus asserts, "external" (275a)) leads to 
the rupture that is "its injurious intrusion into the inside" ("Plato's Pharmacy" 158), or rather 
to the exteriorising movement of the arche-trace which reveals that this rupture has always 
been at work. 
Derrida's interrogation of the Platonic voice centres around the myth of Theuth and 
Thamus, as articulated within the Phaedrus by Socrates. Theuth, the Egyptian god of 
"number and calculation, geometry and astronomy, as well as the games of checkers and 
dice, and, above all else, writing" (274c-d), approaches Thamus, the king of the gods, in 
order to display his inventions with a view to their adoption by mankind as a whole, an 
adoption which evidently requires the assent of this paternal figure. In regards to writing 
Theuth asserts: "0 King, here is something that, once learned, will make the Egyptians wiser 
and will improve their memory; I have discovered a potion (pharmakon) for memory and for 
wisdom" (274e). The word pharmakon is that from which Derrida's interrogation takes its 
trajectory, a polyseme which can mean, amongst other things, both remedy and poison. 
Thamus' rejection of writing on the basis that it represents hupomnesis, mere repetition 
without knowledge or "the appearance of wisdom" rather than its "reality" (275a), translates 
Theuth's designation of pharmakon as remedy to that of poison. Yet this translation is, of 
course, ironic when one considers that writing has been adopted by mankind, the myth itself 
being a mere hupomneme, a repetition without knowledge: 
One should note . . . that what writing will later be accused of - repeating 
without knowing - here defines the very approach that leads to the statement 
and determination of its status. One thus begins by repeating without knowing 
- through the myth - the definition of writing, which is to repeat without 
knowing. ("Plato's Pharmacy" 74-75) 
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As Socrates implicitly admits in enacting Thamus through mythology, this repressive origin 
has never existed apart from the pharmakon that he seeks to repress, the figure of Thamus 
being a hupomnemic effect of writing, of mythology. Thamus, therefore, has always already 
been poisoned, there being no such origin in the absence of the usurping representation, the 
hupomneme, which logically precedes this origin: this repressive origin succumbs to the 
Lethean properties of the pharmakon in the very act of being identified. Accordingly, Theuth, 
in the act of presenting writing to the paternal figure of the king, is revealed to be the son 
who has always already usurped the place of the father; he is the origin of the origin, the 
pharmaceutical writing at/of the origin that allows the mythological figure of 
'uncontaminated' orality to exist. 
Mythology and writing thus coincide for both imply the absence of the origin even as 
both are the means through which this 'origin' continues to 'exist' as a signifier. Socrates, in 
merely identifying writing as a historical 'presence', acknowledges it as that which has erased 
Thamus' authoritative presence, simultaneously acknowledging that Thamus is a myth that 
inherently admits of this erasure, mythology being the only means through which Socrates 
can reconstitute this supposedly self-present figure. Analogously, Plato utilises writing in 
order to reconstitute the authoritative figure of Socrates, he who also represses writing. In 
this light, Socrates himself, like Thamus, is revealed to have succumbed to the pharmakon 
through his act of repression, being another mythological representation of uncontaminated 
orality which relies on writing for its very 'existence'. Plato's utilisation of the notion of 
"writing in the soul" as a metaphor for the self-presence of the voice, is therefore deeply 
ironic, for, like writing as a mythologisation of the origin, it signifies Socrates' implication in 
the pharmaceutical text, the constant repetition without knowledge, the hupomnesis which 
defines the self-present origin as an empty signifier, the myth which is the written subject: 
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SOCRATES: Now tell me, can we discern another kind of discourse, a 
legitimate brother of this one? Can we say how it comes about, and how it is 
by nature better and more capable? 
PHAEDRUS: Which one is that? How do you think it comes about? 
SOCRATES: It is a discourse that is written down, with knowledge, in the soul 
of the listener; it can defend itself, and it knows for whom it should speak and 
for whom it should remain silent. 
PHAEDRUS: You mean the living, breathing discourse of the man who knows, 
of which the written one can be fairly called an image. 
SOCRATES: Absolutely right. (276a-b) 
It is the identification of writing with the mere image of knowledge rather than with 
knowledge itself that renders Plato's metaphor for the soul more than a metaphor. This 
'metaphor' represents and embodies (two terms that can no longer be distinguished) the 
articulation of the self through, or rather, as writing. It signifies that knowledge and the self, 
like Thamus, can only exist through the writing that facilitates both, the usurping supplement 
which is a pre-condition of any 'origin'. 
At very the advent of writing as a significant force in Western history then, the self-
erasing rupture that is the arche-trace exteriorises the eternal absence at the origin, the 
usurpation of Thamus necessarily admitting of its own mythological status. This rupture 
consequently overflows its bounds, usurping the logocentric notions of "[f]orgetfulness", 
"living memory" or the "natural, primary, and immediate presence of sense to the soul" and 
replacing them with a hupomnemic play of signification, a 'memory' without an origin, a 
myth without source. Plato, therefore, must take on the authoritative role of the father, of the 
law ('logos' designating the law as well as speech) that re-imposes itself in light of this 
transgression thus reinstating the logos through a repression of writing. It is this which makes 
Plato such a significant figure in the history of metaphysics, for at the 'originary' point of 
repression he exteriorises writing's usurpatory status, its status as a pre-condition of this 
38 
repressive logos. Plato may assume the authoritative role of the father and yet it is writing 
which allows him to do so, writing mediating this assumption just as myth mediates Thamus' 
repression of hupomnesis, just as our awareness of the repression of writing in the Phaedrus 
is mediated by the written text that we hold in our hands. The Platonic intention is undercut 
at every point, there being no escape from writing. As Derrida asks in indicating the self-
deconstructing nature ofPlato's authority: 
What law governs this "contradiction," this opposition to itself of what is said 
against writing, of a dictum that pronounces itself against itself as soon as it 
finds its way into writing, as soon as it writes down its self identity and carries 
away what is proper to it against this ground of writing? ("Plato's Pharmacy" 
158) 
It is in the Phaedrus that the logocentric tradition is initiated even as it is the Phaedrus which 
reveals that this tradition, and the logos itself, can only exist by virtue of the very writing that 
it represses: 
. . . what seems to inaugurate itself in Western literature with Plato will not 
fail to re-edit itself at least in Rousseau, and then in Saussure. In these three 
cases, in these three "eras" of the repetition of Platonism, which gave us a new 
thread to follow and other knots to recognize in the history of philosophia or 
the episteme, the exclusion and the devaluation of writing must somehow, in 
their very affirmation, come to terms with: 
1. a generalised sort of writing and, along with it, 
2. a "contradiction": the written proposal of logocentrism; the simultaneous 
affirmation of the being-outside of the outside and of its injurious 
intrusion into the inside: 
3. the construction of a "literary" work. Before Saussure's Anagrams, there 
were Rousseau' s; and Plato's work, outside and independent of its 
logocentric "content," which is then only one of its inscribed "functions," 
can be read in its anagrammatical texture. 
Thus it is that the "linguistics" elaborated by Plato, Rousseau, and Saussure 
must both put writing out of the question and yet nevertheless borrow from it, 
for fundamental reasons, all its demonstrative and theoretical resources. 
("Plato's Pharmacy" 158-59) 
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Yet if the logocentric tradition continually borrows its resources from writing then it 
is equally clear that writing borrows from the logocentric tradition. It is, after all, Plato's 
attempt to enforce the law which allocates writing its philosophical value as that which 
continually resists the law, thus exteriorising its full significance. Similarly, it is Thamus' 
attempt to repress the hupomneme which is writing which assigns the hupomnemic status of 
the myth of Thamus its theoretical significance. There is, therefore, a question of whether 
writing facilitates the Platonic assumption of logocentric authority or whether this 
assumption facilitates the opening up of the field of writing, for few could doubt that the 
Phaedrus, as a "written proposal of logocentrism", constitutes an irresistible attraction for 
the deconstructive critic. Is not a "the written proposal of logocentrism" a little too obvious a 
contradiction for a writer as sophisticated as Plato to overlook? The questions mount up. 
How could Plato exteriorise this significance without performing the repression which allows 
it to be exteriorised? Does not the necessity of this repression merely foreshadow the 
necessity of Derrida logocentrically positing the origin and its usurpation in the form of the 
arche-trace, that which opens up the economy of the text? Derrida's criticism of Platonic 
logocentrism, and his charge that the Phaedrus is the inaugural text in "the greatest totality . 
. . within which are produced, without ever posing the radical question of writing, all the 
Western methods of analysis, explication, reading, or interpretation" (Grammatology 46) is 
based on the assumption that Plato was unaware of the ironies of the Phaedrus, the points of 
contradiction which allow, or alternatively, invite a dialogic intervention in the text and the 
consequent exteriorisation of this text's auto-deconstructive nature. In actuality, such a 
reading is contrary the whole spirit of the Phaedrus, it not being the case that the 
construction of this work exists "outside and independent of its logocentric "content"" but 
that this content wilfully interacts with the performativity of its written constitution. As will 
become apparent, writing, for Plato, does not constitute the factor that incessantly contests 
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logocentrism but rather, is that which facilitates logocentrism. The logos or the origin in 
question is, ultimately, material reality, this being the potentiality that is incessantly revealed 
by writing, a potentiality which writing can neither affirm nor deny. 
2 
WRITING AND ORALITY 
In order to fully appreciate the implications of Plato's view of writing it is necessary 
to appreciate that the Platonic dialogue occurs at a historical point when the traditional role 
of the oral poet was being replaced by writing. This also has implications for the Platonic 
conception of mythology for as Luc Brisson has demonstrated in his extensive contextual 
analysis of Plato's use of the term muthos, the term is synonymous with the notion of an oral 
literature within the Platonic oeuvre3 In a pre-literate society the oral poet acts as the 
medium through which not only history but paideia itself is transmitted, the encyclopaedic 
memory of the poet acting as a means of preserving the social heritage. As Eric Havelock 
asserts, for the Hellene 
[t]his over-all body of experience (we shall avoid the word 'knowledge') is 
incorporated in a rhythmic narrative or set of narratives which he memorises 
and which is subject to recall in his memory. Such is poetic tradition, 
essentially something he accepts uncritically, or else it fails to survive in his 
living memory. Its acceptance and retention are made psychologically possible 
by a mechanism of self-surrender to the poetic performance, and of self-
identification with the situations and the stories related in the performance. 
Only when the spell is fully effective can his mnemonic powers be fully 
mobilised. His receptivity to the tradition has thus, from the standpoint of 
inner psychology, a degree of automatism which however is counterbalanced 
by a direct and unfettered capacity for action, in accordance with the 
paradigms he has absorbed. (198-99) 
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As this quotation suggests, the oral tradition acted as an essential means of socialisation, a 
means which could only be questioned at the expense of endangering the continuity of Greek 
culture itself and, therefore, the cohesive society which was founded on this culture. In such a 
society, epistemological resources are almost indistinguishable from the social memory itself, 
and these resources are dedicated almost exclusively to the maintenance of the body of 
knowledge which constitutes the social archive. This maintenance however is continually 
predicated on the relevance of this knowledge to the current social context, a factor that 
prevents knowledge from remaining in a state of suspension as elements of it are modified or 
discarded, a process that constitutes the process of mythologisation. As Havelock asserts: 
"The living memory preserves what is necessary for present life. It slowly discards what has 
become wholly irrelevant. Yet it prefers to remodel rather than discard. New information and 
new experience are continually grafted on to inherited models" (122). It is this process which 
constitutes the point at which orality and writing converge, for the oral poet, who acts as the 
voice of a past which is always present by virtue of this mythology, must, nevertheless, 
maintain the unquestionable authority of paideia, and the most convenient method of doing 
so is to render himself absent from his own voice. He thus enacts his recitation as the product 
of divine inspiration, as indicated by a traditional supplication to the muse such as in 
Homer's Iliad: "Rage - Goddess, sing the rage of Peleus' son Achilles ... " (1.1 ). As 
Socrates puts it in speaking of Homer in the Jon4, the poet has 
[a] divine power that moves you, as a "Magnetic" stone moves iron rings. . . . 
This stone not only pulls those rings, if they're iron, it also puts power in the 
rings, so that they in turn can do just what the stone does - pull other rings -
so that there's sometimes a very long chain of iron pieces and rings hanging 
from one another. And the power in all of them depends on this stone. In the 
same way, the Muse makes some people inspired herself, and then through 
those who are inspired a chain of other enthusiasts is suspended. You know, 
none of the epic poets, if they're good, are masters of their subject; they are 
inspired, possessed, and that is how they utter all those beautiful poems. 
(533d-534a) 
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The oral poet, in abdicating responsibility over his own words, thus reinforces the authority 
of his voice, allowing that voice to harmonise with social practice. This voice is, therefore, 
monologic both in the sense that it is removed from the vagaries of human interaction, and in 
the sense that it has no 'present' speaker; it remains the supremely impersonal voice of 
mythology itself, a voice which cannot, therefore, be interrogated or disrupted. In this respect 
poetic form is all important, for the rhythmic articulation of meaning not only acts as an 
important mnemonic device for the poet, but it also gives his poetry its hypnotic power, its 
power to seduce an audience. This audience passively acquiesces to an ecstatic loss of self 
which both reinforces the impression that this poetry divinely inspired, and prevents any 
interrogation of the social heritage, by erasing the space between present and past, voice and 
audience. This past, the social heritage, is, therefore, not so much a body of knowledge which 
can be interrogated, but an experience which is communally and unquestionably lived 
through hupomnesis, enacting myth as a presence which masks its status as the historical 
outcome of a constantly changing social context, its status as repetition without knowledge. 
As Timothy Clark asserts: 
Memory is not primarily an individual faculty in this context, but a function of 
a communal transformation. . . . Memory does not call to mind an image of 
the past. It names a general transformation that carries poet and auditor to 
another, eo-temporal aspect of reality, the realm of myth, legend, fame- not 
so much the past as the realm of all meaning per se, of all that perdures in the 
space where language of cultural self-definition continually speaks itself. ( 42) 
Oral poetry may be the space of cultural self-definition but it cannot be seen to be the space 
of cultural re-definition, an awareness that would reveal its hupomnemic status and erode its 
socialising effects. It is, therefore, the hypnotic power of poetic form, the repetitive rhythm 
that leads to a loss of self, thus inducing the "eo-temporal aspect of reality", that gives the 
experienced heritage its divine authority. 
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The effect of the introduction of writing, however, is to remove the encumbrance of 
maintaining and authorising this heritage. This heritage is no longer sustained by its 
embodiment in society, or the psyche which is educated into this tradition, but in writing 
itself Writing, therefore, is the medium that divorces the subject from the mythologised 
history that had previously shaped his awareness of the world, initiating, in Havelock's 
terms, the separation of "the knower from the known" (197-214 passim), the subject of 
knowledge from the object of knowledge. This object can then be analysed and questioned 
rather than merely lived, as knowledge becomes a dialogue rather than a seductive 
monologue which masks its status as process. It is on this point that the Plato's Phaedrus 
would appear to resist Havelock's theory, writing for Plato constituting a continuance of the 
oral tradition in many respects. Socrates suggests that writing replicates the unquestionable 
authority of the oral poet's voice, comparing writing to "the offsprings of painting" which 
. . . stand there as if they were alive, but if anyone asks them anything, they 
remain most solemnly silent. The same is true of written words. You'd think 
they were speaking as if they had some understanding, but if you question any 
thing that has been said because you want to learn more, it continues to signify 
just that same thing forever. (275d-e) 
Evidently writing, like oral poetry, constantly enacts an ever-present or eo-temporal 
experience, there being no dialogue with writing and thus no means of contesting the 
authority of the 'past' that it presents. The repetitious nature of this textual past is enacted in 
or as the Phaedrus itself: the originary repression of writing by Thamus is being repeated by 
Socrates in the very act of articulating the myth and this repression is being performed by the 
Platonic text even as we articulate this text in the reading situation. Such repression of 
course, is undercut by its own written status. Yet it must be noted that the reader cannot be 
overtly conscious of this written status at the moment of articulation. Any overt cognisance 
of one's sensible experience of this text is, at this point, usurped by the purely intelligible 
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content of the narrative with which one is concerned. As this suggests, we also ecstatically 
abdicate any overt awareness of ourselves in favour of the presence of the originary 'voice' 
of Thamus, the text usurping any present sense of selfhood: ". . . it will introduce 
forgetfulness into the soul of those who learn it . . . they will put their trust in writing, which 
is external and depends on signs that belong to others, instead of trying to remember from the 
inside, completely on their own" (275b ). What is in question in this remark is not writing or 
meaning itself, the usurpatory nature of this 'written' 'voice' indicating a breach between the 
"external" and the "inside" which reveals that there has never been a dividing between the 
two or an originary 'self to forget5 . What is in question rather is the particular meaning in 
question, the meaningful content which is remembered "from the inside" in that it 
corresponds with one's own apparent experience of the world, with one's own history rather 
than with that of "others". This history (e.g. one's experiential knowledge that writing has 
not been repressed, that it historically exists) is also usurped by the 'voice' that we 
experience at the moment of reading the Phaedrus, this corresponding to the very repression 
(e.g. by Thamus) that is occurring in the content of this 'voice'. The reader, in the very act of 
articulating the written myth of Thamus, thus unconsciously assumes the status of Thamus, 
repressing any awareness that this usurpation has occurred in reading the text and being 
transported to a past in which the voice has not yet been usurped6 . One can thus see the myth 
of Thamus as being a mythological reflection of the reader's position at the moment of 
reading, their failure to recognise the hupomnemic status of the text at this point being 
reflected in the myth's failure to acknowledge that Theuth has usurped Thamus. This silence, 
moreover, is merely indicative of Thamus' authoritative currency as a mythological 
presence, a currency which allows him to erase, to repress, writing as a historical reality and, 
more importantly, as a present historical reality. 
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The text thus represses its own written presence in precisely the same manner that the 
oral poet represses his own 'presence' as a means of lending authority to the voice of a 
mythological past. Yet, as has been suggested, the 'absence' of the poet from his inspired 
voice, that which would appear to transmit eternal truths, is a mere apparency since this voice 
alters as the present social context requires. This ability to alter in order to fit in with the 
current social context is the process of mythologisation, and it is notable that this process 
ceases on the introduction of writing, as modem textual versions of Homeric myth testify. As 
Luc Brisson puts it in his examination ofPlatonic myth: 
Plato's testimony on myth is ... balanced on a razor's edge. At the turning 
point between two civilizations, one founded on orality and the other on 
writing, Plato in fact describes the twilight of myths. In other words, Plato 
describes that moment when, in ancient Greece in general and at Athens in 
particular, memory changes; if not in its nature, then at least in its means of 
functioning. A memory shared by all the members of a community is now 
opposed by a memory which is the privilege of a more limited number of 
people: those for whom the use of writing is a matter of everyday habit. A 
memory condemned to transforming what it repeats is challenged by a 
mnemonic activity which consists in storing and faithfully reproducing a 
specific passage. A memory for which all repetition is equal to a re-creation is 
confronted with a memory for which the past - objectified by writing -
constitutes a given fact. (38-39) 
As Socrates' assertion that writing "continues to signify just that same thing forever" 
suggests, one cannot apply the processive nature of mythology to writing. The apparent 
incontestability of the poet's voice is transformed into a genuine incontestability of the 
written text that objectifies the past. Writing thus accounts for "the transition from muthos to 
logos, from "oral tradition" to "critical historiography"''(xxiii) 7, logos here designating "a 
discourse which must be based solely on reason, that is, without any recourse to experience .. 
. . a discourse which claims to attain certitude and universality" (Brisson 11 )8 Moreover, the 
absence that lies at the heart of writing is a genuine absence rather than the feigned absence 
of the oral poet, he who is in dialogue with the present social context and is always 
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potentially open to dialogic interrogation by his audience. As Plato overtly acknowledges, 
this potentiality does not exist in the case of the text, it being the genuine absence which 
allows the text to incessantly repeat itself: writing articulates an unchanging myth of the 
origin, the unchanging myth of Thamus being replicated by Socrates, Plato, and by the reader 
in the act of reading. More accurately however a reversal occurs, for while the content of this 
myth (the characters involved) change, its form and its function (the repression of writing) 
remains the same, unlike oral mythology in which the characters remain the same even as the 
form and function alters to suit the present social context. Similarly, where writing transports 
the reader to the past which bears no relation to the present context (e.g. a realm in which the 
usurpation of the origin by writing has yet to occur), the past to which the poet's audience is 
transported is always covertly subject to the demands of the present, the poet actually 
transporting the past into a present social context. 
It is in recognising these similarities and dissimilarities between the role of writing in 
the Phaedrus and the role of myth in the oral tradition that we begin to appreciate the true 
nature of the pharmakon for Plato, a nature that becomes apparent in Socrates' discussion of 
the myth of Orithuia. When Phaedrus, Socrates' partner in the dialogue, asks "isn't it from 
somewhere near this stretch of the Ilisus that people say Boreas carried Orithuia away?" 
(229b ), and goes on to question Socrates' views with regards to the veracity of the myth 
(229c ), Socrates asserts that he could reject it as the more rationalistic citizens do, adding an 
explanation of the myth in the rationalistic style; yet he ultimately asserts that he accepts 
"what is generally believed" (230a) since he believes that it is more urgent to know oneself 
before investigating such matters. Derrida, while recognising that this is not the absolute 
rejection of myths, but the "not bothering with them, in order to free oneself for the relation 
with oneself and the pursuit of self knowledge" ("Plato's Pharmacy" 68) nevertheless 
interprets it as a "send-off of myths" ("Plato's Pharmacy" 72), the repression of 
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the mythologeme which is writing, a repressiOn which cannot be its negation, smce it 
inevitably admits writing in the act of repression. For Derrida this is indicated by the fact that 
Orithuia is playing with Pharmaceia when she is blown, by Boreas, into the abyss, an 
enactment of the Lethean properties of a writing that erases the self-presence of 'living' 
discourse: "Through her games, Pharmacia has dragged down to death a virginal purity and 
an unpenetrated interior" ("Plato's Pharmacy" 70). Derrida, however, fails to note the precise 
nature of the games which are involved here, for Socrates does not give myth itself the "send-
off', as is suggested his acceptance of what is "generally believed", and his subsequent 
utilisation of the myth of Thamus. Socrates accepts mythology in the same way that the 
audience would unquestioningly accept it if it were articulated by the monologic poet, 
saying, in relation to these myths, that he looks "not into them" (230a). Socrates, therefore, 
specifically rejects any dialogue with mythology, any attempt at a rational explanation of its 
origins. It is this question of the truth which lies behind myth, the question of the origin, 
which, for Socrates, constitutes the pharmakon. The single reference to Pharmaceia in the 
Phaedrus occurs in Socrates' rational explanation of the myth and it is these explanations of 
myth, not myth itself, which constitute the game in question: 
Now, Phaedrus, such explanations are amusing enough, but they are a job for 
a man I cannot envy at alL He'd have to be far too ingenious and work too 
hard - mainly because after that he will have to go on and give a rational 
account of the form [ eidos] of the Hippocentaurs, and then of the chimera; and 
a whole flood of Gorgons and Pegasuses and other monsters, in large numbers 
and absurd forms, will overwhelm him. Anyone who does not believe in them, 
who wants to explain them away and make them plausible by means of some 
sort of rough ingenuity, will need a great deal oftirne. (229d-e) 
The phrase "a great deal of time" is, perhaps, an understatement, as Plato recognises, for in 
giving a rational account of these origins one is attempting to formalise the absence which 
lies at the heart of all myths rather than accepting the present relevance of the myth, its truth 
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value rather than its underlying truth. In other words, one is attempting to existentially enact 
the very absence which defines mythology as mythology, an enactment which would be the 
erasure of mythology into facticity. Yet absence, by its very nature, is the space of de-
contextualisation which permits everything, being that which underlies every mythologeme, 
every signifier: it is therefore every signifier which must be explained, a process which is 
infinite by virtue of the infinite potentiality of absence itself This process, moreover, 
ultimately reduces every signifier to insignificance since every signifier, no matter what its 
particular form or its truth value, will ultimately be a formal repetition of the absence from 
which it is derived, just as the 'absent' figure of Thamus is repeated in the substitutional 
figures of Socrates, of Plato, of the reader. One could compare all of these figures to 
Orithuia, for all are swept away in this repetition, forgetting themselves as they are usurped 
by the timeless origin which is insistently reconstituted by the text. They are rendered, even 
in their own presence, a repetition without knowledge, their awareness of themselves, of the 
present, being subsumed into the space of the absent or mythological origin. Socrates thus 
demonstrates the pharmaceutical nature of the question of the truth of origin via the myth of 
Thamus, he who reduces all of these figures to the repetitive trace of an origin which has 
either never existed or, indifferently, which no longer exists (this being the pharmaceutical 
question of which we are speaking). As Socrates says in introducing the myth, in 
administering this pharmakon to Phaedrus: "I can tell you what I've heard the ancients said, 
though they alone know the truth. However, if we could discover that ourselves, would we 
still care about the speculations of other people?" (274c). In contrast, Socrates, in answering 
Phaedrus' inquiry about the truth of the myth of Orithuia (229c ), refuses to succumb to the 
pharmak.on which is being administered to him: he asserts that it is pointless to look into this 
question (229e-230a), giving the question of the origin, not mythology itself, the "send-off' 
("Plato's Pharmacy" 72). 
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In drawing his parallels between mythology and writing, Socrates points to the futility 
of entering into a rational dialogue with a discourse which has a genuine absence at the origin 
as opposed to the merely apparent absence through which the oral poet maintains the 
authority of his voice. In entering into this dialogue one subordinates any distinct 
mythological content, and thus the truth value of the myth, to the ever-present form which is 
myth itself This view can be compared to Derrida's deconstructive approach to textuality, 
that which subjugates the apparent intention of the text to that text's written status, it not 
being a question of what the text says, its content, but of what the text does, its form. As 
Socrates puts it in admonishing Phaedrus for his doubts about the veracity of the myth of 
Thamus, one should "listen to an oak or even a stone, so long as it was telling the truth, while 
it seems to make a difference to you, Phaedrus, who is speaking and where he comes from. 
Why, though, don't you just consider whether what he says is right or wrong?" (275b-c). As 
this remark implies, Socrates no more gives writing the "send-off' than he gives mythology 
the "send-off', for one cannot deny hupomnesis. It is, rather, the question of the origin of 
writing which is being repressed here, the question of its mythological or hupomnemic status 
rather than this status itself This mythological or hupomnemic status (a status which, let us 
not forget, is defined in relation to the question of the origin) is inconsequential for Socrates, 
the form being subordinate to the content of the myth (the truth value of which is not 
dependent on the origin). The fact that Thamus' repressive criticisms of writing are 
mythological or that the Phaednts' criticisms of writing are written criticisms does not 
invalidate or negate the value of these criticisms, and neither does the fact that the origin of 
these criticisms has never verifiably existed: indeed, we have seen that Plato uses the 
mythological or written form as a means of demonstrating the incessant repetition of the 
empty formality of this 'absent' origin, thus exhibiting that these criticisms are valid. It is in 
refusing to address the insignificant question of the origin (or in addressing it only so that he 
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can demonstrate this insignificance) that Plato most sharply differs from Derrida, he whose 
whole oeuvre is centred around the question of the validity of the logos. In light of this 
awareness it is unsurprising that Derrida should choose this particular Platonic text as being 
the most amenable to deconstructive analysis, this being a text which performatively and 
knowing reveals the consequences of delving into the question of the origin, that which is, as 
the Phaedrus reveals, inseparable from the question of writing. 
Plato, however, clearly has a different view of the performance in question from that 
of Derrida, even as he is fully aware of the ironies on which Derrida rests his case. Indeed, 
one can read the Phaedrus as a self-consciously performative embodiment of precisely the 
view of writing that Derrida outlines, a pharmaceutical temptation which leads to a 
demonstration of dangers of this path, just as Socrates presents Phaedrus the pharmaceutical 
temptation which is the myth of Thamus. As the Phaedrus reveals, it is in shifting the 
question of mythology away from its contextual truth to the question of the origin that the 
interrogator transforms to myth an incontestable repetition of the origin: within the Phaedms, 
every figure (including the reader) is capable of assuming this status, and Thamus (however 
he is presented) thus remains in place in spite of, or because of, his absence, incessantly re-
enacting the repression of writing and its historical presence, right up to, and including, the 
moment of reading. For Plato, therefore, the pharmakon 's Lethean properties lie not in its 
power to dissolve any origin in a process of dissemination, but in its power to petrify the past 
as a mythological or written form, this petrifaction being the destruction of the 'living voice', 
that which is subject to dialogic intervention in the same way that the present social context 
dialogically intervenes the mythology of oral poetry. Orithuia's game with Pharmaceia, it 
should be noted, ends in the stasis of death, the end of play, but only in Socrates' rationalistic 
explanation of the origin: in the myth, a myth that Socrates accepts as a hupomneme that is 
subject to the demands of the present, Orithuia lives on as the wife ofBoreas9 
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3 
UNDOING '11-IE VOICE: PLATONIC PSYCHO-ANALYSIS. 
Freud, in "Beyond the Pleasure Principle" 10 demonstrates an acute awareness of the 
erotic attractions of the thanatological factuality, the possibilities for self-authorisation, 
which Thamus represents in the Phaedrus. This factuality, like Thamus' repression of 
writing, is sustained by constantly reducing the self to formal repetition of an absent past, 
unconsciously repeating, in the very act of repression, that which it seeks to repress. Freud 
summarises this position in terms of the analysand who continually repeats the unconscious 
pain of the breach between self and origin, child and mother, in an attempt to master, through 
repetition and constant repression, this externally imposed incursion, thus retaining the 
immanent and homeostatic self-presence of the origin. As Freud asserts, recalling Plato's 
acceptance of the hupomnemic status of myth, the analysand "is obliged to repeat the 
repressed material as a contemporary experience instead of, as the physician would prefer to 
see, remembering it as something belonging to the past" (228). In the analytic situation, the 
opposition between repeating and remembering amounts to an opposition between 
performance and recognition, in the same manner that Thamus covertly performs his written 
status in the act of repressing writing without apparently recognising this fact. Similarly, the 
analysand constantly attempts to reduce present externality, that which represents the fact 
that the oedipal breach has occurred, to a replication of their original pre-oedipal state. In the 
analytic situation this repression of the present in favour of the past occurs through the 
process of transference, the attempted narcissistic reduction of the disruptive reality 
principle, as represented by the analyst, to a replication of the self, or, analogously, of the 
absent mother who cannot be differentiated from this pre-oedipal self, she who represents the 
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symbiosis self and externality. It is the role of the analyst to reveal the current impositions of 
reality and thus the repressed pain of the breach. Yet his intervention, of course, represents 
yet another reproduction of the oedipal breach which must be repressed: 
These reproductions, which emerge with such unwished for exactitude ... are 
invariably acted out in the sphere of transference, of the patients relation to the 
physician. When things have reached this stage, it may be said that the earlier 
neurosis has now been replaced by a fresh, 'transference neurosis' .... The 
physician as a rule cannot spare his patient this phase of the treatment. He 
must get him to re-experience some portion of his forgotten life, but must see 
to it, on the other hand, that the patient retains some degree of aloofness, 
which will enable him, in spite of everything, to recognise that what appears 
to be reality is in fact only a reflection of a forgotten past. (228) 
As the final sentence suggests, the mythological writing, the formal repetition through which 
the present is unconsciously petrified as past, can easily become a timeless factuality, an 
immanently present reality which must be recognised as a hupomneme. The acting out of the 
past in the transference neurosis is in itself evidence of the presence of this repetitive 
factuality, another repetition of the pre-oedipal status which erases or, rather, represses any 
awareness of the present, of its own status as the past, and of the fact that the oedipal breach 
has already occurred. This breach is never consciously remembered as past by virtue of the 
fact that it never escapes its own status as an inescapable presence, being the performance 
which, like writing, constantly represses that which it is repeating. Similarly, the genuine 
differences between the analysand and the analyst can be overcome, in transference, by 
virtue of the fact that the disruptive reality that the analyst represents can be repressed, 
subsumed into the immanent presence of the pre-oedipal self, thus becoming 
indistinguishable from the 'absence' which is the oedipal breach itself. It is this desired 
'absence' which manifests itself as the analysand's, ultimately autoerotic, attraction for the 
analyst, being a desire to erase oneself into the analyst or, indifferently, to erase the 
disruptive analyst into the pre-oedipal situation: such eroticism is, therefore, a denial of the 
53 
reality principle, being the analysand's means of retaining their homeostatic authority over 
reality. Paradoxically, however, in surrendering to this erotic attraction the analysand 
abdicates control over their own behaviour, becoming 'absent' from themselves in order that 
they can retain their absolute self-presence. This surrendering of the self to one's 
unconscious desires means that the role of the intelligible ego is simply to rationalise this 
process in order that the appearance of self-presence can be maintained. The true nature of 
the situation remains repressed and meaning, the analysand's words, become an empty 
performance which, no matter how they are formulated, will always ultimately signify the 
'absent' origin, the pre-oedipal situation, which the analysand seeks to retain. The pre-
oedipal origin, therefore, is that which is constantly re-performed in this rationalisation, 
being performed as this empty rationality. That this rationality is a product of the demands of 
one's own repressive behaviour, that which the ego can no longer control, is, ironically, the 
very means through which one's control over the self is confirmed, since the nature of one's 
rationalisation will always absolutely replicate this behaviour, giving the illusion of absolute 
authority over the self without revealing the true nature of this self surrender. Such an 
awareness would, in itself, represent a disruptive breach, a negation of one's authority. 
Socrates' interaction with Phaedrus, in the Phaedrus, clearly foreshadows this view of 
the psycho-analytic situation. As with the analyst, the repression of writing, of the present, 
and the hupomnemic status of the past, is precisely that which Socrates wishes to reveal to 
Phaedrus via the myth of Thamus. That Socrates leaves it to Phaedrus to realise the irony of 
the myth in question, the fact that Thamus is only present through the myth which denotes 
his erasure by the historical presence of writing, merely accentuates the fact that Socrates 
himself is ironically using the self-authorising nature of this repression in the very act of 
formulating the myth. As Socrates asserts in introducing the myth: "I can tell you what I've 
heard the ancients said, though they alone know the truth. However, if we could discover that 
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ourselves, would we still care about the speculations of other people?" (274c). In repressing 
the "truth" [alethes] of the past he allows himself to utilise its absence, inventing the 'myth' 
and bringing Thamus into being as a present 'truth' which, in turn, erases the reality of 
writing's historical existence and thus the usurpation of the origin. Yet, unlike Thamus, who 
represses his own implication in the immanence of writing in order to authorise his monadic 
form, Socrates enacts the myth as a transparency which obviously ignores the presence of 
writing. As far as Socrates is concerned this myth retains its truth value, Thamus' criticisms 
of writing being valid, yet it is obviously false in terms of its form or its function, the 
repression of writing which the myth implies clearly having never occurred. Socrates thus 
invites Phaedrus' dialogic intervention, an intervention that will reveal this overt repression 
of the disruptive presence of writing, the unrecognised disjunction between the content of the 
myth and the hupomnemic form of the myth itself Such an intervention would undo Thamus' 
status as a mythological voice, erasing its petrified form and enacting its content (the 
criticisms) as a living truth that is open to cross-examination. Socrates, in performing 
Thamus' repression of writing, is prompting the undoing of this performative repression, 
seducing Phaedrus into a dialogue which will undo the relevance of the factual or originary 
form of the mythological argument that its truth value (rather than its empirical or originary 
truth) can be revealed. Socrates thus reflects the manner in which the psychoanalyst induces 
the process of transference in the analysand in order to disrupt it. As Freud asserts in relation 
to the repressive process of transference, the analyst must get the patient to "re-experience 
some portion of his forgotten life" (228), the oedipal breach or, in this case, the breach 
between Thamus' self-present voice and writing which has self-evidently breached this 
voice. This breach, however, is always being repeated in the process of continually 
repressing the disruptive present. The performance, therefore, must be repeated with an 
appreciation of its true, contemporary relevance or, synonymously, its irrelevance to the 
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present 11 , in order that the analysand can undeniably relive this past in its present context as 
past. Socrates attempts to induce this appreciation by dialogically prompting Phaedrus to 
invoke the contemporary existence of writing, thus revealing the present irrelevance of 
Thamus and his repression (though not the irrelevance of his criticisms which retain their 
truth value). A recognition of the actuality of the performance, in contrast to the mere 
rational explication, is that which prompts a "sense of conviction of the correctness of the 
construction that has been communicated to him" (228) since it not only concretely reveals 
the irrelevance of this performance but simultaneously does so by revealing the relevance of 
the contemporary itself, that which is constantly repressed. If the patient can recognise that 
"what appears to be reality is . . . only a reflection of a forgotten past. . . . the patient's sense 
of conviction is won, together with the therapeutic success that is dependent on it" (228). 
The nature of the conviction in question here becomes evident when one reflects that 
the repression of the historical presence of writing by Thamus is also the repression of the 
present relevance, the truth value if not the truth, of his mythological voice. The truth value 
of Thamus' criticisms becomes irrelevant since their only purpose is to facilitate his 
repression of writing, that which allows him to retain his immanent facticity. This negation of 
the truth value of the voice's content, its reduction to a mere rationalisation of the repression 
that is being performed, leaves only the empty form of the performance itself, a performance 
which is incessantly and indistinguishably repeated by Thamus, by Socrates, by Plato, and by 
the reader in reading the Phaedrus. In this respect it is notable that the word hupomnesis is 
only used twice in the Phaedrus, once when Thamus represses writing on this basis, and 
once when Socrates accepts writing as hupomnesis. Socrates' acceptance does not alter the 
truth value of Thamus' criticisms of writing, merely highlighting the manner in which 
Thamus is instrumentally using this truth for his own ends, as a means of repressing writing 
that he can authorise himself as the static form. Valid content becomes indistinguishable 
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from invalid content by virtue of the fact that its only purpose is to act as the inert material 
which sustains the authorising replication of empty form. Indeed, one could say that this 
sophistic lack of conviction in one's own words distinguishes the rational from the tmth 
itself even when both refer to the same content, it being this inability to distinguish between 
the two (e.g. to discern whether Thamus' criticisms are sincere or merely instrumental) 
which means that the performance itself must be disrupted rather than the content. It is 
through this disruption that the true nature of this content can be recognised, and can be 
dialogically assessed on its own terms, rather than in terms of its instrumentalised form, its 
performative function. Indeed it is this recognition that opens content to interrogation, the 
possibility which constitutes the true status of content. It is for this reason that Freud asserts 
that the analysand's conviction in the true, hupomnemic status of the past can only be won 
through this performative disruption, allowing a recognition rather than a mere rationalised 
repetition of the hupomnemic truth as a temporal presence. 
It is this fact that explains the self-contradictory nature of the Platonic text: smce 
Plato ts writing Socrates' votce, this performance is the only means through which the 
written Socrates can undo the repression of writing, if Plato is not to succumb to the self-
contradiction. It is the self contradiction, the fact that a written Socrates is criticising writing, 
which unveils Socrates' status as writing, prompting the reader to fracture the narrative's 
facticity and recognise its true, hupomnemic, status. As in the case of Thamus, the content of 
the written Socratic discourse could give way to the lack of conviction which would replace 
the truth value of this content with the timeless rationality of Socrates' textualised 'voice', 
this rational content being absolutely substitutional so long as it serves the instrumental status 
of this repressive and seemingly self-present 'voice'. It is for this reason that the absence of 
Socrates must be acknowledged so that the content can be judged on its own terms, in terms 
of present truth value rather than in terms of its 'true' origins (written or otherwise): it is the 
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written status of the 'repressive' voice which constitutes this acknowledgement. Jasper P. 
Neel, in reflecting the Derridean view of the Phaedrus, inadvertently recalls the repression of 
writing by Thamus as a means of self-authorisation: 
In order to attack writing and sophistry, Plato becomes a writer and a sophist. 
This is disingenuous. . . . He has set out to define thought for humanity, and 
his strategy is more than disingenuousness; it is vicious, for he uses rhetoric 
and writing to define and then occupy the moral high ground, and then he tries 
to destroy the means he has used so that no one else can use that means again, 
not in 367 B.C., not ever. What Platonism offers in Phaedrus is not dialectic. 
What Platonism offers in Phaedrus is a continuous repetition of Platonism. 
(23) 
What Neel fails to appreciate is that the disingenuousness of the written voice, that which 
represses writing in order to retain its repetitive authority, is also the very reason that Plato 
criticises writing. If Plato did not succumb to this disingenuity in the Phaedrus, he would be 
disproving the very point that he is making about writing and, ironically, would then be 
disingenuous. It is only through the disingenuity which is the performance of writing that 
Plato can reveal the truth value of his own writing, a revelation which occurs in the blatant 
contradiction which is the Phaedrus. Ironically, when Neel asserts that this work does not 
offer dialectic but a continuous repetition of Platonism, he is himself entering into the very 
dialogue which this contradiction provokes and permits, removing the "moral high ground" 
of the authoritative Platonic voice, a self-authorisation which is facilitated by writing, and 
revealing its true status as the empty repetition which is writing: again, this is the very point 
that Plato is making. That the authorising lack of conviction which Neel perceives in the 
content of Plato's text should be derived from the written form of this text, reveals that it is 
content's lack of conviction in its own form which, paradoxically, gives the content of the 
text its conviction. Indeed that writing is then perceived as writing rather than as an 
inunanent authorial voice means that, in the absence of anything other than the text, this 
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conviction in its own lack of conviction is the only truth to which this written content can 
refer, being the only factor which remains continually relevant to the text's present status. 
Neel's inability to appreciate the functional nature of the Platonic disingenuity, and 
his consequent reduction of Plato to the same immanent status as Thamus, is replicated by 
Phaedrus' reaction to the myth. When Phaedrus recognises that the historical erasure of 
writing can only be explained if this myth is disingenuous invention, he admits the myth's 
status as a presence, chiding Socrates for being "very good at making up stories from Egypt 
or wherever else you want!" (275b). Nevertheless, unlike Neel, he fails to succumb to the 
self-contradiction that Socrates dangles before him, or to undo the myth's self-authorising 
repression of writing: he thus resists the reality principle, refusing to disrupt the repressive 
performance of transference that Socrates has induced, thus reducing Socrates' voice to the 
same monadic status as that of Thamus'. This fact, in itself, indicates how this repression 
permits the absolute conflation of Socrates and Thamus, author and myth, into the 
homeostatic presence which is permitted by the dead form of myth. Socrates, therefore, 
admonishes Phaedrus' identification of the myth with its author, asserting that the Priests of 
Dodona, and indeed, "( e )veryone who lived at that time" were willing "to listen to an oak or 
even a stone, so long as it was telling the truth, while it seems to make a difference to you, 
Phaedrus, who is speaking and where he comes from. Why, though, don't you just consider 
whether what he says is right or wrong?" (275b-c). That it is speech which is identified with 
this author merely demonstrates that this identification is facilitated by the reduction of 
writing to absence, reconstituting the voice as that of an immanent Author-God rather than 
that of an 'absent' poet who remains differentiated from the divinity that he enacts. Plato's 
identification of the author with a "stone", moreover, is just one instance in which a failure to 
disrupt the process of transference which writing initiates leads to a reduction of the self to 
the empty formality of matter, as we shall now see. 
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4 
THE MATERIAL PAST AND Tiffi EROTIC SCRIPT. 
That Plato regards the materiality of writing to be the basis of the speech writer's 
authority is evident from very beginning of the Phaedn1s. When Socrates encounters 
Phaedrus walking outside the city walls, Phaedrus explains that he has spent the morning 
listening to Lysias reciting a speech in which he exhorts a young man to favour the man who 
does not love him rather than the one who does. Yet when Socrates asks him to recite the 
speech, Phaedrus resists, claiming that it would be impossible for him to recite from memory 
a speech that Lysias had "took such time and trouble to compose" (228a), asserting, 
nevertheless, that he will gladly give him a "careful summary of its general sense" (228d). 
Socrates, however, reveals his awareness that Phaedrus is concealing the actual manuscript of 
the speech beneath his cloak, asserting that the whole point of Phaedrus' sojourn is to find a 
private place in which the speech can be memorised. Derrida correctly interprets this 
concealment as the repression of writing, a repression which reconfirms one's implication in 
writing. It is precisely this repression which draws Socrates from the city: 
Only the logoi en biblois, only words that are deferred, reserved, enveloped, 
rolled up, words that force one to wait for them in the form and under cover of 
a solid object, letting themselves be desired for the space of a walk, only 
hidden letters can thus get Socrates moving. If a speech could be purely 
present, unveiled, naked, offered up in person in its truth, without the detours 
of a signifier foreign to it, if at the limit an undeferred logos were possible, it 
would not seduce anyone. ("Plato's Pharmacy" 71) 
What Derrida fails to mention, however, is that Socrates' desire for writing, and his 
movement from the city, are not the reflexive actions of a figure caught up in the text, for 
Socrates is well aware of the erotic attractions of the pharmakon, an attraction which is 
undercut by his ironic patronisation ofPhaedrus: 
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... you, I think, have found a potion fpharmakon] to charm me into leaving. 
For just as people lead hungry animals forward by shaking branches of fruit 
before them, you can lead me all over Attica or any where else you like 
simply by waving in front of me the leaves of a book containing a speech. 
(230d-e) 
What attracts Socrates is not Phaedrus, but the book that he attempts to conceal, a repression 
that Socrates recognises as an attempt to repress writing in order to covertly authorise the 
monologic voice through writing. Socrates plays along with, rather than acquiesces to, 
Phaedrus' power to seduce, a power which is facilitated by his possession of the script: he 
artfully evades Phaedrus' exhortation to Socrates to "[l]ead the way" (227b) so that Phaedrus 
can retain his role as the leader (229b), the seductive and "most marvellous guide" (230c), a 
guide who wishes to conceal the script because he sees this as an opportunity to practise his 
"speechmaking" (228e) on Socrates, who is thereby relegated to his "training partner" 
(228e). The words, therefore, are not "under cover of a solid object", as Derrida asserts, for 
the solid object is under cover of Phaedrus' spoken words, as it always is in the act of 
reading. Phaedrus' concealment of the scroll is not seen, by Socrates, as a mere attempt to 
repress writing, but as an attempt to repress writing so that Phaedrus can appropriate the role 
of the scroll's author, or, more accurately, appropriate his authority, an attempt which can 
only succeed if both writing, and the original author, are reduced to an absence which cannot 
contest this authoritative voice. It is precisely the undisrupted vocal articulation, the 
immanent authority of the voice, which is confirmed by this repression of writing, a voice 
which cannot be interrogated by virtue of its speaker's absence, whether that speaker is 
defined as Lysias or Phaedrus. Phaedrus is the speaker who is erased from his own speech, a 
process which analogous to the oral poet erasing himself in order to maintain the 
unquestionable authority of his words, the unquestionable authority of originary voice. 
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Yet ifPhaedrus' attempts to appropriate the authority ofLysias' disembodied voice in 
hiding the scroll, specifically repressing the physicality of writing, then Socrates revokes the 
authority of this voice by undoing this repression. In doing so he reveals the isomorphic 
relationship between the purely intelligible presence of the author, Lysias, and the inert 
materiality of the writing, it being this inertness which acts as the absence that covertly 
sustains the author as a pure intelligibility: " ... I'll never, as long as Lysias himself is 
present, allow you to practise your own speechmaking on me. Come on, then, show me" 
(228d-e). The 'presence' of Lysias, as embodied by the script, is, of course, simultaneously 
undercut by the fact that the script merely indicates the emphatic absence of Lysias, the 
absence which permits Phaedrus to conceal the manuscript in the first place, thus enacting 
himself as the medium of Lysias' purely intelligible voice. This is why Socrates parodically 
performs his own repression of the materiality of writing, ironically identifying the script as 
Lysias in the very act of revealing the text's material presence. Like Thamus, Lysias has 
covertly negated himself into, and enacts himself through, the text only in order that the 
written status of this text can subsequently be repressed, a repression which leaves only the 
factual authority of a voice which will be always be identifiable as the purely intelligible 
presence of Lysias himself Yet it is the fact that this voice can only be purely intelligible by 
virtue of Lysias' absence which subsequently allows Phaedrus to appropriate this voice, an 
appropriation, however, which can only occur through Phaedrus' negation of his own 
intelligibility, the abdication of any responsibility for his own voice12 . It is this abdication, 
the continuing identification of the speech with the sensibly absent yet intelligibly present 
figure of Lysias which prevents any dialogic disruption of the authoritative voice, just as 
Socrates abdicates responsibility over his own words in attributing his criticisms of writing to 
the sensibly absent yet intelligibly present figure of Thamus (although Thamus' absence is of 
course feigned, Thamus actually being identifiable as Socrates himself). Phaedrus, therefore, 
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assumes the incontestable authority of the absent Lysias, absenting himself in order that he 
can assume this authority. Socrates' attribution of his own criticisms of writing to Thamus 
can be seen as a satirical reflection of this process, Socrates 'absenting' himself from his own 
voice via myth that he can lend authority to this voice through or as the purely intelligible 
figure ofThamus. In doing so Socrates is clearly parodying the role of the oral poet: 
To give life to ... imaginary beings and to summon the "beyond," the poet 
first produces a story which, through language, gives a picture of the beings 
who populate this other world. By totally identifYing himself with these 
beings, the poet alienates his own identity. He places in his own mouth the 
speech which these beings should utter and the sounds which they should 
emit. He even physically becomes these beings and, with the help of masks, 
he takes on their attitudes and postures, postures which are expressed by 
music and given rhythm by dance. When summoning the beyond, the whole 
bodies of the poet and of his interpreters are mobilized in the theatre and 
sanctuary. (Brisson 8) 
The humour of the dialogic situation in which the myth of Thamus is recited lies, of course, 
in the fact that beings who populate the "other world" in question are physically present, as 
they are present in the reading situation itself in the form ofthe book and the reader. Socrates 
and Phaedrus do not have to physically become these beings since they are already these 
beings, the difference between the mythological realm and the present situation being a mere 
apparency. 
Nonetheless, it is evident that the authoritative or univocal status of the voice is 
constituted by the absence of one's sensibility of the author, that which renders Lysias a 
purely intelligible presence, and the absence of the intelligibility of the speaker, that which 
renders Phaedrus a purely sensible presence. One could say that the authority that Phaedrus 
attempts to appropriate in hiding the script, therefore, is constituted by the appropriation of a 
purely intelligible past by a purely sensible presence. In concealing the script Phaedrus is 
substituting his material presence for that of the script itself, and in doing so is reducing 
himself to precisely the same material status as that script, being the inert means through 
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which Lysias sustains his purely intelligible presence. Moreover, the immanent authority of 
the purely intelligible figure of Lysias is also constituted by this reduction to the inert 
materiality of the script; it is this materiality which denotes his absence, the means through 
which his intelligible presence remains incontestable. The unresponsive script, therefore, 
incarnates an absent past, being a placebo for the sensible presence of the author (hence 
Socrates' identification of the script as Lysias); the script physically constitutes the very 
absence which renders Lysias' purely intelligible voice irrefutable, erotically representing the 
material possibility of absolute self-authorisation. This is significant precisely because, for 
Plato, "mythical beings cannot be apprehended by any sense. In Plato's work, they fall under 
the jurisdiction of the soul. . . . these realities cannot be apprehended by any of the senses . . 
." (Brisson 7-8). If Phaedrus moves into the space that this script represents in order to 
appropriate the timeless rationality of Lysias' voice, then it nevertheless remains apparent 
that this voice can never escape the vehicle of its transmission, of an audience's present, 
sensible awareness of its speaker. Indeed, this incontestable rationality and its ability to 
transform the means of transmission into the embodiment of an absent past, the space which 
promises self-authorisation, acts as the means of initiating the listener's erotic attraction to 
this present speaker no matter who he is: they desire to move into, and appropriate, the space 
in question, reducing themselves to this book/ this absent past that they can attain the 
incontestable self-presence, the pure intelligibility, that the voice promises. Such eroticism 
obviously bears comparison to the Freudian notion of Thanatos, the death drive. It is notable 
that Freud views the "compulsion to repeat" in the analytic situation, the attempt to retain or 
attain absolute self-authorisation by repeating or returning to the past, as a manifestation of 
this death drive, the instinctual "urge inherent in organic life to restore an earlier state of 
things which the living entity has been obliged to abandon under the pressure of external 
disturbing forces ... the expression of the inertia inherent in organic life" (244). This urge, 
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for Freud, is also the basis of the Eras, the "'instinct towards perfection"' (250) which drives 
the sexual libido: 
The ... instinct never ceases to strive for complete satisfaction .... No 
substitutive or reactive formations and no sublimations will suffice to remove 
the . . . instinct's persisting tension; and it is the difference in amount between 
the pleasure of satisfaction which is demanded and that which is actually 
achieved that provides the driving factor which will permit of no halting at 
any position attained, but in the poet's words, 'ungebandigt immer vorwdrts 
dringt' ['presses ever forward unsubdued 13 ']. (249) 
As will become evident, for Plato, it is the difference between the satisfaction that the written 
script or the mythological 'voice' promises and that which is actually achieved which 
sustains reading as a specifically erotic process in which the text is never finally installed 
within the 'rights of reality', this installation always being contested by the potentiality which 
is matter. 
The nature of this eroticism becomes apparent in the scopophilic nature of Socrates' 
feigned attraction to Phaedrus: 
It's a miracle, my friend; I'm in ecstasy. And it's all your doing Phaedrus: I 
was looking at you while you were reading and it seemed to me the speech 
had made you radiant with delight; and since I believe you understand these 
matters better than I do, I followed your lead, and following you I shared in 
your Bacchic frenzy (234d) 
This scopophilic attraction bears comparison to Socrates' subsequent explanation of eras in 
terms of the beloved acting as the vehicle through which the form of beauty reveals itself: " .. 
. we grasp it sparkling through the clearest of our senses. Vision, of course, is the sharpest of 
our bodily senses, although it does not see wisdom. It would awaken a terribly powerful love 
if an image of wisdom came through our sight as clearly as beauty does .. _" (250d). It is the 
image of wisdom, of the self-present rationality which the negation of Lysias/ Phaedrus into 
text facilitates, which is perceived in Phaedrus' reading. Phaedrus has inserted his own 
material presence into this space of negation, offering himself as the vehicle through which 
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divine wisdom becomes apparent. The speaker thus attains the erotic status of the materiality 
of writing itself, the present materiality which masks itself with the purely intelligible past, 
with the textualised voice. Phaedrus thus reduces himself to the timeless rationality that this 
materiality embodies. In utilising this rationality then, the speaker can simultaneously present 
himself to the audience as the erotic opportunity of self-negation and self-authorisation, two 
factors which, as the myth of Thamus demonstrates, are wholly identifiable. The audience, 
like Phaedrus, can only succumb to this covertly erotic temptation, for, since they cannot 
interrogate the speaker's voice, they can only submit to it, erasing their own intelligibility 
into that of the usurping voice. The voice cannot reformulate itself in reaction to 
interrogation and so the audience must reformulate themselves in terms of this apparent 
rationality: " ... whoever is persuaded by the myth surrenders his liberty, for he is led, 
without being fully aware of the fact, to modify his behaviour according to a system of 
inherited values which, by definition, is foreign to him" (Brisson 9). Even when the audience 
'misinterprets' the textualised voice, this misinterpretation will not be corrected, and, as such, 
will be accepted as a valid interpretation, as a 'truth' which is inherent within the voice, 
rather than as product of the listener's reinterpretation. Such writing transmits, as Brisson 
puts it, "unfalsifiable information" (10) and is therefore aligned with myth and the oral 
tradition, there being no means of affirming or denying the veracity of that which is, or 
appears to be, articulated14. This, indeed, is the seductive means through which the voice 
retains its incontestable, immanent rationality, enacting the lack of conviction (it would, in 
this context, be more accurate to say the absence of conviction) which means that any 
interpretation will appear to be valid (unless a listener wilfully misinterprets), negating the 
relevance of any content by allowing any reader/ listener to assume that they have mastered 
this content: 
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When it has once been written down, every discourse rolls about everywhere, 
reaching indiscriminately those with understanding no less than those who 
have no business with it, and it doesn't know to whom it should speak and to 
whom it should not. And when it is faulted and attacked unfairly, it always 
needs its father's support; alone it can neither defend itself nor come to its 
own support. (276e) 
As Thamus asserts, readers "will imagine that they have come to know much while for the 
most part they will know nothing" (275b ), and the phrase "know nothing" is pertinent, for the 
universal appeal of the voice is derived the absence of conviction which is the material text 
or the self-authorising speaker. As in myth, any interpretation will be derived from the 
absolutely substitutional space of this absence, that which negates any differentiated content, 
any interpretation, into the constant restatement of the erotic appeal of matter, the empty 
form which embodies this authorising absence. This is also why this empty formality, as 
enacted in the performative nature of the speech, cannot be disrupted by the speaker's 
attempts to adapt its content into subjective terms, thus enacting his differentiated 
individuality. For example, Phaedrus' "careful summary" of the speech's "general sense ... 
in the proper order" (228d), the means through which he wishes to practice his 
"speechmaking" (228e ), would enact precisely the same paradigm. Any divergence from the 
text, a differentiation which could reinforce Phaedrus' status as 'author', would still be 
protected from interrogation by virtue of his abdication of responsibility, the abdication 
which would ascribe any interpretation to the absent Lysias. More importantly, this 
abdication would still enact Phaedrus as the erotic materiality which this content merely 
serves to mask, the true basis of his authority, enacting the lack of conviction which negates 
the present relevance of this differentiated content. Only this contemporary relevance could 
permit Phaedrus' speech to be differentiated from that of Lysias', rather than reduced to the 
homogeneity of a static past that the text embodies as the unchanging, intelligible, presence 
<?f Lysias. Any alteration in the vocal articulation of the text would simply restate an empty 
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form which, in light of its lack of content, remains indistinguishable from the empty form of 
the 'original' text. 
That this erasure of the difference between writing and speech, text and myth, 
constitutes an erasure of time, and thus of the present, also becomes evident. Once the speech 
has been read and Phaedrus asks for Socrates' acclaim, Socrates ironically asks: 
What? Must we praise the speech even on the ground that its author said what 
the situation demanded, and not instead simply on the ground that he has 
spoken in a clear and concise manner, with a precise turn of phrase? If we 
must, I will have to go along for your sake, since ... that passed me by. I paid 
attention only to the speeches' style .... it seemed to me, Phaedrus ... that he 
said the same things two or even three times, as if he really didn't have much 
to say about the subject, almost as if he just weren't very interested in it. In 
fact, he seemed to me to be showing off, trying to demonstrate that he could 
say the same thing in two different ways, and say it just as well both times. 
(234e-235a) 
Socrates is feigning the role of the seduced here in order to reveal the manner in which the 
absolute repetition of empty or self-authorising form re-enacts itself in each reading, negating 
any difference between those readings. Socrates' exaggerated inability to apprehend the 
content of the speech serves to demonstrate the manner in which each reading will fail to 
meet the particular demands of the present situation, erasing the particularity of any reading, 
and will only meet the demands of the author's desire for authority (Lysias' "showing off"). 
That this is a desire which erotically infects every reading is demonstrated by Phaedrus' 
desire to say "the same thing in two different ways", to present his summary of Lysias' 
speech. 
Yet if this implies that the difference between speaker and audience can be wholly 
overcome, that the audience, like Phaedrus, can always appropriate the role of the author, 
erotically consummating the negation of difference between the speaker and themselves, then 
it is precisely the sensible presence of the speaker which prevents this consummation. It is 
this presence which continually remains in place, signifYing the difference between speaker 
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and audience, subject and object. The attainment of the intelligibility or self-presence that the 
text/ speaker promises and the negation of the contesting sensible presence of that text/ 
speaker are two sides of the same coin. In other words, the empirical presence of the speaker 
renders him a hupomnemic enactment of intelligibility rather than an embodiment of this 
pure intelligibility. It is for this reason that the scopophilic eroticism of Socrates' attraction to 
the speaker is not a desire for the speaker, but a desire for the erasure of the speaker: more 
specifically, it is a desire for an erotic self-negation into the speaker, inserting oneself into 
this space of erotic sensibility. It is only through this insertion that the audience can erase the 
sensibility which constantly signifies the absence of any consummation between the self and 
the disembodied intelligibility of the voice. Again, this recalls the manner in which the lover 
is drawn to his beloved by the possibility of negating the difference between self and other, 
thus apprehending the pure intelligibility of the form of beauty which the beloved reflects but 
never wholly embodies. Similarly, it is the fact that pure intelligibility cannot be embodied 
by the speaker, by virtue of the audience's sensibility of that speaker, which prompts the 
uncovering of the script itself, in an attempt to attain the erotic telos, a telos which is not so 
much writing, as the possibility of erasing oneself into writing in order to achieve the 
incontestable absence which ts indistinguishable from the absolute repetition of self-
presence. As we have seen, the teleological end of Socrates' feigned attraction is not 
Phaedrus, or Phaedrus' reflection of the form of beauty (the purely intelligible form of 
beauty1\ but the script itself, that which, like the oral poet, is masked by a purely intelligible 
past. This is why, in revealing the repressed script, Socrates is merely mimicking Phaedrus' 
own revelation of the script. In reference to Phaedrus' assertion that he is unable to recite 
Lysias' speech from memory, Socrates asserts: 
Oh Phaedrus, if I don't know my Phaedrus I must be forgetting who I am 
myself- and neither is the case. I know very well that he did not hear Lysias' 
speech only once: he asked him to repeat it over and over again, and Lysias 
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was eager to oblige. But even that was not enough for him. In the end, he took 
the book himself and pored over the parts he liked best. He sat reading all 
morning long, and when he got tired, he went for a walk, having learned - I 
am quite sure - the whole speech by heart . . . (228a-b) 
Socrates initially insinuates that, in erasmg his knowledge of Phaedrus, he is forgetting 
himself, reflecting the audience's erotic desire to erase their knowledge of the speaker, his 
sensible presence, in order that they can appropriate his position, erasing themselves into this 
space in attaining the self-authorising intelligibility of the disembodied voice: " ... if I don't 
know my Phaedrus I must be forgetting who I am myself . . . ". The voice thus represents the 
thetic space in which the difference between self and other does not apply. Despite the 
constant, disingenuous, identification of the voice as Lysias' voice, anybody can occupy this 
space. This process of erotically conforming to the incontestable voice and moving into this 
space is enacted in Phaedrus' constant requests for repetition (as opposed to entering into a 
dialogue), the means through which he initially wishes to learn "the whole speech by heart", 
transforming the self into this atemporal rationality. However, in order to attain this 
rationality, thus consummating his erotic attraction to Lysias, Phaedrus must negate his 
sensible awareness ofLysias. It is in appropriating the script that Phaedrus can insert himself 
into the sensible space of Lysias, negating his sensibility of Lysias, to leave only the 
intelligibility of the voice. Yet the absolute attainment of this intelligibility is a mere 
apparency, for Phaedrus must subsequently erase his sensible awareness of the script itself, 
the presence which continually signifies that this consummation with the pure intelligibility 
of the past has not been attained. Again, this is suggestive of the manner in which the 
material script, as a sensible presence, comes to embody the possibility of the past, the 
possibility of supplanting this presence simultaneously being the erotic possibility of 
attaining the purely intelligible status of the origin, this being the absent/ present pharmakon 
which seduces the reader. Consequently, Phaedrus attempts to consummate his erotic 
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attraction to the script by negating the script, memorising the speech in precisely the same 
manner that he attempts to learn the "whole speech by heart" from Lysias. Phaedrus, as his 
concealment of the script from Socrates demonstrates, must negate any present sensibility of 
the text, repressing the specifically written status of the speech: he does so by finally 
attaining the status of the script itself, becoming the absence which allows the voice to 
remain an incontestable presence. In memorising the speech, he abdicates responsibility even 
for his own thoughts, completely forgetting himself in order that he can attain the pure 
intelligibility that the text promises and subsequently, erotically, enacting himself as the 
possibility of attaining this purely intelligibility to his audience. 
Yet even if Phaedrus' erasure of the script facilitates a consummation with this 
seductive object, the consummation with pure intelligibility is never finalised. Phaedrus' 
'pre-oedipal' status, the reduction of himself to the absence that lies behind the text in order 
that he can become the 'full' presence that is the textualised voice, remains subject to the 
disruptive demands of the present, demands that must be continually repressed. As the erotic 
desire to erase the subject's sensibility of the text's physical means of transmission suggests, 
a sensibility of the present in itself constitutes one of these disruptive demands. This is why 
Socrates initially attempts to shift Phaedrus' attention away from the question of mythology, 
the pharmaceutical question of the origin, to the sensuous situation in which the two find 
themselves, this being a means of reminding Phaedrus of both the present and his own 
presence: 
SOCRATES: By Hera this really is a beautiful resting place .... the whole place 
is filled with its fragrance. From under the plane tree the loveliest spring runs 
with very cool water- our feet can testify to that .... Feel the freshness of the 
air; how pretty and pleasant it is; how it echoes with the summery sweet song 
of the cicada's chorus! The most exquisite thing of all, of course, is the grassy 
slope: it rises so gently that you can rest your head perfectly when you lie 
down on it. (230b-c) 
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Again, Socrates' actions foreshadow the role of the Freudian analyst. The Freudian analysand 
attempts to repress the present in the process of transference, maintaining his pre-oedipal 
status by erotically transforming the analyst to a replication of the self Similarly, the 
speaker, even if he has memorised the speech and achieved the desired 'self-presence' that 
this entails, does not erase the eras which leads him to this point. In order to maintain this 
'self-presence' he continues to incessantly project his eroticism onto the audience in an 
attempt to reduce this audience to a replication of the self, or, analogously, to reduce the self 
to a replication of the audience. The erotic relationship between the two, therefore, is 
reciprocal, this being why Lysias is not only willing but "eager" to oblige Phaedrus' requests 
that he repeat the speech "over and over again" (228a). The speaker, however, must disguise 
or rationalise his erotic attraction to the audience, for this attraction, in itself, would 
performatively signify that he has not attained the pure intelligibility with which he seduces 
them. Like the oral poet this speaker must enact the immanent rationality of his words as an 
absolutely autonomous self-presence, a timeless truth that is not subject to the erotic demands 
of the audience, for as we have seen, it is this inertness, this incontestable nature, which 
seduces the audience in the first place. It is only through these means that the speaker can 
initiate the audience's erotic desire to lose themselves in the empty formality of the voice, 
transforming them into a mirror image of himself as their eras comes to reflect his own. The 
repression or rationalisation of the poet's erotic relationship with his audience is parodied in 
Socrates' attempt to "make a different speech, even better than Lysias"' (235c), a speech that 
is itself a parody of Lysias' original speech. The disingenuity of Socrates' speech, however, 
is made manifest: 
There once was a boy, a youth rather, and he was very beautiful, and had very 
many lovers. One of them was wily and had persuaded him that he was not in 
love, though he loved the lad no less than the others. And once in pressing his 
suit to him, he tried to persuade him that he ought to give his favors to a man 
who did not love him rather than one who did. And this is what he said. . 
(237b) 
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Like Lysias, the lover sophistically enacts himself as an embodiment of disinterested 
rationality in order to disguise the irrational process of eroticism that he is attempting to 
initiate in his audience, criticising eroticism in the very act of performing eroticism. As in the 
case of Thamus, the dishonesty lies not in the speeches' content, for his criticisms of love 
could be perfectly valid: his dishonesty lies in his lack of conviction, the undisclosed, or 
unconscious motives, behind his rational words. It is these motives which render the contents 
of his words inconsequential, being mere instruments for seducing the audience with the 
erotic promise of negating themselves into the position of the poet. Yet the deceptive status 
of this rationality works in both directions, for it also masks the fact that the speaker is, 
himself, in love with his audience, the reason, of course, why he wishes to initiate their 
attraction, designating the audience an eroticised object. This is precisely why Socrates' 
scopophilic attraction to Phaedrus is reciprocal: ". . . running into a man who was sick with 
passion for hearing speeches, seeing him -just seeing him - he was filled with delight: he 
had found a partner for his frenzied dance ... " (228b). Just as Socrates is in "ecstasy" at the 
sight of Phaedrus being "radiant with delight' as he reads, thus following his "lead" that he 
may share in his "Bacchic frenzy" (234d), Socrates conversely links the scopophilic 
attraction of Phaedrus to Socrates to the bacchanalia. It is notable, however, that the phrase 
"frenzied dance"(228b), is a translation of 'sunkorubantionta' "dance of the Corybantes", an 
orgiastic ritual which was thought to cure the mental disorder which was inspired by the 
Corybants, reflecting the manner in which both audience and speaker are enticed to the 
irrational process of eras with the eternal promise of rationality. 
Socrates begins to reveal the consequences of this mutual and self-negating eroticism 
m his "different speech", ironically indicating its infinite nature and linking it to the 
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pharmaceutical question of writing and the ongm. The speech is intended to act as a 
refutation of Phaedrus' assertion that Lysias "has omitted nothing worth mentioning about 
the subject" (235b), or, literally, has left "nothing remaining" (paraleoipen), as though 
Lysias has finally attained the pure intelligibility with which the audience is erotically, and 
covertly, enticed. Socrates asserts that if he accepts this view he will be refuted by "all the 
wise men and women of old who have spoken or written about this subject" (235b), and 
when Phaedrus asks who they are and where Socrates has heard a better speech, Socrates 
demurs: 
I can't tell you offhand, but I'm sure I've heard better somewhere; perhaps it 
was the lovely Sappho or the wise Anacreon or even some writer of prose. So, 
what's my evidence? The fact, my dear friend, that my breast is full and I feel 
I can make a different speech, even better than Lysias'. Now I am well aware 
that none of these ideas can come from me - I know my own ignorance. The 
only other possibility, I think, is that I was filled, like an empty jar, by the 
words of other people streaming in through my ears, though I'm so stupid that 
I've even forgotten where I heard them. (23 Se-d) 
As Phaedrus pretends that his "general summary" is a result of his inability to memorise 
Lysias' speech, thus enacting the summary as an incontestable presence which negates him 
into the empty form of this speech, Socrates becomes an "empty jar" ( angeiou) the material 
form which, like Phaedrus, is filled with the voice of others, the vehicle through which the 
absent origin speaks. It is this abdication of responsibility in favour of an absent past which 
renders his materiality a signifier for the erotic possibility of self-negation, of 
thanatologically or erotically reducing oneself to the sensible absence/ pure intelligibility of 
this past: the word angeiou can also mean 'body' or 'coffin'. Socrates' speech thus reflects 
Phaedrus' erotic appropriation of Lysias' voice, or alternatively, the erotic appropriation of 
Phaedrus by this voice. As Socrates' inability to remember the original author reveals, the 
process of mythologisation which the name 'Lysias' now denotes has rendered Phaedrus 
indistinguishable from every other absent author, from every other speaker who has ever 
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erotically inserted themselves into this mythological space, that to which Socrates, Plato and 
the reader (for example) succumb. The attraction of this erotic possibility of self-negation/ 
self-authorisation becomes apparent when one compares Socrates' attribution of the speech 
to forgotten authors with the invocation with which begins his speech, an invocation to what 
is, apparently, divinity: 
Come to me, 0 you clear voiced Muses, whether you are called so because of 
the quality of your song or from the musical people of Liguria, "come, take up 
my burden" in telling the tale that this fine fellow forces upon me so that his 
companion may now seem to him even more clever than he did before: (237a-
b) 
As the ironic final words suggest, Socrates abdicates responsibility over his speech in order 
to authorise himself as an erotic embodiment of pure intelligibility, humorously revealing that 
'his' cleverness is predicated on his erotic negation into the purely intelligible voice that 
speaks through him. He reflects this process in his comical desire to cover his face while he 
recites (237a) thus masking his sensible presence with the divine wisdom of an absent past. 
Yet the true nature of the Muses that Socrates invokes has already been made clear, being the 
undifferentiated voices of past authors who emit themselves through Socrates. This is linked 
to the "quality" of the Muses song, or, in the original, their form: "eite di aides eidos ligeiai". 
Socrates asserts that the Muses are called the ligeiai, the "clear voiced" either by virtue of the 
nature of their form (their eidos) or by virtue of that word's derivation from the musical 
Ligurians (Ligu6n). This fanciful etymology thus equates the poetic form through which the 
oral poet seduces his audience with the static form of the past, the purely intelligible 
factuality, through which the writer seduces his audience. The role of the Muses in poetry 
and the role of the 'forgotten' authors in writing are, therefore, equated through the wholly 
contingent phonic relationship between the words ligeiai and Ligu6n, the speeches' status as 
"unfalsifiable information" allowing him to substitute one origin for the other. Yet this 
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contingency not only emphasises the absolutely substitutional nature of the ongm which 
speaks through Socrates, but also the absolutely substitutional nature of what is said in the 
speech. This speech is reduced to an irrelevant play of formal signifiers which have no other 
purpose than to instrumentally sustain the authority that the speaker has appropriated; it 
makes no difference which constitutes the origin for the erotic effect will be the same. 
Evidently, the past performs the same role in writing as the Muses perform in oral poetry, 
both negating the speaker that his authority can be reinforced. As Socrates suggests, this 
authority is ultimately derived from the absent and undifferentiated "wise men and women of 
old" (235b) who, like the Muses, are speaking through the "empty vessel" of Socrates. 
Socrates cannot remember which particular author inspires his words, revealing that the 
voice that enacts its timeless presence through him is the voice of an indifferent past, of 
every 'author' who has been erotically seduced by writing: " ... perhaps it was lovely Sappho 
or the wise Anacreon or even some writer of prose" (23 Se). It is this formal enactment of the 
divine potentialities of absence, of the undifferentiated dead, through which the poet 
authorises his voice. 
Nevertheless, as Socrates subsequently reveals, the true, present, inspiration for his 
speech is Phaedrus himself, he who comes to embody these dead 'authors', this past, in his 
recitation of Lysias' speech, a past which can equally be embodied by the materiality of the 
script itself This is why Socrates ironically equates Phaedrus with both the Muses and the 
inanimate landscape: 
SOCRATES: There, Phaedrus my friend, don't you think that I'm in the grip of 
something divine? 
PHAEDRUS: This is certainly an unusual flow of words for you, Socrates. 
SOCRATES: There's something really divine about this place, so don't be 
surprised if I'm quite taken by the Nymph's madness as I go on with this 
speech. I'm on the edge of speaking in dithyrambs as it is. 
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PHM:ORUS: Very truel 
SOCRATES: Yes, and you're the cause of it. (238d) 
When, therefore, Socrates criticises Phaedrus for worrying about "who is speaking and where 
he comes from" (275b-c), comparing the author to a stone or a tree, he is linking the 
indifference of the absent past to the indifference which is inherent in materiality itself, a 
materiality which erotically embodies the thanatological possibility of reducing oneself to 
this indifferent status. Yet if the material status of the script embodies this absent past, 
presenting the erotic possibility of attaining pure intelligibility, then this intelligibility, like 
death, is only intelligible from the outside. Just as the past is only purely intelligible as the 
past, (i.e. from a present position which is other to the past), that which the text presents is 
only purely intelligible by virtue of one's othemess to the situation which is represented, it 
being this othemess, this hupomnemic status, which renders it purely intelligible. 
Consequently, that which the text promises, the possibility which the materiality of the script 
embodies, can never be attained, there being no consummation with a pure intelligibility 
which only exists as a hupomneme, a reminder. The possibility of this consummation only 
endures as long as eroticism itself endures, an eroticism which is, in the absence of any 
possible consummation, infinite. 
The manner in which Phaedrus absents himself into the isolation of the countryside, 
erasing himself from the societal dialogue, the context, which testifies to his sensible 
presence, can be seen as an allegorical enactment of the thanatological attractions of absence. 
Nevertheless, while Phaedrus may have memorised the text in an attempt to reduce himself 
to this text, he cannot attain that which the text promises, which is why he absurdly continues 
to recite to the trees and landscape. This is an absolutely appropriate image for the infinite 
and futile process of eroticism to which writing, and the inseparable question of the origin, 
gives rise. The poet's attempts to covertly seduce the audience into becoming an absolute 
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reflection of himself, the constant attempt to negate the hupomnemic or sensible awareness of 
this audience that he may maintain self-authorisation, ultimately gives way to a farcical 
attempt to negate the sensible altogether, to negate not only the societal context but the 
present as a whole in favour of a purely intelligible past. All that Phaedrus can do is 
continually repeat himself to this inert materiality in an attempt to maintain the incessantly 
hupomnemic intelligibility that he has already attained: he is involved in an infinite process 
of trying to reduce this disruptive present to a pure intelligibility or, conversely, trying to 
reduce himself to the static materiality of the landscape, thus negating its disruptive, sensible 
presence. From an external point of view, of course, this erotic monologism has already 
reduced Phaedrus to the material status of writing, Phaedrus being a mere vehicle for the 
mythological voice: he has already achieved the absence which supposedly constitutes a 
consummation with the pure intelligibility, that with which writing entices him. However, 
that this intelligibility is intrinsically hupomnemic means that he cannot be aware of this 
attainment, hupomnesis remaining m place disingenuously denying any such 
'consummation'. Phaedrus has already been reduced to the same status as the trees and the 
landscape that he inhabits, even as he continues his attempts to reduce himself to their 
objective status. Such an 'unconscious' status can only be apprehended from an external 
point of view, Phaedrus being continually implicated in the process of eras, in the act of 
reading through which he forgets himself Again, this points to the manner in which this 
erotic telos can only be intelligibly perceived from this external, hupomnemic perspective, 
hence the infectious nature of this pharmakon. Socrates' pursuit ofPhaedrus after he has left 
the city, and his feigned erotic attraction for him can be seen as an allegorical enactment of 
this thanatological substitutionality. As this feigned eroticism parodically demonstrates, to 
witness Phaedrus' recitation, and more importantly, the unconscious status of which 
Phaedrus himself is unaware, is to be hupomnemically, or erotically, drawn to the 
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intelligibility of his speech or, indistinguishably, to his material, sensible, presence, that 
which one wishes to erotically erase and appropriate. This is the means through which one's 
eras lives on via a substitutive and indifferent material origin even after one's death, this 
voice constantly, and unsuccessfully, attempting to negate its material means of transmission, 
attempting to attain an absence which has already been attained and is incessantly being 
attained. Similarly, the fact that Phaedrus consummates his relationship with Lysias by 
assuming his role, negating him in favour of the script, and then consummates his 
relationship to this script, memorising it and thus negating it in favour of the inanimate 
landscape, reveals the manner in which the speaker is caught up in this ultimately auto-erotic 
process, Phaedrus being unable to step out of this circularity and apprehend his own 
monolithic status. 
Socrates parodies this process in the myth of the cicadas, those who have "died 
without even realising it" (259b-c). Socrates explains the efficacy of his own speech by 
attributing it to "the messengers of the Muses who are singing over our heads" who "may 
have inspired me with this gift" (262d), adding them to the inspirational indifferentiation of 
the Muses, the past authors, Phaedrus and the landscape. The cicadas had been human-beings 
before the Muses, and the songs they inspired, were created, whereupon they became so 
enraptured by these songs that they forgot to eat and drink: 
. . . so they died without even realising it. It is from them that the race of the 
cicadas came into being; and as a gift from the Muses, they have no need of 
nourishment once they are born. Instead, they immediately burst into song, 
without food or drink, until it is time for them to die. After they die, they go to 
the muses and tell each one ofthem which mortals have honored her. (259b-c) 
It is the entrancement of music which seduces the cicadas, the empty formality of the 
repetition which, from an external point of view, constantly signifies the attainment of 
materiality, the possibility of attaining a self-negatory consummation with pure intelligibility. 
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It is notable, in this respect that cicadas were thought to be autochthonous. As Aristophanes 
asserts in the famous Platonic discussion of eras in the Symposium16, a discussion in which 
the erotic is explained in terms of the desire to negate the division between male and female 
and attain their original, asexual, status, lovers, 
. . . would throw their arms about each other, weaving themselves together, 
wanting to grow together. In that condition they would die from hunger and 
general idleness. . . Then, however, Zeus took pity on them, and came up 
with another plan: he moved their genitals around to the front! Before then, 
you see, they used to have their genitals outside, like their faces, and they cast 
seed and made children, not in one another, but in the ground, like cicadas. 
(191b-c) 
The relevance of shifting the genitals is that it permits "interior reproduction, by the man in 
the woman" (19lc), rather than through the external means of the ground, thus allowing a 
temporary attainment of the negation of difference. This negation, unlike the materiality of 
the speaker or the text, does not present itself, through the disembodied voice, as the only 
embodiment of pure intelligibility, that which leaves "nothing remaining" (235b). Moreover, 
this consummation does not occur through a utilisation of this disingenuous promise, and 
does not rely on this disingenuity in order to initiate the material eras, for the material form 
of the lover is that which masks intelligibility, their beauty reflecting the Form of beauty, 
rather than presenting this intelligibility as that which masks material form: the lovers' 
"cannot say what they want from one other. ... like an oracle it (the lover's soul) has a sense 
of what it wants, and like an oracle it hides behind a riddle" (192c-d). As Nicholas P. White 
asserts: 
It is as though we might "see" the Forms, but only under circumstances in 
which, or through a medium because of which, it would be impossible to 
perceive them clearly, as though -- to use a figure that Plato tends not to 
employ, but that conveys the idea - there were a mist between us and them 
which we had to penetrate in order to apprehend them. (91-92) 
80 
The negation of the particular, material, difference between lovers, therefore, does not 
present itself as the possibility of negating difference itself and attaining complete self-
presence, or promise this negation to be the attainment of absolute intelligibility, the promise 
that writing cannot fulfiL The act of love thus retains the externality which is the condition of 
intelligibility, the condition of the non-attainment of pure intelligibility. As Socrates asserts, 
the lovers, " ... when they have consummated ... go on doing it for the rest of their lives, but 
sparingly, since they have not approved of what they are doing with their whole minds" 
(256c). This temporary, partial, nature of the negation of difference restores the reality 
principle, allowing the autochthones to "return to their jobs, and look after their other needs 
in life" ( 191 c) rather than being repetitively, bound by the erotic desire to overcome the 
particular difference, the particular externality of an erotic object, and thus attain the 
complete negation of difference which is absence or synonymously the immanence that this 
particularity promises, but which is not there. 
It is this non-attainment which prompts Phaedrus' change in allegiance from Lysias, 
to the text, to the landscape, as he attempts to attain the immanence of matter itself, that 
which always remains other to intelligibility, yet is perceived as the possibility of complete 
intelligibility as a result of the erotic process that the textualised voice initiates. For, as the 
continuation of the cicada's thanatological repetition, the incessant desire to die after they 
have died, demonstrates, the consummation with matter is negated through this 
consummation, erasing each person into the repetitive, undifferentiated, and infectious 
chirping ofthe living/dead cicadas. This is analogous to the autochthones' repetitive attempts 
to mate with the ground, to negate, or negate oneself into, that which constantly signifies 
non-consummation, and that which must be erased in order to restore the originary, 
undifferentiated, self, the telos of an erotic process which always sustains its own possibility 
through negating itself at the moment of attainment. Again, from a disembodied viewpoint, 
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the negation of differentiation which matter embodies has already been achieved, for the 
thanatological cicadas absolutely reflect each other in their death. It is the awareness of 
externality in itself which continually signifies difference, and to succumb to the erotic 
attractions of this externality is to negate difference without being able to apprehend that 
negation. This gives rise to the circular, narcissistic nature of the relationship between the 
poet and audience, for each cicada reports to the muse only the mortals who have honoured 
their particular nature, those who honour Terpsichore through dance, who honour Erato 
through love, and so on. Yet that they do so through the songs that are im.pired by the muses 
points to the fact that the emptiness of this form will inevitably allow the muses to hear only 
what they wish to hear, that which will reflect the externalised authority that they cannot 
subjectively attain. As Socrates asserts "a man who is ruled by desire and is a slave to 
pleasure will turn his boy into whatever is most pleasing to himself' (238e), and what is most 
pleasing to himself is of course, himself, or rather the erotic desire for the self-replication 
through which he constantly attempts to externally affirm his self-presence, to consummate 
himself It is this reduction that Socrates ironically mocks in answering Phaedrus' assertion 
that he will erect "a life-sized golden statue (chrusen eikona) at Delphi, not only of myself 
but also of you" (235e) if Socrates can improve on Lysias' speech without repeating it: 
"You're a real friend, Phaedrus, good as gold (hos a/ethos chntsous) ... " (235e). It is the 
desire to turn Socrates into another mimetic icon, a mere form, which reveals the authorial 
necessity of a mute witness who can only reflect this immanent authority, negating the 
difference between self and world, subject and object. As Socrates asserts, the "most 
ambitious politicians love speechwriting", and usually begin the written speech with a list of 
their admirers; yet these admirers cannot be differentiated from the politician himself, just as 
the politician cannot be differentiated from his admirers, the reciprocal loss of self which is 
the mark of the poet: "Resolved," the author often begins, "by the council" or "by the 
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people" or by both, and "So-and-so said" - meaning himself, the writer, with great solemnity 
and self-importance. . . . then, if it remains on the books, he is delighted and leaves the stage 
a poet" (258a-b ). That the muses merely replicate themselves through the auto-erotic voice of 
the cicadas, reflects not only this auto-erotic annihilation, but also the absurdity of Phaedrus' 
monologue, his authority over the trees and stones which absolutely reflect this empty 
formality, and yet remain erotic by virtue of his sensible awareness of them. Like the Muses, 
he is no more than another cicada amongst the mass, constantly repeating his own self-
present status to an audience who merely repeat this self-presence back to him, and thus 
remind him that this presence is always beyond his self-awareness, always an externality. 
Socrates may assert that "landscapes and trees have nothing to teach me - only the people in 
the city can do that" (230d), but the people of the city, of course, can only teach by 
interrogating Socrates' opinions, and it is, therefore, the eroticism which is initiated by the 
unquestionable nature of the textualised voice which negates the boundary between city and 
country, covertly reducing each member of society to the undifferentiated and silent 
formality of the stones and trees which inhabit this landscape. The individuality of each city-
dweller is erased into a homogeneity of a society in which each member, like the living/ dead 
cicadas, can only infinitely repeat the empty formality into which they are seduced, actively 
repeating their own reflective passivity. 
Nevertheless, this is not to assert that Plato rejects writing. As his discussion of myth 
demonstrates it is in concentrating on the question of writing itself rather than on what 
writing scrys, on the origins of myth rather than its truth value, that the imaginative space, the 
space of potentiality, that writing opens up is undone, as one succumbs to a futile eroticism in 
which one is incessantly trying to conform to, and attain, a reality which is a mere 
hupomneme. This produces the kind of society which is enacted in the myth of the cicadas, a 
myth which reflects, to some degree, that of the pre-literate society, a society in which the 
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body of cultural knowledge necessarily remains unquestioned, and is, therefore, reflected in 
every consciousness. As Plato's identification of myth with the oral tradition suggests the 
danger of writing is precisely its installation within the 'rights of reality', that which would 
(if it could be attained) be the reduction of writing to precisely the kind of reality that was 
previously articulated in the form of myth and oral poetry. As his acceptance of writing as a 
hupomneme suggests, the virtue of writing is not its ability to usurp consciousness, but its 
ability to exteriorise the fact that consciousness itself, the body of knowledge which is 
handed down, has never been installed within the 'rights of reality'. As the truth value of 
myth is subsequently open to dialogic interrogation, so is consciousness itself, the ambiguity 
of consciousness' relation to the past and reality being revealed. Both of these factors are 
reduced to irresolvable potentialities, revealing the ambiguity of consciousness itself, a 
consciousness which is now free from the demands of memory and a linguistically imposed 
'reality'. This is precisely why Plato accepts the hupomnemic status of writing, of myth, the 
past and reality: it is this hupomnemic status which facilitates the mneme, that which 
constitutes consciousness' ability to explore and actualise its own potentialities. Gerard 
Naddaf poses the question: "Did he [Plato] not see a written text as an aide-memoire which 
would incite discussion with or without the presence of its author?" (xxii). The answer is 
affirmative, Plato opposing the monologic writing in precisely the same manner that he 
opposes the monologism of the oral poet. Rather than being a repression of writing then, the 
Phaedrus constitutes a recognition of the value of writing and an attempt to protect writing 
from precisely the reductive arguments that Derrida proposes. The pharmaceutical question 
of writing itself is, as Derrida's work demonstrates, inseparable from the wholly irresolvable 
question of the origin, of reality, of the past. To attempt to resolve these factors by finally 
installing the text within the 'rights of reality' is not only to negate or resolve these 
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potentialities, but is also to negate and resolve the potentiality which is writing or 
consciousness itself, an act of closure which, for Plato, constitutes a betrayal of writing. 
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CHAPTER2 
THE POTENTIAL BODY AND THE BODY'S POTENTIALITY: THE USURPATION OF NIETZSCHE 
1 
0TOBIOGRAPHIES AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF TI-lE ARC HE-TRACE 
In a lecture delivered at the University of Montreal in 1979 (subsequently published 
as 'Otobiographies' in The Ear of the Other1 (1985)) Jacques Derrida examines Nietzsche's 
Ecce Homo2 in terms of autobiography. He takes his critical trajectory from the function of 
"an outwork, an hors d'oeuvre, an exergue or a flysheet" ("Otobiographies" 11) which 
separates the preface of the text from the text Ecce Homo itself: 
On this perfect day, when everything is ripening and not only the grape turns 
brown, the eye of the sun just fell upon my life: I looked back, I looked 
forward, and never saw so many and such good things at once. It was not for 
nothing that I buried my forty-fourth year today; I had the right to bury it; 
whatever was life in it has been saved, is immortal. The first book of the 
Revaluation of All Values, the Songs of Zarathustra, the Twilight of the Idols, 
my attempt to philosophize with a hammer - all presents of this year, indeed 
of its last quarter! How could I fail to be grateful to my whole life? - and so I 
tell my life to myself ( 677) 
For Derrida, this exergue represents the inherently present space which is enacted in the act 
of autobiographical self-recitation, the borderline which separates the self-written from self-
writing, a borderline which is constantly breached through this act and reconstituted in this 
act: indeed, it is this process which "constitutes, gathers, adjoins, and holds the strange 
present of this auto-biographical recit in place" ("Otobiographies" 13). This point not only 
enacts Nietzsche's empiricity, being the point at which the past is buried via the text, an 
acceptance of the death to which the author must succumb in order to be an author, for this is 
also the burial of death itself, the point at which this past is about to be redeemed in the 
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affirmative act of self-recitation, the point at which the past can come to textual fruition. 
Nietzsche " ... buries his past forty-four years. But what he actually buries is death, and in 
burying death he has saved life- and immortality" ("Otobiographies" 12): 
. . . the structure of the exergue on the borderline or of the borderline in the 
exergue will be reprinted wherever the question of life, of "my-life," arises. 
Between a title or the preface on the one hand, and the book to come on the 
other, between the title Ecce Homo and Ecce Homo "itself," the structure of 
the exergue situates the place from which life will be recited . . . 
("Otobiographies" 14) 
Yet what this "strange present" also reveals is the manner in which Nietzsche lives on his 
own credit, writing being the point of self-investment, that which enacts the promise of a life 
which cannot be finally consummated until one's death: "I live on my own credit [I go along 
living on my own credit, the credit I establish and give myself: Jch le be mif meinen eigenen 
Kredit hin]; it is perhaps a mere prejudice that I live [vielleicht bloss ein Vorurteil dass ich 
le be]" ("Otobiographies" 8). As Derrida asserts in reference to this quotation: "This life will 
be verified only at the moment the bearer of the name, the one whom we, in our prejudice, 
call living, will have died" ("Otobiographies" 9). In a more expansive mode: ". . . since the 
"I" of this recit only constitutes itself through the credit of the eternal return, he does not 
exist. He does not sign prior to the recit qua eternal return. Until then, until now, that I am 
living may be a mere prejudice. It is the eternal return that signs or seals" ("Otobiographies" 
13). Nietzsche's act of self-writing, as he tells his life to himself, will always, ultimately, 
become that which is written, which is both buried and constantly about to be redeemed as 
this timeless point reasserts itself, preventing any pre-mortem consummation with the self as 
written. Recalling the manner in which the usurpation of Thamus by writing ensures his 
eternal recurrence as a timeless mythological presence, it is only at the point of death, the 
obliteration of Nietzsche's empirical presence, that Nietzsche's intrinsically written life 
fulfils the promise that he constantly makes to himself via the act of writing. It is at the point 
87 
of death that Nietzsche fmally escapes himself that he can become himself, his written self, 
in a self-consummation which relies on the mediation of the reader: 
He never knows in the present, with present knowledge or even in the 
present of Ecce Homo, whether anyone will ever honor the inordinate credit 
that he extends to himself in his name, but also necessarily in the name of 
another .... if the life that he lives and tells to himself ("autobiography," they 
call it) cannot be his life in the first place except as the effect of a secret 
contract, a credit account which has been both opened and encrypted, an 
indebtedness, an alliance or annulus, then as long as the contract has not been 
honored - and it cannot be honored except by another, for example, by you -
Nietzsche can write that his life is perhaps a mere prejudice, "es ist vielleicht 
bloss ein Vorturteil dass ich lebe." ("Otobiographies" 9) 
It is only the reader who can honour the credit that Nietzsche extends to himself, for 
Nietzsche will not live, and will not have lived, until the textual figure that he promises 
himself is brought into being through the act of reading, the ultimate point of redemption: 
"The time for me hasn't come yet: some are born posthumously" (715). 
The significance of the exergue is apparently, therefore, temporal, enacting death, the 
unstated nature of Nietzsche and of his past life, even as it foreshadows the consummation 
which is about to occur as we read the book, the transformation of an empirical Nietzsche 
into the figure which Nietzsche has promised himself, the past which is about to occur in 
what is now a process of eternal recurrence, eternal redemption: "I show you death that 
consummates - a spur and a promise to the survivors. He that consummates his life dies his 
death victoriously, surrounded by those who hope and promise" (Zarathustra 183-84 ). It is 
evident, therefore, that the reason that the reader occupies a privileged position in relation to 
Nietzsche himself, thus facilitating this consummation, is that they escape Nietzsche's 
empiricity and the necessity of constantly translating this empiricity into the mythology that 
Nietzsche, in his own presence, can only promise himself It is in the absence of this 
empiricity that Nietzsche finally coincides with himself, with the textual figure that he 
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prospectively posits: Nietzsche, once dead, once read, has now become the myth or the 
written self that he will become and is becoming during his life. 
Nevertheless, that this is an eternal return is indicative of the manner in which this 
consummation can never be finalised, or rather, (as in the case of Thamus) can never be seen 
as final, for this transformation is re-enacted in every act of reading, and this is precisely why 
Nietzsche incorporates this inherently present point of recurrent recitation into the structure 
of Ecce Homo. He does so in order to reveal the manner in which this liminal point refutes 
any final incorporation into the text, for there is no possibility of this liminal space being 
transgressed without it being restated at the point that this 'transgression' is recognised or 
'finalised'. As Rodolphe Gasche asserts in acknowledging that one can never incorporate the 
border into that which it borders without erasing and implicitly re-stating its liminal status: 
"Heterogeneous to both the work and the life, this place of the "programming machine" 
engenders the text of which it is a part to the extent that it is a part larger than the whole" 
( 42l This point, therefore, cannot be left behind once read, for it enacts the inherently 
present space from which the text is being read, the position that Nietzsche surrenders to the 
reader upon death. In this respect we should note that even within Nietzsche's own life one 
can see this nicit as enacting an act of self-reading as well as self-writing, for it is precisely in 
the difference between what is read and what is written, what is buried and what is saved, 
that Nietzsche facilitates his self-transformation. As he asserts in relation to Human, All Too 
Human: " ... almost every sentence marks some victory- here I liberated myself from what 
in my nature did not belong to me" (739). Nevertheless, once Nietzsche, on death, has 
liberated himself from the empirical life which "did not belong to me', the self-
consummation that death facilitates has now always already occurred and it is also always on 
the threshold of recurring in the act of reading. No matter how far back one traces the 
Nietzschean text one will never find an empirical presence, for Nietzsche's consummation 
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with the textual figure that he credits has, now, already occurred and has always already 
occurred. Each point of reading becomes the incessantly restated point of Nietzsche' s 
posthumous birth, even as it is now the text rather than Nietzsche's 'life' which pre-dates this 
point. Yet the text also post-dates this point for it has not only supplanted the empirical past, 
but has always already supplanted it, being prospectively, as well as retrospectively in place. 
It is this factor which problematises any directional sense in reading, any distinction between 
the origin and the telos, for we are simultaneously and indistinguishably looking backwards 
or forwards: " . . . the eye of the sun just fell upon my life: I looked back, I looked forward, 
and never saw so many and such good things at once" (677 Emphasis mine.). As Derrida 
asserts this point "returns every day, always each day, with every turn ofthe annulus. Always 
before noon, after noon" ("Otobiographies"l4). 
It is for this reason that this Janiform point, the exergue, both refutes and affirms its 
placement at the beginning of the text, for the text both precedes and antecedes this point. As 
the present point from which the past is about to be recited, this past implicitly precedes this 
point even as it is about to be redeemed. Conversely, this prospective text, as the redeemed 
past, is already in place, having already supplanted Nietzsche's empiricity: "It was not for 
nothing that I buried my forty-fourth year today; I had the right to bury it; whatever was life 
in it has been saved, is immortal" (677). The past has already been saved as the text even 
before we begin to read the text 'proper'. Unlike Nietzsche, however, the reader has no 
access to the empirical past which sustains his process of self-reading/ self-writing: it is for 
this reason that the text, and Nietzsche's consummation with or as this text is already in 
place, the reader being the only one who can verify the immortality that Nietzsche has 
already assumed on death, this contradiction between immortality and death being a mere 
apparency. As Derrida asserts: "What one calls life - the thing or object of biology and 
biography - does not stand face to face with something that would be its opposable ob-ject: 
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death, the thanatological or thanatographical" ("Otobiographies" 6). In the absence of the 
empirical Nietzsche it is only the reader who can take on the role of Zarathustra for as 
Nietzsche asserts in quoting this prospectively redemptive figure: "To redeem those who 
lived in the past and to turn every 'it was' into a 'thus I willed it' -that alone should I call 
redemption" (764-65). The commencement of the reading process thus becomes, forever, the 
point at which Nietzsche's empirical life has already been buried by the text, the point at 
which '"it was'" is already "'thus I willed it"', as well as the point at which this textual life is 
about to be redeemed (re-redeemed) as Nietzsche is reiterated as the textual figure that he 
(now) already is in a process of eternal return. 
The exergue, therefore, is no more a preface than a postscript, enacting a point which 
both acknowledges the arche-writing which exists before the letter and also the 
transformation of Nietzsche' s empiricity into this arche-writing. As such, it refutes any 
attribution of temporal positionality within the text, being the dislocated present which is 
always situated at the beginning and the end, enacting the text which has been and is still to 
come, a constant commemoration ofNietzsche's posthumous birth: 
This page is in a certain way dated because it says "today" and today "my 
birthday," the anniversary of my birth. The anniversary is the moment when 
the year turns back on itself, forms a ring or annulus with itself, annuls itself 
and begins anew. It is here my forty-fifth year ... something like the midday 
of life. The noon of life, even midlife crisis, is commonly situated at about this 
age, at the shadowless midpoint of a great day. ("Otobiographies" 11-12) 
As Derrida recognises, it is because of its recurrent nature that it becomes impossible to date 
the timeless moment when "the eye of the sun just fell upon my life" (677). This moment is 
always now whether one defines this moment in terms of the present of Nietzsche's self-
recitation, in terms of the moment of death at which life is verified4, or in terms of the 
moment of reading: "This difficulty crops up wherever one seeks to make a determination: in 
order to date an event, of course, but also in order to identify the beginning of a text, the 
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origin of life, or the first movement of a signature. These are all problems of the borderline" 
("Otobiographies" 13). 
It is, however, in recognising the relationship with the initiatory, "the beginning of a 
text, the origin of life, or the first movement of a signature", that Derrida acknowledges the 
manner in which this borderline is ultimately a constant restatement of the border which 
separates signification from its origin, a border-line which cannot be dated since it is the 
timeless position which one always occupies in the eternal return. For if one considers the 
manner in which Nietzsche buries his own empiricity via the text, and the manner in which 
the text finally supplants this empiricity on death, it becomes apparent that the paradigm 
outlined is ultimately derived from the manner in which the relationship between effect and 
cause is reversed in the usurpatory movement into language. The 'origin' of textuality does 
not come into being until its 'effect', the text, brings it into being through a retrospective 
inference, and then only as a signifier. The origin can only ever be a supplementary effect of 
this text, a text which is, and now has always been, the origin of this 'origin': "From the 
moment that there is meaning there are nothing but signs. We think only in signs. Which 
amounts to ruining the notion of the sign at the very moment when, as in Nietzsche, its 
exigency is recognized in the absoluteness of its right" (Grammatology 50). As the final 
sentence suggests, the notion of the sign itself comes into question as a result of this 
confusion of reality and signification, cause and effect, as evidenced by Nietzsche's 
utilisation of the "absoluteness" of the sign's "right" to be considered as reality rather than as 
a mere reflection of a pre-discursive reality. One can, therefore, compare this a posteriori 
production of the 'origin' to Nietzsche's posthumous birth, the manner in which he only 
comes into being (via the reader) as an 'effect' his writings, an effect which finally supplants 
his empiricity, thus redeeming him as a figure which he can only credit within his life5. The 
'effect' - Nietzsche's writings and the textual figure that they enact - supplants the 
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'empirical' Nietzsche in precisely the same manner that the 'effect' -the text- becomes that 
which has now always already been in the place of the origin. In both cases, there has never 
been any other origin than writing, which is why the name, the signifier, supplants its bearer: 
". . . if life returns, it will return to the name but not to the living, in the name of the living as 
the name of the dead" ("Otobiographies" 9). One should also note that any linguistic 
enactment of the origin is both subsequent to language even as it supplants that which is 
prior to language, the reason why arche-writing is both, prospectively, already in place and 
has, retrospectively, always been already in place. Indeed, it is in utilising the manner in 
which the empirical origin is transformed into arche-writing, the writing before (or after) the 
letter which is now indistinguishably origin and telos, that Nietzsche can write his telos and 
redeem or redefine the origin in doing so, the means through which '"it was'" becomes 
'"thus I willed it'", and the means through which " ... One Becomes What One Is". It is this 
confusion of origin and telos, past and future, which problematises any attempt to date or 
identifY the point at which the text begins: one enters into this point at the moment of self-
awareness, the point at which one enters language and brings the self into linguistic being via 
this act, and this is a point which, once entered, is and has never been transcended, for one 
has never entered language and has always occupied this point, language having now (and it 
is always now) already been in place. 
2 
RECITING THE BODY'S ABSENCE 
In light of the manner in which Derrida derives his interpretation of the Nietzschean 
recit from the initial movement into textuality, it would seem that the text has no beginning, 
and also that Nietzsche has no life beyond the text, for reference to Nietzsche's 'empirical' 
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life can be no more be justified than reference to a pre-discursive origin. Indeed, as in the 
case of the arche-trace, it is precisely in referring to it that one transforms it into that which 
has never been, as Nietzsche recognises in asserting that "it is perhaps a mere prejudice that I 
live'" (673), and as Derrida recognises in questioning the notion of 'the empirical' itself: 
I can no longer say what an empirical text is, or the empirical given of a text. . 
. . we think we know what a given text is - a text that we receive in the 
editorial form of an authenticated corpus, and so on. We also have a certain 
number of "empirical facts" about Nietzsche's life. Although there may be 
any number of debates on this subject, any number of disagreements about the 
content of these givens, the presupposition is, nevertheless, that one knows 
what one means by Nietzsche's "empirical" life. That is, one assumes that one 
knows what is at the organizing center of the debate. If one problematizes 
things as I tried to do yesterday, however, the opposition between, for 
example, the empirical and the non-empirical . . . is precisely what becomes 
problematic. I then no longer know what this experience is that grounds the 
value of the empirical. This is the case whether one is speaking of Nietzsche' s 
life or his corpus - his body, if you will ... ("Roundtable on Autobiography" 
44) 
From this perspective, one can no more speak of an 'empirical' experience than one can 
speak of an experience which is prior to language without transforming this experience into a 
linguistic experience: "I can no longer say what an empirical text is ... ". This is, indeed, the 
very means through which Nietzsche is posthumously born as a textual/ mythological figure, 
is transformed into the figure that he promises himself during his life through the self-credit 
which is his writings. 
Yet within Nietzsche's lifetime this is a process of self-credit, a self-investment 
which will not be repaid until Nietzsche's posthumous birth as the textual figure which 
finally supplants his empiricity. If there has never been an empirical experience, as Derrida 
implies, then one is prompted to ask how the pre-mortem Nietzschean position is 
distinguishable from the post-mortem readerly position since his would seem to be a purely 
textual life in both cases. In other words, what privileges the reader as the medium through 
which Nietzsche can finally attain a self-consummation with the textual self, a self that 
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Nietzsche can only credit during his lifetime? As Derrida acknowledges, the point which 
prevents any grounding of the text in the empirical transgresses the pre-mortem and post-
mortem positions: 
... wherever the paradoxical problem of the border is posed, then the line that 
could separate an author's life from his work ... or which, within this l{fe, 
could separate an essentialness or transcendentality from an empirical fact, or; 
yet again, within his work, an empirical fact from something that is not 
empirical - this very line itself becomes unclear. ("Roundtable on 
Autobiography" 44-45 Emphasis mine) 
It is in transgressing the difference between "empirical fact" and "essentialness or 
transcendentality" that Derrida would appear to erase the distinction between what Nietzsche 
is during his empirical life and the mythological figure which he would seek to become after 
this life. While it is certainly true that Nietzsche also transgresses this distinction (as the 
subtitle to Ecce Homo indicates, he already is what he is becoming) he was also aware that 
this transgression could not be affirmed until his posthumous birth, for as Nietzsche asserts: 
"I am one thing, my writings are another matter ... " (715). This is precisely why his life is a 
process of becoming, of self-overcoming via writing, and if this is the means through which 
'"it was'" eventually becomes "'thus I willed it"' then one is forced to ask what "'it was"' 
was. In other words, what is buried at the point of redemption? Indeed Nietzsche maintains 
the distinction between "'it was"' and '"thus I willed it'" when he asserts: "It was not for 
nothing that I buried my forty-fourth year today~ I had the right to bury it; whatever was life 
in it has been saved, is immortal" (676). 
In answering these questions it ts important to recall the manner in which the 
Derridean paradigm outlined intersects with the question of the origin, for it would be 
simplistic to assume that the term 'empirical' here refers merely to the reality ofNietzsche's 
life, to the historical actuality of his life as it was lived. The role of this empiricity is closely 
related to the role of the body in the Nietzschean schema, for it is clearly Nietzsche's 
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biological presence which distinguishes Nietzsche's pre-mortem position from the post-
mortem position of the reader, maintaining the distinction between what Nietzsche is and the 
figure that he promises himself Derrida draws a parallel between Nietzsche's position and 
that of the reader in asserting that "I ... no longer know what this experience is that grounds 
the value of the empirical. This is the case whether one is speaking of Nietzsche' s life or his 
corpus - his body, if you will . . . ". It is in this remark that the distinctions and the parallels 
between the Nietzschean and the readerly positions become evident, for it is clear that if the 
eternal return, from a readerly perspective, is facilitated by an inability to say what 
Nietzsche's 'empirical' life is, then analogously it is equally clear that the eternal return, 
from Nietzsche's perspective, is facilitated by his inability to speak the body: "Behind your 
thoughts and feelings, my brother, there stands a mighty ruler, an unknown sage - whose 
name is self In your body he dwells; he is your body" (Zarathustra 146). The body is 
precisely the self which is annulled in the movement into language, and it is precisely this 
annulment, this inability to say what the body is without translating this origin into a 
signifier, a mask, which constitutes the drive behind Nietzsche' s work and facilitates the 
process of self-overcoming. Zarathustra himself is a mythological enactment of, and a mask 
of, Nietzsche's body, in the same manner that the 'origin'/ the signifier that the text 
originates masks any authentic origin. Nietzsche/ the body utilises this inherently eliminative 
movement into language, the body's own inability to say what it is by virtue of the 
paradoxical fact that it has become 'self aware, as a means of positing Zarathustra as a 
fiction of what the body/ the self can become (since any enactment of this origin is a mere 
signifier), and as a mythologisation of what the body always already is (since this signifier 
has now always already been in place no matter how far back one traces this process). It is, 
indeed, the body's inability to speak itself which sustains and constitutes the instinctive will-
to-power of which Nietzsche's writings are a manifestation, defining philosophy and thought 
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itself: ". . . by far the greater part of conscious thinking must still be included among 
instinctive activities, and that goes even for philosophical thinking .... most of the conscious 
thinking of a philosopher is secretly guided and forced into certain channels by his instincts" 
(Beyond Good and Evil201). 
Yet while Nietzsche ts still a bodily presence (and one should be wary of 
distinguishing Nietzsche from his body for the self "is your body") it is evident that the 
inherent distinction between the body and the body's signified or intelligible awareness of 
itself, the distinction between origin and telos that Nietzsche utilises in overcoming himself, 
remains in place. Moreover, that this distinction between body speaking and the body spoken 
is inescapable, being a precondition of self-awareness itself, is indicative of its equivalence to 
the inescapable breach which inhabits autobiographical writing, that between self-writing and 
self-written. As Seim Burke asserts: 
Even given an ideal autobiographical scenario - that of the author who is 
engaged in a continual and self-reflexive autobiographical writing, a perennial 
diarist whose only concern is with the act of diarising - there would always be 
a hiatus, both spatio-temporal and ontological between he who writes, and 
what is written. This division is inescapable. (Death and Return of the Author 
55) 
The difference between the two, of course, is that the hiatus which separates the body from 
its self-signification is not spatio-temporal and ontological but purely epistemological, 
occurring as a result of body's inability to intelligibly apprehend itself even in its own 
presence. It is precisely because this distinction is epistemological rather than ontological, 
because the body is inapprehensibly present, that the distinction between the body and its 
signification remains in place during Nietzsche's lifetime: "Two markedly distinct 
subjectivities are in opposition: the one, transpersonal, extraworldly, normative and formal; 
the other intraworldly, biographical, a subject of desire, for want of a better word, a 
'material' subject" (Burke Death and Return of the Author 113). This is why one can 
97 
interpret the incessant nature of the pre-mortem process of redemption which is Nietzsche' s 
writing as "a continual and self-reflexive autobiographical writing" in Burke's sense, being a 
continual attempt by the body to apprehend its own presence and finally speak itself: 
Verily, all being is hard to prove and hard to induce to speak. Tell me, my 
brothers, is not the strangest of all things proved most nearly?. . . . this most 
honest being, the ego, speaks of the body and still wants the body, even when 
it poetizes and raves and flutters with broken wings. It learns to speak ever 
more honestly, this ego: and the more it learns, the more words and honors it 
finds for body and earth. (Zarathustra 144) 
However, there can be no final affirmation of Zarathustra, and the body will not have finally 
spoken itself as Zarathustra, until this spatia-temporal and ontological hiatus is finally in 
place and the body has been supplanted by the text. This is precisely why the reader's 
position is privileged in relation to Nietzsche's own position: it only at the point of death that 
the body and the body's mythological enactment of itself can finally coincide and the body 
can be posthumously born as Zarathustra. It is the physical absence of Nietzsche which 
allows the reader to redeem Nietzsche as the textual figure that he promises himself, for it is 
this absence which breaches the pre-mortem symbiosis between self/ body and self-image, 
allowing this self-image to escape its origin and come into its own. However, one can see this 
as the point at which the potentiality which is the body is actualised as the text, rather than as 
the point at which the body is supplanted by the text. More accurately, it is this supplantation 
which allows the body to be reborn as the text, for it is its absence which facilitates the 
body's translation into its self-image, Nietzsche's (absent) reality being subsumed into the 
image which, now, is this reality, and, now, has always been this reality. One is reminded 
here of Zarathustra's assertion that one should "write with blood" (Zarathustra 152), writing, 
and Zarathustra himself, being the ultimate means through which the body is redeemed. As 
the man whom Zarathustra encounters in the parable "The Leech" asserts: "For the leech's 
sake I lay here beside this swamp like a fisherman, and my arm, which I had cast, had 
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already been bitten ten times when a still more beautiful leech bit, seeking my blood, 
Zarathustra himself' (Zarathustra 3 61-63). 
When Nietzsche describes his writing as a process through which "one becomes what 
one is", adding that "[t]o become what one is, one must not have the faintest notion what one 
is" (71 0), it is apparent that what one is is the mystery which is the body and what one will 
become- Zarathustra (for example)- is also the body (what one is), or rather what the body 
will become at the point of physical death/ textual redemption. Zarathustra's pre-mortem 
existence as a mere signifier, a mask, in itself, testifies to the mysterious status of the body at 
this point, even as the body/ Nietzsche will be born as this signifier through the process of 
self-overcoming that this mysterious status allows. A corollary of this paradigm is that the 
textual enactment of his telos, of Zarathustra, can only ever be an illusory figure to Nietzsche 
himself (i.e. to Nietzsche as a physical presence), since it is only in the absence of the body 
that he, the body, is supplanted by, and transformed into, this figure. As Nietzsche asserts in 
reflecting this translation of the body into the reality of its self-image, of one potentiality into 
its other: "The true goal is veiled by a phantasm: and while we stretch out our hands for the 
latter, nature attains the former by means of our illusion" (The Birth of Tragedy 44). 
Before going on to explore the manner in which this schema requires a reformulation 
of the Derridean view of textuality, it has already become apparent that, for Nietzsche, it is 
only at the point of death that the origin can be said to have been finally supplanted by the 
text, not at the point of the text's institution. The trace which inhabits Nietzsche's 
autobiographical n!cit at the point of writing is that of his body, his physical presence. If this 
were not the case, then the distinction between what Nietzsche is and what he will become on 
death would not be in place during Nietzsche's lifetime. Moreover, the process of self-
overcoming via the specifically written text would not occur: it would not have to occur since 
the significance of writing (in the prosaic sense) would be occluded, Nietzsche not having to 
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rely on specifically post-mortem mediation of the reader for his redemption, or the fact that 
the their position is privileged by his physical absence. As Catherine Pickstock recognises, it 
is the question of physical presence which problematises Derrida' s elision of the distinction 
between speech and writing, and between origin and text: 
. . . it could be argued that . . . Derrida . . . suppresses the link between 
language and physicality, for in aligning writing with parricide or the absence 
of the father, and orality with the metaphysics of presence, he subtly denies 
the fact that language of any kind requires a bodily presence6 . . . Derrida 
argues that language needs no speaker, since it is more fundamentally a trace 
of a speaker who was never present to begin with .... Derrida's written model 
suggests no people at all, only a word which comes from nowhere, an 
autonomous word which conceals or violently eradicates its origins, and 
dictates to its "author," rendering him entirely passive before a disembodied 
and (spiritual?) power. (21-22) 
In contrast, it is evident that, for Nietzsche, the significance of writing lies in the fact that, 
unlike speech, it does not require his immediate bodily presence. It is precisely his body's 
absence at the point of reading which allows the body/ the self to redeem itself: the body, the 
self, can determine what it will be at the point that its actuality is supplanted by the 
mythological figure that it prospectively posits. For a nineteenth-century writer such a 
positing can only occur through writing. 
3 
THE TRACE OF 11-IE BODY 
While it is evident that the body and its inapprehensible nature facilitates the pre-
mortem process of becoming which is Nietzsche's life, it is equally evident that it is the 
presence of the body which prevents Nietzsche from finally becoming the self that he credits 
during his own lifetime, there being no installation of this figure within the 'rights of reality' 
in Nietzsche's own presence. This not only holds in place the distinction between what 
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Nietzsche is and what he will become, but also the distinction between Nietzsche and the 
privileged reader, and between speech and writing. This is not however, to imply that one can 
simplistically accept speech as an index of self-presence, for it is precisely Nietzsche's 
physical presence which prevents any identification of the self-as-signified with the self, 
Zarathustra remaining illusory until the point of death: the identification of the self-spoken 
with the self-speaking can only occur in absence of the latter, the point at which the 
'speaker's' physicality is supplanted by, and redeemed as, the self-spoken, a process which 
requires the medium of writing. Yet if it is the immediate presence of the body which 
distinguishes the pre-mortem position of the author from the post-mortem position of the 
reader, then the trace which inhabits Nietzsche's self-nkit cannot simply be a trace of the 
body's absence, it must betray the body's presence in some manner, even as it must do so 
without allowing that presence to be affirmed, for it is precisely this inability which 
facilitates the process of self-becoming. The process of self-becoming, it would seem, does 
not merely require that the body is inapprehensible, but that it is an inapprehensible presence, 
a logos which is denied in the process of signification but which implicitly re-asserts itself 
via this deniaL In order to appreciate the manner in which this occurs it is necessary to 
appreciate the fundamental premise of the Nietzschean textuality as it has been outlined. As 
will become apparent, this premise will require further modifications of the relationship 
between textuality and empiricism, revealing that the trace which sustains textuality is the 
inalienable possibility which is matter. 
If the distinction between Nietzsche and the textual figure Nietzsche becomes on 
death is held in place by his bodily presence, then it is apparent that this textual figure, 
Zarathustra, is always illusory to Nietzsche himself This is why Zarathustra is a pro.spective 
rather than present reality, a redemptive figure who can only become Nietzsche's reality in 
Nietzsche's absence, and only to the privileged reader. Zarathustra, therefore, remains 
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illusory as a result ofNietzsche's physical presence, acting as an index ofthe body's inability 
to intelligibly apprehend itself in this presence except as an illusion, a mask. It is also 
evident, therefore, that body remains inapprehensible because of its overwhelming presence. 
Zarathustra remains illusory as a result of the fact that this signifier is implicated in the 
immanence of the body, meaning that the body has yet to differ from itself so that it can be 
apprehended in meaningful terms. In this light, it is evident that the elusive nature of the self 
is actually symptomatic of the body's inability to escape its own immanence that it can 
meaningfully present its totality, what it is, to itself In other words, the body cannot 
transcend its own presence in order that it can be authentically present to itself: 
What, indeed, does man know of himsel£1 Can he even once perceive himself 
completely, laid out as if in an illuminated glass case? Does not nature keep 
much the most from him, even about his body, to spellbind and confine him in 
a proud, deceptive consciousness, far from the coils of the intestines, the quick 
current of the blood stream, and the involved tremors of the fibers? ("On 
Truth and Lie" 44) 
This totalising viewpoint can only occur if the self occupies a position which is differentiated 
from itself In other words, one must be present at one's own absence, achieving what the 
philosopher Thomas Nagel has designated a 'view from nowhere': this inherently 
hypothetical viewpoint is a product of our "ambition to get outside of ourselves" ( 6) and 
achieve "the perspective of a particular person inside the world with an objective view of that 
same world, the person and his viewpoint included" (3)7 . As the quotation from Nietzsche 
implies, however, man is confined within a "deceptive consciousness" which is "far" from 
the body only by virtue of its inability to achieve this transcendental viewpoint. Again, the 
breach between the body and consciousness in this case is epistemological rather than 
ontological: the body cannot escape itself in order that it can bring itself into subjective 
being. In the inapprehensible presence of the body, consciousness thus remains "hanging in 
dreams, as it were, upon the back of a tiger" ("On Truth and Lie" 44). 
-~~~'1 ~ 
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It is the body's inherently pre-mortem inability to escape its own immanent, yet 
incessantly potential, presence which, for Nietzsche, sustains the creative process, a process 
which utilises the desire for self-transcendence, the desire to move beyond the self so that the 
self can brought into subjective being. Nietzsche utilises this desire as a means of fashioning 
the self in the will to power, for the body desires "to create beyond itself That is what it 
would do above all else, that is its fervent wish" (Zarathustra 14 7). Consciousness may be 
deceptive in the sense that the self involved in 'self awareness is illusory in the body's own 
presence, yet the body can only "create beyond itself' by accepting this illusion as its reality 
in the certitude that it will become this redemptive reality. Nietzsche 'forgets' the body and 
wilfully deceives himself in accepting this textual figure as his reality, resolving one 
potentiality (the body, "'it was'") in favour of the other (the self one desires, '"thus I willed 
it'"). It is in doing so that this illusion will ultimately become his post-mortem, textual, 
reality: 
"To every soul there belongs an another world; for every soul, every 
other soul is an afterworld. Precisely between what is most similar, illusion 
lies most beautifully; for the smallest cleft is the hardest to bridge. 
"For me - how should there be any outside-myself? There is no 
outside. But all sounds make us forget this; how lovely it is that we forget. 
Have not names and sounds been given to things that man might find things 
refreshing? Speaking is a beautiful folly: with that man dances over all things. 
How lovely is all talking, and all the deception of sounds! With sounds our 
love dances on many-hued rainbows." (Zarathustra 329) 
The "folly" or the "deception" of names and sounds is that they mask the body and their 
implication within it, thus apparently escaping its immanence and enacting the illusion of an 
"outside", an exteriority of meaning where one's words can exist independently of the body. 
As a result they also imply the possibility of an "afterworld" from which a transcendental 
apprehension of one's totality can be achieved, a meaningful apprehension of the self from a 
position which is other to the self While writing, of course, does allow Nietzsche's words to 
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exist independently of his physical presence, thus allowing for an "afterworld", it should be 
noted that both this "outside" and this "afterworld" are not possible for Nietzsche himself: 
Nietzsche can never apprehend his own words without those words being implicated in his 
own physicality, and he can never transcend this physicality in order that he can achieve a 
totalising 'view from nowhere' 8 . However, Nietzsche can posit himself as occupying this 
transcendental position as a fictional figure such as Zarathustra, the deception through which 
he "dances over all things", in order to become this figure. Nevertheless, while this fiction 
will ultimately become Nietzsche' s reality (or alternatively Nietzsche' s reality will become 
this fiction) via the mediation of the reader, to Nietzsche himself this textual figure will 
always be a deception. The signifier Zarathustra, for Nietzsche, can only ever be 
apprehended as it is implicated in his own inapprehensible physicality thus remaining a 
signifier, an illusion of the body rather than an enactment of what this body has become: 
"For me - how should there be any outside-myself?". There is no "outside-myself' [Ausser-
mir] for the body and Nietzsche cannot step outside of the immanence of his own physical 
presence, of his self, in order that he can adopt the transcendental position of the reader, a 
position which is, of course, transcendental only in relation to Nietzsche himself This is why 
it is only "every other soul" which is an "afterworld" to Nietzsche, indicating the post-
mortem role of the reader in translating this deception into a truth. Nevertheless, Nietzsche 
posits this self as a fiction which will become true in his absence, creating beyond himself, 
and wilfully forgetting that his words are implicated within the space of the body, that there 
is no "outside-myself': "One must learn to look away from oneselfin order to see much: this 
hardness is necessary to every climber of mountains" (Zarathustra 265). This forgetting of 
the body, of course, is invited by the deception which is signification itself, that which 
appears to lie beyond the self: ". . . all sounds make us forget this; how lovely it is that we 
forget". It is in knowingly deceiving himself by accepting this illusion as a reality that 
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Nietzsche ensures that this illusion will become his reality through the post-mortem 
mediation of the reader_ The reader, of course, can never apprehend Nietzsche's actual self, 
his body, only the self that this body posits, the textual self that this body, now, is and, now, 
has always been. This textual self is only distinguishable from Nietzsche's 'deception' by 
virtue of the fact that it is now true, having supplanted and redeemed Nietzsche's physical 
actuality. Between this deception and this truth lies the process of writing, of self-deception 
in the name of truth: "Precisely between what is most similar, illusion lies most beautifully; 
for the smallest cleft is the hardest to bridge". 
One can see in this how the Nietzschean paradigm attenuates Derrida' s formulation of 
textuality: the movement into signification is not the erasure of the body via its 
transformation into a signifier (one cannot erase that which has never been apprehended in 
the first place9) but is, rather, a failure by the body to apprehend itself within the space of its 
own unspeakable immanence, a failure, by this immanence, to differ from itself that it can 
come into being. The text remains implicated within the space of the body: ". . . body am I 
entirely, and nothing else; and soul is only a word for something about the body" 
(Zarathustra 146). In this respect one should note Nietzsche's frequent identification of the 
will to power as a desire to attain that which has already been inapprehensibly attained (e.g. 
the desire to "become" what one already is) reflecting the paradox whereby the body can 
only intelligibly apprehend its self-identical status, becoming what it already is to itself, if it 
transcends itself: indeed, it is this factor which constitutes the paradox of the Nietzschean 
text, revealing how the body asserts its inapprehensible presence. On one hand, the body's 
inability to apprehend itself implies that the body has been 'erased' in epistemological terms, 
lying beyond the limits of consciousness, recalling Catherine Pickstock's assertion that the 
Derridean text consists of "a word which comes from nowhere, an autonomous word which 
conceals or violently eradicates its origins"; the body has thus, apparently, been usurped in 
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the exteriorising movement into textuality or 'self awareness (hence the deceptive status of 
"names and sounds"), and simultaneously transformed into a teleological object of desire. 
Yet, on the other hand, it is precisely the inability to attain this object, to affirm the body via 
this 'transcendence', which continually testifies to the body's inability to transcend or differ 
from itself, undoing the movement into textuality and subsuming the text into the immanence 
of the body, or rather revealing that the text has never transcended the body: " ... I live in my 
own light; I drink back into myself the flames that break out of me" (Zarathustra 218). This 
object of desire, therefore, remains an object of desire not because it is absent but because of 
the ineffable nature of its absolute presence. The body may speak but it is unable to transcend 
itself that it may be spoken except, that is, as a fiction, a signifier which merely serves to 
mask the body from itself without disrupting or escaping its immanence: ""1," you say, and 
are proud of the word. But greater is that in which you do not wish to have faith - your body 
and its great reason: that does not say "I," but does "I"" (Zarathustra 1 46). It the very fact 
that the self as signified is a mask, a fiction that is not identifiable with the body, which 
continually implies that this signifier remains implicated within the body's immanence. In 
these terms it is apparent that the difference between the origin and its image is actually the 
difference between the origin and that which the image represents, rather than the image 
itself it is this mask (or these masks) which constitute consciousness or 'self awareness, for 
as Nietzsche avers: " ... consciousness is a surface" (710). This surface is both a constant 
sublimation of the mysterious depth which is the body, the body's constant illusion of itself 
and that which facilitates the process through which the body overcomes what it is, the 
means through which the body can define the figure that it will be in its absence: "The body 
is inspired; let us keep the "soul" out of it" (758). 
In this context life itself is a constant repetition of the initial movement into language 
even as the constant 'erasure' of the origin which this movement involves is actually a 
106 
incessant reiteration of the origin's inability to transcend itself It is precisely through the 
'erasure' of the origin that this origin constantly re-asserts its inescapable, if inapprehensible, 
presence, constantly revealing that the body cannot establish its self-identity precisely 
because it is always absolutely self-identical 10. It is this identity to which Nietzsche refers in 
delineating, 
. . . a more primitive form of the world of affects in which everything still lies 
contained in a powerful unity before it undergoes ramifications and 
developments in the organic process . . . -as a kind of instinctive life in which 
all organic functions are still synthetically intertwined along with self-
regulation, assimilation, nourishment, excretion, and metabolism - as a pre-
form oflife (Beyond Good and Evil 238). 
The post-mortem nature of Nietzsche' s birth, therefore, is not merely the outcome of an 
inability to transcend his 'empirical' life, but an outcome of the fact that he has never 
transcended the origin which is the body and has never been born even within this life. If the 
text has no beginning it is not because the beginning has been erased but because one has 
never transcended the beginning in order that one can validly assert that the text has begun. 
Every moment of Nietzsche's 'empirical' life is an attempt to escape this self-identity that 
self-identity may be affirmed, even as this escape would be the moment of death, reflecting 
the manner in which Nietzsche's identity will not be affirmed/redeemed except in his absence 
via the reader. 
4 
THE ORIGIN : ... A FUTIJRE HIMSELF AND A BRIDGE TO niE FUTURE .... 
What Nietzsche constantly buries (and redeems) during his life, therefore, is not 
merely the historical factuality of this life but his body, for this process, as initiated at the 
initial point of linguistic 'self apprehension, is the means through which one's birth is 
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constantly deferred. The origin is erased via signification and is, like Zarathustra, still to 
come: 
From this point of view even the blunders of life have their own meaning and 
value - the occasional side roads and wrong roads, the delays, "modesties," 
seriousness wasted on tasks that are remote from the task. All this can express 
a great prudence, even the supreme prudence: where nosce te ipsum would be 
the recipe for ruin, forgetting oneself, misunderstanding oneself ... So many 
dangers that the instinct comes too soon to "understand itself'- (710) 
The process of over-coming, therefore, is sustained by the body's constant credit for itself, a 
credit which requires that the body does not "understand itself'. The body must remain the 
unverifiable object of its own belief, this simultaneously being a belief in the self that the 
body can become. As Nietzsche's utilisation of Zarathustra demonstrates, Nietzsche was 
aware that any signification of what the body is, of its presence, is no less fictional than a 
prospective signification of what the body can become. In light of its unverifiable nature, the 
body potentially exists and it is through this status that the body fulfils its own potentiality in 
the process of self-becoming. The origin, therefore, is transformed into the telos via this 
postponement, in a process which facilitates the body's self-transformation into the textual 
figure that it promises itself The origin ceases to be past and becomes fiJture: "-It was on 
these two walks that the whole of Zarathustra I occurred to me, and especially Zarathustra 
himself as a type: rather, he overtook me" (754). 
In this light, the institution of language and 'self awareness does not simply 'erase' 
the self but implicitly re-states it as the goal which is yet to be attained, in an apophatic 
process of defermentn. This lack, the body's inability to currently attain itself, is implicitly 
re-stated in every subsequent act of self-signification until the point of death. It is this 
constant process of signification, of deferment through signification, which renders the 
writing process the "bridge to the overman" (Zarathustra 147). "How lovely it is that there 
are words and sounds! Are not words and sounds rainbows and illusive bridges between 
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things which are eternally apart?" (Zarathustra 329). The text, during Nietzsche's life, is the 
"illusive" bridge which arcs what Nietzsche is, his physical and empirical actuality, the 
origin which has yet to exist by virtue of its immanent presence, until this "illusive" text is 
translated into his reality on death. The inapprehensible origin which is the body is not only 
overcome through the process of writing12, for it is also carried over the "bridge to the 
highest hope, and a rainbow after long storms" (Zarathustra 211) through the deferment 
which is Nietzsche's textual self-recitation13 . The body thus overcomes itse(finto the text, the 
process of 'self' signification being the body's deferment of what it is, until what it 'is' is the 
post-mortem textual figure that it promises itself in signifYing itself Yet that this should be a 
bridge between "things which are eternally apart" reflects the manner in which the actuality 
of the body will never be apprehended by the body within this paradigm. Nietzsche as a 
physical actuality will never be reconciled with the textual figure that he will become, for it 
is only in his physical absence that he can finally become this figure. Similarly, it is the 
living Nietzsche's inability to intelligibly apprehend his own physical presence which 
facilitates his body's (Nietzsche 's) instinctual process self-becoming via writing. In both 
cases the actuality of the body is elided, absent in the first case, and deferred in the second 14 . 
It is evident, therefore, that Nietzsche himself will never apprehend the body as either pre-
discursive origin or post-mortem telos, the two points that this bridge which is his life, the 
mode ~f potentiality which is his life, spans, and this is merely another way of saying that the 
body will never intelligibly apprehend itself as a presence during or (of course) after its 
existence: "You are going your way to greatness: here nobody shall sneak after you. Your 
own foot has effaced the path behind you, and over it there is written: impossibility" 
(Zarathustra 265). The text, therefore, is the means through which the origin, the body, 
overleaps Nietzsche's reality (its own reality), a reality which is never apprehended: "There 
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are many ways of overcoming: see to that yourself! But only the jester thinks: "Man can also 
be skipped over"'' (Zarathustra 311) 
The "bridge to the overman" therefore is constituted by the living body's linguistic 
inability to apprehend itself: the body's signified awareness of itself 'skips' over the body's 
actuality until this signifier, on death, becomes this actuality. As Nietzsche writes, 
Zarathustra "strides over the bridge as spirit" (Zarathustra 127). However, while Nietzsche 
will never become meaningfully aware actuality of the body, of the origin, it is nevertheless 
evident that its pre-mortem presence facilitates the process of self-overcoming during his life, 
being that which is overcome. The "bridge to the overman" is not merely the process of 
deferment which is textuality for at this pre-mortem stage the process of self-recitation is 
implicated in Nietzsche's physical presence, remaining incomplete for this reason: the bridge 
is constituted by a process of deferment, of writing, which relies on the pre-mortem 
symbiosis between the body and its self-representation. The body, in its presence, is the 
inapprehensible ground, the trace, which underlies this process of deferment, until this 
ground is rendered absent on death and the body finally becomes its self-image. At this point 
the bridge ceases to be a "bridge to the highest hope" (Zarathustra 211 ), a process of self-
recitation, and becomes "a rainbow after long storms" (Zarathustra 211 ), that which has been 
recited: 
... the lover of knowledge is obtrusive with his eyes - how could he see more 
of all things than their foregrounds? But you, 0 Zarathustra, wanted to see the 
ground and background of all things; hence you must climb over yourself -
upward, up until even your stars are under you! (Zarathustra 265) 
It is the eternally mysterious status of this ground which allows the body to fulfil the promise 
that it makes to itself in signifYing itself, ultimately becoming identifiable with the self-image 
that it prospectively textually posits, the means through which the body "reinterprets all that 
has been as a bridge to itself' (Zarathustra 314). 
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In this light Nietzsche's 'empirical' life cannot, therefore, be regarded as Nietzsche's 
life for Nietzsche has yet to exist, has yet to speak himself into existence. Indeed, the 
constant self-recitation which is Nietzsche's writings constitutes both a constant attempt by 
the body to speak itself in a biologistic process of becoming (an attempt which 
simultaneously and incessantly postpones this utterance) and the translation of 'Nietzsche's' 
empirical life into a redemptive text which will only become identifiable with Nietzsche at 
the point of his posthumous birth, the point at which Nietzsche comes into being in order that 
this life can be redeemed; it is only at this point that the body coincides with, and is born as, 
the textual figure that it has promised itself in its will to power, finally escaping its own 
immanence that it can speak itself into being as the text. It is evident from this that an 
aesthetic perception is the means through which the body can fulfil its potential, this 
perception being the attribute of "a powerful soul which belongs to a high body, beautiful, 
triumphant, refreshing, around which everything becomes a mirror" (Zarathustra 302). 
Recalling his description of consciousness, in relation to the body's totality, as "hanging in 
dreams, as it were, upon the back of a tiger" ("On Truth and Lie" 44), Nietzsche (quoting 
Zarathustra) explains his experience of inspiration: it is 
. . . as if the things themselves approached and offered themselves as 
metaphors [ als ob die Dinge selber herankiimen und sich zum Gleichnisse 
anbOten - all of the things themselves approached and offered themselves to 
metaphors] ("Here all things come caressingly to your discourse and flatter 
you; for they want to ride on your back. On every metaphor you ride to every 
truth . . . Here the words and word-shrines of all being open up before you; 
here all being wishes to become word, all becoming wishes to learn from you 
how to speak"). (756-57) 
It is the very translation of the material cause into an illusion, an effect, which allows the 
apparent to become this ultimate reality. One can see this as the translation of an 
inapprehensible, temporally present, material reality into a future reality, a textual reality, 
through the medium of the body, the body being, like the overman, "a future himself and a 
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bridge to the future" (Zarathustra 251 ). One should note that the quotation conforms to the 
schema already outlined, the manner in which the body can only apprehend itself as an 
illusion, a metaphor for itself, by virtue of its inability to escape its own immanence, until a 
post-mortem self-consummation occurs and this metaphor becomes the truth of the body. 
Indeed, Nietzsche's assertion that "here all being wishes to become word, all becoming 
wishes to learn from you how to speak" is comparable to his delineation of the body's 
attempt to speak itself in the process of becoming, for it is evident that being can only speak 
through the body: " .. _ all being is hard to prove and hard to induce to speak . . . this most 
honest being, the ego, speaks of the body and still wants the body . . . It learns to speak ever 
more honestly . . . and the more it learns, the more words . . . it finds for body and earth" 
(Zarathustra 144). 
In this context, the reality of the body, of external causation, of the present, is never 
subjectively apprehended (except as an illusion) by virtue of the body's immanence: as we 
have seen Nietzsche will never apprehend his own actuality, his own presence, except as a 
figure such as Zarathustra, a figure who is always illusory in Nietzsche's own presence. 
Similarly, any material reality remains non-existent to the subject (which is not to say that it 
is non-existent) and in this light the only reality for the subject is the apparent, that which will 
become real and yet which, in the 'absence' of the body, appears to be a current reality. It is 
precisely the fact that we can only apprehend the world as it affects the body, the effect of 
causative reality being our only reality, which defines the apparent as our reality. As 
Nietzsche asserts "the great poet dips only from his own reality" (702): 
First proposition. The reasons for which "this" world has been characterized 
as "apparent" are the very reasons which indicate its reality; any other kind of 
reality is absolutely indemonstrable. . . . The criteria which have been 
bestowed on the "true being" of things are the criteria of not-being, of naught . 
. . (Twilight of the Idols 484) 
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"Nought", it should be recalled, is precisely what Nietzsche' s empiricity, his "true being" is 
to himself, for Nietzsche has yet to come into existence: "I live on my own credit; it is 
perhaps a mere prejudice that I live" (673). 
It is precisely through an aesthetic perception that body redeems itself in transforming 
the world, its experience of the world, from '"it was"' into '"thus I willed it"'. Nietzsche's 
life is not only constituted by the processive redemption of his body, for this is a processive 
redemption of this life as it is implicated within the body, a life which, like the body, will 
remain illusory until the post-mortem point of redemption. As Nietzsche states in 
distinguishing the waking and dreaming states: 
. . . the former appeals to us as infinitely preferable ... yet in relation to that 
mysterious ground of our being of which we are the phenomena, I should ... 
maintain the very opposite estimate of the value of dreams. For the more 
clearly I perceive in nature those omnipotent art impulses, and in them an 
ardent longing for illusion, for redemption through illusion, the more I feel, 
myself impelled to the metaphysical assumption that the truly existent primal 
unity, eternally suffering and contradictory, also needs the rapturous vision, 
the pleasurable illusion, for its continuous redemption. And we, completely 
wrapped up in this illusion and composed of it, are compelled to consider this 
illusion as the truly nonexistent- i.e., as a perpetual becoming in time, space, 
and causality - in other words, as empirical reality. If, for the moment, we do 
not consider the question of our own "reality," if we conceive of our empirical 
existence, and of that of the world in general, as a continuously manifested 
representation of the primal unity, we shall then have to look upon the dream 
as a mere appearance of mere appearance, hence as a still higher 
appeasement of the primordial desire for mere appearance. (The Birth of 
Tragedy 44-45) 
It is important to appreciate the role of this self-deception in the Nietzschean schema, for it is 
precisely a failure to appreciate that this is a deception which frequently leads to 
misinterpretations of the Nietzschean view of textuality, specifically with regards to the 
relationship between appearance and reality. Alexander Nehemas, for example, argues that 
"Nietzsche believes that nothing is left over beyond the sum total of the features and 
characteristics associated with each object and that no person remains beyond the totality of 
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its experiences and actions" (155). This remark stands in stark contradiction to Nietzsche's/ 
Zarathustra's assertion that "[b]ehind your thought and feelings, my brother, there stands a 
mighty ruler, an unknown sage -whose name is self In your body he dwells; he is your 
body" (Zarathustra 146). Yet in spite of this it is true that one can read Nietzsche as accepting 
the characteristically post-modem dictum that "a thing is the sum of its effects". For example 
". . . Heraclitus will remain eternally right with his assertion that being is an empty fiction. 
The "apparent" world is the only one: the "true" world is merely added by a lie" (Twilight of 
the Idols 481 ). What we see here is the self-deception under discussion, the wilful forgetting 
of appearances implication in the body's immanence and an acceptance of that which is 
presently illusory (i.e. that which is illusory in one's own presence) as a reality. As Nietzsche 
asserts "Only through forgetfulness can man ever achieve the illusion of possessing a "truth" . 
. . . If he does not wish to be satisfied with truth in the form of tautology - that is, with empty 
shells- then he will forever buy illusions for truths" ("On Truth and Lie" 45). In succumbing 
to the deception of signification by accepting that which is apparently real as the real, 
Nietzsche, therefore, is not rejecting material reality; if this were the case then he would also 
have to reject the material reality of the body, of the writing which allows him to be 
redeemed in his absence, and of the readers who facilitate this redemption. It is, rather, a 
recognition that this present reality will never exist for us: as Nietzsche immediately asks 
"What is a word? The image of a nerve stimulus in sounds. But to infer from the nerve 
stimulus, a cause outside us, that is already the result of a false and unjustified application of 
the principle of reason ... " ("On Truth and Lie" 45). Signification, therefore, not only masks 
the body but also masks any underlying reality which exists apart from the body. 'External' 
reality, like the body's signification of itself, can only exist to us as it is implicated in body's 
immanence and it will, therefore, always be illusory in the body's own presence, having yet 
to transcend and supplant the body so that it can be installed within the 'rights of reality'. 
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Like the body's signified enactment of itself, the apparent cannot become a reality until the 
body is absent, remaining a mere apparency until this point, which is not to assert that the 
apparent has no external causation, or that there is no external reality. It is, however, to 
acknowledge that this reality cannot exist in terms of bodily experience even as it causes this 
experience: the reality of the apparent is not subordinate to this cause but to its effect, to the 
reality that it will become in the body's absence: ". . . this is what the will to truth should 
mean to you: that everything be changed into what is thinkable for man, visible for man, 
feelable by man. You should think through your own senses to their consequences" 
(Zarathustra 198). 
In this respect one should note that the 'apparent world' of which Nietzsche speaks is, 
specifically, a product of the senses rather than the text: he asserts that philosophers, 
... all believe, desperately even, in what has being. But since they never grasp 
it, they seek for reasons why it is kept from them. "There must be mere 
appearance, there must be some deception which prevents us from perceiving 
that which has being: where is the deceiver?" 
"We have found him," they cry ecstatically; "it is the senses! ... let us 
say No to all who have faith in the senses, to all the rest of mankind; They are 
all 'mob'. Let us be philosophers! Let us be mummies! ... And above all, 
away with the body, this wretched idee fixe, disfigured by all the fallacies of 
logic, refuted, even impossible, although it is impudent enough to behave as if 
it were real!" (Twilight of the Idols 480) 
It is the integral reality of the body which most clearly testifies to the existence of external 
reality even as this reality cannot be real in terms of bodily experience. As Nietzsche/ the 
body will never subjectively apprehend his/ its own reality, never being able to claim this 
reality as its own (a claim which Nietzsche consequently makes for Zarathustra, the body's 
fiction of itself), the actuality of the external world will never be our reality. Nevertheless, if 
the external world will never be real from our perspective one can no more rule out this 
reality than one can rule out the actuality of the body: 
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. . . others even say that the external world is the work of our organs? But then 
our body, as part of this external world, would be the work of our organs! But 
then our organs themselves would be - the work of our organs! It seems to me 
that this is a complete reductio ad absurdum, assuming that the concept of a 
causa sui is fundamentally absurd. Consequently, the external world is not the 
work of our organs-? (Beyond Good and Evil212- 13) 
In criticising the philosophical rejection of the senses and the body in favour of an 
unmediated reality which lies beyond these deceptions Nietzsche admits that there can be no 
other reality for the body beyond these deceptions. Nevertheless, whether the apparent is 
deceptive is a question of perspective, for it should be noted that the apparent is only a 
deception from the perspective of temporally present actuality of the body and the external 
world, neither of which are ever subjectively apprehended. From the subjective perspective 
which we are forced to adopt by virtue of the 'absence' of these factors, the apparent is 
installed within the 'rights of reality', this being our reality. The body cannot "look away" 
from itself to a present reality which is independent of the body, but it can accept these 
deceptions as its own reality in the full knowledge they will consequently be transformed 
from deceptions into reality, the future reality which, in the 'absence' of the body, is already 
apparent: "The now and the past on earth - alas my friends that is what I find most 
unendurable; and I should not know how to live If I were not also a seer of that which must 
come" (Zarathustra 250-51 ). It is in 'forgetting' a body which cannot, in any case, be verified 
that Nietzsche transcends his own mortality, his own presence, and lives in the future, this 
being the means through which he walks "among men as among the fragments of the future -
that future which I envisage" (Zarathustra 251 ). Nietzsche describes this transcendental realm 
as the "undiscovered country" [ein noch unentdecktes LandJ 15 which lies "beyond all the 
lands and nooks of the ideal so far, a world so overich . . . that our curiosity as well as our 
craving to possess it has got beside itself' [ unser Besitzdurst ausser sich gerathen sind- our 
possession-desire gets outside of itself]. He subsequently asks how, "[a]fter such vistas ... 
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could we still be satisfied with present-day man? ... Another ideal runs ahead of us, a 
strange, tempting dangerous ideal . . .", an ideal in which signifies "danger, decay, 
debasement, or at least recreation, blindness, and temporary self-oblivion [ Selbstvergessen -
self-forgetting]. .. that will often appear inhuman . .. " (755). 
Nevertheless, it is evident from this that Nietzsche cannot wholly forget ''present-day 
man", for it is only the present which defines the reality that he apprehends via the apparent 
as a future reality. In the same way that we must presuppose Nietzsche's 'empirical' and 
physical existence if we are not to erase the distinction between what Nietzsche is during his 
own life and the redemptive figure that he will become after his death, Nietzsche must 
presuppose the reality of the inapprehensible present, of the body and external reality, in 
order that the reality that the apparent presents can be defined as a future reality. Moreover, 
this definition is necessary if Nietzsche is to redefine the apparent in terms of what he wishes 
his life to become rather than merely passively accepting his life as presented. He must 
sustain the difference between present and future, between and "'it was'" and '"thus I will it; 
thus shall I will it" if his life is to be redeemed rather than repeated. In this respect it is 
notable that, for Nietzsche, the truth of the apparent is not the truth as presented by the 
unredeemed apparent. If this were the case Nietzsche would be a passive rather than 
redemptive medium in the passage from external cause to his textual self, being condemned 
to eternally relive '"it was"': 
. . . the will itself is still a prisoner. Willing liberates; but what is it that puts 
even the liberator himself in fetters? 'It was' - that is the name of the will's 
gnashing of teeth and most secret melancholy. Powerless against what has 
been done, he is an angry spectator of all that is past. The will cannot will 
backwards; and that he cannot break time and time's covetousness ... 
(Zarathustra 251) 
If "the stone It was cannot be moved" then "all punishments must be eternal" (Zarathustra 
252), thus necessitating that the self "will backwards" from the future to the present, from 
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effect to cause. It is evident, therefore, that the 'effect' involved in any assertion that "a thing 
is the sum of its effects" is not the apparent as presented, that which is determined by 
external causality yet remains illusory by virtue of its implication in the immanent body: it is, 
rather, the apparent as redeemed, the future reality that the body/ self determines for itself in 
the will to power. The inapprehensible actuality of the body renders the present effect of 
causatory reality, the apparent as presented, illusory, thus allowing the body to utilise and 
redeem these illusions by determining its own effect, creating the reality that it will become 
on death, even as the body is, in subjective terms, already absent. The 'truth' of the apparent, 
therefore, is that of the apparent as redeemed rather than as presented, as self-determined 
rather than externally determined: 
Any distinction between a "true" and an "apparent" world . . . is only a 
suggestion of decadence . . . That the artist esteems appearance higher than 
reality is no objection to this proposition. For "appearance" in this case means 
reality once more, only by way of selection, reinforcement, and correction. 
(Twilight of the Idols 484) 
In asserting that the truth of the apparent is that of reality "once more", reality as willed 
rather than as was, Nietzsche reveals that he is utilising two realities and two perspectives. 
Firstly, the perspective of the present whereby the apparent is illusory by virtue of the body's 
presence, even as this illusion is determined by external reality. From this perspective these 
illusions have yet to become Nietzsche's reality, thus giving him the opportunity to redefine 
and redeem them in the will to power: "The will is a creator.' All 'it was' is a fragment, a 
riddle, a dreadful accident - until the creative will says to it, 'But thus I willed it"' 
(Zarathustra 253). Secondly, we have reality "once more", the perspective of the future 
whereby Nietzsche accepts the apparent as presented (as present) as illusory in order that he 
can define his own truth and shape the reality that he will become. In light of the illusory 
nature of the apparent as it is presented, this future reality, which is rendered inevitable by his 
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present actions, is the only reality that he can subjectively apprehend, any conception of 
reality being subordinate to this redeemed 'truth'. 
It is evident, therefore, that in denying any distinction between 'a "true" and an 
"apparent world"' Nietzsche is specifically referring to the apparent as redeemed. The 
apparent as presented, as externally rather than self-determined, is illusory, remaining 
illusory until it has been redeemed, this being the means through which one chooses one's 
own reality. What we see here is an inversion of perspectives whereby the life, or the self, 
that one desires becomes one's only reality, while that which is externally determined 
(empirical reality, one's unredeemed life, the apparent as presented, 'it was') is reduced to 
the status of an illusion by virtue of the reality of the body. The body can shape these 
illusions into its future reality in the will to power, or conversely, it can shape its own current 
conception of itself in terms of the future reality that it desires, becoming this reality in a 
process of "willing backwards". Again, this is not to deny external causation for it is the 
manner in which this causation is implicated in the actuality of the body, in its 
inapprehensible and immanent presence, which defines the unredeemed apparent as illusory, 
as that which has yet to become real, thus facilitating its redemptive transformation into its 
future reality. It is in accepting the reality of the body and the manner in which it transforms 
external causation into an illusion that Nietzsche facilitates the process of redemption, 
allowing the future reality that he chooses to gain functional primacy over any external 
causation, over any present reality, a reality that can never be real to us because of the reality 
ofthe body. 
The inapprehensible reality of the body, and the manner in which it defines any 
present, external reality as an illusion, is, therefore, a perspective which is integral to the 
Nietzschean schema, revealing that Nietzsche does not deny external reality, but denies that 
it can be real in terms of bodily experience, a contention which paradoxically requires the 
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reality of the body. External reality may be real, but it can never be our reality by virtue C?f 
the reality of the body. In this light it is evident that present material reality is necessary for 
Nietzsche's denial of present material reality in favour ofwhat this reality can become, in the 
same manner that the future cannot be the future except as defined against the present. 
Nietzsche, while inverting perspectives, nevertheless requires both, reality and our only 
reality, "'it was"' and '"thus I will it: thus shall I will it'". 
It is the failure to appreciate this perspectivism, the reduction of the Nietzschean 
schema to the single perspective, which explains why Alexander Nehemas' attempt to 
explicate Nietzsche's contention that "a thing is the sum of its effects" as a denial of any 
material reality inevitably ends in an impasse: 
But we now come face to face with a central problem involved in every 
presentation of Nietzsche's view of the will to power. The view asserts that 
things are nothing but their effects, that there are no objects or substances; yet 
it is stated in a language that seems to depend on there being just such entities 
in the world for its own possibility. As Arthur Danto has written, the will to 
power "is a difficult view to render wholly intelligible . . . because the terms 
for intelligibility for us are precisely those the theory cannot fit. To explain the 
theory in our language is to tolerate a fiction which one wishes to overthrow." 
(92- 93) 
As the phrase "stated in a language which seems to depend on there being just such entities .. 
. " suggests, Nehemas attempts to account for this 'problem' in linguistic terms, utilising 
Derrida' s contention that language is inextricably linked to the history of metaphysics: 
We have no language - no syntax and no lexicon - which is foreign to this 
history; we can pronounce not a single deconstructive proposition which has 
not already had to slip into the form, the logic, and the implicit postulations of 
precisely what it seeks to contest. ("Structure, Sign and Play" 280-81) 
Yet Nehemas' phrase reveals the problems involved here for Nietzsche's argument that a 
"thing is the sum of its effects" is "stated in a language which seems to depend on there being 
just such entities". The theoretical coherence of the Nietzschean schema is predicated on 
120 
these objects (most notably the body) possessing an ontological reality rather than a textual 
reality, a reality apart from linguistic concerns, the body being is the "great deliverer ... the 
nameless one for whom only future songs will find names" (Zarathustra 336). As we have 
seen it precisely our inability to intelligibly apprehend this reality (most notably the actuality 
of the body) which allows Nietzsche to argue that, from our perspective, "a thing is the sum 
of its effects", the effect in question not being the apparent, but the reality that we presently 
ensure the apparent will become. Nevertheless, it is in ruling out everything but this 
perspective that theorists reach the kind of impasse that Nehemas highlights, simultaneously 
rendering the perspective that they retain incoherent Moreover, it is in rejecting any other 
perspective that they simultaneously reject the possibility of redemption, defining the truth of 
the apparent as that of the apparent as presented rather than as redeemed, failing to appreciate 
that the former must be illusory in order that it can be redeemed. This distinction between 
present and future can only be held in place by the reality ofthe body, the apparent's bridge 
to its the future reality. It is this potentiality which postpones the moment when the apparent 
transcends the body's immanence, deferring the text's 'rights to reality' and defining the 
apparent as that which is presently illusory: This gives Nietzsche the opportunity to redeem 
and redefine these illusions in preparation for his future, for the point of post-mortem self-
overcoming which, in Zarathustra's words, "shall seal my perfection" (Zarathustra 275), the 
point at which his "past" will "burst its tombs; many a pain that had been buried alive awoke, 
having merely slept, hidden in burial shrouds [Leichen-Gewiinder - corpse-clothes]" 
(Zarathustra 274). In short, it is only the actual presence of the body, and of a world which is 
implicated in the body's immanence via the senses, which defines the unredeemed apparent 
as presently illusory, and the redeemed apparent as a future reality. Nietzsche remembers the 
apparent's implication in the body's presence in order that the present, '"it was"', can be 
defined as an illusion, and forgets the redeemed apparent's implication in the body (which 
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cannot be intelligibly apprehended in any case) in order that the future that he desires can be 
his reality, that which he wills. It is this selectivity and this bifurcation of perspectives which 
explains the obvious contradiction between Nietzsche's/ Zarathustra's assertion that "One 
must learn to look away from oneself in order to see much" (Zarathustra 265) and his 
assertion that "For me - how should there be any outside-myself? There is no outside" 
(Zarathustra 329). Respectively, we have the subjective apprehension of one's post-mortem, 
transcendental future, and a recognition of the inapprehensible, yet present, immanence of 
the body. 
Neither of the perspectives outlined rule each other out; on the contrary, both 
perspectives complement each other, for it is the utilisation of both which renders the 
Nietzschean schema coherent, belying Nehemas' assertion that this constitutes the 'central 
problem' involved in any presentation of the will to power. On the contrary, this is not a 
problem for Nietzsche, for it is precisely this bifurcation of perspectives which facilitates the 
body's process of self-overcoming. Similarly, Danto's assertion that the will to power can 
never be wholly intelligible because "[t]o explain the theory in our language is to tolerate a 
fiction which one wishes to overthrow"; it is precisely that external reality is a fiction.for us, 
and is defined as such by our own physical reality, which allows Nietzsche to overthrow its 
ontological primacy in the will to power via an inversion of perspectives. Nietzsche's denial 
of any underlying reality is a manifestation of the body's will to power, as is his acceptance 
of this underlying reality where appropriate. He utilises both perspectives in the name of self-
becoming. In On the Genealogy of Morals, for example, Nietzsche speaks of the ascetic 
ideal, recognising the value of its downgrading of "physicality to an illusion" (554), and thus 
of the inversion of perspectives whereby the present becomes illusory and the future becomes 
one's reality: within "the ascetic life, life counts as a bridge to that other mode of existence" 
(553). He does not see this as an outright denial of physical reality, however, also recognising 
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that this inversion, this "cruelty against reason ... reaches its height when the ascetic self-
contempt and self-mockery of reason declares: "there is a realm of truth and being, but 
reason is excluded from it!" (554). He immediately compares this to Kant's '"intelligible 
character"' of things, which signifies "that things are so constituted that the intellect 
comprehends just enough of them to know that for the intellect they are - utterly 
incomprehensible" (555). He thus acknowledges a truth which escapes appearance, and one 
should contrast the incomprehensible nature of this truth with Zarathustra's definition of the 
will to truth: " this is what the will to truth should mean to you: that everything be 
changed into what is thinkable for man, visible for man, feelable by man. You should think 
through your own senses to their consequences" (Zarathustra 198). Nietzsche criticises the 
ascetic's outright rejection of the senses, this being a failure to think through the senses to 
their consequences, a failure to accept the perspective whereby one sees the apparent, in 
conjunction with the physicality of the body, as facilitating a future reality which can be 
determined in the will to power: the ascetic looks "for error precisely where the instinct of 
life most unconditionally posits truth" (554). Nevertheless, he recognises that in reducing 
present reality to an illusion the ascetic inverts perspectives and facilitates the will to truth, to 
one's own truth, a process which requires the selective utilisation of perspectives: 
. . . precisely because we seek knowledge, let us not be ungrateful to such 
resolute reversals of accustomed perspectives and valuations . . . to see 
differently in this way for once, to want to see differently, is no small 
discipline and preparation of the intellect for its future "objectivity" - the 
latter understood not as "contemplation without interest" (which is a 
nonsensical absurdity), but as the ability to control one's Pro and Con and to 
dispose of them so that one knows how to employ a variety of perspectives 
and affective interpretations in the service of knowledge. (555) 
He immediately goes on to account for the expedient nature of ascetic's denial of the life 
instinct, their downgrading of physicality, the senses, the ego and of one's reality, in favour 
of a redemptive future. He does so in terms of the body's attempt to preserve itself, thus 
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revealing the perspectival and provisional nature of its self-denial. The body, in its own 
presence, denies this reality and accepts the future as a reality in order that it can 
egocentrically sustain itself and conquer death. The body expediently denies its own reality, 
in the name of the body: 
It will be immediately obvious that such self-contradiction as the ascetic 
appears to represent, "life against life," is physiologically considered and not 
merely psychologically, a simple absurdity. It can only be apparent; it must be 
a kind of provisional formulation, an interpretation and psychological 
misunderstanding of something whose real nature could not for a long time be 
understood or described as it really was - a mere word inserted into an old 
gap in human knowledge. Let us replace it with a brief formulation of the 
facts of the matter: the ascetic ideal springs from the protective instinct of a 
degenerating l~fe which tries by all means to sustain itself and to fight for its 
existence; it indicates a partial physiological obstruction and exhaustion 
against which the deepest instincts of life, which have remained intact, 
continually struggle with new expedients and devices. The ascetic ideal is 
such an expedient; the case is therefore the opposite of what those who 
reverence this ideal believe: life wrestles in it and through it with death and 
against death; the ascetic ideal is an artifice for the preservation oflife. (556) 
What this retention of two perspectives reveals, then, is that its not the case that one 
enters into language and the origin is erased, or that there has never been an origin. As 
Nietzsche is clearly aware, that one can begin with the origin and logically demonstrate the 
means through which this linguistic non-existence can arise, in itself, implies the origin's 
ontological possibility to precisely the same extent as it implies its linguistic impossibility. 
For Nietzsche, within his life, the origin remains inapprehensible not because it has been 
usurped, but because it has yet to be usurped, which is to say that the potentiality which is the 
body has yet to be actualised as the text, that which will constitute Nietzsche's life: 
I live on my own credit; it is perhaps a mere prejudice that I live. 
I only need to speak with one of the "educated" who come to the 
Upper Engadine for the summer, and I am convinced that I do not live. (673) 
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The credit on which Nietzsche lives is not merely a prospective credit which will be repaid 
on death, as Nietzsche becomes the textual figure that he promises himself within life via the 
mediation of the reader. It is also, within this life, a retrospective or immediate credit for the 
potentiality which is his body, the origin which is he seeking to become and cannot become 
by virtue of the fact that it is what he already inapprehensibly is. The textual figure that he 
enacts constitutes this credit for the body, being the means through which this body will 
ultimately transcend itself and be redeemed as the text, a process which can only occur in the 
body's absence. Derrida reads the above quotation to imply that Nietzsche does not presently 
live as a result of the 'educated's' ignorance of his name ("Otobiographies" 9-10), thus 
enacting the role that the reader plays in honouring the contract that Nietzsche makes with 
himself through this text. Yet if Nietzsche requires this testimony in order that he may be 
posthumously born as this textual figure, it is equally true that Nietzsche is presently 
testifying to his own physicality via this textual figure, the mask through which he credits the 
ineffable presence of the body. Recalling his warning of the danger that "the instinct comes 
too soon to "understand itself"(710) he asserts that "[u]nder these circumstances I have a 
duty against which my habits, even more the pride of my instincts, revolt at bottom- namely, 
to say: Hear met For I am such and such a person. Above all, do not mistake me for someone 
else" (673). 
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CHAPTER3 
•.• HELL, I'VE CONTRADICTED MYSELF, No MATTER: BECKETT, ARISTOTLE, AND THE 
HYLOMORPIDC TEXT 
BECKEH AND POST-STRUCTURALISM 
Few would argue against the assertion that Samuel Beckett is a key figure in the 
movement towards a post -structuralist notion of textuality in which the text is 
... no longer a finished corpus of writing, some content enclosed in a book or 
its margins, but a differential network, a fabric of traces referring endlessly to 
some thing other than to itself, to other differential traces. Thus the text 
overruns all limits assigned to it . . . all the limits, everything that was set up 
in opposition to writing (speech, life, the world, the real, history and what not 
.. ). (Derrida "Living on- Border Lines" 257) 
Richard Begam, for example, has spoken of a Beckett who, 
... as early as the 1930s and 1940's ... had already anticipated, often in 
strikingly prescient ways, many of the defining themes and ideas of Barthes, 
Foucault and Derrida. Indeed, we might begin to understand Beckett as a kind 
of buried subtext or marginalium in French post-structuralism. (Samuel 
Beckett and the End of Modernity 4) 
Similarly, Lance St. John Butler and Robin J. Davis have described Beckett as "the poet of 
the post-structuralist age" and a "deconstructionist avant la letter" (x). Such beliefs are 
supported by, for example, Foucault's use of Beckett's The Unnamable and Texts for 
Nothing in his challenge to the historical model of authorship and his associated account of 
the text as that which refers "only to itself, but without being restricted to the confines of its 
interiority, writing is identified with its own unfolded exteriority .... like a game Ueu] that 
invariably goes beyond its own rules and transgresses its limits" ("What is an Author?" 141). 
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It is notable that Foucault's remarks parallel Derrida's view, implying that the Author, like 
"speech, life, the world, the real, history and what not ... " is nothing more that the unfolded 
exteriority of the text, any 'extra-textual reality' actually being the product of an infinite text 
which lacks the limits against which 'textual interiority' can be defined as such. The 
appositeness of this application of Derrida's view that "]here is nothing outside of the text 
[there is no outside-text; il n y a pas de hors-text]" (Grammatology 158) to Beckett is 
reinforced by Derrida' s assertions that he feels "'very close; but also too close" to be able to 
"write, sign, countersign performatively texts which 'respond' to Beckett .. " ("This Strange 
Institution" 60). Such a remark may seem unusual when we recall the Derridean contention 
that his theory of writing is implicit to the texts that he deconstructs1 and thus that all texts 
are, to some degree, auto-deconstructive. Yet the remark, clearly, does not refer to closeness 
in this sense; it implies, rather, that Derrida feels "too close" by virtue of the fact that 
Beckett's texts are se(f-consciously auto-deconstructive, deconstructing themselves to such 
an extent that Derrida cannot "write, sign, countersign performatively texts which 'respond"' 
to them. This is why the novels of Samuel Beckett have not been subject to deconstructive 
analysis in the same manner as those of Plato and Nietzsche. Beckett's texts have never 
needed to be usurped by the supplement which is Derrida's reading since the notion of reality 
in these texts has apparently never resisted deconstruction. Yet is it true that this usurpation 
has not taken place? A consideration of this raises several related questions. How has this 
proximity between Derrida and Beckett come about? How has it affected contemporary 
interpretations of Beckettian textuality? Do these interpretations need to be attenuated with 
reference to the texts themselves? What is at stake here? 
Beckett is, it would seem, a precursor of deconstruction rather than a viable subject 
for the kind of revisionist reading that Derrida practises. Nevertheless, taking their cue from 
these indicators of Beckett's prescience, recent critics have begun to read (or to re-read) 
127 
Beckett's prose in terms which reflect current critical attitudes2, any metaphysical aspect to 
Beckettian textuality frequently being seen as a product of traditional or humanistic 
interpreters who lag behind the "new Beckett, thinkable only in the most recent critical 
terms" (Butler and Davis x). There can be little doubt that Beckett's texts invite such 
analysis, enacting as they do a world in which metaphysical comfort remains elusive, the 
possibility of any transcendental or underlying reality being erased in the very act of 
signification. For Beckett, it often seems that the act of becoming conscious of 'reality' (most 
notably of the self) is the very act which simultaneously places reality beyond consciousness, 
leaving the subject stranded within an infinite process of signification which continually 
defers that which it seeks in the very act of attempting to signifY it. The self, for example, is 
erased in the very act self-presentation, rendered unspeakable in the act of being spoken: 
"Nowhere to be found. Nowhere to be sought. The unthinkable last of all. Unnamable. Last 
person. I. Quick leave him" (Company 19). From this point of view, reality, like Molloy's 
mother (Molloy passim), is that which is always left behind and yet to come, even as the 
infinite nature of signification continually transgresses such limits and reveals this pre- or 
extra-textual reality to be an illusion, a product of the interminable process of desire which is 
the text. Nevertheless, Derrida's assertion that he feels "too close" to Beckett to write about 
him not only points to this singular position of Beckett apropos post-structuralism but also 
to the dangers involved in this kind of post-structuralist reading. It is notable that of all the 
modernist authors who are cited as presaging the post-modem debate on the nature of reality, 
Beckett stands out as the figure who overtly transgresses any categorical distinction between 
modernity and post-modernity. As H. Porter Abbott asserts: 
From early in the 1960's, Beckett has been a site of the modernist/ 
postmodemist turf war . . . after a spate of early readings (often inflected by 
Beckett' s connection with J oyce and Proust) casting him as a modernist or late 
modernist or, at times, the "Last Modernist," momentum has passed to the 
other side as the postmodernist categorizers have steadily gained the high 
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ground. Their advantage of armament has come from the fit between 
Beckett's writing and post-structuralist theory, a fit so snug that Beckett has 
provided, to use Herbert Blau's word, a "gloss" on deconstruction. (Beckett 
Writing Beckett 24-25) 
Similarly, Step hen Barker has asserted that " ... [ o ]ne' s first reaction to reading Beckett is 
that he is not only the most obvious choice of an author to whose works one can apply post-
structuralist strategies but that he is almost too good, programmed, it seems for a Derridean 
treatment" (200). One is reminded here of Beckett's own attempts to draw an interpretative 
analogy between Vico and Joyce, his assertion that "[t]he danger is in the neatness of 
identifications" ("Dante ... Bruno. Vico . .Joyce" 19) and his acknowledgment that 
. . . such an exactitude of application would imply distortion in one of two 
directions. Must we wring the neck of a certain system in order to stuff it into 
a contemporary pigeon-hole, or modifY the dimensions of that pigeon-hole for 
the satisfaction of the analogymongers? ("Dante ... Bruno. Vico .. J oyce" 19) 
That such a choice is rarely mentioned in post-structuralist treatments of Beckett points to the 
very danger that he identifies, the error that Derrida invites in asserting that he is "too close" 
to Beckett. More clearly, Beckett's remarks elicit the question of whether it is more 
appropriate to apply critical theory to the text or whether critical theory should be derived 
from the text, a question which is frequently obviated in post-structuralist readings by the 
very snugness of the fit between Beckett and Derrida: it is this fit which forestalls the 
question of whether we are reading Beckett or Derrida in post-structuralist interpretation, the 
possibility being that we are reading Derrida rather than Beckett. Consequently, this fit also 
elides the question of why we should read Beckett in terms of post-structuralism, "wringing 
the neck of a certain system in order to stuff it into a contemporary pigeon-hole", rather than 
reading post-structuralism in terms of Beckett, modifYing "the dimensions of that pigeon-
hole", albeit not "for the satisfaction of the analogymongers" but in order to reveal the 
"danger ... in the neatness of identifications". This is the danger of finding what one wishes 
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to find, while remaining oblivious to the manner in which Beckett's work attenuates, or even 
contests post -structuralist notions of textuality. 
A reading of Beckett which recognises this danger, therefore, would not be a 
retrogressive step which firmly places (or re-places) Beckett in the modernist camp, but a 
means of interrogating the deconstructionist theory which underpins post-modern thought, a 
recognition that any counter-assumptive theory needs to be wary of its own assumptions if it 
is not to run into a theoretical impasse in relation to the text. Conversely, an unreflective 
post-structuralist reading can draw Beckettian textuality into the impasse of which 
Christopher Norris speaks in questioning Derrida's claim that his theories do not amount to 
an assertion that "there is nothing beyond language . . . and other stupidities of that sort" 
(Kearney 124): ". . . the fact that Derrida has so often been read as saying just that - and not 
only by blinkered polemicists with very stubborn preconceptions - suggests that this whole 
debate has run into a familiar kind of epistemological dead-end" (Norris 144). Sean Burke 
also points to the nature of the assumptions which lead to this "deadlock between French 
theory and Anglo-American criticism" (Qeath and Return of the Author 18) in asserting that 
"it is the ideas of 'deaths', 'ends', 'closures', 'epistemological breaks', 'final ruptures', etc., 
that have often barred the way to meaningful and constructive debate in recent critical 
history" (18). That recent post-structuralist analyses of Beckett have been entitled Samuel 
Beckett and the End of Modernity (Richard Begam) and Into the Breach3 (Thomas Trezise) is 
suggestive of the manner in which an unquestioning application of post-structuralist critical 
tenets to the Beckettian text lead to precisely the "deadlock" of which Burke speaks. 
Nevertheless, Burke's assertion is also suggestive of the manner in which a reading that 
highlights the irreducible nature of Beckettian textuality, its unwillingness to wholly conform 
to either position in this deadlock, can be undertaken. Such a reading requires an approach 
that is free from the pre-conceptions of accepted critical theory, from the assumption that 
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Beckett's work is "programmed" for a post-structuralist reading, and a willingness to extract 
theory from the Beckettian text thus recognising the manner in which this theory can 
attenuate accepted positions. In this we shall see that Beckett echoes both the Platonic 
attitude towards an equivocal writing which exteriorises the irresolvable question of the 
origin, and Nietzschean attitude towards an equivocal reality, that which exteriorises the use 
of writing. In doing so, it will become apparent that Beckett follows these figures in 
recognising that writing exteriorises the irresolvable and inescapable potentiality that is 
matter, a fact that will allow us to go beyond a critique of Derridean theory in order to 
propose a specifically Aristotelian theory of textuality. To begin with, however, it is evident 
that one needs to begin to open up the space between post-structuralism and Beckett and, in 
particular, between the figures of Derrida and Beckett, for as Daniel Katz recognises, if "it is 
undeniable that the theories, speculations, and approaches usually grouped together (for 
better or worse) under this aegis . . . have been an extremely powerful force in works on 
Beckett over the last several years", then this "particularly" applies to the "critical 
approaches usually associated with Jacques Derrida" (4). 
An immediate difference which comes to one's attention m reading Derrida and 
Beckett is the fact that Derrida's texts not only complicate the notion of 'reality' but exhibit a 
desire to actively contest the possibility of any extra-systemic, validating presence beyond 
textuality: this, indeed, is a desire which is characteristic of the deconstructionist project in 
general, constituting the "phase of overturning" which Derrida links to the "general strategy 
of deconstruction" ~ositions 41 ). In relation to the notion of matter, for example, Derrida 
asserts that if he has 
... not very often used the word "matter," it is not ... because of some 
idealist or spiritualist kind of reservation. It is that in the logic of the phase of 
overturning this concept has been to often reinvested with "logocentric" 
values, values associated with those of the thing, reality, presence in general, 
sensible presence, for example, substantial plenitude, content, referent, etc. 
Realism or sensualism -"empiricism"- are modifications of logocentrism . 
~ositions 64-65) 
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This is not, however, to assert that Derrida or the deconstructionist project escape the 
transcendental assumptions that constitute logocentrism for these assumptions "aren't faults, 
errors, sins or accidents that could be avoided. Across so many very necessary programs -
language, grammar, culture in general - the recurrence of such "assumptions" is so structural 
that it couldn't be a question of eliminating them" ("This Strange Institution" 49). The 
"phase of overturning" of which he speaks, therefore, is the subversive use of logocentric 
language as a means of undoing these structural assumptions, his strategic use of the arc he-
trace being the most obvious manifestation ofthis4 Derrida operates within the boundaries of 
an inescapably logocentric system in order to deconstruct the logos (or logoi) on which this 
system is founded: "There is no sense in doing without the concepts of metaphysics in order 
to shake metaphysics. We have no language- no syntax and no lexicon- which is foreign to 
this history" ("Structure, Sign and Play" 110-11 ). In other words, deconstruction does not 
work in opposition to logocentrism, but through logocentrism in opposition to the logos, for 
it is clear from Derrida's statements on matter that if he does not (indeed cannot) wholly 
refute logocentrism then he does wholly refute the extra-textual guarantor which is the logos 
itself, rejecting and contesting the existential validity of "the thing, reality, presence in 
general". 
The polemical nature of Derrida's project, however, seems far more assured in 
regards to the logos than that ofBeckett, whose protagonists do not need to contest the notion 
of extra-textual reality by virtue of the simple fact that this reality is never present to 
consciousness. In Beckett any signifier of this logos readily displays its inability to affirm 
reality, and as a result there is never any suggestion that Beckett or his characters intend to 
contest the logos, a contestation which inherently implies a conviction that there is no logos: 
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for Beckett, the evanescent nature of signification itself clearly renders this intention 
unnecessary Yet in spite of this fact, this intention, as derived from Derrida, is all too 
frequently imported into post-structuralist readings. Frederik N. Smith, for example, asserts 
that in 
undermining the connection between language and reality, Beckett has 
deliberately run words aground, leaving them no longer usable as signs for 
meanings beyond themselves, but oddly free to express meaning by reference 
to other words .... language is accepted as relying not on external 'reality' for 
its significance but is understood rather as the source of its own meaning . . . 
(138) 
The substance of Smith's assertion is undoubtedly valid and yet his assertion that Beckett has 
deliberately undermined the connection between language and reality masks the fact that this 
is not a situation that Beckett creates, a desired release into, or even an acceptance of, the 
textual free-play which relies "not on external reality for its significance but is understood as 
the source of its own meaning". This lack of a limiting externality is, rather, the very problem 
with which Beckett is presented by language. Beckett recognises that one cannot undermine 
the connection between language and reality if that connection has never been established in 
the first place and it is for this reason that the Beckettian text is no more a contestation of this 
connection than it is an attempt to establish it, a fact which is masked by the attribution of the 
deconstructive intention. In this context, the question of whether Beckett is pro or contra the 
metaphysical reduction becomes irrelevant, Beckett frequently acknowledging his inability to 
affirm or deny either position: the Beckettian character, above all, desires resolution and the 
nature of this resolution is inconsequential, taking the form of either a final acceptance of 
textual free-play or a final affirmation of pre-textual reality, neither of which are tenable. 
Malone, for example, asserts: 
I never knew how to play .... I longed to, but I knew it was impossible .... 
That is why I gave up trying to play and took to myself for ever shapelessness 
and speechlessness, incurious wondering, darkness, long stumbling with 
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outstretched arms, hiding. Such is the earnestness from which ... I have never 
been able to depart. (Mal one 180-81 ). 
Yet conversely Becketf s texts also demonstrate that this "speechlessness" cannot be 
maintained, which is why the enforced liberation from 'reality' is all too often that which the 
Beckettian character desires to escape, as demonstrated by the Unnamable's frantic desire to 
transcend the "wordy-gurdy" (Unnamable 403), to "stop, travel no more, seek no more, lie no 
more, speak no more ... in a word lay your hands on yourself' (Unnamable 404). As early as 
193 7, Beckett writes to Axel Kaun that "language appears to me like a veil that must be torn 
apart in order to get at the things (or the Nothingness) behind it" (Disjecta 171), the 
difference between getting at "the things" and getting at "Nothingness" constantly being 
undermined in the Beckettian text by his knowledge that the ultimate apprehension of any 
such 'reality' requires the cessation of signification, of consciousness, thus negating the 
laying of "hands on yourself' in the very act of achieving it: "Dear incomprehension, its 
thanks to you I'll be myself, in the end. Nothing will remain of the lies they have glutted me 
with. And I'll be myself at last ... " (Unnamable 327). As Beckett asserts in relation to the 
work of Masson: "The void he speaks of is perhaps simply the obliteration of an unbearable 
presence, unbearable because neither to be wooed nor to be stormed" ("Three Dialogues" 
140). 
The importation of Derridean intention into the Beckettian text, therefore, not only 
implies a desire to deny reality, but also an ability to deny reality, to unequivocally accept the 
illusory status of the logos in the same manner as Derrida. The necessity of such an 
acceptance becomes apparent when one recalls that it allows the exteriority of an infinite text 
to unfold, transgressing the boundary between inside and outside and, therefore, the 
distinction between signifier and referent, fiction and reality. It is this opening of the 
exteriority of meaning which constitutes the "[t]he historical usurpation and theoretical 
---------------------- - -
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oddity that install the image within the rights of reality ... " (Grammatology 36-37), the 
'rights of reality' being that to which textuality can lay claim in the absence of any extra-
textual reality which can contest this entitlement. The very fact that Derrida sees this 
usurpation of any originating reality by the text as a means of eluding the classical opposition 
of reality and representation, thus deconstructing the binary opposition of transcendental 
realism and empirical idealism, both confirms the necessity of the logos' absence and the 
manner in which this denial, in itself, can be seen as a kind of affirmation, a final escape 
from the aporia of Cartesian dualism. One of the few Beckett critics to interrogate the 
affirmatory nature of this post-structuralist view, questioning its unquestioned application to 
the Beckettian text, is Christopher Ricks, who recognises an inability to deny external reality 
without reasserting its possibility in the act of doing so, thus continually preventing any final 
installation of the image within the 'rights of reality': 
One currently tempting lie is that there is no such thing as the real. Beckett 
takes care to resist this temptation . . . this easing of the mind and life. . . . 
There are for Beckett, as there are, contrarieties which gnaw_ ... But such 
contraries, of social reality or of individual being, contraries from which no 
human enterprise can escape unbesieged, are now held to have been 'refused', 
'put in question', dissolved .... In such 'discourse', as it calls itself, we are in 
another world than that of Beckett' s greatness, his being an art which never is 
so complacent as to deny the existence of 'the without', 'impregnable' as it 
yet fertilely is. (147-51) 
In contrast to readings that would seek to deny this fertile 'without', Ricks asserts that 
Beckett "finds it impossible, impossible in honesty, to discard not only the unnameable 
contrary to the real, but the real" (147). As the Unnamable asserts, all "affirmations and 
negations" are "invalidated as uttered" CU:nnamable 293) and this includes the negation of the 
real and affirmation which would "install the image within the rights of reality". As such, the 
logocentric aspect of the Beckettian text is not analogous to Derrida's inability to wholly 
reject logocentrism (as opposed to Derrida's clear rejection of the logos itself), an inability 
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that Derrida attributes to the historically pervasive nature of metaphysical thought. As with 
Nietzsche, Beckett remains a logocentric writer because, unlike Derrida, he is unable to 
finally refute the logos itself, this inability being a functional element within textuality rather 
than a product of the historical forces that shape our notion of signification. This implies, of 
course, that if any signifier of the logos displays its inability to affirm the logos' reality, then 
it simultaneously displays its inability to wholly deny this reality, reality remaining the 
authentic, tantalising, possibility that inhabits textuality. As the voice of Texts for Nothing 
laments: "ah if no were content to cut yes's throat and never cut its own" (133). Within the 
Beckettian text, therefore, there can be no affirmation (or negation) of either reality or 
textuality: "Such equal liars both. Real and - how ill say its contrary? The counter-poison" 
(Ill Seen Ill Said 82). Evidently, the Beckettian pharmakon is reality, the text being the 
"counter-poison". As the words "equal liars both" suggest, one can no more affirm the text as 
a reality than one can affirm reality itself, that which may be a "lie" but is, nevertheless, "the 
same lie lyingly denied" (Texts for Nothing 154) by the text. As in the Platonic text, it is the 
inescapable and undeniable possibility of reality that incessantly 'poisons' the text defining 
signification as a "lie" and preventing any final installation of "the image within the rights of 
reality". As the body holds in place the distinction between '"it was"' and "'thus I willed it"' 
(Ecce Homo 765) within Nietzsche's work, it is only as a possibility that reality can hold in 
place the aporetic or liminal position in which the Beckettian narrator so often finds himself, 
preventing the free-play of textuality from being conclusively accepted as a liberation even 
as it refutes any self-affirmation: the text remains, instead, akin to purgatory. 
This, of course, raises the question of how this possibility manifests itself: how does 
this putative logos refute any final denial even as it refutes its affirmation? How does it leave 
its elusive yet ineradicable trace in the text? In order to answer this question it is necessary to 
examine the manner in which the theory which inhabits the text operates in conjunction with 
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that text's performativity. More specifically we shall examine the deictic nature of Beckettian 
textuality, revealing that it is his use of deixis which most clearly accounts for the manner in 
which his work intersects with post-structuralism even as it raises important questions about 
this post-structuralist thought. Ultimately we shall see it is this performativity which reveals 
the necessity of situating Beckett within a hylomorphic tradition, thus problematising many 
of the preconceptions that post-structuralist critics and theorists bring to the text. 
2 
PSEUDO-DEIXIS AND THE NON-TRANSCENDENTAL ASSUMPTION 
Deixis is a term which is applied to any linguistic unit which is meaningful only in 
relation to its own utterance, a statement which is meaningful only in relation to the specific 
instance of its own performance, being an attempt refer to this instance (e.g. "I am now 
speaking"): it designates "all the words that situate and indicate the act of enunciation and are 
intelligible only in relation to it (here, now, today, etc.)" (Kristeva Language: The Unknown 
334). As this suggests, the deictic statement is also meaningful only in relation to the person 
who is involved in this instance, the person who performs the act of enunciation, which is 
why Emile Benveniste argues that the most important example of deixis is the utterance 'I '. 
For Benveniste, it is this signifier which deictically establishes subjectivity, being that which 
"signifies 'the person who is uttering the present instance of the discourse containing F' 
(218). Yet in uncovering the referent that defines the usage of 'I', Benveniste recognises this 
signifier' s lack of spec(ficity with regards to the identity of this person, the signifier only 
.specifically identifying the present instance of discourse in which this impersonal figure is 
involved: 
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Could it . . . be said that I refers to a particular individual? ... How could the 
same term refer indifferently to any individual whatsoever and still at the 
same time identify him in his individuality? ... Then what does 'I' refer to? 
To something very peculiar which is exclusively linguistic: I refers to the act 
of individual discourse in which it is pronounced, and by this it designates the 
speaker. . . . The reality to which it refers is the reality of discourse. It is in 
the instance of discourse in which I designates the speaker that the speaker 
proclaims himself as the "subject." (218) 
The int1uence of this formulation of deixis on post-structuralist views of subjectivity is 
manifest, implying as it does that the subject has no verifiable existence beyond the utterance 
or beyond discourse. Barthes' "The Death ofthe Author", for example, applies Benveniste's 
views on deixis and subjectivity to writing: 
. . . linguistics has recently provided the destruction of the Author with a 
valuable analytical tool by showing that the whole of the enunciation is an 
empty process, functioning perfectly without there being any need for it to be 
filled with the person of the interlocutors. Linguistically, the author is never 
more than the instance writing, just as I is nothing other than the instance 
saying I. ... The fact is ... that writing ... designates exactly what linguists . 
. . call a performative, a rare verbal form . . . in which the enunciation has no 
other content (contains no other proposition) than the act by which it is uttered 
- something like the I declare of kings or the I sing of very ancient poets. 
("The Death of the Author" 14 5-46) 5 
It is clear, however, that the physical act of utterance of which Barthes speaks cannot be 
wholly identifiable with the content of this utterance, the speech-act as represented. In 
referring to the act of utterance (or, in Benveniste's terms, the "reality of discourse"), the 
representation of this act necessarily differs from the act itse!f Deixis thus establishes the 
difference between vehicle and tenor, speaker and spoken, the figure writing and the figure 
written, this being the primary scission in the linguistic function. Yet if deictic representation 
is only meaningful in relation to the reality of discourse from which it differs, then how can 
one be aware of this reality without articulating it as another representation? Any attempt to 
meaningfully apprehend this physical act, the referent of the deictic statement, will produce 
merely another element in discourse6, there, now, being nothing beyond discourse other than 
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more discourse: as Barthes asserts, a "disconnection occurs, the voice loses its origin, the 
author enters into his own death, writing begins" ("The Death of the Author" 142). 
A pertinent example of this deictic 'disconnection' between origin and voice, vehicle 
and tenor, occurs during the opening of The Unnamable: "1, say I. Unbelieving. Questions, 
hypotheses, call them that" (293). The narrator's apprehension of the act of saying 'I' (and, 
therefore, of the pre-discursive figure who seys 'I') is subsequent to the signifier 'I', a 
reflection of the fact that one cannot be aware of the self speaking until that self has already 
been ~poken, self-consciousness being subsequent to language. Yet any conscious 
apprehension of the act of speaking (or of the speaker) can only occur via another deictic 
signifier that reflects on the physicality of an utterance which is already in place ("I, say I"). 
In other words the signifier 'I' is questioned in order to produce the signified hypothesis that 
this 'I' has been spoken, there, now, being nothing more than signified questions or 
hypotheses about the inapprehensible space of enunciation/ the enunciator. Clearly, once the 
self has been posited in language there is nothing beyond linguistic representation other than 
more representation. As the Unnamable consequently admits, the process of textuality can be 
seen as an eternally incomplete attempt to fill the "holes" which are left in discourse as a 
result of the deictic statement's inability to apprehend its own physicality, holes which are 
filled with nothing more than discursive fictions or equivocal "hypotheses". As the "master" 
asks in questioning his 'own' signifiers: 
What have you done with your material? We have left it behind. But 
commanded to say whether yes or no they filled up the holes, have you filled 
up the holes yes or no, they will say yes and no, or some yes, others no . . 
. both are defendable, both yes and no, for they filled up the holes, if you like, 
and if you don't like they didn't. ... they fixed their lamps in the holes, their 
long lamps, to prevent them from closing of themselves . . . (Unnamable 
368). 
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As the ambiguity suggests, the hole that is left by the deictic erasure of materiality is "filled" 
by discourse in the manner that a hole is "filled" with light, being no less of a "hole" for this. 
It is this light (consciousness or 'self consciousness) which keeps the "hole" that materiality 
once occupied open, consciousness or textuality only existing as a constant interrogation and 
reiteration of this space, a constant attempt fill the holes and achieve the self-identity which 
has been lost through the deictic articulation/ erasure of this pre-discursive self Language, 
once unleashed, thus has its own inexorable logic: "One starts things moving without a 
thought of how to stop them .... The search for the means to but an end to things, an end to 
speech, is what enables the discourse to continue" (llnnamable 301). 
A recognition of the importance of deixis in the establishment of subjectivity is, 
therefore, one way in which Beckett facilitates post-structuralist readings of his work, 
although Beckett's texts could justifiably be designated pseudo-deictic since he recognises 
the intangible nature of the deictic statement's 'referent', the 'reality of discourse'. Beckett, 
therefore, goes beyond Benveniste and foreshadows post-structuralist thought in accepting 
that a deictic statement cannot ultimately refer to this reality - it can only attempt to do so 
through the constant process of textuality, any such 'referent' always being another 
supplement to discourse. In other words, discourse can never apprehend its own reality, can 
never be totalised. 
Beckett thus accepts that any deictic representation of the "reality of discourse" in 
itself implies that this reality, like the Unnamable's "material", has been "left ... behind". 
Yet he is also aware that the reason why a deictic statement cannot refer to its own reality, 
leaving this reality "behind", is because any such representation is continually implicated 
within this unnameable reality: " ... I'm still in it, I left myself behind in it, I'm waiting for 
me there ... " (The Unnamable 418). Ultimately, this is a reflection of the manner in which 
the totality of a deictic statement (tenor and vehicle) cannot be apprehended from a position 
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within this totality. Any attempt to do so merely produces a representation that may bear no 
mimetic relationship to the actuality that it purports to represent: 
Gaber understood nothing about the messages he carried. Reflecting on them 
he arrived at the most extravagantly false conclusions. Yes, it was not enough 
for him to understand nothing about them, he had also to believe he 
understood everything about them. (Molloy 1 07) 
Gab er's attempt to understand "everything about" his messages by "[ r ]eflecting" on their 
reality produces nothing more than an "extravagantly false" conclusion, a signifier which 
again fails to express the totality of tenor and vehicle, discourse and the unspeakable reality 
of discourse. In the 'absence' of this reality, however, Gaber believes that he understands 
"everything" since there is apparently nothing beyond discourse, hence the falsity of his 
totalised "conclusion"7 This conclusion, however, is not that of Moran who begins his 
attempt to refer to the reality of discourse (as represented by Molloy) on receipt of these 
messages in spite of his desire not to "submit to this paltry scrivening which is not my 
province ... " (Molloy 132) or to "give way to literature" (Molloy 152): "What was I looking 
for exactly? It is hard to say. I was looking for what was wanting to make Gaber's statement 
complete" (Molloy 13 7). As well as noting that it is "hard to say" what Moran is looking for, 
one should note the typically Beckettian ambiguity of the words "what was wanting" since 
they clearly refer both to the lack of the reality of discourse (Molloy or that which is wanted) 
and to Moran's lack of a identifiable self (Moran is the figure who wants to make Gaber's 
statement complete). The remark, therefore, both implies that Moran and Molloy, tenor and 
vehicle, are ultimately one and the same person and that Moran's journey to find Molloy is 
an attempt to attain himself, to finally bring discursive reality in which he is deictically 
involved into linguistic being. Similarly, Moran's writing and his very existence coincide, for 
Moran is attempting to write "the inenarrable contraption I called my life" (Molloy 115), to 
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linguistically apprehend the reality of the vehicle in which he is involved, thus allowing this 
life (and himself) to finally be 'born': 
Far from the world, its clamours, frenzies, bitterness and dingy light, I pass 
judgement on it and on those, like me, who are plunged in it beyond recall, 
and on him who has need of me to be delivered, who cannot deliver myself .. 
. From their places masses move, stark as laws. Masses of what? One does not 
ask. There somewhere man is too, vast conglomerate of all of nature's 
kingdoms, as lonely and as bound. And in that block the prey is lodged and 
thinks himselfbeing apart. (Molloy 111). 
As Daniel Katz recognises, the deficiency which characterises Gaber's messages, Moran's 
writing and Moran's "life", is the deficiency which also characterises the deictic statement '/' 
itself: 
. . . Beckett stresses the "I" as a mark - a mark which can never be saturated 
by the consciousness or intention it is meant to carry. One can always say "I," 
but how to invest it with the intention or meaning which makes it my "I" and 
not someone else's, how to ensure that "I" is said "seriously" and not as if 
enclosed between quotation marks? (22) 
In Moran' s words: "How little one is at one with oneself, good God" (Molloy 1 04). 
It is nevertheless apparent that the subject which is established in Beckett's pseudo-
deictic text is that which is spoken rather than the 'self which is speaking or even the act of 
speech itself: neither of these factors can be incorporated into the very meaning that they 
articulate and neither can be finally established. Within the pseudo-deictic speech, the act of 
speaking or physicality of language itself is always cut off from that which is spoken since 
any meaningful apprehension of the former can only occur in the space of the latter. As the 
narrator of Texts for Nothing asserts, it is 
. . . as if there were two things, some other thing besides this thing, what is it, 
this unnamable thing that I name and name and never wear out, and I call that 
words. It's because I haven't hit on the right ones, the killers, haven't yet 
heaved them up from that heart-burning glut of words, with what words shall 
I name my unnamable words? (125) 
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Language itse(f has no reality to the narrator beyond that which the language articulates, 
beyond the level of discourse. Analogously the act of speaking remains non-existent to the 
narrator, being equally unnamable: " . . nothing doing without proper names" (Unnamable 
340). Yet if the speaker cannot apprehend the speech act then he cannot apprehend himself as 
the speaker. Consequently, Beckett's narrators frequently purport not to be speaking or even 
to be thinking, as is indicated by the narrator of Company who desires "by some successful 
act of intellection . . . to think to himself referring to himself, Since he cannot think he will 
give up trying" (Company 37). As this quotation suggests, the narrator cannot refer to 
himself (even via the third person) since any attempt apprehend the figure 'thinking' or 
thought itse(f is immediately translated into a signifier, the narrator having no meaningful 
being to himself, no thought, beyond this infinite chain of signification. Discourse thus 
usurps the origin which is consciousness itself; like Worm in The Unnamable, "[h]e has not 
yet been able to speak his mind" and cannot, therefore, validly assert that the mind exists in 
order that it can be identified with 'thought'. 
Yet while Beckett admits that only the tenor can be meaningfully apprehended within 
the pseudo-deictic text, never the vehicle, this is not to say that Beckett passively accepts that 
this vehicle is non-existent. It is true that the Beckettian narrator cannot not possess any 
existence to himself beyond the text and cannot identify discourse as the predicate of this 
prelinguistic thinker/ speaker but his narrator, nevertheless, often purports to be speaking 
from an unutterable position which is radically other to his own words, the position of the 
pre-discursive origin which has been wmrped by and m led out of the infinitude of discourse, 
the silent position ~~the vehicle: 
Where would I go, if I could go, who would I be, if I could be, what would I 
say, if I had a voice, who says this, saying it's me? ... He tells his story every 
five minutes, saying its not his, there's cleverness for you .... He has me say 
things saying it's not me, there's profundity for you ... (Texts for Nothing 
114-115). 
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Clearly, this putative figure 'behind' Beckett's words cannot be their intentional author, a 
self-identical figure who thinks and then expresses this thought in speech. As this quotation 
demonstrates, this figure has no means of meaningfully formulating his othemess to the voice 
apart from the voice itself, any such 'thought' instantaneously entering into the domain of 
the spoken, and thus of discourse. This figure, therefore, has no verifiable reality beyond the 
voice, although his and our use of the word 'voice' is pragmatic rather than accurate; one 
could equally argue that the narrator can only apprehend that which the voice articulates (the 
discourse) rather than the voice: " ... what would I say, if I had a voice ... ". As the 
Unnamable asserts: "The fact is all this business about voices requires to be revised, 
corrected and then abandoned" (Unnamable 338). Returning to the quotation however, it is 
equally clear that this non-intentional figure cannot enter into that which he speaks/ thinks, 
being unable to linguistically apprehend himself as the speaker/ thinker in order that the 
spoken/ thought can be identified as a predicate of himself: ". . . who says this, saying it's 
me?". It may be the case that ". . . a voice speaks that can be none but mine, since there is 
none but me" (Texts for Nothing 146) but clearly, this cannot be verified since " ... this 
being which is called me ... is not one ... " (147). In other words, the totality of speaker and 
spoken cannot be affirmed by virtue of the speaker's inability to deictically refer to his own 
reality as the speaker, thus allowing these words to be identified as his 'own'. The narrator 
has to "speak, with this voice which is not mine" even as it can, apparently, "only be mine, 
since there is no one but me" Qlnnamable 309). 
It is evident, therefore, that the unspeakable and non-intentional figure behind the 
Beckettian text can have no being to itself beyond that which language articulates and, 
consequently, can only be a purely physical vehicle for the tenor which is the thought/ the 
spoken. As a speaker, this figure is " ... a mere ventriloquist's dummy, I feel nothing, say 
nothing, he holds me in his arms and moves my lips, all is dark, there is no one ... " (Texts 
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for Nothing 133). The 'he' referred to here is the linguistic subject, the 'I' as spoken, for as 
we have seen this 'dummy' cannot express a pre-existent thought, having no thought or 
speech which escapes discourse. The "dummy", rather, has speech elicited from it by the 
linguistic subject, meaningfully defining itself against the language that it hears (it being the 
one to whom the signifier 'I' implicitly says 'you'), even as it is apparent that any such 
definition will be instantaneously sublimated into, or spoken as, another signifier (i.e. the 
signifier 'you'). As this implies, the act of hearing/ the hearer can no more be brought into 
linguistic being within the text than the act of speaking/ the speaker, for this hearer can only 
identifY himself as such within the space of a discourse which cannot be identified as a 
predicate of himself: "Let him not be named H. Let him be again as he was. The hearer. 
Unnamable. You" (Company 25)_ This figure who hears the 'I' and instantaneously speaks 
itself in relation to that which he hears thus remains an unconscious "dummy", a purely 
physical vehicle, who does not enter into the text and has no 'thought' beyond the text: 
. . . pah there are voices everywhere, one who speaks saying, without ceasing 
to speak, Who's speaking?, and one who hears, mute, uncomprehending, far 
from all, and bodies everywhere, bent, fixed, where my prospects must be just 
as good, just as poor, as in this firstcomer. (Texts for Nothing 150) 
In other words, "It's the same old stranger as ever, for whom alone accusative I exist, in the 
pit of my inexistence, of his, of ours, there's a simple answer" (Texts for Nothing 114). One 
can see this existent/ inexistent stranger ("accusative I exist, in the pit of my inexistence") as 
occupying the position of the Peirce's interpretant, for as Paul de Man recognises, "The 
interpretation of a sign is not, for Peirce, a meaning but another sign; it is a reading, not a 
decodage, and this reading has, in its turn, to be interpreted into another sign, and so on ad 
it?finitum" (9). The interpretant becomes aware of itself in relation to a sign, instantaneously 
signifies this relationship, recognises itself in relation to this signifier, instantaneously 
signifies this relationship and so on, this being the means through which "one sign gives birth 
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to another" (9) in an incessant process of meiosis: " ... I seek, like a caged beast born of 
caged beasts born of caged beasts born of caged beasts born of caged beasts born in a cage 
and dead in a cage . . . " (Unnamable 390). As this process of seeking implies, the 
interpretant itse!f never enters into this chain except as a signifier, a signifier which, 
moreover, can bear no verifiable mimetic relationship to the actuality of the interpret ant since 
this actuality remains continually mysterious: "All these Murphys, Molloys and Malones do 
not fool me. They never suffered my pains, their pains are nothing, compared to mine, a mere 
tittle of mine, the tittle I thought I could put from me, in order to witness it" (Unnamable 
305). It is for this reason that one constantly senses that the fictional characters that inhabit 
Beckett's texts are, ultimately, sublimations of the mysterious, unnameable figure which is 
'Samuel Beckett', the mimetic form of each character being inconsequential and arbitrary as 
a result of this enigmatic status. As Malone asserts: "The forms are many in which the 
unchanging seeks relieffrom its formlessness" (Malone 181). 
The pseudo-deictic nature of the Beckettian text thus becomes clear, the whole 
Beckettian text being a constant attempt to make a deictic statement, to complete the text by 
validly, finally referring to the reality of discourse, thus affirming the existence of the 
evanescent 'self which unspeakably articulates the text: "I'll never get anywhere, but when 
did I? When I laboured, all day long and let me add, before I forget, part ofthe night, when I 
thought that with perseverance I'd get at me in the end?" (Texts for Nothing 123). The 
narrator cannot validly refer to the very reality in which he is involved, the term 'reality' 
incorporating both the physical performance of textuality and the physicality of the body 
through which this performance takes place: like Molloy, the text can only hasten 
"incessantly on, as if in despair, towards extremely close objectives" (Molloy 113). This 
reality, therefore, becomes that which the text is incessantly attempting to apprehend as the 
subject constantly attempts to linguistically give birth to the inapprehensible 'self that lies 
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behind, and ineffably constitutes discourse even as each attempt to do so translates this self 
into another supplement in the infinite chain of signification. Yet the tenor, the discourse, is 
always implicated within the inapprehensible vehicle, consciousness being part of the 
inapprehensible body: Molloy may assert, "[h]ow little one is at one with oneself, good God" 
(Molloy 104) and yet it is also the case that, "in that block the prey is lodged and thinks 
himself being apart" (Molloy Ill). 
It is clear that the inapprehensible nature of the purely physical figure under 
discussion, the deictic text's inability to finally identify or linguistically affirm this figure, 
renders it an assumption, a potential reality. Yet it it is equally clear that the unnameable 
status of this figure is not to be taken as an affirmation that there is no such figure. As Moran 
asserts in allegorising this hypothetical space where names are inapplicable: 
. . . it was only by transferring it to this atmosphere . . . that I could venture to 
consider the work I had on hand. For where Molloy could not be, nor Moran 
either for that matter, there Moran could bend over Molloy. And though this 
examination prove unprofitable . . . I should nevertheless have established a 
kind of connection, and one not necessarily false. For the falsity of the terms 
does not necessarily imply the falsity of the relation, so far as I know. (Molloy 
112) 
The deictic articulation of any extra-discursive self, or the articulation of the reality of this 
potential selfs attempt to 'actualise' itself through textuality, may render this reality 
inapprehensible (Moran and Molloy being mere fictions), there now being no identifiable 
vehicle beyond the tenor, yet this is not to say that there is no such vehicle. As in the case of 
Nietzsche, that this vehicle has never been installed within the 'rights of reality' does not 
refute the possibility that it is real. This assumption, however, frequently infects formulations 
of deixis. John Lechte, for example, asserts that: 
. . . Benveniste' s approach moves us towards the realization that the true 
subject does not precede language, thus reducing the latter to an apparatus of 
representation: rather, it is constituted by language .... the subject of the 
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enonciation [the enunciator]. .. does not refer to a 'concrete', 'singular' 
reality outside language. Furthermore, the subject of the enonciation does not 
have a name because the discursive instance is a 'pronominal instance', that 
is, a place in the discursive chain occupied by the locution. (71-72) 
Lechte is correct in implying that any attempt to refer to the figure who deictically says 'I', or 
the actual act of saying 'I', will transform this referent into a supplement to the text, the 
locution (or the locutor) being nothing more than another element in the "discursive chain". 
Yet even as Lechte asserts that the subject of the enonciation does not refer to a "concrete" 
reality beyond language (this figure being constituted by language) he simultaneously asserts 
that this subject "does not have a name". If this "true subject ... does not precede language", 
having no existence beyond discourse, then who or what is this wmameable figure? Can we 
accept that the "true subject" of language is that which is constituted by language if the 
unnameable figure of the enunciator remains in place, even if it is only as a possibility? Can 
the text be installed within the 'rights of reality' if this possibility persists as a limit to the 
text? Clearly, the question that deixis raises is one of whether the enunciator and its cognates 
(the physical act of utterance, 'concrete' reality, "the reality of discourse" etc.) are non-
existent or simply unnameable and this is more than a question of the applicability of post-
structuralist theory to Beckett, for the ambiguity which informs Lechte's statement informs 
post-structuralist thought itself Barthes, for example, may recognise that the deictic text's 
inability to refer to a "reality of discourse" places the notion of an intentional author in crisis, 
consequently asserting that discourse "has no origin other than language itself' ("The Death 
of the Author" 146), yet he nevertheless retains the distinction between the actual "scriptor" 
who physically writes and the supplement to writing which is the Author, the linguistic 
subject which is produced by the text: " ... the hand, cut off from any voice, borne by a 
gesture of pure inscription (and not of expression), traces a field without origin- or which, at 
least, has no origin other than language itself' ("The Death ofthe Author" 146). Barthes may 
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assert that the text has no ongm, yet he acknowledges that this is a consequence of an 
inability to ident!fy or name the origin which has been under discussion, not a consequence of 
the fact that such physicality does not exist: "Writing is that neutral, composite, oblique 
space where our subject slips away, the negative where all identity is lost, starting with the 
very identity of the body writing" ("The Death of the Author" 142). Nevertheless, as Derrida 
recognises, even this physicality can be seen as nothing more than an effect of writing. As he 
asserts in relation to Rousseau: 
... in what one calls the real life of these existences "of flesh and bone," 
beyond and behind what one believes can be circumscribed as Rousseau's 
text, there has never been anything but writing; there have never been 
anything but supplements, substitutive significations ... (Grammatology 142) 
As in the case of a deictic statement, this physical reality can only meaningfully exist as a 
signifier or a supplement to the text, the 'scriptor' taking on the same status as the illusory 
'Author', having always already been usurped by language. 
Given remarks such as this it is unsurprising that one frequently encounters the 
application of what could be called the non-transcendental assumption in readings of 
Beckett's work, the belief that an inability to deictically refer to "flesh and bone" reality 
justifies the assumption that there is no such reality. It is equally unsurprising that this 
assumption is especially prevalent in readings which are written from a Derridean 
perspective. Leslie Hill, for example, claims that in Beckett's trilogy, "the body cannot claim 
any existence prior to the motions oflanguage" ( 119), the body not being the 
. . . dwelling-place of being or presence, but the body as a form of writing and 
a text .... a rhythm, a texture, a fabric of traces and ... a discharge of affects. 
This body, like the fictional text it becomes, is not unchanging or static, but 
exists as a continual process of assertion and negation, affirmation and 
difference. ( 120) 
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One could assert that Hill is no more speaking of the body here than the Beckettian narrator 
can speak of the ineffable 'self which lies behind discourse. Even if one ignores the question 
of whether one can plausibly speak of the body without accepting that the body is, by 
definition, a material presence (and not necessari~y an "unchanging or static" material 
presence), it is clear that the body's inability to validly "claim any existence prior to the 
motions of language" does not rule out the possibility that the body does unspeakably exist in 
this manner, merely suggesting that this pre-linguistic body cannot be linguistically affirmed: 
. you could lie there for weeks and no one hear you, I often thought of that up in the 
mountains, no, that is a foolish thing to say, just went on, my body doing its best without me" 
(Texts for Nothing 164). As this remark suggests, the extra-discursive, physical, existence of 
the body remains an inalienable possibility in Beckett' s texts. Indeed, as Daniel Katz 
recognises, Hill admits as much in his mereological claim that this "body" cannot be 
"represented as a whole. It is more easily performed or produced, spoken aloud or acted .... 
to read Beckett's novels becomes an exercise in breathing and punctuation" (120). Yet as 
Katz asserts in agreeing with Hill's contention that the body has no pre-linguistic being: 
However, I would differ from Hill's equation of the textual body with some 
sort of "non-semantic" movement . . . an "exercise in breathing and 
punctuation" arising from the text's oral performance. This reappropriation of 
the textual "body" as orality and voice, therefore physical presence, is exactly 
what Beckett's sense of body, writing, and text as exteriority renders 
problematic. (204) 
Beckett may indeed render the notion of the body's reality or physical presence 
"problematic" but this is not to argue that the body does not physically exist or that the 
possibility of its pre-linguistic existence has been removed and is inadmissible. In reading 
Beckett's work we may not be conscious of our physical or non-semantic articulation of the 
text, (being meaningfully conscious of the tenor rather than the vehicle, the meaningful text 
which is spoken rather than the physicality of speech/the speaker itself) but this is not to 
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assert that there is no "oral performance" of the text, even if this performance is via 'the inner 
voice' of consciousness. Such a reading owes more to Derrida and his desire to contest the 
notion of presence than it owes to Beckett, yet as even Derrida admits: "To distance oneself 
from the habitual structure of reference, to challenge or complicate our common assumptions 
about it, does not amount to saying that there is nothing beyond language" (Keamey 124). 
Clearly, there is an apparent contradiction between Derrida's rejection of readings that 
suggest "that there is nothing beyond language . . . and other stupidities of that sort" 
(Kearney 124) and his assertion that there has never been any "real life ... existences "of 
flesh and bone ... there has never been anything but writing; there have never been anything 
but supplements, substitutive significations ... " (Grammatology 159). Equally clearly, Hill's 
and Katz's interpretations of Beckett can be seen as a consequence of this confusion, their 
readings being a consequence of a refusal to admit the possibility of any reality which is not 
subservient to the text. Such rnisreadings of Beckett indicate deficiency in the post-
structuralist enterprise which Derrida's refutation implicitly acknowledges, for as Sean Burke 
argues, as "unjust as this idealist representation is, it does not take place on the basis of 
nothing, for Derrida is at his most ambiguous here, and all the important questions are left in 
suspension" ffieath and Return ofthe Author 127). Nevertheless, in spite ofthese objections, 
it is not the case that the anti-essentialist position of Hill and Katz is necessarily wrong, and 
neither is it the case that Derrida's thesis is wholly repudiated by the Beckettian text. 
Beckett' s work facilitates such interpretations, allowing them as an inalienable possibility. 
Yet all possibilities necessarily permit their correlates, as will become apparent in a double 
reading of a pseudo-deictic text. 
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COMPANY: A CHOICE OF DARKNESSES 
A voice comes to one in the dark. Imagine. (Company 5) 
Who speaks here? One could plausibly argue that it is this question which defines 
Beckett's work, most clearly in his post-war novels, novels which shift from a broadly 
representational mode of discourse to a form of narrative which compulsively interrogates its 
own linguistic processes and its own origins. Indeed, it is this form of self-interrogation that 
appears to sustain language itself, the narrative only existing as a quest for deictic self-
resolution, thus implying that an inability to affirm the self is congenital to the textual 
process. Put simply, we must ask how we can write the self when the erasure of this self 
appears to be a condition of writing. In the case ofBeckett's 1977 text Company the question 
takes on added significance by virtue of the fact that the novel gravitates "more openly 
towards the genre of autobiography than anything before it" (Filling Samuel Beckett 127), a 
view which is echoed by James Knowlson: "Company comes closer to autobiography than 
anything Beckett had written since Dream of Fair to Middling Women in 1931-2" (651). In 
spite of Knowlson's comparisons, it is difficult to escape a perception that Company is the 
only text to have been written with a specifically autobiographical intent: it consists of an 
overarching narrative in which a typically anonymous narrator lies alone in a darkened room 
overhearing a voice which he maintains is not his, even as this narrative is interspersed with 
impersonal reminiscences of episodes from Beckett's own life, all of which are 
autobiographically verifiable. Unlike other, early, novels which are known to be derived 
from Beckett's personal experience (More Kicks than Pricks and Dream of Fair to Middling 
Women) the autobiographical episodes in Company are specifically presented as memories 
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rather than merely utilising 'life' as the material for novelistic discourse. This is not, of 
course, to maintain that these two factors can be wholly extricated from one another; as the 
problem outlined suggests, any attempt to write the self is subject to the aporia of self-
writing, that which inevitably blurs the line between autobiography and fiction, reality and 
invention. It is for this reason that autobiographical 'insets' within Company cannot be 
accepted as autobiography in the sense that they simply recount the facts of its author's life. 
As James Knowlson remarks in recalling his discussions with Beckett on the subject of 
Company: 
. . . it was clear throughout our discussion, not only that real-life incidents had 
been shaped and transformed to fit the fiction but that the skepticism that, as a 
young man, he had brought to his criticism of the role of memory in Proust 
(involuntary as well a voluntary) had been reinforced by the distance that 
separated him from his own past. Memory emerges here very much like 
invention. (652) 
In order to appreciate the significance of the autobiographical nature of the novel, one 
must appreciate the significance of the narrative in which these autobiographical passages are 
'inset'. As will become apparent, this narrative represents the two aspects of potentiality, the 
undecideable difference between a usurpation which is potential in that it may have already 
occurred, the usurpatory text having already been installed within the 'rights of reality', and a 
usurpation which is potential in that it a has yet to verifiably occur, there being no ratification 
of the text's 'rights to reality' in the absence of this verification. This status, moreover, is 
performatively exteriorised in the reading process itself 
The aporia which defines Samuel Beckett's approach to the self in Company is set 
out at the very inception of the novel and, as so often in the work of Beckett, it is the tensions 
which inhabit the opening words which set in motion the novel's linguistic trajectory: "A 
voice comes to one in the dark. Imagine" (5). The tension here is between the notion of"one 
in the dark" and the apparent externality of the voice, that which would seem to preclude any 
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possibility of there being such a unitary, self-identical subject. If the narrator is being spoken 
to there cannot be one in the dark, and this applies even if this "one" is speaking to itself 
This unitary figure, therefore, is immediately reduced to a figment by the institution of a 
voice that is also the institution of the eponymous 'company'. The fictional or imaginary 
status of the origin is, therefore, a requirement of the utterance itself, of the pronominal act: 
the positing of the 'I' by the pre-semantic origin institutes the 'I/ you' polarity whereby the 
posited 'I' implicitly says 'you' to the origin, which thus enters meaningful being by defining 
itself against this 'I'. Yet as post-structuralist theorists recognise, the origin cannot enter into 
this awareness, being identifiable with neither the posited signifier 'I' nor the signifier 'you'. 
The narrator is an effect of language rather than the origin, language being that which 
produces the self as an imaginary construct rather than being that which is produced by a 
pre-existing self The text is, therefore, the origin of an imaginary 'origin' for as the narrator 
admits, he is the "[ d]evised deviser devising it all for company" (3 7), onJy existing through 
the voice which necessarily precedes this existence. In this light one can read the opening 
sentence as implying that the voice that we experience in reading the text is the same voice 
that this "one" hears. In both cases it is the voice that brings this imaginary "one" into being, 
an effect which is emphasised by the exhortatory nature of the word "Imagine" this word 
being interchangeably directed at the reader or the mythical "one" who overhears this voice. 
Evidently, the supplementary writing through which we experience this purely imaginary 
'origin' already inhabits the voice itself since this voice can no more claim to be identifiable 
with this present origin than we, the readers, can experience this pre-textual origin. 
From this perspective, it is evident that writing reveals that the entry into signification 
paradoxicaiJy constitutes the point at which this entry is retrospectively erased. The 
exhortation "Imagine", for example, occurs after the opening words, the reader having 
already 'imagined' the "voice" that comes to "one in the dark" by the time the exhortation is 
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made, this originary imperative having been already usurped by language: we imagine the 
'one' and subsequently become aware of this act, the act being a supplement to a signifier 
which is necessarily already in place. There is, therefore, no point of origin: " ... he must 
acknowledge the truth of what is said. But by far the greater part of what is said cannot be 
verified. As for example when he hears, You first saw the light on such and such a day" ( 5). 
The voice coming "to one in the dark" is imaginary because any entry into language is like 
entering a room only to turn and find that the door does not and has not existed; once 
language has been instituted, the signifier has always been in place. Ironically, it is this 
usurpation of the origin that obliges us to "Imagine" the source and the inception ofthe voice 
again, the original act, like the origin itself, having been absolutely obliterated from what is 
now the inescapable infinitude of language. Language becomes an inescapable process of 
attempting to apprehend that which is erased in the act of being named even as one can only 
do so (or cannot do so) via the name: "Is there anything to add to this esquisse? His 
unnamability. Even M must go. SoW reminds himself of his creature as so far created. W? 
But W too is a creature. Figment" (37). 
It is this process of negation and creation which constitutes the process of 
signification, a process which, therefore, ironically advances through this desire to regress, 
through its desire to capture the unitary, yet non-existent, origin/ telos: "Nowhere to be 
found. Nowhere to be sought. The unthinkable last of all. Unnamable. Last person. I. Quick 
leave him" (19). The origin is that which has differed from itself and is therefore the 
incessantly deferred "unthinkable last of all", the "Last person. I". This "Unnamable" origin 
is always "Nowhere to be found" by virtue of the fact that it is erased from denotation at the 
moment of denotation: "I. Quick leave him". On the surface these words seem to reflect the 
loss of the origin through the institution of the voice, the erasure of the unitary origin which 
is 'I': yet again, however, the attempt to speak of this institution is undercut by the linguistic 
155 
necessity that the originary 'I' is already a signifier, a signifier which, in its very presence, 
represents an acknowledgment that the "Unnamable" origin has always already been brought 
into meaningful being and has always already been erased. There is no institution, and no 
origin, by virtue of the fact that this institution has always already occurred no matter how far 
one traces this process. This is precisely the reason why the voice cannot be identified as a 
predicate of this narratorial origin. 
In this light, the very presence of the signifier always represents an acknowledgement 
that the origin has disappeared, for "the pre-expressive object is impossible to the extent that 
it does not precede but rather is produced by signification" (Trezise 21 ). This indicates why 
Beckett refers to the process outlined as that of imagination, a factor which Beckett comes to 
identifY with consciousness itself thus drawing a parallel between our imagining of the origin 
and his own: " ... many crawls were necessary and the like number ofprostrations before he 
could make up his imagination on this score" (43). Unlike the verb 'signify', the verb 
'imagine' overtly implies the aporia of the "one in the dark", the fact that the actuality of this 
"one" is utterly erased by speech, thus being 'imagined' rather than signified. The origin 
cannot 'exist' unless it speaks, and it does not exist even when it has spoken: it is this which 
constitutes the difference between the two darknesses which recur in the novel, the "darkness 
visible" ( 15) or the "dark of light" ( 49) which is the instituted voice and, by implication, 
'darkness invisible', 'the dark of darkness' which is this impossible origin. The verb 
"Imagine" denotes both a process of creation, of bringing something into existence as an 
image even as it simultaneously admits the non-existential status of that which is denoted in 
this act of creation, an admittance that the origin can only exist as a image: it thus 
encapsulates the manner in which the linguistic creation of the origin is a simultaneous 
admission that the origin no longer exists and has never existed, a pure fiction. In imagining 
the origin, therefore, we both create it and admit its absence, it being the act of speech, of 
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self-representation, which renders this admission necessary. The imaginary, like the 
Derridean arche-trace, is no more than an overt reflection of the manner in which the 
initiation of signification and self-awareness must always admit its own undoing, the 
disappearance of the ongm even necessitating the disappearance of this disappearance, 
leaving in place an infinite text. 
What is most significant m this respect is that Beckett's whole novel admits its 
imaginary status, and it does so via the purely imaginary figure of the narrator. We cannot 
help but sense that this is an audacious novel, for the text enacts itself as being spoken from 
the perspective of the excluded origin, the one who is absolutely erased from the voice at the 
moment of utterance. This origin cannot be signified in any sense, merely imagined: "Use of 
the second person marks the voice. That of the third that cankerous other. Could he speak to 
and of whom the voice speaks there would be a first. But he cannot. He shall not. You 
cannot. You shall not." (6). The irony here, of course, is that the voice ofwhich the narrator 
speaks, that which he overhears and is absolutely other to him, is this voice, as is suggested 
by the fact that this voice is 'marked' by both of the pronouns which characterise the very 
voice that he hears. This voice cannot belong to the figure who purports to speak, a figure 
who cannot be spoken 'to' or 'of within these lines. The narrator, if one can continue to 
speak of this figure, is a wholly unspeakable speaker whose existence cannot be indicated 
within the space of the text. The text, therefore, may present itself as enacting the viewpoint 
of the originary figure who is wholly expelled from meaning in the act of utterance, and yet 
the novel seems to hermetically seal itself against this narrator's his very possibility, even as 
we become 'aware' of him through the novel. Indeed, it is this coming to 'awareness' which 
simultaneously constitutes his negation. 
One can, therefore, validly interpret Company in post-structuralist terms as evidence 
of the purely imaginary nature of the origin and the absolutely free play of textuality within a 
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usurping text. Carla Locatelli, for example, asserts that "Company produces a movement of 
signs rather than . . a naming that would articulate an ideal unified ''I'" (163) and, 
referring to the final lines of the novel, she does "not see Husserl's "ego" or any 
transcendental connotation in the final word describing a subject "Alone". However, a 
performance of the reduction on the "I" occurs throughout the entire work, and functions as a 
critique of the linguistic nature of the "I"" (165). Locatelli is correct in maintaining that the 
word "Alone", like the pronouns "he" and "you", fails to constitute "a naming that would ... 
articulate an ideal, unified "I"" since it is necessarily undercut by the second person: 
And you as you always were. 
Alone. (52) 
Nevertheless, Locatelli is incorrect in maintaining that the inability to linguistically articulate 
the 'I' constitutes the "performance of the reduction on the "I"". The claim of the signifier 
"I" to be able to articulate the unified origin is certainly reduced for as we have seen it 
renders the origin imaginary in the very act of 'signifying' it. It can no more lay claim to this 
ability, therefore, than the equally impotent words "he", "you" or "Alone". Yet in her 
assertion that the 'I' is reduced, Locatelli conflates the signifier and that to which this 
signifier attempts to refer, implying that there is no "Husserlian ego", no origin, by virtue of 
the signifier 's inability to enact it: to recall Beckett's own words, the "form" may not be able 
to accommodate the "mess" but the "mess" is still "there and it must be allowed in" (Driver 
219). 
It is Beckett's assertion which points to the simultaneity which inhabits Company, for 
(as so often in Beckett) the narrator's words can read double, there being a choice of 
darknesses: "The test is company. Which of the two darks is better company" (21). The 
reading that we have performed is one possibility, a viable possibility; yet like all 
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possibilities it is necessarily inhabited by its correlate. Within this possibility the origin is 
erased from language to the extent that one cannot even assert that it has existed, yet, like 
Nietzsche, Beckett was aware that one's ability to begin with the origin and logically 
demonstrate the means through which this linguistic non-existence can arise implies the 
origin's ontological possibility to precisely the same extent as it implies its linguistic 
impossibility. Within the novel this possibility constantly restates itself in the mere 
apparency that is the speaker, a figure who, as we have seen, is a purely imaginary figure, he 
who is utterly erased from the text that he purportedly institutes. The narrative, however, 
does present itself from the perspective of this erased figure, the origin who overhears the 
voice, a presentation whereby the non-existent paradoxically purports to communicate 
directly to us without the mediation of speech or writing. Such a pretence, of course, is 
undercut by language itself, that which constitutes our very awareness of this figure: the 
narrator has no existence to us apart from the mediation of writing, just as the narrator has no 
existence to himself apart from the voice. Yet the important point is that this narrator has no 
existence even with this mediation, being a purely imaginary figure to both the reader and 
himself There can be no knowledge of the actual origin at all and this is to say that one 
cannot use our apparent, linguistic, knowledge of this origin as a justification for saying that 
this origin has been usurped by signification or 'imagination'. How can we know that this 
origin has been usurped by representation if this origin has never been verifiably 
represented? In the absence of any origin to which the "voice" is a predicate, how can we 
verify that this "voice" has ever been spoken or, therefore, that the usurpation has occurred? 
In the absence of any origin one can no more verify the reality of discourse than one can 
verify the reality of the origin itself, which is precisely why the Beckettian text purports to be 
paradoxically speaking from a position beyond meaning: to do so does not merely highlight 
the imaginary nature of the origin, the fact that this unmediated origin is a pretence, for it 
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also alerts us to the uncomfortable possibility that this mediation itself, the usurping voice, is 
imaginary. "A voice comes to one in the dark. Imagine" (5). Does the exhortation "Imagine" 
refer to the "one in the dark" or to the "voice" which would rupture the self-identity of this 
"one"? Similarly, in the final lines of the novel (" ... And you as you always were./ Alone") 
the existence ofthe second person may undercut the word "Alone", yet it is equally true that 
the second person, the voice which speaks to this supposedly solitary figure, is undercut by 
the inescapable possibility that the narrator is "Alone". That this is a viable possibility is the 
conclusion that one must reach (and that the novel evidently, if equivocally, does reach) 
unless one can existentially validate the linguistic performance that purports to undercut this 
origin. One must affirm the voice, proving that this "one" has spoken and has been usurped 
by this voice, that which is no more provable than the origin. This origin has potentially 
spoken and our inability to verify this fact leaves open the potentiality that it has not. 
Locatelli, for example, is correct to deduce the purely linguistic nature of any pretence to a 
transcendental 'I' from this voice, arguing that its performative articulations of the voice 
highlight the imaginary nature of the origin; as has been suggested, the narrator 
acknowledges his own imaginary status as the "[ d]eviser of the voice and of its hearer and of 
himself' (20). Yet if the narrator is imaginary by virtue of the fact that he is devised, then 
equally, the voice through which this imaginary status is revealed is no less devised, and one 
should be wary of interpreting the ambiguous word "devised" as being indicative of the 
fictional (i.e. nonexistential) status of the origin and the created (i.e. existential) status in its 
application to the voice, for this is a distinction that the text does not sustain. This undoing of 
the voice's pretence to verifiably exist is also revealed when the narrator asserts: "Could he 
speak to and of whom the voice speaks there would be a first" (6). The quotation 
performatively reveals that the "first" has never entered into linguistic being by undercutting 
the referential capabilities of the signifier "he", suggesting that "he" cannot be spoken "to or 
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of' even as it is this "he" who supposedly speaks, and is supposedly speaking. This "he" has 
never verifiably spoken by virtue of the fact that his "first", the speaker, has never verifiably 
existed. That one cannot verify this initial act of speech, an act that requires an originary 
speaker, undoes the voice's claim to exist in spite of its apparency. It is, after all, not merely 
the origin that cannot be deictically referred to, thus being brought into being, but the voice 
itself, that which remains imaginary. It is this imaginary status of the voice that constantly 
exteriorises the possibility that the origin has not spoken and has not, therefore, been usurped 
by the voice. As well as raising the possibility of the voice's inability to speak "to or of' this 
"first" person, therefore, the sentence simultaneously raises the possibility that the "first" 
word has never been uttered: "Could he speak to and of whom the voice speaks ... ". That 
"he" cannot speak "to or of' this first, even as the voice is apparently doing so, implies that 
this speech is not occurring; "the voice", this voice, can no more enter meaningful or 
verifiable being than the originary 'I' from which it is, in this light, indistinguishable. It is the 
imaginary product of an imaginary narrator who devises "figments to temper his 
nothingness": "Another devising it all for company. In the same dark as his creature or in 
another. Quick imagine. The same" (27). The origin's inability to ever validly "think to 
himself referring to himself' (3 7) is just as applicable to the voice through which he attempts 
to refer to himself, a voice, therefore, which always collapses back into the silence, always 
beginning: 
. . . from nought anew. Huddled thus you find yourself imagining you are not 
alone while knowing full well that nothing has occurred to make this possible. 
The process continues none the less lapped as it were in meaninglessness. You 
do not murmur in so many words, I know this is doomed to fail and yet 
persist. No. For the first personal and a fortiori pronoun had never any place in 
your vocabulary. But without a word you view yourself to this effect ... (50) 
The imaginary voice, therefore, is indistinguishable from this origin to the extent that 
neither can be existentially validated. If the origin is rendered absolutely other to the voice in 
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the act of inception, as suggested by the narrator's inability to identify the vmce as a 
predicate of himself, then this voice remains a "cankerous other", an oxymoronic phrase 
which could either be said to express the manner in which the 'I' is linguistic outgrowth of 
the instituted voice, an imaginary construct, or the manner in which the voice itself is an 
imaginary outgrowth of the origin, the initial divorce between the inescapable origin and the 
voice having never occurred. The narrator, therefore, remains a nonentity who has never 
come into being by virtue of the fact that the voice has never left him, which is synonymous 
with an assertion that the voice has never left itself in order that it can bring itself into being. 
The text supports both readings, this being, for Beckett, the irresolvable status of language. 
What this simultaneity points to is the paradox which inhabits self-identity, the 
possibility that the self-identical 'I' insistently remains other to itself because it never 
transcends itself in order that it can be meaningfully apprehended and brought into subjective 
being. The 'I', or, synonymously, the voice which is, from this perspective, indissociable 
from the origin, are paradoxically other to themselves because of their inability to become 
other to themselves and deictically affirm their own existence. In these terms, both are 
unspeakable and, therefore, non-existent within the space of their own constant self-
coincidence. When the narrator asserts "I. Quick leave him", for example, he is not only 
suggesting that the signifier 'I' is always already in place and that "Quick leave him" is a 
retrospective summation of the instantaneous act of erasure, an explication of the 'I's' 
performative erasure of the origin. This is also an exhortation to transcend the 'I' in order 
that this 'I' can be apprehended and brought into meaningful being: "Quick leave him. Pause 
and again in panic to himself, Quick leave him" (3 7). The duality in progress is not only 
captured by the ambiguity of the third person (is this the origin speaking of the voice or the 
voice speaking of the origin?) but also by the indeterminate nature of this "panic" - does he 
panic in his desire to return to himself (the origin) after the erasing performance of language 
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or does he panic because he is returning to himself, to the 'I' which he never transcends that 
he can meaningfully apprehend himself? Whereas in the former the origin does not exist 
because this origin has spoken, in the latter the origin does not exist because it has never 
spoken, having always unspeakably coincided with his own physical immanence. From the 
latter perspective, the narrator is in a "flesh-locked sea of silence" ("Assumption" 5), "a 
prisoner, frantic with corporeality, rearing to get out and away" (Texts for Nothing 123), for 
if one considers 'mental activity' to be an ultimately physical activity (i.e. consciousness as 
an element within the inescapable immanence of the body), then from this inapprehensible 
objective perspective it could be asserted that the subject is on his "back in the dark and ha[ s] 
no mental activity of any kind", this being a suspicion that the subject cannot escape: "Might 
not the hearer be improved? Made more companionable if not downright human. Mentally 
perhaps there is room for enlivenment. An attempt at reflection at least. At recall. At speech 
even ... But physically? Must he lie inert to the end?" (22). Clearly, in recognising that the 
mental may not escape the orbit of the physical there is a movement from the possibility that 
the text has no beginning (that the origin is absent) to the possibility that the text has never 
truly begun (that the is origin is immanent), the first possibility inevitably giving way to the 
second. Within the second possibility the point of differentiation between the origin and its 
representation, the point at which the origin is usurped, has never occurred, not in Derrida's 
sense that there has never been an origin for the infinite text to usurp, this point of usurpation 
being a myth, but in the sense that such a usurpation has always yet to occur. In Beckett's 
short story "The Calmative" ( 1946), the narrator, in spite of the fact that "what I tell this 
evening is passing this evening" is obliged to recognise that "[a]ll I say cancels out, I'll have 
said nothing". Consequently he is telling his story from a future perspective, from the 
hypothetical point at which the usurping differentiation between the origin and its 
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representations has occurred, this being a usurpation that has currently yet to occur just as it 
has yet to verifiably occur in Company. One should also note the Nietzschean influence here: 
I'll tell my story in the past nonetheless, as though it were a myth, or an old 
fable, for this evening I need another age, that age to become another age in 
which I became what I was. . . . it's to me this evening something has to 
happen, to my body as in myth and metamorphosis, this old body to which 
nothing has ever happened, or so little, which never met with anything, loved 
anything, wished for anything, in its tarnished universe, except for the mirrors 
to shatter, the plane, the curved, the magnifYing, the minifYing, and to vanish 
in the havoc of its images. (62-63) 
An awareness of the dual perspective that inhabits the Beckettian text also suggests 
the dual significance that writing has for Beckett. Firstly, it exteriorises the Derridean 
possibility, the fact that the origin is utterly erased from language by its representational 
supplement. Secondly, it exteriorises the corollary possibility of an origin that is unable to 
existentially verifY the voice or the fact that this voice has usurped the origin, thus allowing 
this possibility to constantly reassert itself In the former case writing is applied to 
consciousness, its significance lying in its exteriorisation of the absence of the origin within 
linguistic consciousness: in the latter, consciousness subsumes writing, its significance lying 
in its ability to performatively exteriorise consciousness' inability to ver~fy that the origin has 
been usurped, even when this origin has clearly been usurped from a readerly point of view. 
In other words, writing constitutes a means of revealing that the usurpation of the origin can 
only ever be a hypothesis within consciousness. It is Company's inability to account for this 
usurpation which allows the "voice" within the novel to coincide with the reader's voice. 
This coincidence, however, incorporates both possibilities under discussion. Beckett 
draws a direct parallel between the putative 'voice' which comes to (erases/ creates) the "one 
in the dark" and the inauguration of the reader's voice by implying that both are conditions of 
this 'one's' imaginary being. To designate this a parallel, however, is not quite correct, for 
there is no distinction between the voice of the narrator and that of the reader. If the "one in 
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the dark" who purports to speak is utterly erased by the voice to the extent that it has never 
even existed, as suggested by his inherently imaginary status, then the assumption that the 
voice to which the text refers is a predicate of this figure, a predicate of someone other than 
the reader, cannot be sustained. That the "one in the dark" becomes purely imaginary at the 
moment it begins to speak its own existence is precisely the means through which the 
narratorial voice is deprived of any grounding in an extra-textual reality and allowed to 
absolutely coincide with the reader's voice. The text becomes unanchored from its grounding 
in the reality of the "one on his back in the dark" and directly coincides with the reader's 
consciousness. This sense of immediacy pervades Beckettian textuality, language no longer 
mediating a preceding reality but, rather, seeming to constitute this 'reality' in the here and 
now. In reading Beckett we constantly sense that the text (or indistinguishably the subject) 
has not been written but is being written as we enter into a process of self-writing which 
transcends mimetic autobiography and the individual text in order to performatively enact its 
own constitution. It is for this reason that H. Porter Abbott has designated Beckett's work a 
species of autography rather than autobiography, autography being "the larger field 
comprehending all self-writing" rather than merely "that most common narrative, the story of 
one's life" (Beckett Writing Beckett 2). For Porter Abbott the species of autography into 
which Beckett falls (along with Wordsworth and Augustine) is that which declares itself as 
"something happening in the textual present, a prayer in action" ( 6), being "an autographical 
attempt to pull time up into itself' ( 14): 
Beckett's subset is writing governed not by narrative form or any species of 
tropological wholeness but by that unformed intensity of being in the present 
which at every point in the text seeks to approach itself Writing under such 
governance, Beckett must. .. "undo" autobiography. Yet this undoing is not to 
the end of fictional creation but to the end of being Beckett, Beckett as it were 
avant la letter, Beckett before he is Beckett. ( 18) 
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Of course, a "prayer in action" necessarily occurs now, and the 'being in the present' to 
which Porter Abbott refers is the present point of reading, for it is only this point which gives 
being to the text (and one should note that this reader can be the general reader or Beckett 
himself). Similarly, when Porter Abbott describes this autography as "something happening 
in the textual present" then the phrase "textual present" does not refer to the present as it is 
represented by the text but to the actual present of the reading situation, the point at which 
this "something' - the performance of the text - is "happening". This present, apparently, 
cannot occur elsewhere for there is "[n]o that then to compare to this now" (Company 36): 
"There being nothing to show when it describes correctly his situation that the description is 
not for the benefit of another in the same situation" (36). As David Watson has asserted, 
Beckett' s later works are "probably most fruitfully read as allegories of their own verbal 
processes" (I 88). Nevertheless, what this 'present' voice constantly exteriorises is its 
inability to confirm its own usurpatory status, its own existence. The usurpation of this origin 
is undone, it not being the case that the past is pulled into the present of the reading situation 
but that the reader is pulled into the silent position of this origin, as this origin continues to 
re-assert itself as a possibility even in its factual absence in the reading situation. In this light, 
it is apparent that the significance of writing lies not only in its ability to exteriorise the 
absence of the origin within (or, for Derrida, which is) consciousness but also in its ability to 
exteriorises that there can be no factual absence of the origin within consciousness, this being 
a mere possibility which is always countered by the possibility of the origin. Analogously, 
therefore, the immediacy of the text is not merely a product of the lack of any origin but a 
product of an inability, within the text, to verifY any usurpation of this origin, the text being, 
like consciousness itself, pulled in both directions. 
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4 
TI-IE POTENTIAL TEXT 
.. I'm a big talking ball, talking about things that do not exist, or that exist 
perhaps, impossible to know ... (Unnamable 307) 
"The key word in my plays is 'perhaps"' says Beckett in conversation with Tom 
Driver (Driver 220), the corollary of which is, of course, 'perhaps not', for as Aristotle ("who 
knew everything" (Texts for Nothing 13)) asserts defining the potential: "to every potency 
there is a contrary potency in the same subject and with respect to the same thing (tou autou 
kai kata to auto pasa dunamis adunamiai)" (Agamben 183)8 That which is potential is 
defined as such by its opposing corollary, by the other potentiality which always inhabits it: 
" ... anything which is capable of existing may not be in actuality. Thus, that which is 
capable of existing may or may not exist; and so the same thing is capable of existing and of 
not existing" (Agamben 16t It is this radical indeterminacy which fuels the movement of 
Beckettian textuality and which reveals its status as a mode of potentiality: the Beckettian 
narrator's inability to affirm his own existence can never rule out the possibility of this 
existence, merely the possibility of referring to it, and it is this potential existence which is 
the source of his own potentiality, his dunamis. As Aristotle's words suggest, it is in retaining 
the possibility of existence (or alternatively, in being unable to refute this possibility) that the 
narrator simultaneously opens himself to its corollary, to the possibility of non-existence, this 
being the well from which the Beckettian text frequently draws itself, "[f]or the only way one 
can speak of nothing is to speak of it as though it were something" (Watt 74): 
who may tell the tale 
ofthe old man? 
weigh absence in a scale? 
mete want with a span? 
The sum assess 
of the world's woes? 
167 
Nothingness 
In words enclose? (Watt 247) 
As Giorgio Agamben, in speaking of Aristotle, puts it, 
. . . human beings, insofar as they know and produce, are those beings who, 
more than any other, exist in the mode of potentiality. Every human power is 
adynamia, impotentiality; every human potentiality is in relation to its own 
privation. This is the origin (and the abyss) of human power, which is so 
violent and limitless. . . . human beings are the animals who are capable of 
their own impotentiality. The greatness of human potentiality is measured by 
the abyss of human impotentiality. (182) 
Yet if human beings exist in "a mode of potentiality", sustaining themselves in relation to 
their "own privation", then that of which the Beckettian narrator is deprived, that which is 
merely possible (i.e. his non-existence), remains defined as such by its corollary possibility, 
his potential (i.e. unverifiable) existence, that of which he is equally deprived. One could, 
therefore, equally define the mode of potentiality of which Agamben speaks as a mode of 
privation that is sustained in relation to this potential existence, and it is striking that the 
Beckettian narrator is no less deprived of existence than non-existence, which is why he 
often purports not to be speaking: 
... there I am the absentee again, it's his turn again now, he who neither 
speaks nor listens, who has neither body nor soul ... in the end I'll recognise 
it, the story of the silence that he never left . . . then it will be he, it will be I, it 
will be the place, the silence, the end, the beginning, the beginning again . . 
(Unnamable 417) 
Clearly, this figure not only seeks an exit from being but an exit from non-being, a breach of 
the silence as well as the silence, a beginning to speech as well as its cessation: he seeks 
existence. The inability of which Agamben speaks in asserting that "[e]very human power is 
adynamia, impotentiality" may equate, therefore, to the Beckettian narrator's inability to 
"speak and yet say nothing, really nothing?" (Unnamable 305), nothingness being the 
privation in relation to which the text sustains itself, yet this is not simply an inability to 
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linguistically apprehend non-existence. One should not overlook that the quotation indicates 
an inability to "speak" as well as an inability to "say nothing, really nothing" suggesting that 
if human beings "exist in a mode of potentiality" (emphasis mine), then this mode of 
potentiality can, itself, be seen a privation of existence. In other words, the impotentiality 
which sustains the Beckettian text is an inability to say something as well as an inability to 
"say nothing", the word 'nothing' frequently being utilised as a kind of ironic cipher for this 
ineffable 'thing': "Nothing ever troubles me . . . About myself I need know nothing" 
(Unnamable 295-96). Such is the aporia of being "unable to act, obliged to act" ("Three 
Dialogues" 145) which gives rise to "the madness of having to speak and not being able to" 
(Unnamable 326-27). 
Clearly, such an aporia does not invalidate Agamben's assertion that every human 
potentiality exists in relation to its own privation; it merely indicates that this is an 
undeniable possibility which, as such, is necessarily inhabited by another undeniable 
possibility. Human potentiality exists in relation to the potential existence of which it is 
deprived as well as in relation to a potential privation of existence. There are obviously two 
contradictory perspectives here and it is within this frame of contradiction that the Beckettian 
narrator 'exists', oscillating between both possibilities yet remaining unable resolve them 
through a meta-assertion: 
. . . how proceed? By aporia pure and simple? Or by affirmations and 
negations invalidated as uttered, or sooner or later? Generally speaking. There 
must be other shifts. Otherwise it would be quite hopeless. But it is quite 
hopeless. (Unnamable 294) 
The mode of potentiality which constitutes the Beckettian text, therefore, is not merely a 
mode of existence which is sustained in relation to the possibility of its privation: it is, 
simultaneously, a mode of privation which exists in relation to the possibility of existence. 
The Unnamable may exist in relation to his own privation since the "search for the means to 
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put an end to things, an end to speech, is what enables the discourse to continue" (Unnamable 
302), yet it is clear that this discourse simultaneously exists as the search for a beginning: 
"Nothing then but me, of which I know nothing, except that I have never uttered" 
(Unnamable 306). 
Clearly, the reason why the voice does not yet exist, and the narrator has always yet to 
speak is because he is unable to deictically affirm the existence of the voice in spite of its 
apparent immediacy: 
... every time I say, I said this, or speak of a voice saying ... Molloy, and 
then a fine phrase . . . I am merely complying with the convention that 
demands that you either lie or hold your peace .... In reality I said nothing at 
all, but I heard a murmur, something gone wrong with the silence . . . (Molloy 
87-88) 
As the Unnamable ironically asserts in relation to this voice: "Nothing has ever changed 
since I have been here" (Unnamable 296). Evidently, the voice, regardless of its immediacy, 
is no more verifiable than reality itself: this voice cannot deictically speak itself into 
existence for as Wittgenstein points out "we cannot express through language what expresses 
ilselfin language" (Tractatus 4.121)10: " ... with what words shall I name my unnameable 
words?" (Texts for Nothing 125). Similarly, if the narrator of Company desires "by some 
successful act of intellection ... to think of himself referring to himself' (37) then, as 
Agamben points out, "a term cannot refer to something and, at the same time, refer to the 
fact that it refers to it" (213). The 'nothing' that the Beckettian narrator seeks to speak, 
therefore, is not merely non-existence, but specifically the 'nothing' which is his speech, his 
own non-existence: "I have nothing to do, that is to say nothing in particular" (Unnamable 
316). If "[n]othing is more real than nothing"11 (Malone 193) then in seeking to "say 
nothing, really nothing" the narrator does not merely seek to silence the voice but to 
deictically refer to this silence. Like Nietzsche, the narrator seeks to finally speak the silence 
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that constitutes him, to finally, linguistically translate the 'nothing' that he is into something: 
. it's the same old road I'm trudging, up ... towards one yet to be named .. ''(Texts for 
Nothing 144). 
From this perspective, language is not merely a mode of potentiality which exists in 
relation to a privation, for it is itself this privation even as it is experienced, its existence 
being unverifiable. Evidently, one cannot affirm the existence of any mind independent 
reality (including the reality of the mind itself) by virtue of the fact that any such 'reality' 
must occur within the apparently infinite space of representation. In Beckett's texts, an 
awareness of the reality of language itself necessitates a linguistic articulation of this reality, 
an articulation whose reality, in turn, must be linguistically articulated, ad in.fini tum. The 
reality of language is never affirmed in spite of the apparency of our experience of it. As 
such, language is itself merely potential, its existence remaining an irresolvable yet 
irrefutable possibility. This possible existence and the prospective possibility of its 
verification, of validly 'naming the name' and finally bringing this 'nothing' (this privation 
which is experienced) into linguistic existence, is always present to the narrator as the 
unnameable which is language itself: 
... may not this screen which my eyes probe in vain, and see as denser air, in 
reality be the enclosure wall, as compact as lead? To elucidate this point I 
would need a stick or a pole .... I could also do, incidentally, with future and 
conditional participles. Then I should dart it, like a javelin, straight before me 
and know, by the sound made, whether that which hems me round, and blots 
out my world, is the old void or a plenum. (Unnamable 302) 
In this context, one's experience of language can be regarded the actuality of that which is 
possible but has yet to be actualised, or in the Aristotelian/ Joycean schema "an actuality of 
the possible as possible" (lllysses 26)12 . This is one's actual experience of a privation, of that 
which is continually deprived of any verifiable reality, language being, in St. Augustine's 
words, "a being which is non-being" 13 constituting "the long silent guffaw of the knowing 
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non-exister" (Texts for Nothing 150). As Agamben points out m relation to Aristotle's 
assertion that "the mind [nous] is like a writing tablet on which nothing is actually written" 14 : 
Nous is thus a potentiality that exists as such, and the metaphor of the writing 
tablet . . . expresses the way in which pure potentiality exists . . . the pure 
potentiality of thought is a potentiality that is capable of not thinking, that is 
capable of not passing into actuality. But this pure potentiality (the rasum 
tabulae) is itself intelligible; it can itself be thought. (215) 
Such a discourse has yet to affirm its own existence, being deprived of this existence and 
continually 'existing' as this deprivation: " ... all you have to do is say you said nothing and 
so say nothing again" (Texts for Nothing 124). Recalling Aristotle's definition ofthe mind, 
this deprivation also informs the Beckettian narrator's inability to write: "How, in such 
conditions, can I write, to consider only the manual aspect of that bitter folly? I don't know. I 
could know. Not this time. It is I who write, who cannot raise my hand from my knee" 
(Unnamable 303). Yet in applying the Aristotelian definition to this quotation from Beckett, 
we must ask whether such a discourse sustains itself via the potential to be written (the 
possibility which can be actualised at some future point) or via the potential of affirming that 
it has already been written (the possibility of affirming the actuality which is already in 
place). Is the tabula rasa in question yet to be written on or is it yet to be seen to be written 
on, in the same manner that we must ignore the evidence in front of our eyes if we are to 
accept that the Beckettian narrator has not written, or in the same manner that the narrator 
himself must ignore the apparency of language if he is to accept that he is not speaking? 
It is this ambiguity that lies at the heart of the debate over the Beckettian text's 
relation to 'reality', this being the ambiguity of the word 'potential' itself To simply assert 
that something is 'potential' (e.g. "I potentially exist") is to fail to indicate whether one is 
referring to that which may already exist yet cannot be affirmed (e.g. "It is possible that I do 
exist"), or whether one is referring to that which does not currently exist but could come into 
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being ("It is possible that I will exist"). This ambiguity is inherent in our definition of the 
Beckettian text as a mode of potentiality, most specifically in our use of the word 'possible': 
if the language that the narrator experiences is "the actuality of that which is possible but has 
yet to be actualised" ("the actuality of the possible as possible") then we must ask whether 
the central word 'possible' points to the present or to the future, whether the definition means 
that language already exists yet cannot be affirmed (i.e. that it is actual but has yet to become 
actual to us, the name having yet to be named) or whether language does not currently exist 
yet cannot be denied (i.e. that it is not yet actual but is already actual to us15 ): "I could also 
do, incidentally, with future and conditional participles" (Unnamable 302). In short, the 
ambiguity raises the question of whether reality has yet to be affirmed or whether it has yet to 
be at all, a dual possibility which the Beckettian narrator cannot resolve, as evidenced by his 
ability to (potentially) exist both after and before the beginning; he is apparently already 
speaking (i.e. it is possible that he is speaking) even as he has apparently yet to speak, (i.e. it 
is possible that he will speak): 
Ah to know for sure, to know that this thing has no end . . . this farrago of 
silence and words, of silence that is not silence and barely murmured words .. 
. . to know its life still, a form of life. . . . Words, mine was never more than 
that, than this pell-mell babe] of silence and words, my viewless form 
described as ended, or to come, or still in progress, depending on the words, 
the moments, Long may it last in that singular way. Apparitions. _ . ghouls .. _ 
do I as much as know what they are, of course I don't ... (Texts for Nothing 
125) 
It is his inability to "know what" these apparitions "are", to affirm the existence of the 
language that he experiences (thus affirming that he is already speaking) which allows the 
voice to constantly give way to the silence in the wave-like movement of language. In being 
unable to affirm the very language that he experiences the speaker is inevitably returned to 
the 'conclusion' that he has yet to speak, only for the apparition of language, the "murmurs" 
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which inhabit this silence to give way, in turn, to the voice, the "conclusion" that he is 
already speaking: 
. . . the words fail, the voice fails, so be it, I know that well, it will be the 
silence, full of murmurs, distant cries, the usual silence, spent listening, spent 
waiting, waiting for the voice, the cries abate, like all cries, that is to say they 
stop, the murmurs cease, they give up, the voice begins again, it begins trying 
again, quick now before there is none left, no voice left, nothing left but the 
core of murmurs, distant cries, quick now and try again ... (Unnamable 417) 
The Beckettian narrator thus constantly oscillates between the two possibilities that word 
'potential' allows. 
It is clear, therefore, that the ambiguity which inhabits our use ofthe word 'potential', 
our failure to specifY whether it refers to a present (potential) existence or a future (potential) 
existence (implying that one does not currently exist) is more than a mere failure to be 
specific in one's meaning. For Beckett, this ambiguity is rather ajunctional ambiguity which 
is intrinsic to textuality and the mode of potentiality which is human existence itself 
Agamben is correct to assert that ". . . human beings . . . are those beings who, more than 
any other, exist in the mode of potentiality" (182) and yet this does not clarifY the sense of 
potentiality at stake, the question of whether this 'potentiality' is sustained in relation to that 
which already exists but cannot be affirmed or to that which does not currently exist but 
could come into being. As the Beckettian text demonstrates, the mode of potentiality that 
constitutes human 'existence' is inhabited by both possibilities, the lack of clarification 
which characterises Agamben's words being the very lack of affirmation (of either existence 
or non-existence) which constitutes the text as a mode of potentiality. The Beckettian 
narrator, in implying that the possibility that he has yet to write, asserts that " . . . I . 
cannot raise my hand from my knee" yet as the evidence of our eyes, and the very fact that 
we (the readers) are aware of this inability suggests, this possibility is necessarily inhabited 
by the undeniable (if irresolvable) possibility that he has already began to write, a possibility 
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which always holds open the inescapable possibility of existence and of affirming this 
existence: "How ... can I write ... ? I don't know. I could know. Not this time. It is I who 
write, who cannot raise my hand from my knee" (Unnamable 303). Echoing Nietzsche, 
Beckett presents human existence as a mode of potentiality which is constantly tom between 
the possibility of what already is and the possibility of what has yet to be, between putative 
existence and putative non-existence: 
Is it really he, can it possibly be he, then moving on in company along a road 
that is not mine and with every step takes me further from that other not mine 
either, or remaining alone where I am, between two parting dreams, knowing 
none, known of none ... {Texts for Nothing 148). 
5 
CONTR.AR[ETIES WHICH GNAW: BECKETI, ARISTOTLE AND HYLOMORPHISM 
Beckett, of course, was not the first to recognise that the dual possibility inhabiting 
the word 'potential' is the fundamental aporia which characterises and constitutes human 
existence: such potentiality, for example, clearly inhabits Nietzschean thought and finds its 
derivation in the erotic, non-reductive, materialism which, for Plato, is exteriorised by 
writing, the desire to attain that which has (possibly) already been attained16 ln identifYing 
this dichotomy Beckett thus acknowledges a hylomorphic strain of thought within the 
Western tradition, it being Aristotle who is the historically acknowledged source of this 
tradition. Within this Aristotelian context the irresolvable yet inalienable possibility of 
material being informs and facilitates the mode of potentiality that is human existence, the 
former potentiality making the latter potentiality possible. In these terms the aporetic 
inability to affirm or deny material being is the seed from which actuality and self-
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actualisation spnngs, the potential status of material reality being transformed into this 
reality's potentiality, the dynamic process of actualising itself and its latent capacities. In 
Richard Tamas' terms, this Aristotelian conception of matter is: 
... an indeterminate openness in things to structural and dynamic formation. 
Matter is the unqualified substrate of being, the possibility of form, that which 
form molds, impels, brings from potentiality to actuality . . . All of nature is in 
the process- is itself the process- of this conquest of matter by form. (58) 
The key feature of matter, for Aristotle, and the reason for the traditional arguments 
over whether Aristotle accepted the existence of primal matter, is its lack of thiS11ess (t6& 
tt) 17, the quality of being separable and definable, this lack being the reason why Aristotle 
rejected matter's status as a substance. Indeed, the Beckettian narrator's inability to affirm 
that he already exists by meaningfully translating himself and his own language into a 
definable 'this', and his frequent reference to such unnameable factors as 'nothing', echoes 
Aristotle's inability to unequivocally apply the word 'being' to matter: 
. . . matter becomes substance. For ifthis is not a substance, we are at a loss 
as to what else is a substance. If the others [form or predicates of matter] are 
taken off, nothing appears to remain . . . if length and width and depth are 
removed, we observe nothing left, unless there is something bounded by 
these; so matter alone must appear to be substance. . . . By "matter" I mean 
that which in itself is not stated as being the whatness of something, nor a 
quantity, nor any other senses of "being" .... From what has been said, it 
follows that matter is a substance. But this is impossible; for to be separable 
and a this is thought to belong most of all to a substance. (Metaphysics 1 029a 
11-29) 
Accordingly, Aristotle reserves the term 'substance' for the essence a phenomenon, essence 
being that which is included in any per se account of such a phenomenon, that which allows 
it to be determined as a presence (i.e. the definable and formal qualities which make a thing 
what it is, a this). It is clear, therefore, that Aristotle's equivocation about the 'being' of 
matter is actually an equivocation about the applicability of any formal concept of being to 
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matter, form rather than matter being the defining factor of actuality or substance. As 
Plotinus recognises in following the Aristotelian tradition 18, matter is the substrate that 
receives form yet, in itself, lacks the form that allows for a definable existence, the 'thisness' 
which constitutes a substance: 
The Matter in the Intellectual Realm is an Existent, for there is nothing 
previous to it except Beyond-Existence; but what precedes the Matter of this 
sphere is Existence; by its alienism in regard to the beauty and good of 
Existence, Matter is therefore a non-existent. (TI.4.16) 
One should note that in implying that only that which exists in the "intellectual realm" is "an 
Existent", Plotinus concurs with Aristotle's identification of substance and actuality as 
necessarily possessing the quality of 'thisness'. Matter, therefore, has never been 
logocentrically determined as a presence and consequently has never been installed within 
the 'rights of reality': it is "not a thing of Real-being but belongs to some other Kind of 
existent" (II.4.14.). Clearly that matter has never been determined as a presence in order that 
it can be installed within the 'rights of reality' does not revoke the possibility that it is, in 
some unverifiable sense, real. In the same way that the Beckettian narrator frequently refers 
to the unnameable reality of his own language as 'nothing', Plotinus' assertion that matter is 
"non-existent" is not an assertion that there is no such thing as matter: matter is "no name 
void of content; we know there is such a base, invisible and without bulk though it be" 
(11.4.12): "It [the soul] knows ... a whole which includes two components; it has a clear 
knowledge or perception of the overlie (the Ideas) but only a dim awareness of the underlie, 
the shapeless which is not an Ideal-Principle" (11.4.10). In other words the "mess" of reality 
"invades our experience at every moment. It is there and it must be allowed in .... the form . 
. exists as a problem separate from the material it accommodates" (Driver 219). A more 
plausible source for this assertion, however, is St. Augustine, whose Confessions was not 
only strongly influenced by Plotinus and Aristotle but was also an abiding influence on 
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Beckett19 . Writing in this Aristotelian tradition, St. Augustine refers to "unformed matter" as 
being "not absolute nothingness" but "a kind of formlessness without any definition" 
(XII.iii): 
I found it easier to suppose something deprived of all form to be non-existent 
than to think something could stand between form and nothingness, neither 
endowed with form nor nothing, but formless and so almost nothing. . . . If 
one could speak of 'a nothing something' or 'a being which is non-being', that 
is what I would say. Nevertheless it must have had some kind of prior 
existence to be able to receive the visible and ordered forms. (XII. vi) 
As has been suggested, it is this status as a "nothing something" which informs the 
Beckettian narrator's relation to language, language being a thing which is apparently there 
(i.e. it is something) even as it cannot be appointed any formal meaning (i.e. it is nothing 
from this perspective )20 . As this status defines Beckettian language as a mode of potentiality, 
it also informs Aristotle's belief that matter is potentiality: matter may exist yet this existence 
cannot be formally verified, transforming this existence into an irresolvable and undeniable 
possibility. This view most famously put forward in De Anima: 
. . . substance is . . . spoken of in three ways, as form, as matter, and as the 
composite, and of these matter is the potentiality, form actuality, and since the 
composite is in this case the ensouled thing, it is not that the body is the 
actuality ofthe soul but that the soul is the actuality of some body. (II.ii). 
When Aristotle asserts that "matter is the potentiality" here, he is clearly not suggesting that 
matter is form's telos (or in Aristotle's terms, the form's "end cause" (Physics Iliii)), or that 
matter has yet to exist: indeed he asserts elsewhere that "the body, far from being one of the 
things said of a subject, stands by itself as subject and is matter" (De Anima Il.i). In 
designating matter a "potentiality", therefore, he is clearly implying the possibility that 
matter already exists even as this existence cannot be affirmed. In light of this inability, 
however, it would be correct to assert that matter itse(f has yet to enter into formal being or 
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actuality and when one reflects that such 'thisness' is, for Aristotle, the defining quality C?f 
actuality, one begins to appreciate the reason for matter's status as a substrate and a 
potentiality: matter may subsist (i.e. it is already in place) but does not yet exist in any 
substantial sense (i.e. it remains a mere possibility), the criterion of substantiality being that 
which Aristotle applies to existence. 
It is the fact that matter has always yet to exist in this substantial sense that also 
explains why formal actuality has substantial priority over potentiality/ matter in spite of the 
possibility of matter being already in place (a fact which, it should be noted, is reminiscent of 
the manner in which representation, for Derrida, has logical priority over 'reality'). This, for 
example, is the reason why "the soul is the actuality of some body" rather than "the body" 
being "the actuality of the soul"; the soul is the form of the body and it is this form, rather 
than the body's materiality, which is identifiable as the body's actuality, the soul being, as 
Aristotle famously puts it, "the first actuality of a natural body with organs" (De Anima II. 
i)21 . Similarly, formal being has substantial priority over becoming by virtue of the fact that it 
has already attained the status of a substance: 
. . . things which are posterior in generation are prior in form or in substance; 
for example, an adult is prior to a child, and a man is prior to seed; for the 
former in each case already has the form, the latter does not. ... generation is 
for the sake of an end; and the end is an actuality, and potentiality is viewed 
as being for the sake of this. . . . Further, matter exists potentially in view of 
the fact that it might come to possess a form; and when it exists actually, then 
it exists in a form. (Metaphysics 1 050a.4-17) 
Of course, when matter "exists as a form" and has become actual, it does not exist in this 
substantial sense at all, the form in question being something other to matter (i.e. a substance, 
an adult, a man). To recount: "to be separable and a this is thought to belong most of all to a 
substance" (Metaphysics I 029a 11-29). As Plotinus puts it: " ... bodiliness is itself a phase 
of Reason principle and so is something different from Matter . . . bodiliness already 
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operative and so to speak made concrete would be body manifest and not Matter 
unelaborated." (II.4.12). In other words, when matter "exists as a form" then matter itselfhas 
not been actualised; it remains the substrate to this form and remains merely potentiaL 
Nevertheless, the quotation from Aristotle points to the specifically hylomorphic nature of 
the Aristotelian paradigm and, more importantly, to the manner in such hylomorphism 
incorporates both senses of potentiality under discussion. In asserting that "matter exists 
potentially" here, Aristotle is not simply implying that matter has yet to become actual but is 
also implying the possibility that matter is already in place in the same manner that the 
"mess" of reality is, for Beckett, already "there" but has yet to "be allowed in". Aristotle is 
certainly not, for example, suggesting that a child currently lacks material existence, but 
rather that this material status cannot be verified since it lacks the quality of thisness; such 
matter already exists even as it cannot be formally verified (i.e. it does potentially exist) and 
it exists "in view of the fact that it might come to possess a form" (i.e. in view ofthe fact that 
it can, potentially, come into existence as a substance, having yet to become actual). The 
process of becoming (the growth of the child, the germination of the seed) occurs "for the 
sake of an end", this end being, on one hand, the possibility of matter itself finally coming 
into substantial being and, on the other hand, the possibility of matter becoming a substantial 
form (an adult, a man) which is other to matter. Aristotle can validly consider the latter to be 
the 'end' by virtue of the fact that it is the only one which can occur in actuality: the former 
is untenable since matter is always transformed into something other to matter as soon as it 
enters into formal being, the reason why matter has incessantly yet to exist in any substantial 
sense and the reason why form has substantial priority (and in a sense, temporal prioritl2) 
over matter. Yet this does not alter the fact that the process of actualising this end (the form 
of the man/ the adult) only occurs as a result of the fact that matter becomes its own dynamis, 
this process occurring "for the sake of' the "end" which is matter itself The process of 
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actualisation and actuality itself are, therefore, products of the aporia which is inherent to 
matter, of the relationship between a substrate which (possibly) already exists but which has 
incessantly yet to come into actuality, matter being both origin and telos or in Aristotle's 
terms material cause and end cause, with the proviso that any actual end cause will always be 
a substance which is other to matter. In other words actuality and actualisation can be seen as 
the product of matter's relationship to itself, in the same manner that Beckett's fictions are 
the product of an unidentified (or unidentifiable) narrator's attempts to linguistically actualise 
itself, sublimations of the mysterious figure which is Samuel Beckett. As Malone asserts in 
recognising Aristotle's contention that matter underlies change yet is not itself changed: "The 
forms are many in which the unchanging seeks relief from its formlessness" (Malo ne 198). 
Nevertheless, it is clear that this hylomorphic paradigm does not merely present 
matter as a possibility but also as an impossibility. The potentiality which is matter may 
produce actuality and yet is impossible in that it can ever be actual itself, always being 
transformed into a substance which is other to matter in this act of actualisation: it is, 
therefore, both a potentiality (i.e. it is potentially already in place) and an impotentiality (i.e. 
it can never become actual). Yet it must be noted that the latter impossibility does not 
logically preclude the former possibility, it being the former, irresolvable yet inescapable, 
potentiality which inhabits and sustains the hylomorphic process13 . The impossibility of 
matter finally actualising itself as "matter unelaborated" (to recall Plotinus) does not revoke 
the possibility that matter is already in place or the possibility that this matter is constantly 
'actualising' itself as substances which are other to matter. This ultimately impossible, 
incessantly incomplete, actualisation of matter is constantly in process. As Beckett's texts 
insistently reveal, it is the possibility of an 'unnameable' self being already in place which 
sustains the linguistic process in spite of the impossibility of naming or linguistically 
actualising this self In other words, the impossibility of an endeavour may bar this 
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endeavour's completion but it is no bar to its execution: ". . . I can only speak of me, no, I 
can't speak of anything, and yet I speak, perhaps it's of him . . who cannot hear, cannot 
speak ... of whom I can't speak, of whom I must speak, that's all hypotheses ... " 
(Unnamable 408). In the same way that the impossibility of finally actualising matter does 
not alter the possibility that matter is already in place or logically preclude the process of 
matter's actualisation, the impossibility of finally speaking the self here clearly fails to 
excuse the narrator from the inescapable obligation of attempting to linguistically actualise 
this unnameable self This self remains in place as that which potentially already exists even 
as it is impossible to finally resolve this potentiality by appointing it the quality of 'thisness', 
this being the Unnamable's impossible obligation: "If only I were not obliged to manifest" 
(Unnamable 298). 
Indeed, it is precisely the impossibility of finally actualising these factors which 
always leaves them in place as potentialities, thus sustaining the process of actualisation. For 
Beckett, it is the impossibility of affirming the self, or synonymously, of negating the 
potentiality which is the self via this (impossible) act of linguistic actualisation, which 
sustains the process of writing: " ... it's the same old road I'm trudging ... towards one yet 
to be named, so that he may leave me in peace, be in peace, be no more, never have been." 
(Texts for Nothing 144). Clearly affirmation and negation here are two sides ofthe same coin 
for the "[n]egation" of this potentiality is "no more possible than affirmation" (Juliet 165)24: 
indeed, if one defines this self as a potentiality, then the negation of this potentiality is 
synonymous with the act of affirmation. It is precisely the impossibility of finally naming/ 
negating the potential self which sustains this self as a potentiality, a potentiality which the 
narrator cannot escape that he may "be in peace". It is the unavoidable nature of this 
potentiality which explains why he is equally unable to avoid the obligation of attempting to 
name/ negate this self in spite of the impossible nature of this task, in the same manner that 
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the impossible nature of actualising/ negating matter as a potentiality, does not negate the 
necessity of its hylomorphic movement: "I have to go on . . . I am up against a cliff wall yet 
I have to go forward. It's impossible, isn't it? All the same, you can go forward. Advance a 
few more miserable millimetres . . . " (Juliet 141 ). As the Unnamable asserts in a remark 
which recalls the manner in which Aristotelian hylomorphism exists as an attempt to resolve 
the potentiality which is matter even as this is, simultaneously, an impossibility: 
The only problem for me was how to continue, since I could not do otherwise, 
to the best of my declining powers, in the motion which had been imparted to 
me. This obligation, and the quasi-impossibility of fulfilling it, engrossed me 
in a purely mechanical way . . . so that my situation rather resembled that of 
an old broken-down cart- or bat-horse unable to receive the least information. 
. . . as to whether it is moving towards the stable or away from it, and not 
greatly caring either way. The question, among others, of how such things are 
possible had long since ceased to preoccupy me. (Unnamable 322) 
That this movement is an "obligation" even as it is a "quasi-impossibility" reflects the 
"quasi-impossible" nature of matter, its status as that which is (possibly) already in place 
even as it is impossible to finally resolve/ negate this potentiality in an act of actualisation: 
matter, therefore, is an irresolvable and inescapable potentiality, an impossible potentiality. 
Similarly, the narrator is unable "to receive the least information . . . as to whether it is 
moving towards the stable or away from it", the hylomorphic movement being an eternally 
incomplete movement away from the potentiality which is matter towards the impossible 
actuality which is matter. As both Aristotle and Beckett admit, from one perspective, the 
process of self-actualisation, the change which occurs between these two points, is not a 
change at all, such change being a mere apparency: 
I invented it all, in the hope it would console me, help me to go on, allow me 
to think of myself as somewhere on a road, moving, between a beginning and 
an end, gaining ground, losing ground, getting lost, but somehow in the long 
run making headway. All lies. (Unnamable 316) 
183 
The Beckettian narrator may not be able to existentially verifY himself or his own language, 
this unnameable reality being rendered opaque in the very act of formal (i.e. meaningful) 
articulation, yet that this self 'actualisation' is always a failure to actualise the self (i.e. it is a 
fiction), leaves this unspeakable reality, this impossible telos, in place as the inescapable and 
irresolvable potentiality of the text Indeed, we have already seen that the narrator cannot 
escape this unspeakable reality: in being unable to verifY the actuality of his own language, 
he is necessarily returned to the 'conclusion' that he has yet to speak, this unchanging origin 
being the inescapable trace which 'poisons' the text, the unspeakable possibility to which he 
always returns. 
Aristotle also recognises that the process of actualisation which takes place in the 
space between a substrate which (possibly) already exists but has yet to become actual, can, 
from one perspective, be seen as no change at all. In order to demonstrate this lack of change 
between origin and telos, Aristotle draws an analogy which equates matter with knowledge 
itself (i.e. latent or potential knowledge) and form with contemplation of this knowledge (i.e. 
the actualisation of such knowledge )25 . Aristotle asserts that this actualisation of the potential 
is, on one hand: 
. . . a kind of destruction by the opposite, on the other rather a preservation of 
what is in potentiality by what is in actuality . . . for that which has knowledge 
becomes that which contemplates, and this is either not to change at all (for 
the progression that occurs is towards the thing itself and towards its actuality) 
or is another kind of change of state. And for this reason it is not right to say 
that that which understands, whenever it is understanding, is changing its 
state, any more than it would be right to say this of a builder whenever he is 
building. (De Anima II.S) 
In one sense, the actualisation of the potential, the formal actualisation of matter as a 
substance, is "a kind of destruction by the opposite", the erasure of matter via the imposition 
of a form which is inherently other to matter. Yet on the other hand, that this "destruction" 
always represents a failure to actualise matter itself leaves matter in place as the potentiality 
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of this fonn, this being "a preservation of what is in potentiality by what is in actuality". 
Giorgio Agamben argues this point in an important re-evaluation of Aristotle's remark that 
" [a] thing is said to be potential if, when the act of which it is said to be potential is realized, 
there will be nothing impotential" (Agamben 183)26 : 
Usually this sentence is interpreted as if Aristotle had wanted to say "What is 
possible (or potential) is that with respect to which nothing is impossible (or 
impotential). If there is no impossibility, then there is possibility." Aristotle 
would then have uttered a banality or a tautology . 
Let us instead seek to understand the text in all its difficulty .... What 
Aristotle . . . says is: if a potentiality to not-be originally belongs to all 
potentiality, then there is truly potentiality only where the potentiality to not-
be does not lag behind actuality but passes fully into it as such. This does not 
mean that it disappears in actuality: on the contrary, it preserves itself as such 
in actuality. (183) 
The actualisation of the potentiality which is matter does not negate this potentiality, for 
matter does not actualise itself as matter but as a substance which is other to matter. Matter, 
therefore, remains in place as that particular substance's "potentiality to not be", matter being 
the privation of this form and of its actuality. Formal actuality, therefore, always preserves its 
"potentiality to not be" a form or an actuality and this is, synonymously, to preserve the 
potentiality which is matter. Moreover, as the Beckettian narrator's language always exists as 
a mode of potentiality by virtue of the fact that its existence has yet to be verified, this 
preservation of matter as a potentiality reciprocally defines any substance or actuality itse(f as 
a potentiality, actuality existing as the (quasi) possibility of matter's actualisation: " ... there 
is truly potentiality only where the potentiality to not-be does not lag behind actuality but 
passes fitlly into it as such". The substance of a man, for example, may be actual as a man, 
but remains, potentially, matter (i.e. it is possible that he is already a material object - a 
body) and the potentiality of matter (i.e. a product of matter's self-actualisation, of the 
possibility that matter itself will become a substance). Such actuality is, therefore, the 
potentiality of matter both in the sense that it assigns matter its status as a possibility which is 
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already in place, thus opening up material being to the possibility of self-actualisation, and 
also in the sense that it is that which matter is capable of becoming, a product of matter's 
self-actualisation or its dunamis. 
In always being actualised as something that is other to matter itself, therefore, the 
potentiality that is matter remains potential in spite of this actualisation. This potentiality is 
the inescapable and unchanging trace that inhabits formal actuality, that which constantly 
reasserts its equivocal presence throughout the process of self-actualisation. Matter, for 
Aristotle, is the potentiality which always survives actualisation, a word which refers to the 
dynamic process which occurs between the two senses of the word potentiality, between the 
possibility of matter being already in place and the possibility of matter finally coming into 
substantial being. One can either see the potentiality in question as being the trace of that 
which is already in place or of that which has yet to become actual; both of these statements 
are applicable to matter, matter being, indistinguishably, origin and telos. In one sense, 
therefore, self-actualisation "is not [a] change at all (for the progression ... occurs is towards· 
the thing itself and towards its actuality)" (emphasis mine), matter being that which endures 
and underlies the process of actualisation that occurs between "the thing itself' (the origin or 
the material cause) and "its actuality" (the telos or the end cause), both of which are matter. 
Actuality, therefore, is a product of matter's relationship to itself, matter being the 
unchanging substrate or "underlying thing" (Physics I. 6) which passes through change 
unchanged: in alluding to his own translation of the quotation from Aristotle27, Giorgio 
Agamben clearly indicates the extent to which formal actuality can be seen as a product of 
matter's self-actualisation: "Contrary to the traditional idea of potentiality that is annulled in 
actuality, here we are confronted with a potentiality that conserves itself and saves itself in 
actuality. Here potentiality, so to speak, survives actuality and, in this way, gives itself to 
itself' ( 18). 
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6 
IMMANENCE AND ABSENCE: BECKETI AND PRE-NATALITY 
We are now in a position to fully explore the ramifications of this hylomorphic 
paradigm on post-structuralist interpretations of Beckett. How does the possibility of a pre-
discursive reality manifest itself and how does this putative logos refute any final denial even 
as it refutes its affirmation? How does it leave its elusive yet ineradicable trace in the text? 
These are ultimately questions of the origin and the most effective means of answering them, 
therefore, is to examine the pre-natal nature of Beckettian textuality, revealing how this can 
be seen as a reflection ofthe Aristotelian paradigm that we have outlined. 
Declarations of the subject's pre-natal status are common in Beckett' s work, the most 
significant quotation in this respect being the fragment "never been properly born" from the 
'addenda' of Watt (248), a remark that is derived from a lecture by Jung that Beckett 
attended in 193528 . This is reflected in Beckett's 1956 radio play All That Fall (1956) when 
Mrs Rooney recollects "attending a lecture by one ofthese new mind doctors" (195): 
MRS ROONEY: ... I remember his telling us the story of a little girl, very 
strange and unhappy in her ways, and how he treated her unsuccessfully over 
a period of years and was finally obliged to give up the case. He could find 
nothing wrong with her, he said. The only thing wrong with her as far as he 
could see was that she was dying. And she did in fact die, shortly after he had 
washed his hands of her. 
MRROONEY: Well? What is there so wonderful about that? 
MRS ROONEY: No, it was just something he said, and the way he said it, that 
have haunted me ever since. 
MR ROONEY: You lie awake at night, tossing to and fro and brooding on it. 
187 
MRS ROONEY: On it and other. .. wretchedness. [Pause.] When he had done 
with the little girl he stood there motionless for some time, quite two minutes I 
should say, looking down at his table. Then he suddenly raised his head and 
exclaimed, as if he had a revelation. The trouble with her was she had never 
really been born! (195-96) 
That Beckett continued to be 'haunted' by this remark is indicated in a 1968 conversation 
with Charles Juliet: 
-I have always had the feeling that somebody inside me had been murdered. 
Murdered before I was born. I had to find that person and try to bring him back 
to life ... I once went to a lecture given by Jung . .. He talked about one of his 
patients, a little girl . .. At the end, when the audience were filing out, Jung 
stood there in silence. And then he added, as if to himself, in amazement at a 
sudden discovery: 'In fact, she had never really been born. ' 
-I have always had the feeling that I had never been born either. (Juliet 138) 
Beckett expands on the nature of this "feeling" in conversation with Lawrence E. Harvey 
(pub.l970)29, when he states his "unconquerable intuition" that "life on the surface was 
'existence by proxy. . . . that being is so unlike what one is standing up"', this being the 
intuition of "'a presence, embryonic, undeveloped, of a self that might have been but never 
got born, an etre manque"' (247). 
As H. Porter Abbott asserts in relation to these remarks: "In the context of a whole 
range of current discourse on Beckett, but particularly discourse starting from a post-
structuralist assumptions, Beckett' s alleged words represent a problem that is usually 
ignored" (Beckett Writing Beckett 18). One of the assumptions to which Porter Abbott is 
referring is that the text has no pre-discursive origin, Beckett' s remarks implying, in contrast, 
that he has never escaped this origin and has never been born: his concept of himself, 
therefore, has never been installed within the 'rights of reality', "life on the surface" being 
merely "existence by proxy". Clearly, this reflects the role of the Nietzschean body, the 
potentiality that continually defers any installation of the text within the 'rights of reality' 
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until the moment of death. As is the question of the body in Nietzsche, these remarks. and 
Beckett' s allusions to pre-natality, are "usually ignored" because they problematise the post-
structuralist assumption that the origin has (and has always already) been usurped by its 
supplementary representation in the act of 'actualising' itself via the differential act of self-
representation. In contrast, the remarks suggest that this point of differentiation, the moment 
of birth at which the boundaries between outside and inside give way to this usurpatory text, 
has incessantly yet to occur. To recall Nietzsche: "The time for me hasn't come yet: some are 
born posthumously" (Ecce Homo 715). 
This, however, is not to say that Beckettian textuality does not permit the possibility 
that this usurpatory moment of birth has always already occurred30 just as the Beckettian 
narrator's frequent inability to verifY the reality of his own voice does not mean that he has 
not spoken (although, as in Company, he obviously cannot deny this possibility). Beckett's 
belief in his own pre-natal status is an "intuition" rather than an established fact, a possibility 
that cannot be verified. The origin in which he remains implicated is, therefore, a potentiality. 
It is the potential status of the origin, and thus of Beckettian pre-natality, which permits its 
correlate, the absence of an origin and a usurpatory text which has been installed within the 
'rights of reality', a fact which explains why Beckett's novels are so amenable to post-
structuralist analysis. Nevertheless, for Beckett, this Derridean perspective remains a mere 
possibility, a hypothesis which is necessarily balanced with another, Aristotelian, possibility, 
the possibility that the text has yet to escape or usurp the origin and be 'born'. The 
recognition of the Beckettian text's status as a mode of potentiality, ofthe manner in which it 
is torn between these pre- and post- natal possibilities, indicates a failure by post-structuralist 
interpreters to recognise that their assumptions are, for Beckett, ah~;·ays assumptions, this 
being the reason why the hylomorphic nature of Beckettian textuality is "frequently ignored". 
This is not merely a failure to recognise the hypothetical nature of post-structuralist theory, 
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but a failure to recognise the manner in which this merely potential status is functional within 
textuality. In other words, the post-structuralist rejection of the origin leads to a premature 
recognition ofthe text's 'rights to reality'. 
How, then, do Beckett's remarks complicate the post-structuralist argument on the 
issue of the origin? In spite of the fact that Beckett does not theoretically elaborate on his 
"unconquerable intuition" of "a self that might have been but never got born"', one can, 
nevertheless, already trace the logical trajectory of such an elaboration on the basis of the 
remarks alone, before examining them in the context of his novels. What is immediately 
striking about Beckett's remarks is that they imply that he has been conceived but not born, 
which is to say that the origin has represented/ supplemented itself but that this 'supplement' 
has yet to escape its implication in the origin. Consequently, this implies that the origin has 
yet to be usurped by its 'supplement' and, conversely, that this 'supplement' has yet to be 
installed within the 'rights of reality'. Such an installation, the usurpatory moment of self-
actualisation, is deferred by a limiting origin that remains in place. In other words, the 
origin's conception of itself, the self as signified, has never truly differed from the origin that 
it can usurp it, this textual figure having never been 'born': the 'supplement' is an "etre 
manque", a non-being or the fiction of the origin which incorporates it, just as any deictic 
signifier is a fiction of the actual speech act in which it remains implicated, or our self-
conception is a fiction of the actual self which incorporates this conception. What, therefore, 
would be the status of this origin? Evidently, that this origin continues to enclose its 
supplemental "proxies" means that no signifier can mimetically reflect it, to recall Derrida' s 
assertion that the "reflection, the image, the double, splits what it doubles": the origin can 
only 'reflect' within its inapprehensible totality rather than reflecting this totality, which is to 
say that it cannot 'reflect' at all, producing an arbitrary fiction of the origin rather than a 
representation. That this fictional "proxy" cannot verifiably represent the origin presents the 
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possibility that what it does represent is a failure by the origin to truly differ from itself that it 
can represent itself The textual figure's failure to truly differ from the origin, therefore, 
would not only entail that the text has not been installed within the 'rights of reality' (this 
installation being deferred by the origin which remains in place), but also that the origin itself 
has never been installed within these rights, its existence having yet to be verified. This 
origin, like Aristotelian matter, has never become a 'this' having never actualised itself via 
the act of 'self-representation': representations of this origin are mere proxies which no more 
reflect the origin than Aristotelian substances reflect the substrate which is matter, or than 
Beckett's fictions represent the origin which is Samuel Beckett. Even to itself, therefore, the 
origin remains a mere potentiality, the failure to be born not merely representing a failure to 
give birth to the textual figure, the 'representation' which would usurp it, for it 
simultaneously represents a failure by the origin to give birth to or actualise itself via or, 
rather, as this textual figure. The origin has never reflected or actualised itself in 
representation in an act of self-usurpation that would install this signifier, and thus the origin 
itself, within the 'rights of reality'. The origin's installation within these rights, its 
actualisation as the text which usurps it, is constantly deferred, not by a text which differs 
from and usurps the origin, but because this usurpation, this birth or actualisation of the 
origin, has never occurred: it is constantly deferred by the origin itself, an origin which has 
never truly differed from itself, and incessantly remains in place as a potentiality. 
This would suggest that Beckett refuses to conflate difference and deferment in the 
Derridean fashion, the deferment of Beckett's 'birth' being caused by a lack of difference, by 
a text which has never escaped its implication in the origin and an origin which has never 
escaped its own immanent, undifferentiated presence that this potential presence can become 
actuaL Evidently, this argument suggests that the self-identical logos is not the solution to the 
aporias which characterise Beckettian textuality, but is, rather, the very cause of these 
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aporias, any Beckettian narrator being unable to verifiably coincide with himself because he 
always unspeakably coincides with himself As Beckett asserts in relation to the work of 
Masson: 
Here is an artist who seems literally skewered on the ferocious dilemma of 
expression. Yet he continues to wriggle. The void he speaks of is perhap~ 
simply the obliteration of an unbearable presence, unbearable because neither 
to be wooed nor to be stormed. If this anguish of helplessness is never stated 
as such, on its own merits and for its own sake, though perhaps very 
occasionally admitted as spice to the 'exploit' it jeopardized, the reason is 
doubtless, among others, that it seems to contain in itself the impossibility of 
statement. Again an exquisitely logical attitude, in any case, it is hardly to be 
confused with the void. ("Three Dialogues" 140) 
One should note that this dilemma "seems to contain in itself the impossibility of statement" 
in precisely the same manner that the origin in itself cannot verifY its existence via a text 
which never escapes its "unbearable presence": "That should have been enough for him, to 
have found me absent, but it's not, he wants me there, with a form and a world, like him, in 
spite of him, me who am everything, like him who is nothing" (Texts for Nothing 114 ). 
Clearly, within this paradigm the text may appear to be disembodied yet this disembodied 
status is not necessarily symptomatic of the absence of an underlying 'seLf (the most obvious 
candidate here being the body), any more than matter's lack of the quality of 'thisness' 
within the Aristotelian schema is symptomatic of matter's non-existence. This 'self is, 
rather, the potentiality which has incessantly yet to become actual, a "nothing something .. 
a being which is non-being" to recall St. Augustine's phrase (XII.vi). Nevertheless, while 
Aristotle accepts substance as actuality by virtue of the fact that matter itself can never be 
actual (bearing in mind that such actuality remains, potentially, matter), the perpetually 
potential status of the Beckettian origin does not allow him to accept the text as an actuality: 
the persistence of this potentiality, the "non-being" which is the origin, reciprocally defines 
signification as a "non-being", a potentiality which has yet to usurp the origin in order that it 
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can be installed within the 'rights of reality': "It's not true, yes, it's true, it's true and it's not 
true, there is silence and there is not silence, there is no one and there is someone, nothing 
prevents anything" (Texts for Nothing 154). Evidently, therefore, the apparently disembodied 
status of the text could be symptomatic of this potential self s immanence, of the signifier' s 
inability to truly differ from the origin in which it is implicated that it can reflect this 
immanence and actualise this potentiality. To recall Molloy: " ... in that block the prey is 
lodged and thinks himselfbeing apart" (Molloy 111). 
In this context it is clear that Beckett's 'pre-natal' remarks imply that his view of 
textuality is influenced by an Aristotelian or hylomorphic schema, and that it is this influence 
which is "usually ignored" in "discourse starting from a post -structuralist assumptions". 
Aristotle's contention that actuality is a product of matter's incessant and eternally 
incomplete movement of self-actualisation is reflected in the contention that textuality is a 
product of the origin's incessant attempts to actualise itself, to give birth to itself via 
textuality, or as the usurping text: "I am neither ... Murphy, nor Watt, nor Mercier, nor -no, 
I can't even bring myself to name them ... who told me I was they, who I must have tried to 
be, under duress, or through fear, or to avoid acknowledging me ... " (Unnamable 328). The 
fictional rather than representative status of the origin's supplements echo Aristotle's 
contention that matter can never actualise itself as matter, but only as a substance which is 
formally other to matter. Beckett's fictions may not mimetically represent Beckett, being 
other to him in this sense, and yet it is very difficult to avoid the intuition that they are mere 
'proxies' of this incessantly unspoken figure, a figure who possesses the same potential status 
as matter within the Aristotelian schema, having yet to be actualised/ born: " ... one day I 
shall know . . . that I once was, and roughly who, and how to go on, and speak unaided, 
nicely, about number one and his pale imitations" (Texts for Nothing 142). Aristotle's 
contention that this "destruction by the opposite" is always "rather a preservation of what is 
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m potentiality by what is in actuality" is echoed by these "pale imitations" inability to 
verifiably reflect the origin, thus pennitting the possibility that the text has never escaped the 
origin that it can reflect/ usurp it: "Words, he says he knows they are words. But how can he 
know, who has never heard anything else? True. Not to mention other things ... to which the 
abundance of matter has unfortunately up to now prohibited the least allusion" (Unnamable 
358). This abundant origin has always yet to be actualised via or as its 'usurping' 
representations, having never been translated into a 'this':" ... it's still the same old road I'm 
trudging, up yes and down no, towards one yet to be named ... " (Texts for Nothing 144). 
Let us now apply this to the Beckett's novels, in order to reveal how this potentiality asserts 
itself and how this paradigm continues to pennit the post-structuralist hypothesis. 
It has already been suggested that the incessant lack which characterises the 
Beckettian text stems from an inability to deictically refer to the 'reality of discourse', to 
'name' the 'name': the text lacks the quality of 'thisness' since any reference to such a reality 
is merely another supplement in the play of representation, another 'name' which merely 
restates its own unnameability. Like the origin, the text has never been apprehended as a 
'this', textuality itself being a potentiality which has yet to actualise itself Clearly, therefore, 
any reality slips away in the very act of self-articulation, including, as we have seen in our 
discussion of deixis, the reality of the act of articulation itself The self-identity of the 
enunciator, for example, would appear to be lost at the moment that this identity is 
'actualised' via the signifier 'I', there, now, being no apparent origin other than the play of 
representation. This usurpation is most explicitly demonstrated in The Unnamable, the 
narrator being unable to manifest himself as anything other than a fiction, a supplement: "All 
these Murphy' s, Molloys and Mal ones do not fool me. They have made me waste my time, 
suffer for nothing, speak of them when, in order to stop speaking, I should have spoken of me 
and of me alone" (Unnamable 305). Like Derrida, Beckett recognises that there can be no 
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'origin' for us apart from signification, the Unnamable being unable to validly speak of any 
self-identical "me alone" for even the word "Unnamable" is a name, a signifier that ruptures 
self-identity, instituting the difference between origin and signifier in which the origin is 
usurped by the text. Self-identity is lost at the moment that this identity is articulated, there 
now being nothing more than supplements: "I seem to speak, it is not I, about me, it is not 
about me" (Unnamable 293). Nevertheless, in articulating his inability to speak of "me 
alone", his inability to linguistically actualise this potentiality, the Unnamable is also 
articulating his inability to resolve and thus eliminate this potentiality. In the same manner 
that any formal actualisation of Aristotelian matter leaves this matter in place as a potentiality 
by virtue of this substance's formal 'othemess' to matter, the Unnamable's actualisation of 
himself as a fiction or a name which is formally 'other' to the origin constantly leaves the 
potentiality which is his unnameable reality in place. The narrator may not be able to speak 
of any self-identical "me alone", yet his inability to verify the reality of discourse means that 
this never negates the possibility that he is alone and has never spoken. In other words, he 
can no more existentially verify the reality of the text that supposedly usurps such a unitary 
origin, than he can verify the reality of the origin itself: 
. . . there is no one here but me, no one wheels about me, no one comes 
towards me, no one has ever met anyone before my eyes, these creatures have 
never been, only I and this black void have ever been .... Nothing then but 
me, of which I know nothing, except that I have never uttered, and this black 
of which I know nothing either. . . . And Basil and his gang? Inexistent, 
invented to explain I forget what. (Unnamable 306) 
One should note the typically ironic use of the phrase "no one" here, the "no one" in question 
being the Unnamable, the figure who cannot "know" himself via his fictions because these 
fictions are never truly 'other' to him that they can verifiably represent him. In reading The 
Unnamable we may recognise that the narrator cannot 'find himself in language and yet we 
cannot fail to also sense that this is a narrator who cannot escape himself: 
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I greatly fear, since my speech can only be of me and here, that I am once 
more engaged in putting an end to both. Which would not matter, far from it, 
but for the obligation, once rid of them, to begin again, to start again from 
nowhere, from no one and from nothing and to win to me again, to me here 
again, by fresh ways to be sure, or by ancient ways, unrecognisable at each 
fresh faring. (Unnamable 304) 
The explanation for this claustrophobic sense of selfhood lies in Beckett's knowledge 
of the ambiguity that inhabits the Derridean arche-trace, that which suggests that any 
usurpation of the origin logically entails that there has, now, never been an origin and, 
consequently, that there has never been any verifiable usurpation of this origin. If the 
narrator "put[s] an end to" "me and here" in articulating this identity, then this origin is 
inapprehensible both before and after this point. How, then, can he know that he has put an 
end to this origin, that the origin has always already occurred as opposed to having not yet 
occurred? The usurpation can never be affirmed for in the absence of any verifiable origin 
there can be no verifiable usurpation qfthe origin and, therefore, no verification ofthe text's 
rights to reality. Consequently, that this usurpation has already occurred cannot be affirmed, 
this being a mere possibility which always necessarily admits the correlate possibility that 
this usurpation has yet to occur, that the origin has never differed from itself Put simply, the 
possibility that the text has no beginning always gives way to the possibility that the text has 
not begun: "I wonder if I couldn't sneak out by the fundament, one morning, with the French 
breakfast. No, I can't move, not yet .... One can be before the beginning, they have set their 
hearts on that" (Unnamable 355). The usurpation, the putative "end" to "me and here", 
therefore, is undone, the narrator always winning "to me again", returning to a potential 
origin which may not have been affirmed as a 'this', but which, nevertheless has yet to be 
verifiably usurped, hence the "obligation, once rid of them, to begin again"31 : " ... I'll be 
born and born, births for nothing, and come to night without having been" (Unnamable 404). 
The narrator is obliged "to start again from nowhere" and, as the phrase "births for nothing" 
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implies, he always return to this "nowhere" to this originary point which has yet to actualise 
itself in order that it can be eliminated as a potentiality. Every movement beyond the 
threshold undoes itself in erasing the origin and thus erasing any verifiable usurpation of this 
origin: this potential origin, the beginning which has never been verifiably transcended in 
order that it can be appointed the quality of 'thisness', is incessantly restated as the 
unspeakable trace which inhabits and subsumes the text: " ... it speaks of a prison, I've no 
objection, vast enough for a whole people, for me alone, or waiting for me, I'll go there now, 
I'll try and go there now, I can't stir, I'm there already, I must be there already ... " 
(Unnamable 413). 
Clearly, in order to escape this situation the narrator would have to encounter the 
origin, encounter himself, that the usurpation could be affirmed: 
One starts speaking as if it were possible to stop at will. It is better so. The 
search for a means to put an end to things, an end to speech, is what enables 
the discourse to continue ... In the frenzy of utterance the concern with truth. 
Hence the interest of a possible deliverance by means of encounter. 
(Unnamable 302) 
This quotation would seem to suggest that there can be no return to the origin once this 
deictic articulation has taken place, echoing Roland Barthes' assertion that 
[ s ]peech is irreversible; that is its fatality, what has been said cannot be 
unsaid, except by adding to it: to correct, here is oddly enough, to continue. In 
speaking, I can never erase, annul; all I can do is say "I am erasing, annulling, 
correcting," in short, speak some more. (The Rustle ofLanguage 76) 
Nevertheless, the Unnamable's contradictory desire for an "end" and the desire for 
"deliverance" suggests that the Beckettian narrator is constantly caught in a double bind. On 
one hand he desires "an end to speech", acknowledging an inability to finally undo the voice 
and return to the silence of the mythological origin which has apparently already been 
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usurped/ deferred by the act of self-articulation. On the other hand, he mentions a "possible 
deliverance", acknowledging an inability to finally "utter me, in the same foul breath as my 
creatures" (Unnamable 302). The "deliverance" in question, therefore, is not merely a 
deliverance from language but a deliverance through language. The Unnameable desires to 
actualise himself via the text, this actualisation requiring the usurpatory moment of birth, a 
signifier which actually differs from and represents the origin in order that this origin can be 
finally supplanted by its representation. This textual figure would consequently be installed 
within the 'rights of reality', the 'unnamable' origin finally being 'delivered' as its 
supplement. As is the case of the relationship between the Nietzschean body and his textual 
supplement, Zarathustra, the Unnameable would not only be usurped by but also actualised 
as this fictional figure, that which would no longer be a fiction, an "etre manque" for it could 
now lay claim to the 'rights to reality'. As the Unnamable's recognition of a "possible 
deliverance" implies, however, such a point of usurpation/ deliverance cannot be affirmed: "I 
shall perhaps be delivered of Mal one and the other . . . the day I see the two of them at one 
and the same time, that is to say in collision" (Unnamable 301 ). Evidently, the origin has 
never been verifiably represented by its fictional supplement, Malone, that the usurpation of 
the origin, the 'deliverance' of/ from this origin, can be substantiated: 
... perhaps they have said me already, perhaps they have carried me to the 
threshold of my story, before the door that opens on my story, that would 
surprise me, if it opens, it will be I, it will be the silence, where I am, I don't 
know, I'll never know . . . (Unnamable 418) 
This addition of the origin to its representation, the verification of the usurpation, would, of 
course, require an apprehension of the origin which is not mediated, an apprehension which 
is not instantaneously usurped by representation in being 'added to' its representation: "This 
infinitesimal lag, between arrival and departure, this trifling delay in evacuation is all I have 
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to worry about. The truth about me will boil forth at last ... " (Unnamable 352). As Alex 
Callinicos asserts: 
. . . any attempt to halt the endless play of signifiers, above all by appealing to 
the concept of reference, must . . . involve postulating a "transcendental 
signified" which is somehow present to the consciousness without any 
discursive mediation. (74) 
The question that Beckett is clearly posing here, therefore, is of how one can verifY 
any usurpation of this fact when the difference between the origin and its representation has 
never been apprehended. How can one verifY that the text has been installed within the 
'rights of reality' in the absence of any verifiable origin and thus in the absence of any 
verifiable usurpation of this origin? In the absence of the origin, this usurpation is a mere 
potentiality which has incessantly yet to be verified. The narrator therefore cannot deny the 
correlate potentiality that 'representation' is actually a product of this putative origin's 
inability to differ from itself that it can reflect itself: "I thought I was right in enlisting these 
sufferers of my pains. I was wrong. They never suffered my pains, their pains are nothing, 
compared to mine, a mere tittle of mine, the tittle I thought I could put from me, in order to 
witness it" (11nnamable 305 emphasis mine). Derrida's argument that the usurpation has 
always already begun (or, synonymously, that there has never been a usurpation) always 
gives way to the correlate possibility that this usurpation has yet to occur, the possibility that 
the origin is still ineffably in place. The Unnamable cannot verifY that his fictions have been 
installed within the 'rights of reality', that his act of textual self-usurpation has occurred that 
he can finally be 'delivered' as one of these fictions: " ... Malone revolves, a stranger 
forever to my infirmities, one who is not as I can never not be" (llnnamable 302). Indeed, 
that his fictions have never verifiably reflected, or differed from, the origin means that the 
narrator has yet to be conceived: 
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I who am on my way, words bellying out my sails, am also that unthinkable 
ancestor of whom nothing can be said. But perhaps I shall speak of him some 
day, and of the inpenetrable age when I was he, some day when they fall 
silent, convinced at last I shall never get born, having failed to be conceived. 
Yes, perhaps I shall speak of him, for an instant, like the echo that mocks, 
before being restored to him, the one they could not part me from. 
(Unnamable 356) 
The Unnamable thus implies that one cannot unequivocally assert that the origin has 
been usurped unless one can unequivocally assert that the origin itse(fhas been apprehended, 
this being the assumption that Derrida makes in declaring that "[ w ]hat can look at itself is not 
one: and the law of the addition of the origin to its representation, of the thing to its image, is 
that one plus one makes at least three" (Grammatology 36). The Unnamable does not share 
this assumption, being unable to prove that he has ever 'looked' at himself, consequently 
remaining unable refute the possibility that he is still "one". This differential self-reflection 
has incessantly yet to occur: ". . . mutilate, mutilate, and perhaps someday, fifteen 
generations hence, you'll succeed in beginning to look like yourself ... It isn't enough that I 
should know what I'm doing, I must also know what I'm looking like" (Unnamable 317). 
That the Unnamable's fictions (his mutilations) do not verifiably reflect the origin implies the 
possibility that they have never differed from the origin in order that they can reflect it. Until 
the Unnamable can "know" what he is "looking like" the possibility of an encompassing 
origin remains in place, in precisely the same manner as the inability to formally actualise 
matter itself within the Aristotelian schema constantly leaves the potentiality which is matter 
in place. It is the Unnamable's inability to finally appoint the quality of thisness to the origin 
which allows this origin to constantly reassert itself as the inalienable potentiality which 
underlies the text, the putative and unchanging arche which both sustains textuality and 
constantly undoes the usurpatory pretensions of textuality: the text's rights to reality are 
constantly deferred: 
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. . . the admission that I am Mahood after all and these stories of a being 
whose identity he usurps, and whose voice he prevents from being heard, all 
lies from beginning to end? And what if Mahood were my master? I'll leave it 
at that, for the time being. (Unnamable 313) 
The Unnamable's inability to affirm this hypothetical usurpation, to affirm that the fictional/ 
supplementary figure Mahood32 has logical priority over the origin which is the Unnameable, 
means that he is incessantly unable to escape the possibility that this usurpation has never 
occurred in the sense that it has yet to occur: 
Is he still usurping my name, the one they foisted on me, up there in their 
world, patiently, from season to season? No no, here I am in safety, amusing 
myself wondering who can have dealt me these insignificant wounds. 
(Unnamable 300) 
This is why Beckett speaks of a self "inside me", a self which "had been murdered. 
Murdered before I was born". His "mutilations" are "insignificant wounds" since each self 
posited is undone by its inability to verifiably reflect the origin, always leaving in place the 
possibility that it is still implicated within this eternally putative origin, the possibility that 
the text has yet to be born: "It was he told me stories about me, lived in my stead, issued 
forth from me, came back to me, entered back into me .. '' (Unnamable 311 ). Similarly, any 
'usurping' speech is incessantly undone by this possibility as it is revealed to have never 
breached the silence of this unverifiable yet inescapable origin: in attempting to "utter me, in 
the same foul breath as my creatures" (11nnamable 302), the Unnamable is attempting to tell 
"his story the story to be told ... he's in his own story, unimaginable, unspeakable ... the 
story of the silence that he never left" (Unnamable 417): 
On the subject of me properly so called, I know what I mean, so far as I know 
I have received no information up to date. May one speak of a voice in these 
conditions? Probably not. . . . The fact is all this business about votces 
requires to be revised, corrected and then abandoned. (Unnamable 338) 
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If, for Derrida, it is the usurpation which installs "the image within the rights of 
reality" (Grammatology 37), this being a usurpation which has always already occurred, then 
clearly Beckett can only acknowledge this as a possibility; he simultaneously recognises that 
the 'absence' of this usurpation is equally suggestive of the possibility that the origin is still 
ineffably in place_ Again we see the Beckettian text's status as a mode of potentiality, being 
tom between an origin that may have already been usurped and an origin that has yet to be 
usurped. If the narrator cannot wholly refute the former possibility then equally, in the 
absence of any origin or any apparent usurpation, he finds it impossible to wholly refute the 
latter: 
I shall begin to know something, just enough for it to turn out to be the same 
as always, the same which seems made for me and does not want me, which I 
seem to want and do not want, take your choice, which spews me out or 
swallows me up, I'll never know ... (Unnamable 304) 
Unsurprisingly then, Aristotle's assertion that the 'actualisation' of matter is, from one 
perspective, not a "change at all (for the progression that occurs is towards the thing itself 
and towards its actuality)" is reflected by the Beckettian text's insistence that any enactment 
of the usurping play of textuality is constantly balanced by an enactment of unchanging 
stasis, this being a reflection of the fact that the origin's attempts to actualise itself via 
textuality, its textual "progression ... towards the thing itself and towards its actuality", is 
incessantly revealed to be no change at all, a failure by the origin to escape its own 
immanence that this immanence can be appointed the quality of thisness: 
. . . I' m all these words, all these strangers, this dust of words, with no ground 
for their settling, no sky for their dispersing, coming together to say, fleeing 
one another to say, that I am they, all of them, those that merge, those that 
part, those that never meet, and nothing else, yes, something else, that I' m 
something quite different, a quite different thing, a wordless thing in an empty 
place, a hard shut dry cold black place, where nothing stirs, nothing speaks, 
and that I listen, and that I speak, like a caged beast born of cage beasts born 
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of caged beasts born of caged beasts born in a cage and dead in a cage, born 
and then dead, born in a cage and then dead in a cage ... (Unnamable 390) 
As Wolfgang Iser asserts in recognising the inescapable nature of this possibility: "Beckett' s 
works are a continual (though never completed) 'exit', and each stage of the exit is only the 
starting-point for more 'exiting"' (258). 
Nevertheless, it is clear that what is in question within this paradigm is not whether 
the origin has been usurped by the text (this being a possibility which, in the apparent 
absence of the origin, cannot be refuted), but whether this usurpation can be verified; it is not 
necessarily the case that the usurpatory text has not been installed within the rights of reality, 
but that these rights have yet to be ratified. The usurpatory liberation of the text from the 
origin could be a situation which has already been attained, yet in the absence of the origin, 
and thus in the absence of any apparent usurpation of this origin, this attainment could no 
more be affirmed than the pre-discursive origin itself, that which is no less of a possibility 
than the usurpation. Such a lack of awareness of the usurpation is exhibited by the narrator of 
Texts for Nothing: "Ah, says I, punctually, if only I could say, There's a way out there, 
there's a way out somewhere, then all would be said, it would be the first step on the long 
travellable road" (137). The narrator, apparently, has uttered the 'password' "[t]here's a way 
out of here" thus implying that he has taken "the first step on the long travellable road". Yet 
clearly this narrator can no more verify that he has taken this "first step" through which the 
text usurps the origin, than he can verify the possibility that he is still implicated within the 
origin: the origin always returns as an undeniable possibility, leading to the incessant pre-
natality which his subsequent remarks imply: 
Would I know where I came from, no, I'd have a mother, I'd have had a 
mother, and what I came out of, with what pain, no, I'd have forgotten, what 
is it makes me say that, what is it makes me say this, whatever it is makes me 
say all, and it's not certain, not certain the way a mother would be certain .... 
Yes, I'd have a mother, I'd have a tomb, I wouldn't have come out of here, 
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one doesn't come out of here, here are my tomb and my mother, its all here 
this evening, I'm dead and getting born, without having ended, helpless to 
begin, that's my life. (Texts for Nothing 138) 
Again we see a suggestion here that the text is the product of the origin's 
hylomorphic attempts to actualise itself, finally differing from itself that it can bring what it 
currently unspeakably is into being; the narrator desires to escape the beginning that he can 
verify that he has begun: "I'd have a mother, I'd have had a mother". Nevertheless, the 
narrator can never verify that he has escaped the origin because he usurps this origin in the 
act of escaping it, having never experienced this origin that its usurpation can be affirmed: " . 
. . I'd have had a mother, and what I came out of, with what pain, no, I'd have forgotten ... 
". Clearly it is not merely the origin which is forgotten here but the usurpation of the origin, 
that which allows his mother to re-assert her potential presence. Similarly, the identification 
of womb with tomb is suggestive of the manner in which this escape can never be verified. 
The narrator is always already "dead and getting born" in that his conception of himself has 
already given way, and incessantly gives way, to the origin: he has been murdered before he 
has been born. Again, the image has never been verifiably subtracted from its origin that it 
can supplant it, or rather, if we assume that this supplantation has occurred then this 
supplantation would not be recalled: our assumption that this supplantation has occurred is 
always a mere assumption. 
What Beckett's allusions to pre-natality reveal then, are two inescapable yet 
irresolvable possibilities, the possibility that the usurpation has already occurred and the 
possibility that the usurpation has yet to occur, the possibility that the text has escaped the 
origin and the possibility that it is still implicated within the origin. The former possibility 
always gives way to the latter: 
. . . I invented it all, in the hope it would console me, help me to go on, allow 
me to think of myself as somewhere on a road, moving, between a beginning 
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and an end, gaining ground, losing ground, getting lost, but somehow in the 
long run making headway. All lies. (Unnamable 316) 
This quotation could easily be seen as a precis of Molloy, a novel which traces a 
single arc in the wave-like movement of textuality. Molloy's narrative is the most explicit 
example of the 'lie' which is "life on the surface" or "existence by proxy", a 'lie' which 
culminates in Molloy' s admission that his "unreal journey" (Molloy 17), the very narrative 
that we are experiencing, has never occurred, it being "in the end ... the story of the silence 
that he never left" (Unnamable 417): 
Every time I say, I said this, or, I said that ... or find myself to attribute to 
others intelligible words, or hear my own uttering to others more or less 
articulate sounds, I am merely complying with the convention that demands 
you either lie or hold your peace ... in reality I said nothing at all ... (Molloy 
87-88) 
The reason why Molloy's narrative is a 'lie' is, again, because Molloy is unable to refute the 
possibility that he is still implicated within the origin. Molloy may not be able to find his 
mother yet he acknowledges that his mother's elusive nature may be a result of his inability 
to differentiate himself from his mother: like Beckett, and the Unnamable's fictions, Molloy 
has been conceived but never born: 
My mother. I don't think too harshly of her. I know she did all she could not 
to have me, except of course the one thing, and if she never succeeded in 
getting me unstuck, it was that fate had me earmarked me for less 
compassionate sewers. (Molloy 19) 
This implies that Molloy is this origin's 'conception' of itself in the sense that he is the 
origin's self-image, an image which does not reflect the origin by virtue of the fact that 
Molloy has yet to differ from his origin that he can reflect it. The origin, therefore, has yet to 
be usurped by its representation, remaining in place as a potentiality, and the word potential 
here is used in its dual sense, for Molloy's mother is both his origin (that which potentially 
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already exists) and also his telos (that which has yet become actual). In other words Molloy 
is trying to give birth to his mother as an actuality, or rather, this origin is trying to 
hylomorphically give birth to itself both via and as the textual figure of Molloy, Molloy's 
"whole body", to quote Moran, being "a vociferation" (Molloy 114): " ... when I appeared to 
give up and to busy myself with something else, or with nothing at all any more, in reality I 
was hatching my plans and seeking the way to her house. This is taking a queer turn" 
(Molloy 87). Molloy, therefore, is not only the origin's 'conception' of itself in the sense that 
he is the origin's self-image, but also in the sense that he constitutes the means through 
which the origin attempts to inseminate itself in order that it can finally be born through the 
act of self-representation/ self-differentiation. His journey or his "queer turn" (Molloy 87) is 
the means through which the origin attempts to conceive itself via the textual figure of 
Molloy, his narrative being the origin's autoerotic attempt to bring itself into being: " ... was 
such an encounter possible, I mean between me and a woman? Now men, I have rubbed up 
against a few men in my time, but women? . . I don't mean my mother. I did more than rub 
up against her" (Molloy 56). The origin thus has intercourse with itself via a text which has 
never differed from the origin: as Molloy asserts, he will "have occasion" to describe his 
mother's room once this self-copulation is complete: ". . . later perhaps. When I seek refuge 
there, beat to the world, all shame drunk, my prick in my rectum, who knows. Good. Now 
that we know where we're going, let's go there" (Molloy 19). Yet even if this usurpation/ 
birth does occur or has occurred, this fact cannot be affirmed: 
. . . I fail to see, never having left my region, what right I have to speak of its 
characteristics. No, I never escaped . . . On the other hand, if it is true that 
regions gradually merge into one another, and this remains to be proved, then 
I will have left my region many times, thinking I was still within it. But I 
preferred to abide by my simple feeling and its voice that said, Molloy, your 
region is vast, you have never left it and you never shall. (Molloy 65) 
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If the narrator can forget such an escape from the origin by virtue of the fact that any self-
differentiation supplants and erases the origin, then, equally, the narrator is forgetting that he 
has escaped the origin. He is unable to recognise or verify that he has already "left" his 
"region", in precisely the same manner that he cannot verify that he has ever escaped his 
mother. It is precisely his inability to find his mother which reconfirms the possibility that he 
has never left her, this lack of verification ultimately being the means through which the 
origin pharmaceutically 'poisons' Molloy as this incessantly potential reality, this 
immanence, reasserts itself as a possibility. Again, Molloy, the origin's self-conception, is 
murdered before he is born, ultimately returning to the 'conclusion' which is his non-
substantial origin, to the "mess": " . . . doubtless she had poisoned my beer with some thing 
intended to mollify me, to mollify Molloy, with the result that I was nothing more than a 
lump of melting wax, so to speak" (Molloy 47). Again, the evanescence of language allows 
the possibility which is the origin to reassert itself, the free-play of textuality always being 
balanced and checked by this unverifiable yet irrefutable stasis of this origin, the potentiality 
to which the narrator inescapably returns: 
. . . in me there have always been two fools, among others, one asking nothing 
better than to stay where he is and the other imagining that life might be 
slightly less horrible a little further on. . . . And these inseparable fools I 
indulged in turn about, that they might understand their foolishness. (Molloy 
48) 
Consequently, it is not merely the case that there has never been an ongm (although, 
following Aristotle, we must recognise that this origin has never been, and has always yet to 
become actual), rather there has never been a verifiable usurpation of the origin. Molloy's 
journey is undone, revealed to have never occurred as a result of the fact that he "had never 
succeeded in liquidating the matter of my mother" (Molloy 87), his mother being the silent 
origin that he has never left, that which has never spoken Molloy and which has never spoken 
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or actualised itself as Molloy: "And the cycle continues, joltingly, of flight and bivouac, in an 
Egypt without bound, without infant, without mother" (Molloy 66): 
. . . everytime I say, I said this, or speak of a voice saying ... Molloy, and 
then a fine phrase more or less clear and simple, or find myself compelled to 
attribute to others more or less articulate sounds, I am merely complying with 
the convention that demands you either lie or hold your peace .... In reality I 
said nothing at all, but I heard a murmur, something gone wrong with the 
silence. . . sometimes there arose within me, confusedly, a kind of 
consciousness, which I express by saying, I said etc. . . . Or which I express 
without sinking to the level of oratio recta, but by means of other figures quite 
as deceitful, as for example, It seemed to me that, etc., or, I had the impression 
that, etc, for it seemed to me nothing at all, and I had no impression of any 
kind, but simply somewhere something had changed, so that I too had to 
change, or the world too had to change, in order for nothing to be changed. 
(Molloy 88) 
Again, these final words reflect the Aristotelian contention that the 'actualisation' of matter 
is, from one perspective, not a "change at all (for the progression that occurs is towards the 
thing itself and towards its actuality)". Molloy's textual "progression" is the origin's 
movement towards itself and towards its actuality even as, like matter, this origin never 
becomes actual, remaining the potentiality which is incessantly leaves its trace in actuality, 
the unchanging origin which undoes any usurpation. Consequently, Molloy is a mere proxy, 
"embryonic, undeveloped . . . a self that might have been but never got born, an etre 
manque'". He is only other to his mother in the same sense that any formal actualisation of 
matter is other to matter, this "destruction by the opposite" always being "rather a 
preservation of what is in potentiality by what is in actuality". Moran subsequently implies 
that Molloy bears this trace of this immanence which innapprehensibly exists but which has 
never been actual: 
Mother Molloy . . . was not completely foreign to me either, it seemed. But 
she was much less alive than her son, who God knows was far from being so. 
After all perhaps I knew nothing of mother Molloy ... save in so far as such a 
son might bear, like a scurf of placenta, her stamp .... I shall say briefly what 
little I did know about him. . . . He had very little room. His time too was 
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limited. He hastened incessantly on, as if in despair, towards very close 
objectives. Now a prisoner, he hurled himself at I know not what narrow 
confines ... (Molloy 113) 
As this suggests, Molloy is not the supplement which has usurped the origin, but is, rather, "a 
prisoner, frantic with corporeality, rearing to get out and away" (Texts for Nothing 123), 
hastening "incessantly on .. towards very close objectives" as he incessantly attempts to 
finally escape the putative origin in which he is inapprehensibly involved in order that this 
origin can be actualised, or rather as the origin attempts to escape itself via Molloy that it can 
finally actualise itself However, each attempt to actualise the origin contains the seeds of its 
own undoing: " ... it's still the same old road I'm trudging up ... towards one yet to be 
named, so that he may leave me in peace, be in peace, be no more, have never been" (Texts 
for Nothing 144). 
Overall, what this suggests is that the usurpation of the origin by its supplement, for 
Beckett, is constantly in process and is never complete, or rather, even if it is complete, this 
fact cannot be affirmed, the origin continuing to assert its status as a possibility in spite of 
this usurpation. The very 'absence' of the origin incessantly implies the possibility of this 
origin's immanence, the absence of a beginning incessantly implying an inability to pass 
beyond the beginning that this beginning can be affirmed. As Beckett asserts in relation to 
Molloy " - I had to eliminate all the poisons . .. " (Juliet 140)~ yet as he acknowledges in Ill 
Seen Ill Said the poison, the origin which has never been actual, cannot be erased precisely 
because it has never been actual, "- [n]egation" being "no more possible than affirmation" 
(Juliet 165): 
Illumination then go again and on return no more trace. On earth's face. Of 
what was never. And if by mishap some left then go again. For good again. So 
on. Till no more trace. On earth's face. Instead of always the same place. 
Slaving away forever in the same place. At this and that trace. And what if the 
eye could not? No more tear itself away from the remains of trace. Of what 
was never. (Ill Seen Ill Said 96) 
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Clearly, therefore, the post-structuralist contention that there is not, nor has ever been, 
an origin to textuality is always premature, the possibility of the origin incessantly deferring 
any usurpatory 'birth' of textuality. Nevertheless, we must also emphasise that the origin, and 
thus the whole 'pre-natal' paradigm that we have outlined, remains a mere possibility. We 
should recall Beckett's assertion that "[t]he key word in my plays is 'perhaps"' (Driver 220) 
when he says that "the void .... is perhaps simply the obliteration of an unbearable presence, 
unbearable because neither to be wooed nor to be stormed" ("Three Dialogues 140) . This 
hylomorphic paradigm, however, remains an inescapable possibility even as it permits its 
correlate Derridean possibility. The important point, however, is that Beckett's allusions to 
pre-natality reduce the Derridean hypothesis to a possibility, a potentiality which, in the 
apparent absence of any origin, cannot be affirmed or denied, all "affirmations and 
negations" being "invalidated as uttered" (Unnamable 294). This possibility, of course, 
remains inhabited by the possibility of the origin, a possibility that Beckett acknowledges in 
his allusions to pre-natality. Even though the Beckettian text permits a Derridean reading, 
therefore, one cannot assert that these texts conform to the post-structural tenet that the text 
has no origin or that textuality has been installed within the rights of reality. Such claims 
cannot be accepted as long as the possibility of the origin remains in place, this being the 
possibility which incessantly poisons the text, preventing its installation within the rights of 
reality: "Such the confusion between real and - how say its contrary? No matter. That old 
tandem. Such confusion between them once so twain. . No matter now. Such equal liars 
both. Real and- how ill say its contrary? The counter-poison" (Ill Seen Ill Said 82). 
Again this radical indeterminacy can be seen as a reflection of Aristotelian theory, it 
also being the case that the Aristotelian conception of textuality facilitates Derridean theory. 
We must note that within Aristotle's hylomorphic paradigm, matter is continually assigned 
the status of a potentiality, it being implicit in this that matter may or may not exist. This is 
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affirmed when we recollect that it is precisely matter's inability to possess the quality of 
'thisness' which sustains the hylomorphic process of becoming: it is this lack of affirmation 
which sustains the hylomorphic movement, the actualisation of the potentiality which is 
matter. In this Aristotle permits a deconstructive reading, this lack of affirmation implicitly 
allowing for the possibility that this origin may not exist. Indeed, one can see Aristotle's 
acceptance of substantiality or 'thisness' as the criterion of actuality (and his concomitant 
suggestion that matter is not and can never be actual) as being analogous to the installation of 
textuality within the rights of reality. Aristotle thus accepts the possibility that there has 
never been a usurpation of the origin in the same way as Derrida, matter having never been 
installed within these rights, the material origin having never been actual. That this actuality 
is constantly deferred in the hylomorphic process of becoming is the very reason why matter 
incessantly remains a mere potentiality; this is why substance can be accepted as the criterion 
of actuality, being ontologically prior to matter in the same way that representation, for 
Derrida, is ontologically prior to reality. Yet if Aristotle accepts the possibility that there has 
never been a usurpation of the origin and implicitly acknowledges this in accepting 
substance's claim to the rights to reality, he does not do so because he believes that such an 
origin does not exist but because he is aware that this origin can never be actualised or 
existentially verified. The possibility of such a material origin is retained because, as 
Aristotle was aware, any recognition of the possibility that there has never been a usurpation 
of the origin in the Derridean sense (in the sense that this usurpation has always already 
occurred) always and equally implies the possibility that there has never been a usurpation in 
the sense that the origin yet to be usurped, this being a possibility which cannot be avoided: 
this, indeed, is the "preservation of what is in potentiality by what is in actuality", the 
retention of the material origin as a potentiality in the act of "destruction" by the imposition 
of form. Aristotle may concur with the Derridean installation of the text within the rights of 
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reality in accepting substantiality as the criterion of actuality, and yet this actuality remains a 
mode of potentiality, this actuality being the process of matter's self-actualisation: " ... 
change is the actuality of that which exists potentially, in so far as it is potentially this 
actuality" (Physics ID.i.57). That this actualisation of matter cannot finally occur does not 
negate the possibility that it is occurring in the same way that the Beckettian origin's inability 
to give birth to itself does not negate the possibility that this origin is incessantly being born: 
that it cannot finally occur explains why Aristotle can accept substantiality as actuality, while 
that it is occurring explains how he can simultaneously accept this actuality is a mode of 
potentiality, actuality being the potentiality of matter. This substantial mode of potentiality, 
therefore, is always inhabited by its correlate potentiality, that of the material origin in which 
remains implicated, a possibility that this 'text' cannot finally refute or resolve. 
What Beckett's remarks and this hylomorphic view indicate, therefore, is that post-
structuralist readings which unequivocally accept that there has been a usurpation of the 
origin, or refuse to admit the possibility of a pre-discursive origin, are partial readings, as is 
implied by H. Porter Abbott's assertion that allusions to pre-natality are "usually ignored". 
They acknowledge only one possibility, and when there is only one possibility we have 
certainty, affirmation. Such certainty is implicit in Derrida's contention that the origin has 
always already been usurped, and that the text has been installed within the rights of reality. 
Yet in spite of this it is evident that the radical indeterminacy of the Beckettian text 
interrogates this contention: in permitting the possibility of the subject's pre-natal status, 
Beckett is implicitly asking the fundamental question of how we can know that the origin has 
always already been usurped in the absence of this usurpation. Is not this usurpation, and thus 
the text's entitlement to the rights to reality, as much of an assumption as the pre-discursive 
origin itself? A non-transcendental assumption? Does not the absence of any usurpation 
equally imply the possibility that the text has yet to be usurped, that the origin has yet to 
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become actual because it has never differed from itself? These questions, and these 
possibilities, are not merely epistemological for they are posed by the mode of potentiality 
which is textuality itself, having a functional effect in Beckettian textuality in the same 
manner that the ambiguity of matter has a functional effect in Aristotelian hylomorphism: " .. 
. all these questions I ask myself. It is not in the spirit of curiosity. I cannot be silent. About 
myself I need know nothing. Here all is clear. No, all is not clear. But the discourse must go 
on. So one invents obscurities. Rhetoric" (Unnamable 296). It is these questions which are 
"usually ignored" in post-structuralist readings of Beckett which fail to appreciate either the 
manner in which these questions haunt the Beckettian text or that Derrida's theories are, as 
Beckettian textuality demonstrates, theoretical: "Questions, hypotheses, call them that." 
(Unnamable 293). 
7 
INVENTING THE MEss: THE INFINITE BODY 
The unwillingness of post-structuralist interpreters to acknowledge the pre-natal 
status of Beckettian textuality stems, no doubt, from the contradiction between an infinite 
process of textuality and the notion of the limit. The infinite, by definition it would seem, 
brooks no exterior limit. Indeed, Derrida frequently enacts any pre-discursive reality as a 
limit to the infinitude, thus implying that the infinitude and limits are mutually exclusive 
possibilities, hence his assertion that " ... the text overruns all the limits assigned to it ... all 
the limits, everything that was to be set up in opposition to writing (speech, life, the world, 
the real, history and what not . . . )" ("Living On - Border Lines" 257). Derrida defines 
factors such as "speech" and "the real" as limits to the infinitude of the text, and it is, 
therefore, Derrida who sets these extra-discursive factors "in opposition to writing", only to 
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advocate one side of this opposition. Beckett, on the other hand, advocates both sides of this 
opposition, for while his texts constantly admit their own infinitude, he realises that this does 
not mean that the text is without limits. Molloy, for example, echoes Wittgenstein's assertion 
that the "metaphysical subject" is "the limit of the world - not a part of it" ( Tractatus 5. 641) 
in admitting infinitude while simultaneously acknowledging the possibility of a 'self which 
escapes this infinitude: " ... the resources of nature are infinite apparently. It was I who was 
not natural enough to enter into that order of things, and appreciate its niceties" (Molloy 44). 
Underlying this apparent contradiction is Beckett's knowledge that the physicality of the 
body itself can be seen as infinite, for while Molloy asserts that "the limits of my region were 
unknown to me" (Molloy 65) and that he abides "by my simple feeling and its voice that 
said, Molloy, your region is vast, you have never left it and you never shall" (Molloy 65), he 
nevertheless adds that "the confines of my room, of my bed, of my body, are as remote from 
me as were those of my region" (Molloy 66). In continuing to admit the possibility of the 
body (albeit an unnameable body), Beckett acknowledges the difference between infinitude 
and limitlessness. Beckett accepts the possibility that the text is not infinite in the sense that it 
has no limits but in that sense that it is infinitely divisible: "There it is then divided into five, 
the time that remains. Into five what? I don't know. Everything divides into itself, I suppose" 
(Malone 182). Such an infinite divisibility within the totalised space of the body allows for 
both an infinite text that apparently brooks no exterior limit and a physicality that escapes 
this text, a limit which is never apprehended. This is reading is supported by Beckett's 1949 
remark that the history of art is a history of its attempts to escape a 
. . . sense of failure, by means of more authentic, more ample, less exclusive 
relations between representer and representee, in a kind of tropism towards a 
light as to the nature of which the best opinions continue to vary, and with a 
kind of Pythagorean terror, as though the irrationality of pi were an offence 
against the deity, not to mention his creature. ("Three Dialogues" 145) 
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Beckett enacts the totality of the relation between the representer and the representee in terms 
of the irrational, infinite, number pl3 (3.142857 ad infinitum) a number which may be 
infinite yet enacts an infinite process of division, being infinitely entropic. Pi is both a 
discrete or limited number (never, for example, reaching the limit 3.15) and an infinite 
number, constantly approaching yet never reaching this limit. This reflects the manner in 
which the enunciator/ representer constantly attempts to approach his own mysterious reality 
through the deictic text, yet never attains this limit by virtue of the infinite and entropic 
divisibility of the text, deixis constituting this infinite process of division/entropy. As Molloy 
ironically asserts in drawing an analogy between pi and textuality: ". . . to know you are 
beyond knowing anything, that is when peace enters in, to the soul of the incurious seeker. It 
is then the true division begins, of twenty-two by seven . . . and the pages fill with the true 
ciphers at last" (Molloy 64)34. The text infinitely disseminates itself by deictically 
supplementing itself in relation to the text's unnameable limit, a putative totality which it 
infinitely approaches, this expansion simultaneously being perceived as an entropic process 
of compression in relation to this limit: 
It's of me now I must speak, even if I have to do it with their language ... 
having to speak . . . of things that don't concern me ... that I don't believe, 
that they have crammed me full of to prevent me from saying who I am. . . . 
They've blown me up with their voices, like a balloon, and even as I collapse 
it's them I hear. (Unnamable 326-27) 
This relationship between the infinite and the limit clearly derives from the paradoxes of 
Zeno of Elea. As the number pi must infinitely expand in order to denote infinite entropy, an 
infinite process of division, Zeno's paradox enacts a limit that is infinitely approached, yet is 
never attained by virtue of this process of entropy or self-division. In approaching a given 
point an object must cover half the distance to that point, the half the distance left, then half 
of that distance, and so on ad infinitum. Watt, for example, is clearly speaking from the 
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position of this limit or 'given point' as he waits for the mysterious figure which approaches 
him at the station to finally reach him_ The figure decreases in size in inverse ratio to this 
approach: 
. . in the ten minutes or half an hour that had elapsed, since he first became 
aware of this figure, striding along, on the crest of the road, towards the 
station, the figure had gained nothing in height, in breadth or in distinctness. 
Pressing forward all this time, with no abatement of its foundered 
precipitation, towards the station, it had made no more headway, than if it had 
been a millstone. 
Watt was puzzling over this when the figure, without any interruption 
of its motions, grew fainter and fainter, and finally disappeared. (Watt 227) 
This expansion/ compression in relation to a limit is recurrent in Beckett's work: Molloy, for 
example, foreshadows the Unnamable's expansion/ compression and his desire to push this 
process to its limit by carrying "this process of compression to the point of abandoning all 
other postulates than that of a deaf halfwit, hearing nothing of what he says and 
understanding even less" (Unnamable 394). Molloy desires 
. . . to know . . . the laws of the mind perhaps, of my mind, that for example 
water rises in proportion as it drowns you and you would do better, at least no 
worse, to obliterate texts than to blacken margins, to fill the holes of words till 
all is blank and flat and the whole ghastly business looks like what it is, 
senseless, speechless, issueless misery ... (Molloy 13) 
Clearly, in this context, this physicality is not so much a limit that is overcome by the text as 
a limit which is never reached by the text in spite of its infinitude_ For Beckett, the expansion 
of the text occurs within in a given space as discourse deictically supplements itself in 
relation to the material limits that it attempts to apprehend, "for it's the end gives the 
meaning to words" (Texts for Nothing 131 ). It is this space which contains and limits 
infinitude: "The longer he lives and so the smaller they grow, the reasoning being the fuller 
he fills the space and so on ... "(All Strange Away 169). 
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Obviously, this raises the question of whether one can validly refer to such a limit as 
a 'limit': can one, for example refer to the number 3.15 as a limit to the infinitude of pi? To 
some extent this question remains academic, being a question of terminology which does not 
effect the validity of the Beckettian paradigm: the pertinent point is that such an infinitude is 
discrete, the narrator's inability to finally refute the inalienable possibility of such a 'limit' 
being the potentiality which constantly contests the hegemony of the text, its final installation 
within the 'rights of reality'_ Conversely, one can ask whether pi (and, analogously, the 
general text) can validly be referred to as an 'infinitude' if one accepts that 3.15 is a limit or 
that this 'infinitude' is discrete. The possibility which is raised here is that textuality is 
infinite in the sense that pi is infinite, being infinite in the sense that it is inexhaustible rather 
than in the sense that it has an infinite extension which comprehends everything, a distinction 
which means that the infinite text can continually tolerate the possibility of an extra-
discursive reality: "Elsewhere perhaps, by all means, elsewhere, what elsewhere can there be 
to this infinite here? I know, if my head could think I'd find a way out, in my head, like so 
many others, and out of worse than this, the world would be there again . . . " (Texts for 
Nothing 123). The Beckettian narrator, therefore, may be incessantly running, but has he 
frequently reveals, he is going nowhere, being trapped in this "infinite here": ". . . I have to 
speak .... nothing ... can lessen what remains to say, I have the ocean to drink" (Unnamable 
316). Evidently, in drawing the analogy between pi and textuality, Beckett reveals his refusal 
to infer that the text can be installed within the rights of reality on the basis of its infinitude, 
the infinitude in question relating to the text's inexhaustible yet discrete nature rather than to 
any hegemonic/ textual ability to 'usurp' reality: again reality remains in place as a 
potentiality. 
In this light it is evident that the unverifiable space of the body is not merely the telos 
which the Beckettian text seeks to attain, the limit that the text incessantly approaches as it 
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attempts to actualise this body; it is also the conceptual space from which signification is 
constantly sublimated, the potentiality or the materiality which is constantly actualised as the 
substances which are Beckett' s fictions. Beckett frequently acknowledges this in his use of 
the word 'invent', a word which implies both the production of a fiction (i.e. of the 
inventions which are Beckett's characters) and inhilation (to in-vent), the sublimation of this 
limiting reality into the discourse as a fiction, (i.e. the in-ventions which are fictions of the 
unnameable figure, 'Samuel Beckett'): "About myself I need know nothing. Here all is clear. 
No, all is not clear. But the discourse must go on. So one invents obscurities" (Unnamable 
296). The word 'invent' is carefully poised between fiction and reality, the word 
"obscurities" referring either to the fictions of the self which are constantly created in the 
process of textuality, the signifiers with which the Unnamable is "crammed ... full of to 
prevent me from saying who I am ... " (llnnamable 327) or to the mysterious reality of the 
'I' which underlies and is obscured by these fictions. It is the latter which the text constantly 
attempts to finally in-vent, to finally draw into the discourse in order that it can be 
linguistically affirmed, a process which leads only to another fiction, to an invention rather 
than an in-vention. Clearly, this process of invention bears comparison to the textual credit 
that Nietzsche assigns to the potentiality which is his body, that which produces the fiction of 
Zarathustra and constantly sustains the textual process of self-overcoming. One should also 
note the Aristotelian influence here, the manner in which any actualisation of this potentiality 
leaves this potentiality in place. One cannot "invent obscurities" for to invent is to bestow 
form and demythologise this obscurity: the obscurity remains in place in spite of the fact that 
it has been 'in-vented', a realisation which no doubt underlies Christopher Rick's assertion 
that Beckett is "never so complacent as to deny the existence of '"the without', 
'impregnable' as it yet fertilely is" ( 151 ). 
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Nevertheless, in making these attempts this obscure reality is in-vented for each 
attempt produces fictions, sublimations of linguistically non-existent reality, in-vention being 
"the conjuring of something out of nothing" (Company 43). Malone, for example, 
acknowledges in his own "inventory" that this incessant desire to finish his writing and thus 
end textuality also constitutes a desire to finally in-vent this reality in which he is 
inapprehensibly (i.e. deictically) involved, allowing his text to validly refer to its own 
totality. He wishes to draw this reality into the discourse for it is only in doing so that he can 
apprehend and totalise his own existence, affirming the very life in which he is involved: ". . 
. gravely I struggled to be no more, to live, to invent, I know what I mean. . . . I say living 
without knowing what it is" (Malone 195). Similarly, one can appreciate the nature of 'in-
vention' if one compares the assertion" ... I invent nothing ... " in Texts for Nothing with 
Watt's assertion that " ... the only way one can speak of nothing is to speak of it as though it 
were something ... " QY.att 74). As Watt asserts: " ... to elicit something from nothing 
requires a certain skill ... " (Watt 74). This 'something' which is elicited from nothing is 
always a meaningful signifier, a signifier which is not opposed to non-existence but to that 
which is meaningless, in-vention being a process of "foisting a meaning . . . where no 
meaning appeared ... " QY.att 74). As Watt asserts in relation to the "incident of the galls" 
(Watt 73): ". . . a thing that was nothing had happened, with the utmost formal distinctness . . 
." (Watt 73). In the same manner that Watt's meaningful interpretations ofthis "nothing" are 
"in reality the same incident variously interpreted", Beckett' s fictions are elicited from (or in-
vented from) the conceptual space that is "Samuel Beckett". As the narrator of Murphy 
asserts in referring to both Democritus' famous assertion that "nothing is more real than 
nothing" and the Aristotelian "prime mover", Murphy ultimately finds, 
. . . the positive peace that comes when the somethings give way, or perhaps 
simply add up to the Nothing, that which in the guffaw of the Abderite naught 
is more real. Time did not cease ... but the big wheel of rounds and pauses 
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did, as Murphy . . . continued to suck in, through all the posterns of his 
withered soul, the accidentless One-and-Only, conveniently called Nothing. 
(138) 
The textual process, therefore, only sustains itself as a constant in-vention of the 
"Nothing", or rather, the reality which is always 'nothing' by virtue of the fact that it cannot 
be named, or finally in-vented. Beckett constantly utilises the word 'nothing' as a means of 
ironically "referring" to this unnameable reality: the words " ... I need nothing ... " (Texts 
for Nothing 100), for example, do not simply imply that the narrator is content with his 
situation, they imply that "nothing" is that which has yet to be apprehended, the "obscurity" 
which has yet to be invented, and thus that this reality is only "nothing" by virtue of the fact 
that it has yet to be linguistically actualised. Similarly, the Unnamable's desire to "say 
nothing" (Unnamable 3 78) is not necessarily a desire for silence, but a desire to break the 
silence, to deictically refer to the reality of his 'own' speech so that this speech act can be 
said to have actually occurred. He wishes to literally scry this "nothing" so that he can finally 
come into being: " ... I have to speak No one compels me to .... Nothing can ever exempt 
me from it, there is nothing, nothing to discover, nothing to recover ... " (The Unnamable 
316). 
In The Unnamable this notion of invention is applied to the reading process in order 
that the limits of the text, the space of potentiality or the "nothing" in which the text remains 
implicated, can be exteriorised. Beckett attempts to admit the "mess" of reality which 
"invades our experience at every moment" into the reading experience via the process of in-
vention, for "[i]t is there and it must be allowed in .... To find a form that accommodates the 
mess, that is the task of the artist now" (Driver 219) 35 . The Unnamable's world is produced 
by the constant process of in-venting his own ineffability, an operation which meiotically 
divides the totality of awareness and text into its constituent forms, as one fiction gives rise to 
another, breaking the total form of' reality', into more and more meaningful elements. 
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It's of me now I must speak, even if I have to do it with their language ... 
having to speak. .. of things that don't concern me ... that I don't believe, that 
they have crammed me full of to prevent me from saying who I am ... They've 
blown me up with their voices, like a balloon, and even as I collapse it's them 
I hear. (Unnamable 326-27) 
Beckett applies this process of in-vention, of entropic expansion/ compression to every level 
of the text, although, within the reading situation, it is exhaustible in terms of language's 
capacity to accommodate these textual 'in-ventions'. The minimal division capable of 
generating meaning by differing from itself is that between letters, the 'next level' up, the 
worc/6, being the minimal unit of meaning: 
I' m all these words, all these strangers, this dust of words, with no ground for 
their settling, no sky for their dispersing, coming together to say, fleeing one 
another to say, that I am they, all of them, those that merge, those that part, 
those that never meet, and nothing else ... (Unnamable 390) 
The maximum division, is that between the text and the reader. The text itself is the 'next 
lower' unit capable of generating meaning by differing from itself37, our perception of the 
meaningless 'reality' of the text, differing from our meaningful interpretation of this text. As 
the Unnamable cannot deictically speak his totalised self, we cannot 'speak' the totality of the 
reading experience since we are deictically bound up in that experience: "But credit where 
credit is due, we made a balls of it between us, I with my signs and she with her reading of 
them. This story is no good, I'm beginning almost to believe it" (!lnnamable 332). Within 
this space, meaning is steadily produced and condensed into the speaker's words through the 
process of in-vention, of expansion/ compression, until it begins to reach these limits of 
language, enacting the space "where language dies that permits such expressions" 
(Unnamable 337). The lower limit of meaning is the word, the word 'nothing', for example, 
being the most obvious victim of the over-determination of meaning which exteriorises the 
limits of this space. Through continual reiteration, the word accrues a more and more 
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meaning, a process which merely accentuates the falsity of the word itself, it being difficult 
not to read it as referring to a 'thing' rather than 'no-thing': 
... that's right, reiterate, that helps you on, open on what, there is nothing else, 
only it, open on the void, open on the nothing . . . I see nothing, it's because 
there is nothing . . . but do I really see nothing, it's not the moment to tell a lie, 
but how can you not tell a lie ... I say I see nothing, or I say it's all in my head 
. . . that came to nothing, I see nothing, either because of this or else on 
account ofthat ... (Unnamable 414-415) 
As the meaningful 'figure' of this word is emphasised through reiteration its 'ground' is 
simultaneously exteriorised: we become alert to the falsity if this word's meaningful status, 
reading the word 'nothing' for what it does not denote, the unnamable "howling behind my 
dissertation" (Unnamable 317): 
This voice that speaks, knowing that it lies, indifferent to what it says, too old 
perhaps and too abased ever to succeed in saying the words that would be its 
last, knowing itself useless and its uselessness in vain, not listening to itself 
but to the silence that it breaks . . . (Unnamable 309) 
The word displays rather than denotes, what it is not, at least to the limits of possibility: "And 
I speak of voices! After all, why not, so long as one knows it's untrue. But there are limits, it 
appears" (Unnamable 338). 
Simultaneously, meaning expands into the whole text because of the exhaustive nature 
of its production. The text becomes so meaning laden that we begin, as readers, to discern its 
vacuousness. Meaning becomes more and more impenetrable, as more and more language is 
crammed into the work: "Carry if necessary this process of compression to the point of 
abandoning all other postulates than that of a deaf halfwit, hearing nothing of what he says 
and understanding even less" (Unnamable 394). As Alfred Alverez has stated: "However 
inexhaustible a mother lode for quarrying academics the book may be, for the ordinary, even 
devoted reader, The Unnamable gets perilously close to being the Unreadable" (63). As the 
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text intensifies, it begins to disregard grammatical form in order to accommodate more and 
more meaning, more and more of the voice. Accordingly, the reader begins to 'skim' the text, 
"hearing nothing of what it says and understanding even less". As in the case of the word 
'nothing', the overloading of language permits us to experience the 'space' in which the text is 
implicated, the 'other' which repudiates meaning while underpinning its existence. As John 
Calder asserts: "After the opening pages there are no paragraphs, and as the work approaches 
the end with increasing speed, there are no full stops, only commas indicate the swift intake 
of breath before pushing out the next phrase" (32). The text begins to reach is semantic limits 
thus exteriorising its 'key-word': 
Perhaps I've missed the key-word to the whole business. I wouldn't have 
understood it, but I would have said it, that's all that's required . . . 
(Unnamable 372) 
I have no explanations to offer, none to demand, the comma will come where 
I'll drown for good, then the silence ... (Unnamable 413) 
Unlike the word, the comma is a signifier that presents its own meaninglessness, enacting the 
silence of a voice that is still implicated in an origin that is constantly in-vented. One cannot 
'say' a grammatical mark, just as we cannot 'say' the nothing that we are: 
. . . how can you think and speak at the same time, without a special gift, your 
thoughts wander, your words too, far apart, no, that's an exaggeration, apart, 
between them would be the place to be, where you suffer, rejoice, at being 
bereft of speech, bereft of thought, and feel nothing, hear nothing, know 
nothing, say nothing, are nothing, that would be a blessed place to be, where 
you are. (1Innamable 377-78) 
Nonetheless, as readers, we can see this meaningless mark and that it bears no relation to the 
meaning within the text, except as a signifier of absence, that which is 'said' in between 
words. What this mark actually signifies is the space between words, the space from which 
meaning is sublimated: 
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I' m all these words . . . and nothing else, yes, something else, that I' m 
something quite different, a quite different thing, a wordless thing in an empty 
place, a hard shut dry cold black place, where nothing stirs, nothing speaks, 
and that I listen, and that I seek ... (Unnamable 390) 
Yet even though the frequency of the 'key-word' increases on a textual level, representing the 
'lowest' semantic limits to which the text can push itself beyond the word, its significance 
does not lie on this level alone, and is not specifically highlighted on this level: 
. . . I am words among words, or silence in the midst of silence, to recall only 
two of the hypotheses launched in this connection, though silence to tell the 
truth does not appear to have been very conspicuous up to now, but 
appearances may sometimes be deceptive. (l[nnamable 392) 
The space that the comma represents becomes significant in terms of the 'highest' form to the 
text, the form of the reading experience itself~8 When read out loud, we cannot fail to become 
aware of the "groaning of the air beneath the burden" (Unnamable 358)39, an awareness 
which is accentuated, in our consciousness, by the manner in which the semantically 
overdriven voice negates its own meaning by pushing itself to the limits of comprehensibility. 
The voice, in combination with the breathing becomes a stream of almost meaningless, 
continual, noise: 
Words, he says he knows they are words. But how can he know, who has 
never heard anything else? True. Not to mention other things, many others to 
which the abundance of matter has unfortunately up to now prohibited the 
least allusion. For example, to begin with, his breathing. (llnnamable 358) 
Paradoxically, "These little pauses are a poor trick too. When they go silent so do 1" 
(Unnamable 371). Breathing, like the comma, refutes meaning, the word 'breathe' being 
inapplicable: "More lies, he doesn't breathe yet, he'll never breathe. Then what is this faint 
noise, as of air stealthily stirred, recalling the breath of life, to those whom it corrodes?" 
(Unnamable 358). The 'breath', as reality, sustains the existence of linguistic meaning, and 
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yet negates an apprehension of itself because it is beyond meaning, even though we are 
unable to be unaware of it: 
But what calm, apart from the discourse, not a breath, it's suspicious, the calm 
that precedes life, no, no, not all this time, it's like slime, paradise, it would be 
paradise, but for this noise, it's life trying to get in, no, trying to get him out, or 
little bubbles bursting all around, no, there's no air here, air is to make you 
choke ... (Unnamable 367-8) 
We thus experience the "air" of reality, which "chokes" us since it repudiates meaning, and 
the "air" of meaning which "chokes" us since it repudiates reality. The text heightens our 
awareness of the "noise" by reducing the voice to "noise", and concurrently heightens the 
consciousness of our inability to reconcile the two: "It is strange they do not go and fetch him 
in his den, since they seem to have access to it. They dare not, the air in the midst of which he 
lies is not for them, and yet they want him to breathe theirs" (Unnamable 361 ). 
This reflects back onto this textual level, for the comma cannot actually be 
represented as a meaningful phenomenon, even though it forces us to acknowledge the 
(non)existence of the absence it signifies. What it actually highlights is the gap, the material 
whiteness of the paper on either side of it, this whiteness being as indispensable to the text's 
existence as the ink that constitutes it. The totality cannot be simultaneously grasped for we 
can only see white on black or vice versa: "If it's not white it's very likely black, it must be 
admitted the method lacks subtlety, in view of the intermediate shades all worthy of a 
chance" (Unnamable 377). The grey, the forms that we posit between the limits of language, 
is as fictional as the narrator's hypotheses: 
. . . light is to close your eyes, that's where he must go, where its never dark, 
but here it's never dark either, yes, here it's dark, it's they who make this grey, 
with their lamps. (Unnamable 368) 
... hell, I've contradicted myself, no matter. (Unnamable 402) 
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As textual or vocal meaning becomes intensified, these unattainable, unavoidable points of 
(un)conscious reality begin to manifest themselves with increasing frequency. It is these 
points which are "the only chance" that we "have of going silent, or of saying something that 
is not false" (Unnamable 324), or of finding a form which "admits the chaos and does not try 
to say that it is something else" (Driver 219). Beckett is, therefore, endeavouring to extend 
the minimum and the maximum units of meaning, from word and text, to grammar and 
reading experience. The 'lowest' unit of meaning, the comma and the 'highest' unit, the 
reading experience, are brought together at the end of the text, each propelled by the over 
determination of meaning, as the materiality of the comma and the materiality of our 
breathing become almost synonymous in consciousness: 
The maxima and the minima of particular contraries are one and indifferent. 
Minimal heat equals minimal cold. Consequently transmutations are circular. 
The principle (minimum) of one contrary takes its movement from the 
principle (maximum) of one another. ("Dante ... Bruno.Vico .. Joyce" 21) 
The circle remains incomplete since we must still concede that we cannot 'say' the material 
whiteness of the text that the black ink alerts us to, or the silence of consciousness that our 
breathing alerts us to. The circle never completely encompasses the infinitude of the real: 
At no moment do I know what I' m talking about, nor of whom, nor of where, 
nor how, nor why, but I could employ fifty wretches for this sinister operation 
and still be short of a fifty-first to close the circuit, that I know, without 
knowing what it means. (Unnamable 341) 
Just as the title ofBeckett's work is the incomplete nam(e) set in the midst of the word 
un-able, the text illustrates that we are also incomplete within ourselves and are unable to 
grasp our own, genuine, totality. Even though Beckett can diminish this gap, this 
diminishment only confirms that this gap remains in place, sustaining the text, the process of 
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in-vention: "I don't know, I'll never know, in the silence you don't know, you must go on, 
I'll go on." (Unnamable 418). 
8 
ILL SEEN ILL SAID AND HIE ENCHAN1MENTS OF REALITY 
The Unnamable's attempt to apprehend the figure which is mearung as it IS 
implicated in the ground which is reality clearly reflects Beckett' s assertion that the "mess" 
of reality "invades our experience at every moment. It is there and it must be allowed in .... 
the form . . . exists as a problem separate from the material it accommodates. To find a form 
that accommodates the mess, that is the task of the artist now" (Driver 219). One can, 
perhaps, divine the precise nature of this 'mess', and its relation to perception, when Beckett 
refers to it as "this buzzing confusion" (Driver 218) later in the interview. As well as 
recalling the status of the Unnamable's voice by the end ofthe novel, this phrase also occurs 
in his early novel Murphy. Neary asserts: '"Murphy, all life is figure and ground.' 'But a 
wandering to find home,' said Murphy. 'The face,' said Neary, 'or system effaces, against 
the big blooming buzzing confusion. I think ofMiss Dwyer"' (6). The phrase itself, however, 
is ultimately derived from the theories of William James who utilised it in order to describe 
the raw sensory experience of a newborn child, its undifferentiated visualisation of the world 
before it learns to perceptually divide it into discrete objects (Westen 504). Yet if this 
division is enacted by the figure/ ground dichotomy which allows for Miss Dwyer to be 
meaningfully defined as "the single, brilliant, organised, compact blotch in the tumult of 
heterogeneous stimulation" (7) then it is notable that it is difficult to find a more apt 
enactment of the figure/ ground dichotomy than in our empirical experience of the printed 
text, a factor which is hinted at in Murphy's answer to Neary: '"Blotch is the word" said 
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Murphy" (7). As The Unnamable demonstrates, the difference between figure and ground is 
not a difference between signifters, any more than the difference between black and white on 
the printed page: as in the case of the page this difference is essentially that of presence and 
absence, that which is apprehended as a signifier and that which is not, there being no 
possibility of simultaneously apprehending both. Alternatively the figure/ ground dichotomy 
can be seen as the difference between a meaningful presence and a meaningless presence for 
the background against which the meaningful figure of Miss Dwyer is defined against is the 
witnessed meaninglessness of a "waste without form, and void!" (7). As ever, one should 
note the ambiguity here: is this an assertion that the waste is "void" or an assertion that it is 
"without . . . void"? Absolute absence or absolute presence? The confusion points to the 
distinctive characteristic of matter, a coincidence with one's absolute material presence 
simultaneously being a coincidence with one's meaningless physicality, the attainment of an 
absolute absence of consciousness: "Dear incomprehension, its thanks to you I'll be myself, 
in the end" (Unnamable 327). Nonetheless, Henri Bergson also points to this "waste without 
form" when he asserts that, 
... the perceiving mind ... marks out divisions in the continuity of the 
extended . . . But . . . to divide the real in this manner, we must first persuade 
ourselves that the real is divisible at will . . we must throw . . . beneath 
concrete extensity, a network, of which the meshes may be altered to any 
shape whatsoever and become as small as we please: this substratum which is 
merely conceived, this wholly ideal diagram of arbitrary and infinite 
divisibility, is homogeneous space. (278)40 
One can see in this the manner in which Beckett's "mess" is paradoxically already "there" 
even as "it must be allowed in", being that which is seen (i.e. visually registered, inherent to 
visual data) yet is not consciously perceived by virtue of the fact that its homogeneity refutes 
the differentiation which is necessary for meaningful apprehension. As Bergson recognises, 
to be consciously aware of everything that one is visually registering is to negate the 
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meaningful differentiation which constitutes consciousness; to "perceive all the influences 
from all the points of all bodies would be to descend to the condition of a material object. 
Conscious perception signifies choice, and consciousness mainly consists in this practical 
discernment" ( 46). In terms of the printed text, for example, the failure of such discernment 
would be the failure to perceive the black ink as a present figure as set against the absence 
which is its white background (bearing in mind that one only attends to the figure which is 
the printed text): to simultaneously attend to both the white and the black (presence/presence) 
is to negate the difference between absence and presence which allows the figure of the text 
to be defined, even though, of course, this indifference is inherent in our vision of the text for 
both black and white are visually registered. Evidently, in order for the figure to become 
meaningfully present to consciousness, it must be defined against the 'absence' which is its 
ground, that which is implicit in vision yet is not consciously registered. It should also be 
noted that if we are not conscious of this ground, then the figure of which we are conscious 
necessarily bears its trace, for the fact that we are conscious of the figure as a meaningful 
presence, in itself, constitutes a trace of this defining 'absence'. As Bergson recognises, the 
object is always defined by what it is not: 
. . . does not the fiction of an isolated material object imply a kind of 
absurdity, since this object borrows its physical properties from the relations 
which it maintains with all others, and owes its determinations, and 
consequently, its very existence, to the place it occupies within the universe as 
a whole? (11-12) 
Nevertheless, both Bergson's and Beckett's remarks point to the manner in which 
one's material being can become identifiable with the homogeneous, passive ground which 
precedes, lies behind, and defines the figure of writing/ consciousness, a reading which is 
supported by the original assertion in Murphy that life is both "figure and ground" and "a 
wandering to find home" for Beckett's characters. For Beckett it is this 'ground' which 
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occupies the position of Derrida' s arche-writing, remaining 'other' to the differential activity 
of textuality even as it is recognised and enacted through this process. While, Derrida refuses 
to designate arche-writing a logos, merely delineating it as the textuality which precedes 
presence, Beckett does not shy away from identifying it with the pre-textual "mess" of 
material existence and implicitly, with the undifferentiated origin which incorporates the 
imaginary "figure" of the text. The final lines of Moran's narrative give a sense of the 
manner in which Beckett brings this arche-writing to our attention within the text: "It is 
midnight. The rain is beating on the windows, It was not midnight. It was not raining" 
(Molloy 179). As a direct contradiction ofthe law of identity (something is what it is, and not 
what it is not) and the law of the excluded middle (the words are true or not true- there is no 
'third' way) these words negate the logic of identity. They only become 'meaningful' in 
terms of difference (one statement is true, one statement is false). Yet there are no criteria 
with which to judge the veracity of each individual statement, rendering them undecideable. 
There is, therefore, no difference, merely homogeneity, a kind of blank space within the 
totality of the lines. We can only comprehend the lines as being a meaningful alternation 
between 'true/ false' and 'false/ true', presence/ absence and absence/ presence, even as we 
recognise the homogeneity of presence/ presence or absence/ absence through this 
alternation. To erase this alternation and achieve this homogeneity is to erase meaning 
altogether, in the same manner that the failure of selective perception or of the figure/ ground 
dichotomy (i.e. presence/ presence) erases difference which, for Bergson, allows us to be 
conscious. It is this perspectivism, and this annihilation, to which Nietzsche refers in 
asserting that 
. . . there would be no life at all if not on the basis of perspective estimates and 
appearances; and if ... one wanted to abolish the "apparent world" altogether 
- well, supposing you could do that, at least nothing would be left of your 
"truth" either. (Beyond Good and Evil 236) 
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Yet for Beckett it is this homogeneity, the 'mess' of reality, which is inherent in visual 
perception and in meaning itself, even as it remains unwitnessed, being that which is "there" 
even as it must be "allowed in". 
Within the reading process, of course, what is "there" yet is not "allowed in" is the 
material presence which is the book itself: the book is there in the sense that it is being 
mutely witnessed, yet it is seen without being meaningfully registered, our mind being 
elsewhere, as in the case of the narrator in From an Abandoned Work: " ... just went on, my 
body doing its best without me" (I 64). This analogy between the book and the body is 
suggestive of the manner in which Beckett can performatively utilise our (non)experience of 
the book at the point of reading, the difference between that which the eye sees and that 
which the mind sees. For Beckett, the book's seen/ unseen status can become a cipher for the 
"mess" which is inherent in visual experience yet is not consciously perceived, that which 
represents the possibility of coinciding with one's own material being. As a result, one 
frequently experiences Beckett's texts as allegories of the reading/ writing process, and/ or 
performative attempts to enact their own empirical materiality. Yet these processes are 
simultaneously allegories of the process of consciousness itself, the process of consciousness 
which is enacted within the text frequently parallels the process which is going on in the act 
of reading this text. Within this performativity the inapprehensible materiality of the book, 
the conceptual space that it seems to present, frequently becomes erotically identified with 
the self-identity of the body, that which is insistently ruptured and erased by the process of 
(self) signification. Like the body, the equivocal materiality of the book comes to represent 
the space of potentiality in which the self can be actualised, and the space from which 
fictions of the self are sublimated. It is these factors which underlie Beckett's assertion that 
Joyce's writing "is not about something; it Is that something itself' 
("Dante ... Bruno. Vico .. Joyce" 215) and his delineation of Proustian symbolism as 
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"autosymbolism": "For Proust the object may be a living symbol, but a symbol of itself' 
(Proust 80). Beckett, nevertheless, recognises that one can only attempt to be "that something 
itself' for the absolute coincidence of representation and reality, figure and ground, would be 
precisely attainment of unconscious material being. 
In this light, it is striking that Christopher Ricks, in rejecting readings which would 
seek to subsume Beckettian textuality into a post-structuralist schema which "has no truck 
with any positing of the reaf' (145) should illustrate his point with a quotation from 
Beckett's Ill Seen Ill Said which he can subsequently link to Derrida's notion of the 
pharmakon: 
On resumption the head is covered. No matter. No matter now. Such the 
confusion now between real and - how say its contrary? No matter. That old 
tandem. Such now confusion between them once so twain. And such the 
farrago from eye to mind. For it to make what sad sense of it may. No matter 
now. Such equal liars both. Real and -how ill say its contrary? The counter-
poison. (82) 
The 'poison' 1s not the writing which, for Derrida, precedes and encompasses self-
apprehension, transgressing the notion of the 'real' and erasmg the possibility of any 
transcendental grounding to the text. The real's unspeakable contrary is, rather, the "counter-
poison" and it is, therefore, the real rather than that which erases the real which is the poison, 
this being a poison of the eye rather than the mind. One should also note, in this respect, the 
characteristically elliptical pun through which Beckett identifies this reality with matter: 
"Such the confusion now between real and - how say its contrary? No matter". The 
quotation, moreover, is performative, intersecting with the inherently present act of reading: 
"On resumption the head is covered. No matter. No matter now". The final sentence suggests 
that the reader, in the very act of meaningfully articulating/ apprehending these printed words 
is erasing their materiality - there is "No matter now" that you are reading these words or, 
more specifically, the printed words that you are presently looking at have no materiality at 
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the precise moment that the book being translated into the text through the act of reading. We 
cease to be meaningfully aware of the book at the point when we are "thinking the thoughts 
of another" (104) to use Poulet's description of the reading process. Similarly, the garbled 
syntax ("And such the farrago from eye to mind. For it to make what sense of it may. No 
matter now") presently forces us to "make what sense of it may" indicating that the "farrago" 
to which the text refers is the very farrago in which we are implicated in the act of reading 
the words, acting as a form of defamiliarisation, a disruption of the habit which, as Beckett 
asserts in relation to one's blank apprehension of the "isolated and inexplicable" object, "has 
laid its veto on this form of perception, its action being precisely to hide the essence - the 
Idea- ofthe object in the haze of conception- preconception" (Eroust 23). 
In the "farrago from eye to mind" the mind is the "counter-poison" for as we become 
aware of the text we cease to be aware of the book at which we are looking. As Georges 
Poulet asks in relation to the act of reading: 
Where is the book I held in my hands? It is still there, and at the same time it 
is there no longer, it is nowhere. That object, that thing made of paper ... that 
object is no more, or at least as if it no longer existed, as long as I read the 
book. ... the book is no longer a material reality. (1 02) 
Poulet' s assertion that the book is "no longer a material reality" at the point of reading is, 
however, equivocal. As Beckett was aware one could equally assert that the book is only 
witnessed as material reality at this point, this being the point at which this object is blankly 
seen yet remains unperceived, being unencumbered by meaning or the meaningful concept 
'book': it is, as Blanchot delineates it, a "non-absent absence" (Infinite Conversation 422). It 
should be noted that this factor is, specifically, peculiar to the act to writing: in Proust for 
example Beckett asserts, the "subject and object . . . are separated by the subject's 
consciousness of perception, and the object loses its purity and becomes a mere intellectual 
pretext or motive" (Proust 74). Yet within the reading process the reader is not conscious of 
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perception because of the split between what the eye sees and what the mind apprehends, and 
the purity of the object, therefore, is not reduced to the concept. In this context Plato's 
warning, in the Phaedrus, against allowing the eroticism of writing to usurp the role of the 
Forms should be recalled, for it is hardly coincidental that Beckett' s language, in writing of 
Proust, should echo the Platonic: 
'Enchantments of reality' has the air of a paradox. But when the object is 
perceived as particular and unique and not merely the member of a family, 
when it appears independent of any general notion and detached from the 
sanity of a cause, isolated and inexplicable in the light of ignorance, then and 
then only may it be a source of enchantment. Unfortunately Habit has laid its 
veto on this form of perception, its action being precisely to hide its essence -
the Idea - of the object in the haze of conception - preconception. ~roust 22-
23) 
Yet if it is the act of reading which prevents any conceptual awareness of the object in 
front of us, then it is evident that the only means of seeing the book in this manner is to insert 
the text into the reader's consciousness in order that the "Concept", or the "Habit" which 
Proust rejects "in favour of the Idea" ~roust 81) can be stripped away: "Not possible except 
as a figment. Not endurable. Nothing for it but to close the eye and see her. Her and the rest" 
(Ill Seen Ill Said 74). We "close the eye" in reading, becoming unconscious to what we are 
looking at in order that we may "see her", which is to bring the woman into imaginary or 
textual being via this act of reading. As a result we are allowed to blankly witness the reality 
of the book at this point. The aporia of this situation then, is that the book can only be 
present to vision in this manner if we remain unconscious as to its presence, for the moment 
that it is conceptually apprehended as a book this blank vision is lost. The book must be 
hidden from meaningful awareness, masked by the text, in order that it can be stripped of this 
conceptuality and seen. 
It is evident, therefore, that any attempt to meaningfully approach this 'pure' vision 
via the text, to allow in that which is "already there" (Driver 219), reinstates conceptuality 
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and erases this vision into meaning. Beckett, therefore, allows the text to covertly act as a 
placebo for the book, referring to that which is being witnessed yet maintaining the distance 
between what the eye sees and what the mind registers in order that this vision does not 
betray itself to conceptuality or awareness. In other words, in order to be "ill seen" (i.e. not 
meaningfully registered, unperceived) the book needs to be "ill said", or it will be "ill seen" 
(i.e. meaningfully seen): "She is vanishing. With the rest. The already ill seen bedimmed and 
ill seen again annulled. The mind betrays the treacherous eyes and the treacherous word their 
treacheries. Haze sole certitude. The same that reigns beyond the pastures" (88). This 
quotation gives some impression of the fine balance that Beckett is trying to maintain here 
via the spectrality which is the woman: our "mind betrays" our "eyes" in the act of reading 
and the "treacherous word" of the text will betray their treacheries, transforming the book 
from that which is "ill seen bedimmed" (i.e. unperceived) into that which is "ill seen ... 
annulled" (i.e. perceived/conceptualised) unless the treacherous word 'woman' remains in 
place, veiling the book from cognisance while illicitly referring to it. In order to see the 
"haze" that we are blankly witnessing beyond the "zone of pasture" (which, it should be 
noted, is where "she", the book, "is best to be seized" (63)), the text must continually distract 
attention from what we are seeing: "What is it defends her? Even from her own. Averts the 
intent gaze. Incriminates the dearly won. Forbids divining her. What but life ending. Hers" 
(64). As this quotation suggests the woman is utilised within the text in a manner which 
hovers between her function as an enactment of the reality of the book and her function as a 
mask for the book. This duality is enacted in the obvious contradiction between the fact that 
she cannot be divined and the narrator' si our awareness of her, which implies that she has 
been divined. Yet our awareness of the woman, and our awareness that she is a woman, only 
occurs as a result of the fact that the book is being read: the woman only exists in her purely 
imaginary form by virtue of the fact that we are looking at the book even as it is translated to 
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a text: "Close it for good this filthy eye of flesh. What forbids? Careful" (74). "What forbids" 
is suggested by the self-exhortation "Careful", being that to which the narrator cannot refer 
without erasing our meaningless view of its reality, that from which the "intent gaze" is 
averted by the woman, and that which constitutes the reality of the "undivined" woman, the 
book: "She is there. Again. Let the eye from its vigil be distracted a moment" (66). It is this 
reality, that which we are looking at in the very act of reading these words, from which we 
are "distracted" by the woman, and that Beckett places the undivined "real" woman into this 
conceptual space merely testifies to its absolute mystery, for one's blank view of the book 
never comes into meaningful being, even as one cannot close one's eye to it: 
Slaving away forever in the same place. At this and that trace. And what if the 
eye could not? No more tear itself away from the remains of trace. Of what 
was never. Quick say it suddenly can and farewell say say farewell. If only to 
the face. Of her tenacious trace (96) 
What the book is a trace of is apparent in the identification of that which "Forbids 
divining her", the text, as "life ending" (64). This identification is symptomatic ofthe manner 
in which the initiation of self-awareness or, analogously, of the reading process through 
which we become aware of the woman, constitutes an erasure of the reality of the self/ the 
book. Both remain undivined by virtue of our 'awareness' of them. To become aware of the 
woman in the act of reading, or to become self-aware via signification/ writing, is, to utilise 
Malone's phrase, to give "birth to into death" (Malone 285). We are born "into death" in the 
act of coming to awareness since we erase any possibility of affirming one's own reality 
through this act, and we also to give birth "to . . . death" as a factor which can be imagined 
but not divined. As Freud asserts "Our own death is indeed unimaginable, and whenever we 
make the attempt to imagine it we can perceive that we really survive as spectators" 
(Collected Papers 304-305). Yet to imply that our consciousness of death inherently implies 
our inability to be authentically aware of it, then this cannot be applied in this case for we are 
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unconscious spectators of the inapprehensible book. In bringing the woman into imaginary 
being we "Close [the eye] for good and all and see her to death" (74), a remark which points 
to the thanatological nature of the book, for in this context the significance of the tomb to 
which the woman insistently returns becomes apparent: 
Changed the stone that draws her when revisited alone. Or she who changes it 
when side by side .... Granite of no common variety assuredly. Black as jade 
the jasper that flecks its whiteness. On its what is the wrong word its uptilted 
face obscure graffiti. Scrawled by the ages for the eye to solicit in vain . . 
Such ill seen the stone alone where it stands at the far fringe of the pastures. 
(84-85) 
The eye, as opposed to the mind, solicits meaning in vain, seeing the "obscure graffiti" 
without meaningfully perceiving its materiality, and it does so by virtue of the fact that the 
mind does not solicit in vain, perceiving this materiality as the meaning which is the text. 
It should be noted however that the "death" implied here is not simply the cessation 
of consciousness but our own meaningless corporeality. That the eye solicits in vain indicates 
the meaningless physicality of our sensations at this point, the fact that these sensations bear 
no relation to that which the mind apprehends through them, for we may be conscious of 
what the book says to us, the text, but we are not conscious of our immediate experience of 
the book itself The book and our physical experience of it are, therefore, restored to their 
meaningless reality at these points, points at which not only the reality of the book becomes 
inapprehensible, but also "Unspeakable globe" (95) which blankly witnesses this reality. It is 
at the precise point of reading that we are unconscious of what we see and unconscious of 
ourselves in relation to what we see, our minds being elsewhere. This fact is also ironically 
reflected later on in the book when the woman imaginatively re-enacts the unperceived yet 
seen tomb of which she has been unaware and in doing so averts her eyes from the lamb 
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which follows her, another imaginative allegory of the reality which is erased/ restored with 
every textual utterance: 
One evening she was followed by a lamb .... It halts at the same instant as 
she. At the same instant as she strays on. Stockstill as she it waits with head 
like hers extravagantly bowed. Clash of black and white that far from muting 
the last rays amplify. . . . Does she see the white body at her feet? Head 
haughty now she gazes into emptiness. That profusion. Or with closed eyes 
sees the tomb. (79) 
To this extent, if we accept Berkeley's assertion that 'esse est percipi', both the book and 
ourselves can be considered inexistent by virtue of the fact that neither are being recognised 
that they can be said to meaningfully exist. We cease to appoint meaning to ourselves or to 
conceptualise ourselves: accordingly, the woman, like the reader at this point (or as the 
reader) "[w]ith herself ... has no more converse. Never had much. Now none" (61). Like the 
reader at the point of reading these lines, she remains wholly unaware of herself by virtue of 
her awareness of the text, a factor which is contrasted with our usual self-awareness ("never 
had much"). 
Yet it ts inaccurate to say that these factors are inexistent for it would be more 
accurate to assert that they are no more existent than that of which we (or the woman) are 
aware of through the text at this point: for Beckett's text can be seen as a hieroglyph ofwhat 
is occurring beyond awareness at the point of reading, being an allegory of the reading 
process as a purely physical phenomenon. To this extent the figure of the woman is not 
merely an imaginary enactment of the witnessed reality of the book, but of our own 
physicality during the reading process, that which we are not consciously acknowledging by 
virtue of the text. The reader, therefore, is the woman at the point of reading, the woman 
being an allegory of the figure of the reader at the point when she is brought into imaginative 
existence via the reading process. What "defends" the woman, "[ e ]ven from her own', is that 
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which defends us from our own and "averts the intent gaze" from our own physicality at the 
point of reading - the text or the imaginary enactment of the woman/ ourselves: 
To the imaginary stranger the dwelling appears deserted. Under constant 
watch it betrays no sign of life. . . . Watches all night in vain for the least 
glimmer. Returns at last to his own and avows, No one. She shows herself 
only to her own. But she has no own. Yes yes she has one. And who has her. 
(62) 
The imaginary stranger is, of course, the physical reality of the reader at the point of reading 
these words, that which cannot enter into textuality at the point of reading, except as that 
which is imagined. It is apparent from this that the narratorial reticence about referring to the 
book is also applicable to the reader or the reading process itself We must remain 
unconscious to ourselves and our own physicality in relation to the book, not in order to 
avoid any apprehension of these factors (since they cannot be meaningfully apprehended 
without their blank physicality being erased) but in order that we do not become conceptually 
aware of them, thus negating their unconscious 'presence' during the act of reading. This, of 
course, is not to be unconscious but is merely to fail to appoint meaning to this reality. This is 
why the phrase "[r]eturns at last to his own" is imbued with irony: it implies the cessation of 
the reading process, yet the imaginary stranger is no less imaginary for this return, continuing 
to avow "[n ]o one" at the point that self-awareness is supposedly reinstated. The only 
difference between this imaginary awareness of the self and that which occurs during the 
reading process is that the latter masks this status and thus prevents any conceptualisation of 
our physical reality, the difference between having no converse with the self and having little 
converse with the self Yet, like the book, this reality is covertly enacted within the text as the 
woman: we are imagined as the woman, and if we are an imaginary stranger to ourselves at 
this point then so is she. The reader (the "imaginary stranger") ceases to witness the woman 
(who is an "imaginary stranger" to herself) and ironically coincides with this imaginary 
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enactment of his or her own physical presence. More accurately, in reading this passage we 
coincide with her/ our inability to apprehend herself/ ourselves at the point of reading, except 
as the anonymous and "imaginary stranger", who as phrase implies, is not there. We could 
also apply this to the figure of the narrator, who we also become in reading the text, and who 
is certainly an "imaginary stranger", being no less unreal and no less anonymous than the 
figure that he ironically imagines. Every imaginary figure is, therefore, telescoped into the 
absolute anonymous self-identity of our own physical presence, "the body that scandal" (75) 
as we become, in some sense, present at our own absence via the text. There is, therefore, no 
one in at the woman's dwelling by virtue of the fact that this imaginary stranger (who is the 
woman, the narrator and the reader) cannot meaningfully apprehend its own physical 
presence, because it is imagining this presence via the text. 
As this suggests, at the point of reading our minds are 'elsewhere' as the reading 
situation, the materiality of the book and our own physical presence, escape the meaningful 
recognition through which they can be said (ill said) to exist; they remain, in terms of 'esse 
est percipi', inexistent. We are, like the "imaginary stranger" not there and this is precisely 
what is occurring to us at the point of reading, as we are defended, even from our own 
presence, by the textual awareness of ourselves or, synonymously, by our awareness of the 
imaginary woman/ narrator/ stranger. The reader, therefore, is absent by virtue of this failure 
to be meaningfully aware of its own physicality at the point of reading, and this lack of 
awareness is enacted within the text which is being read, the very text which distracts from 
this self-awareness. Through these means the characters are allowed to absolutely coincide 
with our 'absent' physicality, or, alternatively, our physicality is allowed to coincide with 
these 'absent' characters, the dividing line between the real and the imaginary becoming 
blurred: "Such the confusion now between real and -how say its contrary? No matter. That 
old tandem. Such now the confusion between them once so twain" (82). What is defended by 
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this imaginary awareness can be compared to the empty room which figures in the stock 
philosophical question of proving the existence of the unperceived: the room's unperceived 
status remains intact even as the reader is present, the reader being a purely physical presence 
who is no more conscious of itself at the point of reading than it is of the room that it 
inhabits. It is no coincidence therefore that the woman's home, "The cabin", is "at the 
inexistent cent er of a formless place", a designation which need not merely apply to the 
purely fictional but also to that which is inexistent in the Berkeley' s sense, that which is 
unperceived and has no formal (i.e. meaningfully witnessed) existence. The irony of this 
enactment of the reader's situation is, again, signalled by self-exhortation and also by the fact 
that the narrative immediately formalizes this "formless place", a reflection of the purely 
intelligible nature of any textual enactment of the reader's situation, the reason why it cannot 
be referred to in any direct manner: "The cabin. Its situation. Careful. On. At the inexistent 
center of a formless place. Rather more circular than otherwise finally. Flat to be sure" (58). 
That this 'inexistent' and 'formless' place is never purely imaginary, merely bearing no 
relation to the formality of the text which 'ill says' it, is reflected in the narrator's inability to 
affirm that the woman, the stones, the "hovel", and indeed "[t]he lot' are purely imaginary: 
If only she could be pure figment. Unalloyed. In the madhouse of the skull 
and nowhere else ... Cooped up there with the rest. Hovel and stones. The lot. 
And the eye. How simple all then. If only all could be pure figment. Neither 
be nor been nor by any shift to be. Gently gently. On. Careful. (67) 
Notably, this list includes the physicality of the eye itself, thus suggesting the manner 
in which this eye is necessary within the act of reading in order that we can be aware of these 
imaginary factors at all. The irony is that the eye is one of these imaginary factors (since it is 
textually enacted here), demonstrating that the physical reality of the reading process cannot 
be apprehended within the reading process except on the imaginary level, and this is no more 
than a reflection of our inability to meaningfully apprehend our own physicality within our 
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own physicality except as an imaginary construct: "The most ideal tautology presupposes a 
relation and the affirmation of equality involves only an approximate identification, and by 
asserting unity denies unity" (Proust 70). 
Moreover, that the book does not escape this absolute self-identity is reflected in the 
fact that the woman "shows herself only to her own", a remark which is demonstrative of the 
manner in which the witnessed meaninglessness of the book mirrors the meaninglessness of 
the "filthy eye of flesh" which blankly sees it, both becoming self-identical: "But she has no 
own. Yes yes she has one. And who has her" (62). This "one" is the "imaginary stranger", 
the physicality which never apprehends itself by virtue of the fact that it always is itself, 
continually sublimating this self-identity in the self-fiction which is the text, in the same 
manner that the reality of the reading process is textually allegorised within the reality of this 
process. As the narrator later asserts in attempting to explain the appearance of this textual 
spectre of reality: "For what reason? For one not far to seek. For others then said obscure. 
One other above all. One other still far to seek. Analogy of the heart? The skull?" (92). The 
physicality of the self is "not far to seek" and "still far to seek", inapprehensible because of 
its punctuality, absent because of its absolute self-presence, a presence which is continually 
"said obscure". As Beckett asserts, utilising the words of Proust: "We cannot know and we 
cannot be known. "Man is the creature that cannot come forth from himself, who knows 
others only in himself, and who, if he asserts the contrary, lies" (Proust 66). 
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CONCLUSION 
THE EXIGENCY OF THE ARCHE-TRACE AND THE EXIGENCY OF THE LOGOS 
How legitimate is writing's claim to the rights of reality? Can it finally expunge the 
potentiality that contests these rights? In light of Derrida's allegation that "il n 'y a pas de 
hors-texte" (literally, 'there is no outside-text') (Grammatology 158), it would seem that the 
more overt ambiguity of the English translation, which, in an all-too-Beckettian fashion, can 
be self-consciously read as referring to 'nothing' as an existential phenomenon ('there is 
nothing outside of the text') is more appropriate. For, while we can never conceptualise the 
'reality' of textuality, a reality that lies beyond the conceptual margins of its own form, this 
does not invalidate, or more importantly, allow us to escape our awareness of its possibility, 
even if we simultaneously concede that this possibility is, within consciousness, unviable. 
Our analyses would seem to suggest, therefore, that writing can no more lay claim to these 
rights than consciousness itself This becomes apparent when one considers Derrida's claim 
for writing in light of its inherently speculative, theoretical nature, a consideration which 
reveals the fallacy of accepting or applying theory without taking this theoretical nature into 
account, a fallacy which not only affects the texts read but one's interpretation of the 
philosophical role of writing itself The hypothetical status of writing's 'rights to reality' 
reflects the hypothetical status of consciousness' claims to these rights, a parity which 
historically assigns writing its literary value, for it ts writing which exteriorises 
consciousness' failure to claim reality for itself. 
If there is one thing that is certain about writing in the narrow sense it is that its 
historical advent allows for the full articulation of a consciousness that is no longer 
constrained by its own immediacy, by the limits of memory or the empirical. As Nietzsche 
demonstrates, writing constitutes the means through which consciousness can now explore its 
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own failure to be installed within these rights of reality, thus constructing its own 
possibilities and consequently fulfilling its potentiality. As Nietzsche also recognises, and as 
Beckett demonstrates, it is the nebulous yet undeniable possibility of reality which constitutes 
the space from which these potentialities are sublimated: to utilise an image which is used by 
Giorgio Agamben in his description of Aristotle's writing, the author dips his pen in thought 
(214), a thought which, of course, incorporates its own ambiguity, its irresolute nature, its 
potentiality. If one considers writing in this context it becomes apparent that Plato's 
Phaedrus does not constitute the originary moment of writing's repression but is rather an 
attempt to protect the imaginative space that writing exteriorises, a space which, as his 
identification of myth with the oral tradition suggests, had not previously existed. It is the 
reduction of writing to reality, as myth becomes reality within the oral tradition, which Plato 
opposes. It is deeply ironic, therefore, that Derrida should interpret this refusal of writing's 
'rights to reality' as the repression of writing: such a refusal constitutes a recognition of the 
value of writing, an acceptance of its reduction of reality to a potentiality, a potentiality 
which is negated if one attempts to finally resolve the pharmaceutical question of writing, 
that which is also the pharmaceutical question of the origin. As all of the authors under 
discussion demonstrate this question can never be finally resolved, a fact which Derrida is 
forced to acknowledge in admitting the inherently speculative nature of his thought Such 
speculation is facilitated by the very reality that writing and consciousness retain as a 
potentiality, the potential status of the logos assigning writing its status as potentiality in 
every sense of the word. It is this recognition that opens up the possibility that the 
'repression' which characterises the logocentric episteme is actually indicative of the manner 
in which the retention of a possible reality is recognised to be that which constitutes our own 
possibility, this being the very fact that writing exteriorises. That the question of writing 
rarely arises within this metaphysical tradition is not as sign of its debasement, but of its 
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pervasive influence on human consciousness. If this is the case, then the extension of writing 
to a limitless text which is uncontested by any other potentiality, constitutes the closure of 
writing, the final actualisation which philosophy, and more importantly, literature has always 
resisted. 
It is Derrida's failure to acknowledge all of the possibilities that we have discussed, 
his refusal to acknowledge that it may be the possibility of presence which has prevented any 
closure to textuality, which underlies his, and others', misinterpretation of the authors that we 
have discussed, a misinterpretation which is merely a manifestation of a more general 
misinterpretation of the historical significance of writing itself This is not to assert that 
Derrida' s theory of writing is wrong, for as has been demonstrated, this theory is allowed as 
a possibility by the writers under discussion. It is rather that these writers can only 
acknowledge the Derridean approach to writing as a possibility, a freedom that Derrida does 
not grant to himself or to writing itself 
For Derrida, writing, in its historicity, constitutes the means through which the 
general text is exteriorised, the identification of this limitless field of signification with 
writing being based on writing's methodological role in exteriorising this field. For Derrida, 
the historical usurpation of reality by writing thus reflects the theoretical role of the arche-
trace, the usurpation which must be methodologically posited as a means of gaining access to 
the limitless text, such a positing being the only means of demonstrating that this usurpation 
has always already occurred, that the origin has always already gone: 
. . . the value of the transcendental arche [ archie] must make its necessity felt 
before letting itself be erased. The concept of the arche-trace must comply 
with both that necessity and that erasure. . . . The trace is not only the 
disappearance of the origin - within the discourse that we sustain and 
according to path that we follow it means that the origin did not even 
disappear, that it was never constituted except reciprocally by a nonorigin, the 
trace, which thus becomes the origin of the origin. From then on, to wrench 
the concept of the trace from the classical scheme, which would derive it from 
a presence or from an originary nontrace . . . one must indeed speak of an 
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originary trace or arche-trace. Yet we know that that concept destroys its 
name and that, if all begins with the trace, there is above all no originary trace. 
(Grammatology 61) 
As Derrida's remarks imply, the methodological value of the arche-trace means that it is a 
theorem that command5 assent, not being a potentiality (in the sense that it can be denied), 
but rather an integral absence. Derrida must admit the usurpation of the origin (and thus the 
origin itself) only that he can reveal that such a usurpation entails that there has never been 
an origin (and thus no usurpation ofthis origin): 
. . . a thought of the trace can no more break with a transcendental 
phenomenology than be reduced to it . ... to pose the problem in terms of 
choice, to oblige or to believe oneself obliged to answer it by a yes or no, to 
conceive of appurtenance as an allegiance or nonappurtenance as plain 
speaking, is to confuse very different levels, paths and styles. In the 
deconstruction ofthe arche, one does not make a choice. (Grammatology 62) 
Yet even as Derrida implies the necessity of the arche-trace in asserting that "one does not 
make a choice" in this matter, he reveals that this necessity is itself a matter of choice, it 
being more accurate to assert that one does not make this choice if one wishes to deconstruct 
the arche. That the "value" of the arche-trace only manifests itself "within the discourse that 
we sustain and according to path that we follow" reveals that this value is methodological 
rather than a philosophical, the arche-trace being a means of intervening in the text that the 
ontological pre-suppositions on which this text rests can be deconstructed: the arche-trace" . 
. . must leave a track in the text. Without that track, abandoned to the simple content of its 
conclusions, the ultra-transcendental text will so closely resemble the precritical text as to be 
indistinguishable from it" (Grammatology 61 ). The onus here is on avoiding the 
transcendental assumptions on which the pre-critical (i.e. the undeconstructed) text is based, 
refusing to permit the possibility of any limiting pre- or extra- textual reality that can contest 
the text's installation within the rights of reality. 
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As our examination of Beckett has demonstrated, the pre-critical text and its author 
are under no comparable obligation, the deconstruction of any presumptive logos being the 
obligation of the deconstructive critic rather than his object. This is not to say that the notion 
of the arche-trace has no philosophical validity, that it is imposed on the text from an 
external source or that this notion is a purely instrumental means of deconstructing the 
primary text. On the contrary, all of these texts incorporate the problematic which is the 
arche-trace and in doing so leave themselves open to deconstruction or to deconstructive 
interpretation, Derrida being correct in maintaining that his theories of writing are intrinsic to 
the primary texts that he studies. As a result of this incorporation, all of these writers share 
the Derridean view that writing is the historical factor that reveals the supplement at/ of the 
origin, this being the exigency of writing. This is why Plato accepts myth rather than any 
rational explanation of the origin, why Nietzsche acknowledges that his textual self has a de 
jure priority over his putative physical presence, and why the Beckettian narrator has no 
apparent being to himself (and indeed no apparent 'self) beyond language. This usurpatory 
status of writing and the relationship of this usurpation to the representational status of 
consciousness extends the significance of writing beyond its commonplace definition as a 
supplement to speech or mere marks on the page. It is this recognition of the philosophical 
significance of writing which facilitates Derrida's deconstructive readings of Plato and 
Nietzsche or, in Beckett's case, which facilitate post-structuralist readings that draw on 
Derrida' s theory of writing. 
What these texts contest, therefore, is not the arche-trace but rather the necessity of 
the arche-trace, all of the writers in question demonstrating that the usurpation of the logos, 
and the resultant contention that the logos has always already been usurped, is no more 
verifiable than the logos itself In the absence of the methodological necessity of accepting 
the arche-trace, this trace is reduced to a mere possibility which necessarily permits the 
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correlate possibility of the origin, Derrida's assertion that the ""[u]surpation" has always 
already begun", in itself, entailing that there has never been a verifiable usurpation of the 
origin, there being no means of eliminating the possibility that the origin has not been 
usurped. Neither of these possibilities can be affirmed or denied; it is rather the case that 
these texts reduce Derrida's theory to a theory, a hypothesis, an irresolvable possibility. 
Where these authors differ from Derrida is in the translation of this recognition of the 
supplement at/ of the origin to the assertion that there is, and has never been, an origin. This 
is the distinctive contribution that deconstructive readings make to our awareness of the 
nature of these texts, although, as we have seen, Derrida's assertion that he is ""too close" to 
be able to "write, sign, countersign performatively texts which "respond" to Beckett' . " 
("This Strange Institution" 60) implies that no such contribution can be made to the 
Beckettian text, there apparently being no question that Beckettian textuality has ever 
resisted this translation. Similarly, this translation is often taken as an unquestioned article of 
faith by post-structuralist critics, as though the existence of the supplement at/ of the origin 
proves the absence of any origin, the reduction of any pre-textual reality to that which has 
never been. Derrida is not alone in this assumption, as becomes apparent in Barthes' 
assertion that, 
[a]s soon as a fact is narrated no longer with a view to acting on reality but 
intransitively, that is to say, finally outside any function other than that of the 
very practice of the symbol itself, the disconnection occurs, the voice loses its 
origin, the author enters into his own death, writing begins. ("The Death of the 
Author"145) 
Theory, here, is translated into unquestioned fact, there being no question that the origin can 
continue to exist in the presence of its supplement. Yet if writing entails the 'death of the 
Author' then, for Derrida, this death has always already occurred, there being no 'before' the 
text by virtue of the supplement at/ of the origin: "Writing did not 'enter' philosophy, it was 
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already there. This is what we have to think about - about how it went unrecognised, and the 
attempts to repudiate it" (A Taste for the Secret 8). The exigency ofthe arche-trace is that it 
facilitates the translation in question, being that which contests any repudiation by allowing 
the notion of any pre-textual reality to be usurped by the notion of an arche-text, a writing 
which is always already in place no matter how much one excavates this origin. It is, 
therefore, no longer a 'self that speaks, but an unbounded text which usurps the originary 
position of this self and the originary position of reality itself 
Nevertheless, our examination of this notion of usurpation m relation to Plato, 
Nietzsche and Beckett raises significant questions with regards to the justification of this 
translation. We must ask, for example, whether the arche-trace allows a recognition that the 
origin has always already been usurped or whether the arche-trace actually facilitates this 
usurpation of reality by the arche-text. How can we verify that the arche-text is not a 
theoretical product of this intervention, the absence of any logos consequently being no less 
of a speculation than the logos itself? On what basis, other than a desire to contest the logos, 
does one make a judgement on this issue? Is it the case that a reading based on the exigency 
of the arche-trace is, as Sean Burke puts it, "an act of critical choice governed by the 
protocols of a certain way ofreading rather than any 'truth ofwriting"' 1 (Death and Return of 
the Author 176)? In the absence of any final answer to these questions there is always the 
danger that the argument for the arche-text can be reduced to the prosaic observation that we 
can have no access to the reality of an absent past or the observation that we can have no 
access to reality apart from the mediation of representation. Even if we accepted this theorem 
as being epistemologically valid it remains the case that any delineation of the arche-trace 
consists of the positing of an origin and of a usurpation of the origin only in order to reveal 
that these factors have never existed or occurred: yet does not the fact that one can begin with 
the origin and logically demonstrate the means through which this linguistic non-existence 
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can arise, in itse[[, imply the origin's ontological possibility to precisely the same extent as it 
implies its linguistic impossibility? To take a Nietzschean view of this, the body's inability to 
apprehend or actualise itself within its own presence may mean that it is impossible for the 
body to exist to itself, the reason why the text, even in the presence of the body, possesses a 
de jure 'right to reality': yet as Nietzsche was clearly aware, this fact does not permit one to 
unequivocally say that the pre-textual body does not exist which is why he retains this 
possibility in order to facilitate his own redemption. 
Clearly, these are questions for the deconstructive critic rather than the writers in 
question, for it is the critic, rather than the pre-critical text or the author of that text, which is 
subject to the methodological exigency which is the arche-trace, that which refutes the 
possibility of any limiting pre- or extra- textual reality which can contest the text's historical 
installation within the rights of reality. The Derridean perspective is always complemented 
by another perspective, another possibility, any installation of writing within the rights of 
reality only occurring at the expense of a 'bracketing ofP of one possibility in order that the 
other possibility can be resolved. It is implying the necessity of the arc he-trace, the exigency 
of avoiding transcendental assumptions, that this 'bracketing ofP takes place, transforming 
the text from a mode of potentiality into an "ultra-transcendental text" which "overruns all 
limits assigned to it ... "(Derrida "Living on- Border Lines" 257). As we saw in the case of 
Nietzsche, such a 'bracketing ofP of any possible reality is facilitated by writing; yet, as 
Nietzsche also demonstrates, this acceptance of one possibility over the other, the acceptance 
of the text's 'rights to reality' over reality's 'rights to reality', is also derived from 
methodological considerations rather than from ontological considerations. Whereas Plato 
attempts to 'bracket ofP the pharmakon which is the irresolvable (and thus irrelevant) 
question of the origin, passively accepting the text's status as a mode of potentiality in order 
that he can concentrate on the contextual truth of a particular example of writing, Nietzsche 
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actively accepts the text's status as a mode of potentiality, utilising the inherent and 
irresolvable aporia between the two possibilities which inhabit the text as a means of 
ultimately resolving one possibility in favour of the other. He redeems the potentiality which 
is the body (the selj) in a process of self-overcoming, of writing/ redemption, a process which 
not only entails an acceptance of the text's 'rights to reality', ofthe Derrideanpossibility, but 
also of the arche-trace' s complementary possibility, there being no redemptive self-
overcoming without a self which can be overcome, an origin which can be redeemed. This is 
why the redeemed textual subject (e.g. Zarathustra) can only possess a de jure right to reality 
in Nietzsche 's own presence, there being no de facto installation of the text within the rights 
to reality as long as the possibility of the origin remains in place. It is in accepting the text's 
de jure rights to reality (thus 'bracketing off' the origin) while simultaneously retaining the 
text's de facto status as a mode of potentiality that Nietzsche facilitates his own redemption. 
In the case of Derrida, however, the failure to recognise the methodological value of 
the arche-trace is the reason why the text's status as a mode of potentiality is overlooked, 
most clearly, as we have seen, in the case of Beckett. The frequency with which the 
ambivalent status of Beckettian textuality in relation to reality is critically resolved in favour 
of the Derridean possibility, the acceptance that Beckett's writing unequivocally conforms to 
the notion of an "ultra-transcendental" text which is wholly unanchored from any pre- or 
extra- textual reality, is indicative of the manner in which the exigency of the arche-trace for 
deconstructive readings is frequently taken as the exigency of the text itself, the 'truth of 
writing'. As David Watson puts it: "What the text is 'about' then, is no longer some 
originary, given reality, but rather itself as language, as a structure of signification as a 
process of the prior construction of that reality" (Watson 24), a remark which is clearly 
derived from Derrida's assertion that "within the discourse that we sustain and according to 
path that we follow ... the origin did not even disappear ... it was never constituted except 
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reciprocally by a nonorigin, the trace, which thus becomes the origin of the origin". Yet 
W at son's usurpatory interpretation of the Beckettian text stands in stark contrast to the 
Beckettian narrator's frequent assertions of his pre-natal status, his incessant inability to 
verify that he has ever left the origin or ceased to coincide with himself: "I gave up before 
birth, it is not possible otherwise ... It was he who wailed, he who saw the light, I didn't 
wail, I didn't see the light, it's impossible I should have a voice, impossible I should have 
thoughts, and speak and think ... (Fizzles 234). The post-structuralist confidence that we are 
dealing with a text "without origin - or which, at least, has no origin than language itself . . . 
" (Barthes "The Death of the Author" 146) is, therefore, rarely shared by the Beckettian 
narrator, and when it is, this confidence is fleeting, being quickly undercut by the inescapable 
and irresolvable possibility of the origin and one's implication in this origin. For Beckett, the 
arche-trace is split, representing, on one hand, the possibility of a usurpation that has always 
already occurred, a text without limit, and, on the other hand, the inescapable origin itself, a 
usurpation or a 'birth' which has never occurred in the sense that has incessantly yet to 
verifiably occur. The latter possibility always reasserts itself as a result of the inherently 
hypothetical nature of the former possibility, the denial of this hypothetical status (via the 
exigency which is the arche-trace) being a methodological consideration of the critic rather 
the Beckettian text2. The possibility of the origin thus postpones any acceptance of the text's 
'rights to reality' or any final deconstruction of the logos, sustaining itself as a mode of 
potentiality which is open to both of the possibilities in question: as the Unnamable puts it in 
articulating this equivocal position: " ... I who am on my way, words bellying out my sails, 
am also that unthinkable ancestor of whom nothing can be said" (l!nnamable 355). 
Evidently, this logocentric aspect ofBeckettian textuality is not merely a consequence 
of historical determination, an inability to escape the conceptual resources or the language of 
metaphysics: indeed, this aspect of Beckettian textuality most clearly manifests itself in the 
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performative nature of these writings rather in their surface meaning, Beckett utilising our 
relationship with the very text in front of us as a means of exteriorising our inability to either 
affirm or deny the logos in question, thus replicating the position of the narrator himself A 
recognition of the nature of this performativity not only reveals the nature of the double bind 
in which the narrator is caught in relation to the logos, that which defines the text's status as 
a mode of potentiality, but also the significance of writing for Beckett. There is, of course, no 
question of the potential origin which is the narrator himself (or the author) being present 
during the readerly performance of the text, just as he apparently cannot be present in the 
narrative situation itself: indeed, that the origin is 'absent' in both cases is the basis of the 
immediacy of the Beckettian text, the sense that language no longer mediates a reality but 
constitutes this reality in the present. This absence is the also the basis of the significance of 
writing for Derrida, writing being the supplement at/ of the origin which reveals that one is 
not present even in one's own 'presence'. To read Beckett on this basis alone, however, is to 
overlook the double bind in which the Beckettian narrator always finds himself, thus 
succumbing to the "easing of the mind and of life" (14 7) against which Christopher Ricks 
warns post -structuralist interpreters of Beckett. If the absence of any apparent origin could be 
result of the narrator's inability to escape his own, incessantly potential, presence, this being 
a de jure rather than a de facto usurpation, then indistinguishably, even if the originary 
usurpation in question has (or, as Derrida argues, has always already) occurred then there is 
no means of verifying this usurpation, the potentiality which is this presence remaining in 
place. One may, therefore, possibly escape the origin but one can never escape the possibility 
that is the origin. To recall Molloy: 
. . . . if it is true that regions gradually merge into one another, and this 
remains to be proved, then I will have left my region many times, thinking I 
was still within it. But I preferred to abide by my simple feeling and its voice 
that said, Molloy, your region is vast, you have never left it and you never 
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shall. And wheresoever you wander, within its distant limits, things will 
always appear the same, precisely. (Molloy 65) 
There is, therefore, no solution to the aporetic situation in which the Beckettian narrator finds 
himself, no meta-assertion which can disentangle him from the frame of contradiction in 
which the subject constantly oscillates between the affirmation and denial of the origin, the 
affirmation and denial of its absence. Indeed, it is the inability to verify any usurpation which 
affords Beckett the means of transposing the equivocal situation of the narrator onto the 
performative situation of the reader, the materiality of the text or the reading situation 
frequently taking on the status of this potential origin. It is not merely the case, as in Derrida, 
that the absence of the origin in the reading situation is transposed onto the original situation, 
revealing the usurpatory supplement at/ of the origin3; rather, the original situation, 
incorporating the potentiality which is the origin, is transposed onto the reading situation, 
thus performatively revealing the double bind in which consciousness is caught, the manner 
in which an inability to verifY the usurpation of the origin leaves the origin in place as a 
potentiality even if this usurpation has occurred (there being no question the origin of the text 
in front of us being present). In this Beckett follows Plato, who also recognises the 
unverifiable status of this usurpation in enacting the myth of the cicadas, they who continue 
to sing even after they have died (Phaedrus 259b-ct. Plato utilises this equivocality, 
writing's inability to affirm its own usurpatory status, in order to transpose the situation in 
which the myth of Thamus is recited (or the myth of Thamus itself) onto the our performative 
reading of the Phaedrus; the erotic movement towards the origin (indistinguishably the 
materiality of the text or the past) which is initiated within the Phaedrus being replicated in 
the present reading situation, there being no textual verification that this origin has been 
usurped. Clearly, both of these authors recognise that the significance of writing lies not 
merely in its ability to suggest that the origin has been usurped but in its ability to exteriorise 
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our inability to verify this usurpation. In both cases, writing does not merely reflect a process 
of consciousness (if one can still use the term) that is not grounded in any extra-textual 
reality, for it simultaneously embodies this process of consciousness with all its fertile 
ambiguity, its inability to escape the potentiality that is the origin. The texts facilitate both 
readings, this being the very mode of potentiality in question. Evidently, therefore, there can 
be no simple transposition of textuality onto the process of consciousness here, this 
usurpation being another possibility. The usurpatory status of the 'internal text' is not nearly 
so assured as that of the 'external text', a fact that Nietzsche utilises in order to maintain the 
space between the pre-mortem and post-mortem 'texts', as space in which he can re-write 
and redeem himself5. 
Again, it is this divided nature of the Beckettian text which reveals that the writer is 
not subject to the same obligations as the deconstructive critic, the failure to recognise this 
fact being the reason why such critics frequently fail to note that Beckett' s novels are situated 
within a logocentric tradition, as is suggested by the Aristotelian or hylomorphic aspect of his 
novels. This logocentrism it should be noted, is not a question of the authorial intention (or 
the apparent authorial intention) that is frequently said to be undercut in post-structuralist 
readings of the primary text. As the Beckettian narrators recurrently demonstrate, there is no 
desire to repress the effects of writing on subjectivity or to maintain the logos, the desire 
being, rather, for an affirmation of either the presumptive logos itself or of the textual free 
play which has usurped (and has always already usurped) this logos, an unrestricted play 
which as these texts reveal, is no less presumptive than the logos itself Yet if Beckettian 
textuality is situated within a logocentric tradition then this is not to say that Beckett finds 
existential reassurance in the possibility of the logos or that he represses the effects of 
writing. As the futility of the Beckettian text incessantly demonstrates the possibility of a 
self-identical logos does not represent a solution to the linguistic aporia in which the narrator 
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frequently finds himself; on the contrary, such self-identity is acknowledged to be the very 
cause of this problem. Within this hypothesis the absence of the logos is not necessarily a 
consequence of the difference on which representation is contingent or the usurpation which 
this act of representation/ differentiation entails: both Nietzsche and Beckett acknowledge the 
inescapable possibility that this absence could equally be a consequence of the self-identical 
status ofthe origin. As the Unnamable puts it: 
I shall not say I again .... It will make no difference. Where I am there is no 
one but me, who am not. . . . Not to mention other things, many others, to 
which the abundance of matter has unfortunately up to now prohibited the 
least allusion. (Unnamable 358) 
Similarly, the Nietzschean body never escapes "the abundance of matter", transcending its 
own undifferentiated presence so that it can become present to itself: it produces, rather, the 
mask or the proxy for the body which is Zarathustra, he who remains inapprehensibly 
implicated in the body and thus has no de facto 'right to reality' in the body's own presence. 
Like the Beckett's textual 'proxies', the "tittle I thought I could put from me, in order to 
witness it" (Unnamable 305 My emphasis), Zarathustra can only be a nascent reality: "The 
time for me hasn't come yet: some are born posthumously" (Ecce Homo 715). The 
'difference' between origin and his representation is thus comparable to the hylomorphic 
'difference' between formal substance and matter within Aristotelian theory, this difference 
not being actual but rather an apparent product of matter's incessant inability to finally 
actualise itself as matter: ultimately substance and matter are inseparable, a self-identity 
which continually ensures that matter remains a potentiality rather than an actuality. 
Similarly, the Beckettian text frequently enacts the homogeneous, passive ground which lies 
behind and incorporates the figure of writing/ consciousness, identifying it with the 
incessantly potential origin in which the text, and the reader, is inapprehensibly implicated, 
that which remains 'other' to the differential activity of textuality only in the sense that it 
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cannot be represented. Beckett does not shy away from identifYing this ground with the pre-
textual material "mess" the indifference of which allows us an awareness that we cannot 
'think' our being by virtue of the fact that we can only unspeakably 'be' our thought. 
Respectively, we are "unable to act, obliged to act" ("Three Dialogues" 145). Again, this 
possibility does not disprove Derrida's anti-essentialist thesis but rather reveals that this 
thesis is itself a mere possibility, the Beckettian text being constantly torn between the 
possibilities of absence and immanence: "That should have been enough for him, to have 
found me absent, but it's not, he wants me there with him, with a form and a world, like him, 
in spite of him, me who am everything like him who is nothing" (Texts for Nothing 114t 
This is why, in reading Beckett, one cannot escape the sense that these novels are 
centred on the question of the logos, the origin which is never present because it never 
verifiably escapes its own, incessantly potential, presence. Watson's assertion that "what the 
text is 'about' . . . is no longer some originary, given reality" is undercut by our sense that 
this is all that many of Beckett's novels are about, Molloy's narrative journey being 
predicated on the possibility of his mother, the narrator of Company constantly trying to 
apprehend his 'otherness' to his own language, the Unnamable and Texts for Nothing 
incessantly meditating on the question of the unnameable origin, or Ill Seen Ill Said covertly 
enacting and admitting the very reality that it usurps. In all of these cases the narrator cannot 
deny the possibility of his de facto self-identical status, the texts constituting the revelation 
that the logos is no longer the solution to the problem but is the problem itself, an absolute 
which constantly proposes the non-identity within identity and, in doing so, always restates 
the possibility of self-identity. One could say that meaning is not, as in post-structuralism, 
that which constantly transgresses identity, but that which transgresses the opposition 
between identity and non-identity itself, and indeed any meaningful binary opposition, 
including those which post-structuralist theorists utilise to distinguish their own project from 
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the metaphysical epoch, for the profoundly aporetic nature of the Beckettian text also erases 
the distinction between the metaphysical and the non-metaphysicaL The self-identical logos 
of which man has dreamed is not the answer to the crisis of meaning or subjectivity, but is 
the fundamental metaphysical problem itself, that which is (possibly) always already silently 
attained and remains a problem because it is already attained. 
That this recognition of the radically indeterminate nature of the logos (or of its 
absence) is not a specifically modem phenomenon is indicated by Plato's refusal to enter into 
the pharmaceutical question of the origin except, that is, to performatively demonstrate the 
pointlessness of doing so, the manner in which this question erases the text's status as a mode 
of potentiality. Derrida concisely sums up the Platonic attitude to writing in asserting that: 
"This logocentrism, this epoch of full speech, has always placed in parenthesis, suspended, 
and suppressed for essential reasons, all free reflection on the origin and the status of writing 
... " (Grammatology 43). Yet Derrida fails to recognise that Plato does not suspend the 
question of the origin to which writing gives rise because this question contests the logos, but 
because this question can never be answered, the status of writing in relation to the origin 
being as irresolvable as the aporetic situation of the Beckettian narrator. Indeed, it is in 
suspending the question of the origin that Plato accepts its effects of writing, just as he 
accepts the hupomneme that is myth in suspending the question of its rational origins (230a). 
Plato accepts that there is no escape from writing, which is to say that there is no escape from 
the mode of potentiality that is human existence, the exigency of the arche-trace and the 
"ultra-transcendental text" being a methodological consequence of polemically contesting a 
repression of writing that has not occurred. Yet, as Derrida acknowledges, it is the polemic 
status of this repression, the "violent hierarchy" (Positions 41) to which it gives rise, which 
not only designates Plato the father of metaphysics 7 but which also justifies the polemos, the 
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"phase of overturning' that is the "general strategy of deconstruction" (Positions 41 ), that 
which defines the strategic exigency of the arche-trace: 
Of course, if there is polemos, and irreducible polemos, this cannot, in the 
final analysis, be accounted for by a taste for war, and still less for polemics. 
There is polemos when a field is determined as a field of battle because there 
is no metalanguage, no locus of truth outside the field, no absolute and 
ahistorical overhang. . . . As a result, those who are inscribed in this field are 
necessarily inscribed in a polemos, even if they have no special taste for war. 
There is a strategic destiny, destined to stratagem by the question raised over 
the truth ofthe field. (A Taste for the Secret 12) 
Derrida, therefore, must presuppose the repressive status of the text, one polemos, in order to 
justifY the strategic nature of the arche-trace, another polemos, and he must do so even as he 
utilises this strategy as a means of demonstrating the repressive status of the text. Clearly, 
such a pre-supposition, the affirmation of what one already knows, requires an unwavering 
confidence in the repressive nature of the metaphysical epoch, this being the structure which 
must be pre-supposed if it is to be deconstructed. That a figure as significant as Plato, the 
supposed inaugurator of this epoch, does not repress writing but rather recognises and freely 
submits to the irresolvable aporias to which writing exteriorises raises the possibility that 
Derrida's 'war' against logocentrism is misdirected. Derrida defines the age of metaphysics 
as " . . . the greatest totality . . . within which are produced, without ever posing the radical 
question of writing, all the Western methods of analysis, explication, reading, or 
interpretation" (Grarnmatology 46). Such a thesis rests on the assumption that the writing has 
been historically received as that which reveals the absence at/ of the origin, contesting 
metaphysical reality's 'rights to reality' and being repressed on this basis. Yet Derrida can 
only reveal that this is the case by succumbing to the strategic necessity of the arche-trace: 
that Plato is not subject to this necessity means that the text, for him, remains a mode of 
potentiality rather than an "ultra-transcendental text". Plato, therefore, does not need to 
repress the arche-trace by virtue of the fact that this theorem, on its own terms, cannot be 
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affirmed, the usurpation off at the origin consequently remaining as hypothetical as Socrates' 
mythological enactment of the advent of writing in the myth of Thamus. Indeed, as we have 
seen, his treatment of this myth can be seen as an exteriorisation of this arche-trace and of its 
status as a mere possibility. In asserting that Plato represses writing, therefore, Derrida is 
assuming that he is subject to the same methodological or polemical demands as the 
deconstructive critic, for it is only in refusing to succumb to the strategic demand of the 
arche-trace that Plato can be said to repress writing. Plato does not repress writing precisely 
because the text, as a mode of potentiality, does not make this strategic demand in the first 
place, the arche-trace being a mere possibility, the text's 'rights to reality' never finally being 
ratified. As Sean Burke points out (Death and Return of the Author 128-38 passim), if one 
considers the points within the "greatest totality" of the metaphysical epoch that Derrida 
does seize upon in order to reveal the universally repressive nature of this epoch, then the 
paucity of overt or significant instances of logocentrism becomes evident: we have Plato's 
Phaedrus, Rousseau's Essay on the Origin ofLanguages, Freud's "tiny" 'Note on the Mystic 
writing Pad, a footnote to Heidegger's Being and Time, a few remarks in Saussure's Course 
in General Linguistics. Such scarcity, of course, may reflect the universal nature of this 
repression, the assumption of the logos being so integral to the metaphysical thought that it 
does not need to be overtly defended. Yet, as our examination ofPlato suggests, such scarcity 
may also reflect the fact that Derrida, in unequivocally resolving the possibility which is the 
usurpation of the origin, transforming this possibility into a determined fact of writing, is 
revising the past, imposing this necessity of the arche-trace onto this epoch and thus 
retrospectively defining it as repressive. It is hardly, surprising, therefore, that the all-
encompassing nature of this repression is not reflected in the historical canon itself 
Similarly, that even post-structuralist precursors such as Nietzsche and Beckett do 
not, or cannot, unequivocally conform to the deconstructive tenet that there is no origin, 
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retaining this possibility and thus the text's status as a mode of potentiality, is suggestive of 
the manner in which the exigency of the arche-trace is peculiar to the deconstructive project 
rather than to textuality itself It must be recalled, however, that it is the exigency of the 
arche-trace, rather than the arche-trace, which peculiar to the deconstructive project, the 
possibility of the usurpation of the origin being undeniable even as it is irresolvable. The 
significance of this project, therefore, lies in the fact that it explores the consequences of one 
undeniable possibility that inhabits the text, and few would argue that Derridean theory (and 
one should note the implications of this word), in unfolding this possibility, has had a 
profound and frequently persuasive effect on our view of textuality. Yet as we have seen in 
the case of Derrida' s influence on Beckett studies, the problem with this theory of textuality 
is that it is frequently too persuasive, too all encompassing, frequently being transformed 
from a theory of writing to the unequivocal truth of writing. To impose this 'truth' onto the 
primary texts, or rather to unequivocally imply that this 'truth' defines textuality itself, is to 
not only to risk a closure in which excludes all that does not conform to this 'truth', rendering 
oneself blind to the dialectic possibilities of the primary text; it is also to risk the kind of 
critical stalemate which has been in place since the late 1960's, the impasse between an 
Anglo-American thought which is frequently regarded as paleocritical and conservative, and 
a French critical theory which is regarded as obfuscatory and logically incoherent. It is this 
impasse which has been mirrored in Beckett studies and which can be mirrored by the 
Beckettian text itself 
As our examination of Beckettian textuality has demonstrated, the nature of this 
impasse is, to some extent, artificial, it not being the case that the logocentric and anti-
logocentric poles of this argument are mutually exclusive; on the contrary, we have seen that 
for Beckett the nature of the logos in itself implies the possibility of its absence, even as the 
absence of the logos in itself implies the possibility of its presence: "It's not true, yes it's 
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true, it's true and it's not true, there is silence and there is not silence, there is no one and 
there is someone, nothing prevents anything" (Texts for Nothing 154). This is the significant 
point on which Beckett differs from Derrida and his historical delineation of the 
metaphysically reassuring role of the logos: unlike Derrida, Beckett does not allow such 
historicity to effect his view of textuality, recognising that it has no bearing on the actual role 
of this potentiality within the text. The notion of the logos, for Beckett, is far from reassuring, 
for any verifiable usurpation of the origin and the consequent ratification of the text's 'rights 
to reality' is no less of a mirage than the meaningful attainment of the logos itself, its 
apprehension as a transcendental signified. This is why the two poles in this debate, within 
the Beckettian text, are constantly locked in the dialectic between being and non-being, the 
dialectic that constitutes human existence. In this context, any attempt to promote one 
possibility over the other is fundamentally misguided, a distortion of the very problems that 
the Beckettian text embodies. The mode of potentiality which is language, incorporating the 
problematic which is writing, bestrides the space between both arguments, both possibilities, 
holding them in suspension in relation to each other even as the two can never truly be 
separated. That this remark also echoes the relationship between consciousness and writing 
in Plato and Nietzsche, their willingness to maintain the distance between the two even as 
they utilise their continuities, points to the equivocal role of writing in this paradigm: we can 
no more affirm or deny the relationship between the consciousness and writing, origin and 
supplement, than we can finally affirm or deny ourselves via the medium of language. It is, 
therefore, only in utilising the notion of potentiality that the two critical positions can be 
shown to complement each other, allowing for a simultaneous acceptance of both. The 
recognition of textuality as a mode of potentiality facilitates a common ground for discussion 
in the debates about that nature of reality, and our definitions of reality. To refuse this notion, 
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to absolutely deny either position in an act of interpretative closure, is not only to deny the 
validity ofBeckettian textuality, it is to deny our very mode of existence. 
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NOTES 
INTRODUCTION: WRITING AND TIIE RIGHTS OF REALITY 
1 A Treatise Concerning Human Understanding (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1998) passim. 
2 Subsequently published (1967) as "Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences" in 
Derrida's Writing and Difference ed. Alan Bass (London: Routledge, 1978) 351-70. 
3 Arche from the Greek arke - founding or controlling principle. The significance of writing, it should be noted, 
also suggests why it should be the literary theorist rather than the academic philosopher who attempts to elude 
the classical opposition between realism and idealism via recourse to textuality. 
4 In conversation, Derrida asserts that he feels "too close" to "write, sign, countersign performatively texts 
which 'respond' to Beckett" ("This Strange Institution" 60). 
5 For a wide-ranging view on Nietzsche's equivocal status in relation to contemporary theory see Nietzsche as 
Postmodemist: Essays Pro and Contra ed. C Koelb (Albany: State U of New York, 1990). 
6 The term 'post -structuralism', of course, was not in use at this point 
7 See Jean-Marie Benoist's The Structural Revolution (London: NLB, 1978). 
8 Descartes "Second Meditation" in Meditations on First Philosophy trans. Donald A Cress (Indianapolis: 
Hackett, 1980) 24-25. 
9 As Alex Callinicos asserts, for Derrida, " ... any attempt to halt the endless play of signifiers, above all by 
appealing to the concept of reference, must ... involve postulating a "transcendental signified" which is somehow· 
present to tl1e consciousness without any discursive mediation" (74). 
10 Derrida concisely captures the strategic nature of the arche-trace in his self-negating assertion that, 
"[m]eaning must await being said or written in order to inhabit itself, and in order to become, by differing from 
itself, what it is: meaning" ("Force and Signification" 11 ). The point of speech or writing, the usurpatory point 
at which meaning "differs from itself', entails that meaning, or the text, is already in place, the usurpation in 
question having always already (i.e. never) occurred; "Meaning must await ... ". 
11 The word supplement, it should be noted, not only indicates that which is an addition to the origin but also 
the compensation for the lack that is the origin. 
12 Alex Callinicos has argued that there are two variants of post-structuralist theory, a "worldly 
poststucturalism" (a term borrowed from Edward Said) which retains the distinction between the discursive and 
the non-discursive and, therefore, the possibility of a reality which is not subject to discursive mediation, and 
the "textualist post-structuralism" (a term borrowed from Richard Rorty) in which any reality can only be an 
effect of discourse. See Against Postmodernism (London: Polity, 1989) 68. As Jeremy Hawtl10rn points out 
( 181 ), post -structuralism in its textual or Derridean variant has had a far greater influence on literary studies that 
its "worldly" version. 
13 The most fatnous example of the kind of debate that is articulated between these positions is probably the 
1977 exchange between Derrida and John Searle on the question of intention in the philosophy of J.L Austin. 
See Derrida "Signature Event Context" (Glyph I 172-97), John R Searle "Reiterating the Differences" (Glyph I 
198-208) and Derrida "Limited Inc" (Glyph 11 162-51). 
14 
"Logocentrism is also, fundamentally, an idealism. It is the matrix of idealism. Idealism is its most direct 
representation, the most constantly dominant force. And the dismantling of logocentrism is simultaneously - a 
fortiori- a deconsWution of idealism or spiritualism in all their variants" (Positions 51). 
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CHAPTER ONE: THE QUESTION OF WRITING: PLATO, MYTH, AND THE ENCHANTMENTS OF 
REALITY 
1 In Dissemination trans. Barbara Johnson (London: Athlone P., 1981) 67-171. The original French version is 
in La Dissemination (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1972) 71-197 although this version was preceded by an early 
version published in Tel Que/32 and 33 (1968). 
2 My own references to Plato are taken from Plato: Complete Works, ed. John M. Cooper (Indiana: Hackett, 
1997). The translation of the Phaedrus in this edition is by Alexander Nehemas and Paul Woodruff. Derrida' s 
references to Plato in the original version of"Piato's Pharmacy" from Platon: Oevres Completes IV: Phedre, 2nd 
Edition, 1950. Barbara Johnson's translation of "Plato's Pharmacy" utilises The Collected Dialogues of Plato 
Bollingen Series LXXI., ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (Princeton, Princeton UP, 1961). 
3 Plato the Myth Maker, ed. and trans. Gerard Naddaf (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1998). 
'
1 Translation by Paul Woodruff in Plato: Complete Works ed. John M. Cooper (Indiana: Hackett, 1997). 
5 Such a breach has always been implicit to the oral tradition, the boundaries of selfltood giving way to a 
communal experience. 
6 One should compare this to Luc Brisson's formulation of the role of myth in Plato: " ... for Plato, myth .. .is a 
fonn of discourse which transmits all information that a community conserves in memory of its distant past and 
passes on orally from one generation to the next .... Myths offer replies to [their] questions, but they are replies 
which can only be set forth, for they tolerate neither questions nor explanations. Thus, a myth is never "myth" 
for the person who adheres to it. It only becomes a "myth" for those who consider it from the outside and who 
question its validity" (9). 
7 Gerard Naddaf, translator's introduction, Plato the Myth Maker, by Luc Brisson (Chicago: U of Chicago P) 
xxiii. 
~ This characterisation of writing in tenns of the rational logos is reminiscent of Karl Popper's delineation of 
writing as the third world: "We can call the physical world "world l," the world of our conscious experiences 
"world 2," and the world of the logical contents of books, libraries, computer memories, and suchlike "world 3" 
(Objective Knowledge 74). Popper also situates mathematics in this third world (138) and it is notable that 
Theuth is not only the god of writing, but of measuring and calculation (274d). 
9 References to this myth are common in classical literature and all of these enact her subsequent marriage and 
the birth of her twin sons Zetes and Callais. See Apollodorus Library of Greek Mvthology 3.15.2, Pausanias 
Description of Greece 1.19.5, Herodotus The Histories 7.189 and Ovid Metamorphoses 6.683. 
10 The Essentials of Psycho-Analysis, ed. Anna Freud and trans. James Strachey, (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 
1986) 218-68. 
1 1 Just as the mythological form of Thamus' arguments are irrelevant to their truth value. 
12 Is Phaedrus usurping the originary position of Lysias here, or is Lysias usurping the present position of 
Phaedrus? The undecideable nature of this question can be applied to the Platonic deconstruction ofDerrida, for 
Derrida also abdicates any responsibility for his own 'voice' in implying that his theory of writing is intrinsic to 
the text that he deconstructs (see Introduction 21-23). Is he usurping the originary text (as writing always 
already has) here or is the Platonic text usurping the contemporary figure of Derrida, erasing him into a play of 
tex1uality which re-states the authoritative figure ofPlato? 
13 Faust Mephistopheles I.iv. 
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14 Luc Brisson argues that Plato's myth of Atlantis in the Timaeus (17a-27c) is a self-consciously ironic pastiche 
of myth and its status as "unverifiable infom1ation" thus bearing comparison to the myth of Thamus (elato the 
Mvth Maker passim). 
15 As Socrates asserts in relation to the realm of forms: "What is in this place is without color and without shape 
and without solidity, a being iliat really is what it is, the subject of all true knowledge, visible only to the 
intelligence, ilie soul's steersman" (247c-d). 
16 Translation by Alexander Nehemas and Paul Woodruff in Plato: Complete Works ed. John M. Cooper 
(Indiana: Hackett, 1997). 
CHAPTER Two: THE POTENTIAL BODY AND 1HE BODY'S POTENTIALITY: THE USURPATION OF 
NIETZSCHE 
1 The Ear of the Other ed. Christie McDonald and Trans. Peggy Kamuf (Lincoln NE: U of Nebraska P) 1985. 
2 Quotations from Nietzsche which are not incorporated into to Derridean text are taken from Ecce Homo in The 
Basic Writings ofNietzsche ed. Waiter Kaufmann (New York: Random House) 1966. 
3 
"Roundtable on Autobiography" The Ear of the Oilier 41-89. 
4 
" ... life will be verified only at the moment the bearer of the name, the one whom we, in our prejudice, call 
living, will have died. It will be verified only at some moment after or during death's arrest" ("Otobiograhies" 
9). 
5 This paradigm, of course, also informs the reversal between cause and effect which defines Nietzsche's view 
of ilie will to knowledge, the notion of an impersonal view based on conventional notions of causation being 
supplanted by retrospective and inherently subjective process in which the philosopher derives tl1e premises of 
his thesis from the conclusion that he wishes to justify: " ... from the work to its author, from the deed to its doer, 
from the ideal to him who needs it, from every mode of thinking and valuing to the imperative want behind it" 
(The Joyful Wisdom 333-34). 
6 This assertion, of course, needs clarification: the only immediate bodily presence that writing requires is that 
oftl1e reader. 
7 Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1986). 
8 It should also be noted that tl1e totality involved here can be iliat of one's body or of one's life, these two 
factors being indistinguishable by virtue of ilie fact that one's subjective awareness can no more transcend its 
life, achieving an "afterworld", than it can transcend ilie body, achieving an "outside": in either case, ilie self 
cannot transcend tile presence which is tl1e self that this presence can be independently affirmed. 
9 In this respect tl1e Nietzschean paradigm also reflects Bartlles' "The Death of the Autllor". The author does not 
'exist' as an autllor until he writes, even as iliis is, simultaneously, the moment iliat he enters into his own death. 
Yet it is clear from this that the author has never existed, has never been born in order iliat he can die: however, 
it would, perhaps, be more accurate to assert that he has never been brought into existence in order that this 
existence can be contested, for it is precisely in tllis elusiveness that the concept of ilie author sustains itself, 
remaining a perpetual possibility which can never be fmally erased. As Nietzsche demonstrates, the tex1. itself 
can be seen as a manifestation of this possibility, this being the potentiality ofilie body in a dual sense; firstly in 
that it reflects tile body's inability to affirm its own existence (ilie body is a mere potentiality) and secondly in 
the sense that it is this inability which allows the body to realise itself, to fulfil its potentiality through writing. 
10 indeed, the manner in which Thamus is erotically utilised as a mask for the unspeakable self-identity of tl1e 
book or U1e object (incorporating ilie speaker who has abdicated responsibility over his own voice) bears 
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comparison to Nietzsche's utilization of Zarathustra as a mask (necessarily a mask) for the unspeakable self-
identity of the body. 
1 1 As Michael A. Sells asserts: "The authentic subject of [the apophatic] discourse slips continually back beyond 
each effort to name it or even to deny its nameability. The regress is harnessed and becomes a guiding semantic 
force, the dynamis, of a new kind of language" (2). As Nietzsche demonstrates, this sem<mtic force can be 
progressive as well as regressive, for he does not merely give credit to the body's existence, but to what the 
body will become at the point of death. 
12 In this light of the danger of textuaJiy referring to one's present 'actuality', rather than to the mask, the 
actuality of what one will become, is all too evident: this is why Nietzsche, or the body which is Nietzsche, is 
loathe to speak of its actuality, what it is rather than what it is becoming. Yet paradoxicaJiy Nietzsche cannot 
warn that this actual self should not be confused with his written self without referring to this 'reality': "Under 
these circumstances I have a duty against which my habits, even more the pride of my instincts, revolt at bottom 
- namely, to say: Hear me/ For I am such and such a person. Above all, do not mistake me for someone else" 
(673). 
13 Of course, one could equally assert that the body constitutes the bridge over which the textual enactment of 
this origin is 'carried', since the post-mortem breach between the body and signification, Nietzsche' s presence 
and its self recit, has yet to occur. 
14 As this redemptive process suggests, the mysterious actuality Nietzsche/ the body is not merely a "bridge to 
the overman" (Zarathustra 147) for as we have seen the body finally becomes the overman at the post-mortem 
point of redemption: the overman, or, indistinguishably, the body, overcomes himseljl itself, being both the 
means and the end, the bridge to the textual figure and the textual figure. Nevertheless, the writer has no end to 
himself because of his pre-mortem inability to apprehend his own physical presence, and his inability to be 
physically present at the post-mortem point of textual redemption: "There it was .. .that I picked up the word 
"overman" ... and that man is something that must be overcome- that man is a bridge and no end" (Zarathustra 
310). Nietzsche's actuality, his 'empirical' presence, thus constitutes the bridge to this textual figure, a bridge 
which can only be apprehended as it is redeemed by this textual figure: the actuality of this "illusive" bridge is 
never apprehended for it is constantly translated into that which is to come, into what is current~v an illusion, in 
the act of being overcome. 
15 One should note the Shakespearian allusion here: 
Who would fardels bear, 
To grunt and sweat under a weary life, 
But that the dread of something after death, 
The undiscover'd country, from whose bourn 
No traveller returns, puzzles the will, 
And makes us rather bear those ills we have 
Than fly to otJ1ers that we know not of? (Hamlet Act Ill Sc.l) 
As Nietzsche asserts, in contrasting the complacent acceptance of illusion as a present possibility as opposed to 
the future certain~v which defines one's actions in the process of becoming: " ... action requires veils of illusion: 
that is the doctrine of Hamlet, not that cheap wisdom of Jack the dreamer who reflects to much and, as it were, 
from an excess of possibilities does not get around to action. Not reflection, no - true knowledge, an insight into 
the horrible truth, outweighs any motive for action, both in Hamlet and in the Dionysian man" (The Birth of 
Tragedy 60). As Nietzsche asks in Ecce Homo: "Is Hamlet understood? Not doubt, certainty is what drives one 
insane. - But one must be profound, an abyss, a philosopher to feel that way. - We are all afraid of the trutJ1" 
(702). Similarly, the significance of Hamlet cannot be divined from tl1e words, for these words enact tJ1e 
superficiality of tlle present rather than tlle trutll of future, of the "undiscover' d country", merely revealing tJ1e 
characters' inability to apprehend the overall significance of the plot by virtue of tlleir current implication in tJ1e 
plot (as contrasted with the transcendental position of the chorus). The play's true significance lies in its totality 
and the actions, the becoming which leads to this totality and which is only wholly explicable in tllis 
transcendental context: for Greek poet's, "the myth does not at all obtain adequate objectification in tlle spoken 
word. The structure of the scenes and the visual images reveal a deeper wisdom than tlle poet himself can put 
into words and concepts: the same is also observable in Shakespeare, whose Hamlet, for instance, similarly, 
talks more superficially tllan he acts, so that the previously mentioned lesson of Hamlet is to be deduced, not 
from his words, but from a profound contemplation and survey of tlle whole" (The Birth of Tragedy 105). 
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CHAPTER THREE: ... HELL, I'VE CONfRADICTED MYSELF, No MATTER: BECKETT, ARISTOTLE 
AND 11-IE HYLOMORPHIC TEXT 
1 See Introduction 21-23. 
2 Typical and recent examples are Anthony Uhlmann Beckett and Post-structuralism (1999). Daniel Katz 
Saying I No More ( 1999) and Richard Begam Samuel Beckett and the End of Modernity (1996), although, as H. 
Porter Abbott has noted (Beckett Writing Beckett 24), this revaluation can be traced back as far as Angela B. 
Moorjani's Abysmal Games in the Novels of Samuel Beckett (1982). 
3 The breach in question being that between existential humanism or phenomenology and post-structuralism 
(Trezise ix). 
4 See Introduction 17-19. 
5 Benveniste's Problemes de Linguistique Gimerale was published in 1966: Barthes' "The Death of the Author" 
was written in 1968. 
6 I follow Benveniste here in defining 'discourse' as the semantic level of language, the meaning which is 
articulated via textuality. 
7 One is reminded of Derrida's conclusion that "[tjhe graphic image is not seen; and the acoustic image is not 
heard" (Grammatology 65) in the act of reading or hearing, our failure to be meaningfully conscious of the 
physical reality of discourse at the point of interpretation leaving nothing but a consciousness of what this 
discourse says, there being nothing (i.e. no graphic image/ no acoustic image) beyond the 'everything' which is 
the text and also no ""natural" hierarchy between the sound-imprint and the visual (graphic) imprint" 
(Grammatology 65). 
8 Aristotle Metaphysics 1046e 25-32. The edition used in this section is Aristotle Metaphysics trans. 
Hippocrates G. Apostle (Bloomington: Indiana UP) 1966. However, reference will occasionally and necessarily 
be made to the more lucid translation by Giorgio Agamben and Daniel Heller-Roazen in Potentialities ed. and 
trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford: Stanford UP) 1999. As well as exteriorising tlte Beckettian text's status 
as a mode of potentiality, this section simultaneously can be read as an application of Aga.mben's philosophical 
interpretation of Aristotle to Beckett or, conversely, a Beckettian interrogation of Agamben's view of 
Aristotelian potentiality . 
9 Metaphysics 1050b 10-12. 
10 See Ludwig Wittgenstcin The Wittgenstein Reader. Ed. Anthony Kenny (London: Blackwell, 1994). 
11 An allusion to Democritus: Murphy, for example, desires the peace which is attained "when the somethings 
give way, or perhaps simply add up, to Nothing, that which in the guffaw of the Abderite naught is more real" 
(Murphy 138). 
12 See Aristotle's Physics lll.i 201 alO-ll. 
13 
" ... the mutability of changeable things is itself capable of receiving ail forms into which mutable tltings can 
be changed. But what is this mutability? Surely not mind? Surely not body? Surely not the appearances of mind 
and body? If one could speak of a 'nothing something' or 'a being which is non-being', that is what I would 
say" (Confessions XI. vi). 
14 De Anima 430al. 
15 As in Nietzsche, whose Zarathustra, his textual self, is not yet actual but is already actual to him. Again, one 
can sec in this why Beckett frequently alludes to the imaginary status of language and thought, the word 
"imagine" denoting an image of that which is (possibly) not yet real, an image of a mind which does not yet 
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exist. Similarly, Zaratlmstra is an 'image' or an 'imagining' ofNietzsche's body, that which is (possibly) real 
but has not yet been installed witl1in the 'rights of reality' as Zarathustra. 
16 See the discussion of Plato's myth of the cicadas 75-78. 
17 The phrase is notoriously difficult to translate. I have used the translation 'thisness' since it is not only the 
commonest translation, but because it also expresses the indicative dimension to the tenn. As the text (Apostle 
1966) suggests, it has also been translated as 'whatness'. 
18 See Plotinus The Enneads, ed. Stephen Mackenna (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1992). 
19 Knowlson 109. 
20 This comparison, however needs to be qualified. To say that language itself cannot be appointed any formal 
meaning, or that it lacks the defining quality of 'thisness', is not to unequivocally assert that it lacks form or that 
it can simp~v be designated "unfonned matter". In the case of the "nothing something" which is language it is, 
ratl1er, that "a thing that was nothing had happened witl1 the utmost fonnal distinctness" (Watt 73). Language 
possesses a form which may be apparent but this form remains indefinable, lacking the quality of 'thisness': tllis 
is why the Beckettian narrator's words remain 'nothing' (or in Augustine's tenus a "notlling something") in 
spite of their form. Such a form, even as it is experienced, is unnameable, remaining meaningless even as it 
facilitates meaning. As in the case of Watt's "nothing something", his unnameable "pot", language itself cannot 
come into meaningful being and its form is not meaningfully experienced: "Watt had been frequently and 
exceedingly troubled, in his time, by this imperceptible, no, hardly imperceptible, since he perceived it, by tllis 
indefinable thing that prevented him from saying, with conviction, and to his relief, of the object that was so 
like a pot, that it was a pot ... " (Watt 79). This meaninglessness becomes apparent in the act of reading; during 
tllis act, one is not meaningfully conscious of the form of tile words tllat one is looking at but, rather, of the 
meaning wllich is articulated through that forn1. In other words, in apprehending the meaning of a word one is 
not meaningfully conscious that word's immediate form even as one experiences this form in purely sensory 
terms. Even if one was 'meaningfully' aware of language's formal characteristics one could not articulate this 
meaning without recourse to expression, what the word s~ys always being other to the fonnal apparency of the 
word itself. 
That the form of such language cannot be appointed tl1e quality of thisness tlms raises the question of 
whether such form can be validly said to exist in the absence of any meatlingful consciousness of that fonn. One 
could say that language possesses 'form' in much the same way that an unseen object possesses a 'form' (e.g. 
Watt's 'imperceptible' pot). Such an object is, in a sense, "unformed matter" by virtue oftl1e fact that its form 
has not been meaningfully recognised as a fonn (i.e. it is not a substance). The 'form' of such an object is not 
actual but is, like "unfonned matter", potential: in the same manner the Beckettian narrator has yet to speak, by 
virtue of his inability to existentially verify Ius own language, transfonning this language from a potentiality to 
an actuality, the 'form' of an unseen object exists in potentiality in that it has yet to be meaningfully verified, 
the object having yet to become actual. Like tl1e language of the Beckettian narrator, therefore, an unseen object 
is not a this since it does not exist in the "Intellectual Realm" (to recall Plotinus). Within the Beckettian text, 
therefore, language itself is like "unformed matter" in tllat is not a substance: in spite of its 'formal' 
characteristics it is unnameable, not being separable and it lacking the quality ofthisness (these qualities being 
reserved for the meaning which language articulates). 
This, in turn, raises the question of whetller an Aristotelian substance can be said to exist when it is not 
meaningfully present to a consciousness. Clearly, while a substance may be a definable this by virtue of its 
forn1, fonn itself is not enough to define it as a substance. This form also needs to be meaningfully present to a 
consciousness in order that it can actually be a this. We cannot define language (for example) as language 
unless it is present to a consciousness, unless its meaning has been actualised: being present to consciousness is 
what makes language what it is, this factor being part of its essence, and one could equally assert that this 
presence is part of the essence of substance itself, as is suggested by Berkeley's recognition tllat "esse est 
percipi". Aristotle, however, fails to recognise that his view of substance is a specifically human view, human 
cognition being necessary to appoint thisness to a substance tl1at it can actually be a substance. This is 
sy1nptomatic of Aristotle's pre-Cartesian viewpoint, his failure to distinguish between mind and externality 
(such a failure could be linked to Heidegger's rejection of Cartesian thought and his notion of 'being-in-the-
world'). Nevertheless, it should be noted that Aristotle's identification of thisness or substance with actuality 
continues to conform to Berkeley's tenet that the reality of sensible things consists in being perceived. 
Berkeley's rejection of the notion that existence is one thing, and perception is another clearly echoes 
Aristotle's belief tllat thisness is a precondition of actuality. Aristotle merely fails to appreciate the problem of 
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attributing thisness or form to an object which is not meaningfully present to consciousness, believing that such 
qualities can unproblematically be said to exist independently of our awareness of them. As Zeller points out. 
Aristotle attributes substance and thisness to the world rat11er tllan to man: 
The 'Forms' had for him ... a metaphysical existence of their own .... And keenly as he 
followed the growtl1 of ideas out of experience, it is none the less true that these ideas, 
especially at the point tllat tlley are farthest removed from experience and immediate 
perception, are metamorphosed in tile end from a logical product of human tllought into an 
immediate presentment of a supersensible world, and tl1e object, in that sense, of an 
intellectual intuition. (Aristotle Vol I, 204) 
As Bertrand Russell asserts in relation to tllis quotation: "I do not see how Aristotle could have found a reply to 
tllis criticism" (A History of Western Philosophy 179). 
21 
"We should not then inquire whether the soul and body are one thing, any more than whetller wax and its 
imprint are ... " (De Anima II.i). 
22 
" ... actuality is prior .. .in substance; and in one sense it is prior in time, but in anotller it is not" (Metaphvsics 
1049b 11-13). Aristotle does not explicitly elaborate this statement, but its sense is implicit in lite remark 
"matter exists potentially in view of tile fact that it might come to possess a form" ((Metaphysics 1050a 17). 
Matter already exists (it has temporal priority) yet has never become actual as matter (form has temporal 
priority). 
23 One is reminded ofNietzsche's/ Zarathustra's assertion tllat "[y]ou are going your way to greatness: here 
nobody shall sneak after you. Your own foot has effaced tile patl1 behind you, and over it tl1ere is written: 
impossibility" (Zarathustra 265). Nietzsche's body, tile possibility that he utilises in tile will to power, will 
never manifest itself as a substance, even on deatll. Like Aristotelian matter, it is an impossible possibility. 
24 As Juliet recollects: 
1 add that he has abandoned tile discourse in terms of the positive and preferred to rely on an 
approach based on tile negative. 
He takes me up on this: 
Negation is no more possible than affirmation. It is absurd to s~v that something is 
absurd. That's still a value judgement. It is impossible to protest, and equally impossible 
to assent. (165) 
Such remarks clearly problematise any delineation of Beckett' s work in terms of negation alone. Daniel Katz, 
for example. asserts that " ... notions of e:>.:pression are resolutely rejected in Beckett' s post-war prose" ( 1) this 
being reflected in tl1e title of her work Saying I No More. Beckett can no more reject the obligation to express 
tl1an he can tl1an he can resolve this obligation, this work always being resolutely equivocal. 
25 
"Now matter is potentiality, and form is actuality, and this in two ways, one that in which knowledge, tile 
other tl1at in wllich contemplation, is actuality" (De Anima Il.i). 
26 Metaphysics 1047a 24-26. 
27 
" ... this is not an alteration- since here tllere is the gift of the self to itself and to actuality [ epidosis eis auto]". 
28 The significance of this lecture, and this remark, on Beckett' s work has been noted by all three of Beckett' s 
autobiographers (Bair 221, Knowlson 616, Cronin 221). 
29 Lawrence E. Harvey Samuel Beckett: Poet and Critic (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1970). 
30 Beckett's theory of tile text, unlike Nietzsche's, does not require tlte body: it is simply tl1at it cannot escape 
this possibility. 
31 One should note tile ambiguity which inhabits the quotation: when tile narrator says, "I greatly fear, since my 
speech can only be of me and here, that I am once more engaged in putting an end to both" we are prompted to 
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ask whether he is speaking of"putting an end to" "me and here" or whetl1er he speaking of"putting an end to'· 
both "my speech" and "me and here", as is suggested by his return to the beginning. Clearly, tllis return to tl1e 
beginning implies that botll his speech is undone, and tlle possibility of actualising tl1e origin via speech is 
undone, neitller speech nor the origin having been installed within the rights of reality. 
32 One should note that one possible etymology of the name 'Mahood' is the word 'Manhood', the absence of 
the 'n' enacting man's! the Unnamable's inability to name himself, thus bringing himself into being or 
actualising himself. The Unnamable like, Molloy, aspires to be "a man, a fortiori myself' (MQ!1Qy 11 ), yet he is 
incessantly 'Un-able' to completely 'nam[e]' himself. 
33 
"Pi - ... an irrational number (one that cannot be expressed as a simple fraction or as a decimal with a finite 
number of decimal places) and a transcendental number (one witllout continuously recurrent digits)" 
(Encyclopaedia Britannica CD-ROM). 
34 
"Conm10n approximations to pi are 22/7 and 3.14, altllough tlle value 3 can be used as a rough 
approximation" (Hutchinson New Century Encyclopedia) 
35 It is notable that elsewhere in this interview, Beckett refers to this "mess" as "this buzzing 
confusion" (218), a phrase which also occurs in Murphy: Neary asserts, '"Murphy, all life is figure and ground.' 
'But a wandering to find home,' said Murphy. 'The face,' said Neary, 'or system offaces, against the big 
blooming buzzing confusion. I think of Miss Dwyer"' (7). The phrase was coined by the psychologist William 
lames in order to describe the manner in which a new-born child visualises the world before it learns to 
perceptually divide it into discrete objects (Westen 504), and thus describes pure sensory experience. This is 
what Beckett means when he describes it as 'invading' our experience. As we shall see, this paradigm recurs 
throughout the Trilogy and is particularly relevant to Moran's narrative. 
36 In speech, of course, there are no letters, merely phones ("The smallest perceptible + discrete+ segment of 
speech sound" (Crystal 427)), and the phoneme ("The smallest contrastive unit in tlle sound system of a 
language" (Crystal 427)) is therefore the lexeme ("The smallest contrastive unit in a semantic system" (Crystal 
424)). Phonemes, however, do not exist in writing in the strictest, material sense, (even if we class them as 
syllables), which merely consists of letters and words ('The smallest unit of grammar that can stand alone as a 
complete utterance" (Crystal 433) "The simplest- if not the original-linguistic formation is the single word" 
(lngarden Literary Work of Art 35}). Beckett constantly seems to allude to words as though they are phonemes: 
"In a word, shall I be able to speak of me ... ?" (Unnamable 305): "In a word there seems to be the light of the 
outer world ... " (Mal one 221 ): "I told him to go and wash himself, to straighten his clothes, in a word, to get 
ready to appear in public" (Molloy 94). Tllis tends to suggest that tlle narrator cannot meaningfully divide tlle 
word into anything other than more words, which indicates his scriptural status. This process is analogous to tlle 
manner in which, in attempting to grasp himself as a singular, meaningful unit, he merely supplements himself. 
37 Roman Ingarden asserts that the highest unit can be either the sentence or the text: " ... botll views ... are correct 
and are not contradictory ... One may observe the whole either in its 'beconling' as it arises from subjective 
operations, or as something already complete, which we can apprehend solely by understanding the individual 
sentences contained in it" (The Literary Work of Art 146). Beckett's text, of course, gradually moves towards a 
conflation of both which, as we shall see, suggests a movement towards textual homogeneity. Since the reader 
has the text before them, they cannot escape an awareness of its totality and, even if tlle sentence is tlle llighest 
unit in the reading experience, the apprehension tlle whole text, as a unit of meaning is the teleological end of 
this experience. 
38 lngarden asserts that the reader and the material text botl1 lie beyond the meaning of the literary structure: 
" ... tl1e attributes, experiences, or psychic states of the reader do not belong to the structure of t11e work" (The 
Literary Work of Art 23): "The print does not belong to the elements of the literary work of art itself but merely 
constitutes its physical foundation. ... The printed signs are not grasped in their individual physical fonn but 
rather... as ideal types" (The Cognition ofthe Literary Work of Art 14-15). One is prompted to ask what "ideal 
type" the comma represents since as lngarden asserts: '"punctuation marks' ... according to tl1eir function, are 
nothing other than various dependent, functional words" (The Literary Work of Art 108). 
39 
"Writing, the letter, the sensible inscription, has always been considered by Western tradition as the body and 
matter external to the spirit, to breatl1, to speech, and to tlle logos" (Derrida GrailiDlatology 35). 
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40 Henri Bergson Matter and Memory trans. Nancy Margaret Paul and W. Scott Palmer (London: Allen and 
Unwin, 1911). As John Pilling (7) and Anthony Cronin (127) have pointed out, Beckett lectured on Bergson at 
Trinity College, Dublin, in the early 1930s. 
CONCLUSION: THE EXIGENCY OF 11-IE ARCHE-TRACE AND THE EXIGENCY OF 11-IE LOGOS 
1 Burke is specifically referring to the question of the disappearance of the Author here, but such a 
disappearance is, of course, a consequence of the arche-trace. 
2 Derrida, of course, admits that the usurpation of the origin is hypothetical in the sense that tbis usurpation is 
merely posited as a means of demonstrating that there has never been an origin in the first place. Yet, as Beckett 
is aware, an inability to verify any such usurpation always leaves the origin in place as a possibility. the 
immanent status of the text also being a mere hypothesis. 
3 As we have seen, to do so in the case of Nietzsche is to remove any possibility of redemption, rendering the 
subject "[p]owerless against what has been done ... an angry spectator of all that is past. The will cannot will 
backwards ... he cannot break time and time's covetousness" (Zarathustra 251). 
4 Tbis also recalls the myth of Orpheus, whose head continues to sing in spite of the dismemberment of his body 
by the Maenads. lhab Hassan, in emphasising the continuities between modernism and post-modernism, enacts 
the heroism of modernism as the moment of surrender itself, the willingness of the writer to escape the 
ideological constraints of metaphysics and bistory as they succumb to the dismembennent wbich is language, a 
masculinist heroism wbich he articulates through the myth of Orpheus. Nevertheless, he acknowledges that 
"[t]he cults that we associate with bis name blend word and flesh into the dance of existence" (5) tbis being the 
reason why "[t]he singing body of Orpheus holds ... a contradiction-between the dumb unity of nature and the 
multiple voice of consciousness ... " ( 6). In speaking of the writer's exile, specifically of Beckett, Hassan asserts 
that "(a)ll exiles, Henry Miller reminds us in bis book about Rimbaud, exile themselves from the world's body. 
the mother's flesh" (213). Yet the instances in which the mother, who Hassan identifies not only with history, 
but also with matter, remains the elusive object of desire in modernist literature belies the kind of heroism 
wbich Hassan claims for the modernist: the journey of Beckett 's Molloy, for example, only occurs as a desire 
for the mother, reminding one more of a headless chicken than a heroically disembodied lyricist. Other 
references to the myth of Orpheus are pertinent here, Elizabeth Sewell, for example: "Language and mind, 
poetry and biology meet and bear on one another in the figure of Orpheus .... The human organism, that body 
which has the gift of thought, does not have the choice of two kinds of thinking. It has only one, in which the 
organism as a whole is engaged all along the line" (5, 19). Similarly, " ... whereas the older poet. .. knew and 
acknowledged mediation, the modern either does not acknowledge or does not know a mediator for his orpbic 
journey. He passes through experience by means of the unmediated vision. Nature, the body, and human 
consciousness-that is the only text" (Geoffrey Hartman The Unmediated Vision 155). 
5 In this respect. Beckett and Plato differ from Nietzsche, who is less interested in utilising writing as a means 
of performatively revealing the potentiality wbich is the origin (and thus the status of consciousness) than he is 
in utilising this potentiality in the process of self-overcoming. With Nietzsche, the emphasis is on discontinuity, 
the breach between the origin and its representation, for he insists that "I am one thing, my writings are another 
matter ... " (Ecce Homo 715). Nietzsche utilises the possibility of the usurpation that writing affords as a means 
of facilitating his redemption as the textual figure that he desires, even as he maintains that there can be no de 
facto usurpation in his own (potential) presence. This is why Nietzsche relies on the reader to finally verify this 
tex1ual figure's post-mortem "right to reality", a fact which simultaneously means that this usurpation cannot be 
verified, there being no verifiable usurpation in the absence of any origin to usurp; the textual self now 
constitutes the only reality that Nietzsche has ever had: "To redeem those who lived in the past and to turn every 
'it was' into a 'thus I willed it'- that alone should I call redemption" (764-65). Nevertheless, even as Nietzsche 
lives the arche-trace, the translation of the origin into that which has never been, he retains the potentiality 
which is the origin, the '"it was'" which is opposed to the '"thus I willed it"'. 
6 One could argue that tbis dichotomy between absence and immanence, liberation from and enslavement to the 
origin is a specifically modernist characteristic of these writers. This dichotomy, for example, is replicated in 
Woolf's To the Lighthouse: Lily Briscoe, in another utilisation of the maternal figure as a symbol of 
metaphysical reassurance, desires to logocentrically attain the matriarchal figure of Mrs Ramsey, a figure who 
272 
symbolises the unity of the origin, a unity that Lily cannot attain: "What device for becoming. like waters 
poured into one jar, inextricably the same, one with the object one adored? ... for it was not knowledge but 
unity that she desired, not inscriptions on tablets, nothing that could be written in any language known to 
men ... " (57). Meaning, however, is constantly caught at the point of liminality, not merely by virtue of one's 
inability to attain this unity, but by virtue of the fact tl1at this unity is inescapable, for Lily cannot liberate 
herself from the immanence of Mrs Ramsey's presence in order that she (Mrs Ramsey or Lily Briscoe) can 
become a meaningful presence: even when Mrs Ramsey is deceased, Lily still remains caught in the chain of 
desire, as is demonstrated by the effect of her painting: "Here she was again, she thought, stepping back to look 
at it, drawn ... into the presence of this formidable ancient enemy of hers-this other thing, tl1is truth, this reality, 
which ... emerged stark at the back of appearances ... " (172). That Lily is, again, "drawn .. .into the presence" of 
tl1is object by virtue of her "stepping back to look at it" is suggestive of the double-bind in which the apparent 
liberation from the origin simply restates the object of desire which one cannot transcend, an object which one 
always appears to be liberated from by virtue of the fact that one is constantly inapprehensibly in its presence. 
Analogously, one could say that the object of desire is that from which one never escapes by virtue of the fact 
that one is always liberated from it, a liberation which reiterates the desire to attain it, as desire becomes a 
constant signifier for one's awareness that this object has always already been silently attained: for Lily cannot 
fulfil her desire for unity with Mrs Ramsey by virtue of the fact this desire signifies tl1e manner in which she is 
already captured by Mrs Ramsey's immanent, tl10ugh inapprehensible, presence: "Was it wisdom? Was it 
knowledge? Was it, once more, the deceptiveness of beauty, so that all one's perceptions, half-way to truth, 
were tangled in a golden mesh?" (57). 
7 
" ... what seems to inaugurate itself in Western literature with Plato will not fail to re-edit itself at least in 
Rousseau, and then in Saussure" ("Plato's Pharmacy" 158). 
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